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Abstract
This thesis models negotiations over U.S. subfederal economic policies that 
conflict with international norms. It analyses a recent case of a U.S. state government 
bargaining with foreign entities over a subfederal economic regulation which violated 
international norms: California’s system of worldwide combined unitary taxation.
The thesis applies Stopford and Strange’s framework of state-firm bargaining to 
the subfederal level by: 1) determining which actors were involved in lobbying to change a 
U.S. state economic policy which violated international norms, California’s unitary tax 
method; 2) determining the actors’ policy agendas; 3) determining the different types of 
political and economic assets each actor possessed, and how effectively the actors used these 
assets to achieve their policy agendas; 4) determining how effectively the actors used 
various channels of negotiation to influence California’s policy, and; 5) determining the 
most effective uses of assets and negotiating channels, key initiatives which influenced the 
outcome of the policy debate.
What happens when U.S. state economic regulations conflict with international 
norms? What capabilities do states possess to defend their regulations when bargaining in 
the international arena? This thesis will argue that in the case of California’s unitary tax, the 
following hypotheses are valid:
1) Poweful U.S. states such as California can maintain regulatory standards at 
odds with federal and international norms. Growing global economic interdepence is not 
eliminating California’s regulatory options, since the U.S. federal government often 
refuses to effectively constrain powerful states which violate federal and international 
norms.
2) U.S. state governments can bargain directly with foreign governments and 
multinational enterprises as actors in the international arena. As the international arena 
increasingly intrudes on the affairs of subfederal governments, the U.S. federal
2
government will not always be the preeminent negotiating channel for international actors 
seeking to influence U.S. economic policies.
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Chapter 1; Introduction
1) Research problem
While International Relations (IR) theorists have begun to recognise the existence 
of U.S. states as players in the international economic arena, their ability to negotiate with 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) over economic policies is seen as significantly limited 
by the traditional dominance of the U.S. national government in foreign relations.1 
Presumably, federal political and legal constraints would combine with internal 
competition between U.S. states for investment to prevent U.S. subfederal governments 
from imposing economic policies which would deter the mobile capital controlled by 
MNEs.
However, the U.S. federal government has often judged it politically expedient to 
allow state governments free rein in formulating economic policies which conflict with 
national government policies. Under the country’s constitution, U.S. state governments 
are allowed a great deal of independence and hold much of the law-making power to 
regulate and attract economic activity. U.S. states have been active in attracting MNEs to 
their jurisdictions through economic incentive packages,2 and several U.S. state 
legislatures have issued political statements on international issues or imposed state-wide 
economic sanctions against MNEs doing business in international hotspots.3
At the same time, the blanket presumption of a race to the regulatory bottom by 
U.S. state governments eager to attract international investment assumes a homogeneity 
of state interests and attractiveness to investors. Although states often strive towards more 
uniform regulations to ensure their local jurisdiction’s competitiveness in the global 
marketplace, all jurisdictions have needs besides maximising economic return: such needs 
ensure the survival of corporate regulation at the local level.4
20
The economic regulatory policies of U.S. state governments have increasing 
worldwide repercussions with the growth of international trade and investment within 
state jurisdictions, since U.S. state governments control relatively large economies which 
cannot easily be ignored by MNEs.5 At the same time, multinational enterprises are 
becoming more “statesmanlike” as they seek to enhance their ability to compete for world 
market share.6 Companies can legally protest state regulations before state governments, 
the U.S. federal government, U.S. courts, or international organisations, and companies 
headquartered outside of the United States can draw on their home governments to protest 
subfederal economic policies. This can lead to negotiations between U.S. federal and state 
governments, between the U.S. federal government and foreign governments, between 
foreign national governments, and between various actors over judicial strategies. The 
increase in international economic interactions at the U.S. subfederal level has thus 
multiplied the number of actors and channels which influence U.S. state economic 
policies.
This thesis will begin the process of modeling negotiations over U.S. subfederal 
economic policies which conflict with international norms. Although every policy debate 
will have anomalies and distinct interest groups which participate based on the issues 
under dispute, fixed dimensions to international negotiations over U.S. state economic 
policies can be laid out. These dimensions differ from those present in traditional 
negotiations between national governments and MNEs over economic policies. Economic 
interdependence theorists have generally focused on changes in the international system, 
and paid less attention to the accompanying transformations in foreign policy processes. 
This paper will attempt to examine the operation of U.S. states in the international 
political economy by looking at newly evolving modes of negotiation over subfederal 
economic policies.
2) The issue examined
This thesis will examine a recent case of a U.S. state government bargaining with
foreign entities over an economic regulatory policy which violated international norms:
California’s system of worldwide combined unitary taxation. This tax method, used in
21
California since the early 1960s, applies a standard formula to apportion the income of a 
multinational enterprise among the different tax jurisdictions in which it operates.
California’s unitary tax method became an international issue because of the 
method’s extraterritorial reach into foreign tax jurisdictions. In addition, although 
California applied the regulation equally to MNEs and companies which operated only 
within the United States, the tax method had a much greater effect on MNEs than on 
purely domestic companies, since MNEs had part of their profits taxed by foreign 
governments which used the competing arm’s length standard (ALS) of taxation. Since 
there is no overarching international mechanism to make sure a company is not double- 
charged on its profits by different tax jurisdictions, MNEs operating in California claimed 
they frequently paid money to two different tax authorities on one set of profits.
California's unitary tax system conflicted with both U.S. national policy and 
America’s bilateral international tax agreements. Despite the extraterritorial implications 
of the state’s policy, California was not directly bound by international agreements which 
promulgated the alternative ALS taxation method, and no enforceable international tax 
regime existed to curtail the state’s use of the unitary method. In addition, the nature of 
U.S. federalism, along with California’s clear political and economic priorities, powerful 
economy, and strong political position within the United States, led the national 
government to refrain from outlawing the method.7
However, California’s use of the unitary tax method was challenged by the U.S. 
federal government, foreign governments, international organisations, and both foreign 
and domestic-domiciled MNEs. As a result of these pressures, and in the face of the 
state’s growing dependence on the world economy, California modified its unitary tax 
method in both 1986 and 1993. The state ultimately changed its tax method to accord 
with international norms in order to remain an attractive destination for international trade 
and investment as California grew more dependent on out-of-state trade and investment. 
However, the state had enough power to modify its regulations in the manner most 
advantageous to it: initially, California maintained the right to overturn a company’s 
decision to file under the alternative ALS method and charged a fee to companies which
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did so; in 1993, despite eliminating these restrictions, California maintained the principle 
that the state had the right to apply the unitary tax method, avoiding the payment of back 
taxes under a legal decision at a time when California was suffering financially.
The California unitary tax issue is the most prominent recent case of a subfederal 
jurisdiction clashing with MNEs over economic regulations which focused primarily on 
promoting subfederal economic welfare. California is a powerful state, and the debate 
over its tax method was lengthy, complex, and appealed to the highest levels of 
arbitration. It is important to examine and understand the debate which took place over 
this issue. Through looking qualitatively at this case, and examining its dynamics, this 
thesis hopes to sketch out how international actors can influence U.S. state economic 
policies which conflict with international norms, even those put forth by very powerful 
states.
Since only one case is being examined, it is equally important to state what the 
thesis will not do: it will not attempt to draw general conclusions on how international 
actors influence U.S. state economic policies, or even to draw general conclusions on how 
international actors influence U.S. state laws which conflict with international norms. The 
operation of international economic forces at the subfederal level is an important new 
field of research where little work has been done. This case study will contribute to the 
examination of international relations at the subfederal level by collecting and analysing 
data related to the policy debate over California’s unitary tax method. Further, it will 
provide an original contribution to the field of international political economy by 
applying state-firm bargaining theory to the subfederal level.
3) Locating the issue in the theoretical realm
Despite agreement among many political economists that interdependence has 
sapped the power of the nation-state and permeated domestic structures,8 the roll call of 
actors who are recipients of this disseminated power almost never includes subfederal 
governments. Latouche (1988) claims that some non-state actors (MNEs, labour 
associations, and nongovernmental organisations [NGOs]) have dominated IR theory at
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the expense of others (states, regions, and cities). On the rare occasions that U.S. state 
governments are included in the roll call of international actors, they have been grouped 
with MNEs and NGOs as transnational actors, leading most of the academic work to 
focus on the states’ trade and investment promotion efforts overseas, and ignoring their 
importance as domestic market regulators of international interactions.
Yet political economists have realised that domestic structures are critical to 
understanding different national policy responses to interdependence.9 Economic matters 
have traditionally been a key area of concern for local authorities, and the 
internationalisation of economic production means a growing number of local 
jurisdictions contain businesses dependent upon the international market for survival. At 
the same time, rising interdependence means that international economic events 
increasingly impact ‘ordinary people’ who need the support mechanisms provided by 
subnational governments, since traditional channels of statecraft are often ill-equipped to 
deal with economic matters.10
The subnational units most often cited as examples of this new international activism 
exist in Western federalist democratic countries (the U.S., Canada, Australia, Switzerland, 
and Germany). If there is already a division of authority between national and regional 
governments, international activism will come much more naturally to subnational 
authorities. Subnational governments in federal democracies hold much of the law-making 
power to regulate and attract economic activity.
Scheiber, Soldatos, and Kline point out that U.S. state intervention in international 
economic matters has long historical antecedents: “the role of federated and other 
subnational units in external relations is not new”.11 Sporadic disputes that challenged the 
national government’s treaty enforcement powers over the states occurred through the 
early 1800s, “such as South Carolina’s imprisonment of black British sailors in
contravention of a bilateral commercial convention and its declared nullification of a
10national tariff as applied within the state’s borders”. Taking the long view from the 
early nineteenth century, Scheiber argues that the U.S. legal and governmental system has 
always had an elaborate mosaic of economic policies at the state level representing each
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state’s distinctive economic interests. “As a working system, United States
federalism.. .has left enormous room for intervention by the states with respect to
1 ^economic institutions and policies”.
While most paradiplomacy theorists recognize that examples of U.S. states being 
able to interact directly with the international arena have occurred throughout the history 
of the United States, they argue that, starting in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
increase in international economic transactions in the U.S. domestic economy brought 
about a qualitative shift in U.S. states’ interest in and ability to bargain in the international 
arena.14 Paradiplomacy theorists agree that expanding U.S. state international 
involvement during this period resulted from “the growing impact of international 
economic forces on the domestic economy”15 in the late 1960s as “(i)ntrastate 
actors.. .reacted to systemic changes at the level of the nation-state and the emergence of 
an increasingly interdependent world by becoming directly involved internationally”.16 
The growth in overseas involvement was seen by U.S. states as “essentially...an 
extension of traditional state economic development efforts to reflect the new importance 
of international factors in the U.S. domestic economy”.17
This greater involvement has occurred on two levels. Qualitatively, subfederal 
jurisdictions more frequently deploy their own channels and spend substantial amounts of 
their own financial resources to pursue their foreign-policy objectives. Quantitatively, the 
“external activity of federated units.. .is unprecedented.. .in that its pace has accelerated 
as it has become increasingly wide in scope...and in relationships (measured by volume 
of interaction and by number of partners)”.18
Fry claims that the end of the Cold War, and the accompanying shift in U.S. 
foreign policy priorities towards economic issues, further accelerated the involvement of 
U.S. subfederal units in the international arena. “Foreign direct investment in the U.S. 
increased over 400 percent from 1983 to 1993”.19 U.S. exports as a proportion of GDP 
increased 50 percent from 1984 to 1988,20 and state appropriations for international trade 
promotion programs increased 260 percent21 From 1984 to 1989, the number of state 
overseas trade offices more than doubled, from 56 to 132.22
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The states’ increased involvement in international trade and investment has 
translated into increased concern over U.S. involvement in international trade treaties and 
economic agreements. “The states’ international activities also lead to a greater number of 
direct contacts with foreign government officials, adding a public officeholder dimension 
to the multiplying channels of private sector communications”.23 Of course, there is 
obviously a fairly wide variation in the resources individual states can devote to 
international trade and investment promotion, and in the amount of a state’s gross product 
which is dependent on international economic activity. California, Florida, New Jersey, 
and New York are among the most prominent state players in the international arena.
At the same time, the increase in foreign direct investment in the U.S. over the 
course of the 1980s resulted in the increased application of state regulatory processes to a 
growing number of foreign companies investing in the U.S.24 Scheiber argues that it is the 
increased reliance of the states on the international economy, and the consequent 
increased importance in the states’ regulatory roles in taxation, antitrust, environment, 
and other policy fields, rather than the mere increase in U.S. state offices abroad, which 
has truly allowed states to bargain in the international arena.
Each U.S. state has its own distinct combination of natural resources, labour, 
corporation, taxation, and general regulatory policies, including environmental, product 
liability, and antitrust regulations 25 Many U.S. states are developing their own industrial 
policies, providing export aid, low-interest loans, technical assistance, and extensive 
investment incentives. By using their regulatory and industrial powers, state governments 
create a climate within their jurisdictions that encourages or discourages various types of 
international economic transactions, including trade, tourism and investment. States also 
implement and enforce provisions of U.S. federal law, including international treaties and 
trade agreements 26
U.S. states have also used their regulatory powers to project economic policies 
which serve political goals into the international arena. In an attempt to serve as a model 
for other jurisdictions, local and state finance officers pressured Swiss banks to respond to
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claims made by Holocaust victims and their heirs; the state of Massachusetts passed 
economic sanctions against Burma; state governments established penalties against 
companies participating in the Arab boycott of Israel in the mid-1970s; and 150 U.S. state 
and local governments passed economic sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s.27 
When state and local governments are motivated by political concepts relating to justice 
and human rights, not enhancing the economic welfare of their citizens, subfederal 
activity may pose a clearer infringement on a federal government’s foreign policy 
authority 28 Although this thesis will examine examples of recent state economic 
sanctions in its concluding chapter, it will focus on California’s unitary tax method as an 
example of international negotiations over a subfederal policy issue where the primary 
intent of the policy was to promote the state’s economic welfare 29
Braithwaite and Drahos believe this type of action on the part of states can be 
effective since the globalization of regulation and legal systems is often achieved by 
observational learning through a process they describe as ‘modeling’. A model is a 
“conception of action that is put on display...symbolically interpreted and copied”,30 and 
modeling is patterned according to configurations of power.31 However, Braithwaite 
points out that “(t)hose imputed low status by a dominant power can choose to solve their
^9status problem by creating new status systems that invert the hegemonic status system”.
In this regard, U.S. states can be seen as an example of Braithwaite’s ‘model mongers’, 
actors that experimentally float oppositional models. “Because states are not unitary in a 
way that realist theory supposes, it is possible for weak actors to enroll the power of 
embattled minority fractions of powerful states in ways that can be transformative”.33 
Persistent application of this strategy can eventually draw out contradictions in the 
dominant model for transfer pricing regulation, the arm’s length model. “Once 
oppositional models have currency, they become a resource for drawing out 
contradictions in the identities propagated by majoritarian models”34 and creating a 
minority constituency for the oppositional model, in this case the unitary tax.
The nature of U.S. federalism limits a straightforward imposition of international 
or federal law on U.S. state economic regulations. The division of authority between 
federal and subfederal governments is often gray, particularly in the economic arena,
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providing leeway for subfederal units to act internationally.35 Duchacek refers to the 
intertwining of national and subfederal actors in a "marbled diplomacy" where functions 
are mixed and both sides search for some type of cooperation. Indeed, the U.S. national 
government appears willing to accept a greater state role in defining investment and trade 
opportunities, with the notion that more localised governments have a greater 
understanding of opportunities for specific businesses. In turn, U.S. states have come to 
regard market regulation as within their policy domain, and resent having this power 
modified by the federal government.
Although the U.S. Constitution clearly gives the federal government 
predominance in foreign affairs, in practice, states often engage directly with the 
international economic system to promote their jurisdiction’s economic welfare. “In 
effect, there is a major difference in the U.S. system between what is constitutionally
Y j
permissible and politically expedient". U.S. courts have not always used their power to 
overturn state laws which potentially conflict with federal regulations or international 
treaties, instead ruling that only congressional laws which specifically contradict state law 
can override state economic policies. This judicial view has resulted in increased 
lobbying of the U.S. Congress by both state and business interests, which has proved 
reluctant to preempt state interests. The United States’ accession to international 
economic policy agreements have been followed by broad exceptions for state policies in 
the U.S. legislation which implements these agreements into U.S. law.
Such weak legal constraints have led some theorists to propose the use of “soft 
law” practices for regulating U.S. state activity in the international economic arena. Soft 
law consists of “politically agreed guidelines for behaviour which cannot be directly 
legally enforced but cannot either be legitimately infringed”,38 and encompasses such 
areas as voluntary agreements and codes of conduct, as opposed to formal treaties. The 
construction of a complex maze of regulatory networks often occurs through direct
<jg
interactions between officials with professional knowledge of a specific subject.
Duchacek states that “(I)n contrast to domestic law, in international relations...no 
common superior authority can be invoked in case of violation. Yet...such unenforceable 
bargains are generally observed, since both sides continue to have a very similar interest
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in preserving the assumed advantage assured by the initial bargain".40 Further, “economic 
competition is itself a co-ordinative and regulatory mechanism" 41 Thus, the ‘unseen 
hand’ of the market-place can be seen as a form of soft law. Indeed, despite California’s 
unusually strong power for a subfederal unit, at the end of the debate over its unitary tax 
method, the state made the same calculations as countless national governments before it, 
and decided that a short-term revenue loss from dropping unpopular regulations was 
outweighed by the long-term potential of increased investment from its adherence to 
international norms.
4) Modeling paradiplomacy
Subfederal activism in the international arena is a new area of study, with few 
theorists in either International Relations or comparative federalist studies 42 Most 
academic work has concentrated on either central-regional government coordination of 
external relations or economic development models for subnational units 43 It is only 
recently that this new level of international activism has been given the label 
‘paradiplomacy’.
"The term paradiplomacy...refers to direct international activity by subnational 
actors...supporting, complementing, correcting, duplicating, or challenging the nation­
state's diplomacy; the prefix 'para' indicates the use of diplomacy outside of the traditional 
nation-state framework".44 Since subnational international activity, in advanced 
industrialised countries, tends to focus on economic issues, as a result of both budgetary 
constraints and ideological considerations, paradiplomacy has relied more on private 
actors than traditional statecraft.45 It is therefore often more functionally targeted than 
conventional state diplomacy, and more experimental.46
However, the external relations of subfederal jurisdictions are like national foreign 
policies in many ways, in that subfederal units create institutions to fulfill their policy 
objectives by maintaining international links, conducting international transactions, and 
even concluding agreements with foreign actors 47 Of course, subfederal units do not 
always act completely outside the parameters of national foreign policies 48 Subfederal
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governments can build on the existing channels and content of national foreign policies, 
but use them to further their particular interests. Duchacek concludes that "If by 
diplomatic negotiation we mean processes by which governments relate their conflicting 
interests to the common ones, there is, conceptually, no real difference between the goals 
of paradiplomacy and traditional diplomacy. Both sides pledge a certain mode of future 
behaviour on the condition that the opposite side act in accordance with its promise".49
Duchacek finds two models can be used to examine the phenomenon of 
paradiplomacy:
1) The Chenos Paradigm, which shows the nation-state as a univocal actor 
speaking to foreign governments with a single voice, that of the executive branch. The 
Chepos Paradigm is modeled below in Figure 1. The nation-state is modeled as a 
pyramid, whose apex, the only voice to the outside world, is formed by the executive 
branch, monitored and restricted on either side by the legislature and the judiciary. The 
large base of the pyramid is the mass public, which has no independent means of relating 
to the outside world.
Figure 1: Chepos Pyramid
Executive LegislatureJudiciary
Mass public
2) The Saqqara Paradigm, a stepped pyramid, shown below in Figure 2. While 
this pyramid has the same apex, the central government, there are many layers of actors
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between the apex and the mass public which can access the international arena, although 
the mass public still has no means of communication with the outside world. Each of 
these layers has two small apexes which serve as conduits to foreign centers of power. 
These sublayers include: the media and intellectuals, functional interest groups (including 
NGOs and MNEs), the political opposition, ethnoterritorial communities, and federal 
territorial subgovemments.
Figure 2: Saqqara pyramid
ExecutiveJudiciary Legislature
MNEs and interest groups
Media and intellectuals
Political opposition
Ethnoterritorial communities
Federal territorial subgovemments
Mass public
Soldatos (1990, 1993) also attempts to model subfederal diplomacy. He states that 
when the different levels of territorial government within a country directly involve 
themselves in foreign policy, the result is the ‘vertical segmentation’ of foreign 
policymaking. These different levels of governments within a country can be segmented 
in their views of how to conduct foreign policy through different perceptions and 
loyalties; different economic, geographic, political, linguistic, cultural or religious
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characteristics; and different policy stances. Different layers of government within a 
nation-state can therefore speak authoritatively to foreign powers on the same policy 
issue, but often from different positions.
Both these theorists describe a fairly static model of paradiplomacy which focuses 
on the outward actions subfederal jurisdictions take to influence the international arena. 
Hocking (1992,1999) instead views international diplomacy as networks of actors who 
interact in different ways depending on the salience of the issue at hand, their interests, 
and their capacity to operate in the various environments where policy decisions are being 
made.50 He believes paradiplomacy unjustly places non-central governments (NCG) 
activity outside the mainstream of diplomacy, and seeks to reincorporate NCGs within the 
foreign policy process, which he believes is a “'multilevel’ political environment 
spanning subnational, national and international arenas”, an environment which forces 
decisionmakers to negotiate simultaneously in several non-hierarchical, interlinked 
political arenas.51 This presents a view of federalism which “emphasises powersharing 
and the evolution of cooperative relationships between levels of government characterised 
by bargaining processes”.52 Hocking therefore has a more dynamic and fluid view of 
subfederal government involvement in the international arena.
As stated earlier, the increase in international economic interactions at the level of 
U.S. states has multiplied the number of actors and channels which influence negotiations 
over U.S. state economic policies. In this context, multilayered bargaining offers a more 
dynamic view of foreign policy processes at the subfederal level than traditional models 
of paradiplomacy. This thesis will further Hocking’s theories of multilayered diplomacy 
by applying Stopford and Strange’s model of state-firm bargaining to the subfederal level.
5) Methodology
a) Multilayered state-firm bargaining theory
Susan Strange (1975, 1985, 1991, 1992,1996) asserts that International Political 
Economy must examine negotiations over economic policies which are conducted outside 
the traditional channels of national government diplomacy and which involve the
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participation of non-state actors such as MNEs. Doz (1986), Behrman & Grosse (1990) 
and Stopford & Strange (1991) all describe the negotiations which take place between 
MNEs and governments over economic policies. These negotiations can include 
traditional diplomatic negotiations between national governments when MNEs enlist their 
home states’ help in negotiating with host nations. At the same time, MNEs can negotiate 
to form alliances with other firms in an attempt to influence government policies, and 
governments can form alliances in an attempt to more effectively regulate MNEs. These 
international negotiations enter the realm of domestic political economy when MNEs 
seek to influence their home governments’ policies.53 Stopford and Strange argue that 
MNEs and governments are now linked in a triangular set of diplomatic interactions as 
both seek to develop strategic alliances in the pursuit of wealth.54 This model of triangular 
diplomacy is shown in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3: Stopford and Strange’s triangular diplomacy
Govemment-Govemment Company-Company
Govemment-Company
Stopford and Strange describe the various sets of negotiations over economic 
policies which take place between an assortment of actors in both the international and 
domestic arenas. They state that the effectiveness of these actors in achieving their 
objectives is strongly determined by the resources they possess and the different
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negotiating channels they employ. They describe a dynamic, multilayered bargaining 
framework. But they do not apply it to the subfederal level.
b) Applying state-firm bargaining to the subfederal level
This thesis will apply Stopford and Strange’s framework of state-firm bargaining 
to the subfederal level to examine the debate over California’s unitary tax method. The 
thesis thus expands the field of paradiplomacy by modeling negotiations over U.S. 
subfederal economic regulations, and expands the base of state-firm bargaining theory by 
applying it to the subfederal level.
Although the framework of state-firm bargaining has not been applied to the 
subfederal level, it is clear that subfederal governments which control economic resources 
and regulate markets are able to engage in negotiations with firms over their economic 
policies. In addition, the nature of U.S. federalism limits a straightforward imposition of 
international or federal law on U.S. state economic regulations. This has resulted in a 
widened legal arena for U.S. state regulatory actions and a correspondingly greater need 
for firms to directly influence U.S. state economic policies.
However, relevant negotiations may not always be between an MNE and a U.S. 
state government: equally important are negotiations between the subfederal and federal 
government, within court cases, between firms within industry associations, or between 
foreign governments and the U.S. federal government.55 Various sets of different 
negotiations are thus taking place, often simultaneously, and each set of negotiations can 
influence others. This variety of interactions makes the formulation of state policies with 
international implications a dynamic and complicated arena in need of further 
examination.
c) The model
In applying state-firm bargaining to the subfederal level, the thesis will examine 
the policy agendas which each actor brought to the debate over California’s unitary tax 
method, and attempt to draw conclusions over which assets and channels of influence 
enabled the actors to achieve their objectives. It will do this by: 1) determining which
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actors were involved in lobbying to change California’s unitary tax method, a U.S. state 
economic policy which violated international norms; 2) determining the actors’ policy 
agendas; 3) determining the different types of political and economic assets each actor 
possessed, and how effectively the actors used these assets to achieve their policy agendas; 
4) determining how effectively the actors used various negotiating channels to influence 
California’s policy, and; 5) determining the most highly effective uses of assets and 
negotiating channels, key initiatives which influenced the outcome of the policy debate. Box 
1, below, outlines the components of the state-firm bargaining model at the subfederal level. 
The following section will define each component of this model.
Box 1: Components of the state-firm bargaining model at the subfederal level
Actors 
Assets 
Agendas 
Channels of negotiation 
Key initiatives
i) Actors
The increase in international economic interactions within the U.S. has multiplied 
the number of actors which are influenced by U.S. state regulations. It is necessary to 
define the motivations and resources of these various actors in order to understand the 
negotiations taking place over U.S. state economic policies with international 
implications.
According to Hocking, there is a “continuing urge to stress the separateness of 
different categories of actor {state vs. non-state) and to view the relationships between 
them in zero-sum terms -  epitomised by often sterile debates as to the relative power of 
different categories of actor”.56 However, non-central governments contain some of the 
qualities of state actors, such as sovereignty, territory, and access to national diplomatic
35
networks, and some of non-state actors, since their “status ambiguity” means non-central 
governments “can often afford to take firm positions on issues.. .which national
cn
governments will need to balance against broader international policy considerations”. 
Non-central governments therefore exemplify the erosion of boundaries between foreign 
and domestic politics which has created the multi-layered political environment in which 
both governmental and non-governmental actors seek to influence policy decisions. The 
number and variety of interactions between actors seeking to influence policy issues in 
the international arena have greatly increased.
In such a fluid environment, “conflicts are prosecuted and resolved primarily on 
the basis of ad hoc power plays and bargaining among combinations of these groups -
co
combinations that vary from issue to issue”. Interaction between these various actors 
depends on the issues at hand, the interests of the various actors, and their capabilities to 
influence outcomes.59 When examining the actors involved in influencing U.S. subfederal 
economic policies, the thesis will classify the actors into different types: firms, state 
governments, national governments, and international organisations. However, these 
classifications do not determine the importance of the actors to the policy debate or 
preclude combinations between the various categories of actors during the negotiating 
process.
ii) Agendas
The model will next examine each of these actor’s policy agendas, both on U.S. 
subfederal tax issues in general and with regards to California’s unitary tax method in 
particular. Stopford and Strange’s description of state-firm bargaining stresses the 
importance of taking into account the contradictory pulls from various bargaining 
relationships which provide multiple, related agendas for actors in both the international 
and domestic arenas. This thesis will describe the multiple, often conflicting, agendas 
each actor pursued in the debate over California’s unitary tax method.
iii) Assets
In attempting to influence subfederal economic policies which violate 
international norms, the effectiveness of the actors in achieving their policy agendas is
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strongly determined by the resources they possess.60 “Power can be thought of as the 
ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an 
acceptable cost to the actor). Power can also be conceived in terms of control over 
outcomes”.61 Keohane and Nye define power as the control over resources which give an 
actor the potential to affect outcomes, and the thesis will follow this definition 62 The 
model will therefore evaluate the assets the actors possess upon entering into the 
bargaining process, the resources which give actors the potential to affect subfederal 
economic policies.
The model used here occasionally separates these assets into political assets and 
economic assets. As defined here, political assets are those which give an actor the ability to 
influence policy directly. Political assets constitute resources such as an actor’s rights under 
a jurisdictional legal structure, access to key decisionmakers, hold over popular opinion, or 
the ability to marshal support for a political leader who can formulate policy. Economic 
assets are defined as resources which allow an actor to indirectly influence a policy debate 
by the weight of an actor’s importance to the marketplace, and include access to proprietary 
technology, capital, key skills, natural resources, and markets. Obviously, political and 
economic assets interact with and influence each other: for example, a government’s 
economic asset in a particular situation may be simply that it has the sovereign political right 
to set the rules of operation for a particular market.
iv) Channels of negotiation
State-firm bargaining does not take place in a vacuum. There is always an 
institutional setting for negotiations between actors, and these institutions play an 
important role in structuring and influencing the bargaining process itself. When actors 
bargain, when they attempt to deploy their assets, they do so through channels of 
negotiation. In Hocking’s view of multilayered diplomacy, the most interesting and 
challenging tests confronting actors seeking to influence policy is to identify the levels of 
government at which they can operate most effectively.64 This thesis will evaluate how 
effectively the actors used, or did not use, appropriate negotiating channels to deploy their 
assets during the debate over California’s unitary method.
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As defined by Behrman, Boddewyn and Kapoor, channels of negotiation consist 
of actors that can be used to influence a host government.65 These channels can consist of, 
among others, home governments, MNEs, state or municipal governments in the host 
country, common-cause groups, law firms, banks, chambers of commerce and industry 
associations, and regional or multinational intergovernmental organisations.66 Therefore, 
many of the actors active in state-firm bargaining at the subfederal level can also be 
considered to be negotiating channels for other actors. This model of bargaining at the 
subfederal level includes the negotiating channels of the U.S. federal government, the 
state of California, the U.S. court system, and international organisations.
v) Key initiatives
When actors effectively deploy their assets through channels of negotiation in 
bargaining over subfederal economic policies which violate international norms, they put 
forward initiatives which lead to solutions in accord with their policy agenda. The key 
determinant of such a successful initiative is the “direct and discernible effect of an 
action” 67 Keohane and Nye state: “There is rarely a one-to-one relationship between 
power measured by type of resources and power measured by effects on outcomes. 
Political bargaining is the usual means of translating potential into effects, and a lot is 
often lost in the translation”.68 Further, the translation from capabilities to outcomes 
depends, to a large extent, on skillful political bargaining.69
Such highly effective uses of assets, deployed through effective negotiating 
channels, can change the circumstances of a policy debate and lead to a solution. Such 
key initiatives can be considered the culmination of state-firm bargaining in that they are 
the most effective means by which an actor’s assets, its potential to affect outcomes, are
7 fltranslated into influence over the outcome of the debate. Highly effective uses of assets 
and negotiating channels will thus be highlighted when analysing the outcomes of the 
debate over California’s unitary tax method.
vi) The question of regimes
Keohane and Nye postulate an intermediate factor between the power structure of 
the international system and the political and economic bargaining that takes place within
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it: international regimes. Such regimes are “networks of rules, norms and procedures” that 
regularise and control interdependence, and include national, international and private 
rules.71 These networks of interacting rules influence and direct the political bargaining 
that takes place within an interdependent system.72 Therefore, the international regime 
relevant to the case of California’s unitary tax method, the 'rules of the game’ governing 
international taxation, will be included in the analysis of the policy debate
d) Research approach
Research to determine the actors, their agendas, their assets, and the various 
channels of negotiation in the debate over California’s unitary tax method consisted of 
surveying a wide variety of participants in the debate to allow an assessment of the 
relative importance of different actors and negotiating channels in the “judgments of well- 
placed observers”.73 In order to begin determining which institutional actors were most 
involved in the debate in California, a large amount of primary material was collected from 
the U.S., including the unitary tax legislation itself, tax journals which tracked the debate on 
a daily basis, industry newsletters, files from the California state archives and the California 
Franchise Tax Board detailing legislative decision-making, and economic data on 
California’s foreign trade and investment and tax collection system. Material was 
downloaded from Lexis on the U.S. Supreme Court 1993 Barclays/Colgate-Palmolive case, 
including the amicus curaie (friend of the court) briefs for both sides of the argument. A 
survey was made of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and 
United Nations standards on transfer pricing and unitary taxation.
A search was conducted of all relevant news articles and primary material on the 
debate over California's unitary tax to gain a fundamental understanding of the different 
arguments put forth and how the issue developed. All of the documents surveyed were then 
analysed to identify relevant actors active in the debate. Interviews were obtained by writing 
letters to the persons identified by the news search, and each participant was asked to 
identify other key players in the debate to ensure that the case study did not miss important 
players who had not been quoted in the press, or who had changed jobs since the time of the 
legislation. Interviews were conducted in Washington DC and New York City; in 
Sacramento and Los Angeles, California, and in London, England. In total, 52 interviews
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were conducted. To ensure as much reliability in the data as possible, every effort was made 
to cross-reference opinions, and each individual’s experience of the negotiating process was 
examined in the light of their position on the issue and their place within the negotiating 
hierarchy.74
Simultaneously, an extensive review of the academic literature was conducted to 
provide a solid base for theory and policy analysis. This literature was drawn from the 
disciplines of paradiplomacy ; federalism ; U.S. state political culture ; state-firm 
bargaining theory78 and bargaining methodology79; political economy, particularly
O A  o  1
interdependence , the political economy of California, and work on multinational
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enterprises ; and taxation theory , particularly transfer pricing practices , U.S. state
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corporate tax and fiscal policy , federalism in taxation , and unitary apportionment. 
Material drawn from these various disciplines was used to analyse the debate which took 
place over California’s unitary tax and to begin the tentative process of building a model of
QO
state-firm bargaining at the subfederal level.
6) Core questions and hypotheses
The question of state-firm bargaining over U.S. subfederal economic policies in the 
international arena is of key importance to the field of international political economy. With 
the growth of international economic transactions, the increased intermingling of countries’ 
domestic and foreign policies mandate a closer examination of international relations at the 
subfederal level. U.S. states have a significant ability to negotiate with multinational 
enterprises over their economic policies, control relatively large economies on an 
international basis, and are in command of large portions of the U.S. regulatory framework. 
The growth of international trade and investment in the U.S. means subfederal economic 
regulations increasingly have worldwide repercussions.
At the same time, the increased globalisation of economic activity has furthered 
attempts to codify international norms which govern trade and investment. These norms 
increasingly apply their reach to subfederal jurisdictions, and to the coverage of services and 
non-tariff barriers to trade, areas largely under the jurisdiction of states in the U.S. When
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analysing state-firm bargaining over international economic rules, negotiations over U.S. 
subfederal regulations are a vital area of concern.
What happens when U.S. state economic regulations conflict with international 
norms? What capabilities do U.S. states possess to defend their regulations when 
bargaining in the international arena?
This thesis will argue that in the case of California’s unitary tax, the following 
hypotheses are valid:
1) Powerful U.S. states such as California can maintain regulatory standards at 
odds with federal and international norms. Growing global economic interdependence is 
not eliminating California's regulatory options, since the U.S. federal government often 
refuses to effectively constrain powerful states which violate federal and international 
norms.
3) U.S. state governments can bargain directly with foreign governments and 
multinational enterprises as actors in the international arena. As the international arena 
increasingly intrudes on the affairs of subfederal governments, the U.S. federal 
government will not always be the preeminent negotiating channel for international 
actors seeking to influence U.S. economic policies.
7) Structure of the thesis
This thesis will examine the debate over California’s use of the unitary tax method 
with a view to modeling the negotiations over U.S. state economic policies which violate 
international norms. It will do this by:
1) examining how debates over international taxation policy affected the debate 
over California’s use of the worldwide unitary tax method. Chapter Two will describe 
what transfer pricing is, how it can be manipulated by MNEs, and the international arm’s 
length standard for regulating transfer prices. It will describe the alternative formulary
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apportionment and unitary methods of policing transfer pricing, and criticisms of the 
various methods. This chapter will demonstrate that the international regime governing 
the taxation of MNEs is mired in controversy, and that the lack of consensus over 
international tax norms heightened the debate over California’s use of the unitary method.
2) identifying the actors in U.S. subfederal tax policy. Chapter Three will provide 
an overview of the players involved in lobbying on state tax issues in the U.S., 
particularly those who took part in the debate over California’s unitary method. It will 
describe each actor’s role in influencing U.S. state tax policy, its policy agenda on 
subfederal tax issues in general and with regards to the unitary method, and the political 
and economic assets that it had at its disposal. It will thus describe the first three 
components of the model being built to evaluate state-firm bargaining at the subfederal 
level: the actors, their agendas, and their assets. Chapter Three will also provide a broad 
overview of the legal issues involved in U.S. state action in the international arena in 
order to more fully define the parameters within which U.S. subfederal actors operate.
3) describing the political economy of the state of California, a lead actor in the 
debate over subfederal use of the unitary tax method. Chapter Four will describe the 
political structure of the California state government, the state’s corporate tax authorities, 
the legislative committees which oversee state tax regulations, and the state institutions 
which implement California’s international agenda. Further, it will describe California’s 
economy, its economic culture, and its foreign trade and investment. Chapter Four will 
then describe California’s particular political and economic assets. It will conclude by 
describing California-based lobbying groups which attempted to influence the debate over 
the state’s unitary method.
4) presenting a factual case study of the debate over California’s unitary tax 
method in Chapter Five. This chapter will include a history of California and federal laws 
concerning the unitary tax method, lobbying to change the method, and U.S. court cases 
which ruled on the legality of state use of the method. Chapter Five will provide a 
detailed examination of the extent of each actor’s involvement in the negotiations,
42
collecting data on the relationships between various governments and MNEs in the debate 
over a subfederal economic policy which violated international norms.
5) analysing the case study to interpret the outcomes of the debate. Chapter Six 
will complete the model of state-firm bargaining over a subfederal economic policy 
which conflicted with international norms by i) evaluating how the various actors used, or 
failed to use, their political and economic assets to achieve their policy agendas; ii) 
evaluating how effectively the actors used various channels of negotiation to influence 
California’s policy; and iii) examining key initiatives, highly effective uses of assets and 
negotiating channels which influenced the outcome of the policy debate. Chapter Six will 
therefore be the core analytical chapter of the thesis, assessing which strategies were 
successful when actors engaged in bargaining over a U.S. subfederal economic policy which 
violated international norms.
6) summarising the paper’s conclusions in Chapter Seven. This chapter will 
demonstrate that the thesis has proved the hypotheses put forth in Chapter One and 
describe findings from the analysis of the debate. It will examine other clashes between 
international norms and U.S. state policies, describe subfederal activism in other 
countries, and discuss the possible implications of new multilateral agreements on U.S. 
subfederal economic regulations. The final chapter will finish by speculating on how 
conclusions drawn from analysis of California’s unitary tax debate could apply to future 
negotiations over U.S. state economic policies which conflict with international norms.
1 “Among many areas of shared or overlapping powers in U.S. federalism, the federal 
government’s constitutional and practical dominance in foreign affairs often stands out as 
a clearly defined exception” (John Kline, 1999, p. 112). Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution gives the president the right to make treaties and Congress the right to 
regulate commerce and declare war. Indeed, it is often pointed out that the U.S. 
Constitution was created to correct the chaotic economic conditions the Articles of 
Confederation had spawned by asserting federal rights to regulate interstate commerce 
and international economic relations.
2 Tolchin, 1988.
3 Examples included U.S. states stipulating English as the only “official” language of the 
U.S.; discriminating against foreign suppliers in government procurement; excluding
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foreigners from owning banks, insurance companies, or farmland; and prohibiting state 
liquor houses from selling Russian vodka (Fry, 1990). Further examples include city 
declarations of nuclear-free zones, U.S. localities providing sanctuary for illegal 
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Chapter 2: Defining the Problem: Taxation of MNEs
1) Introduction
This chapter will examine how debates over the proper means of governing the 
taxation of multinational enterprises (MNEs) affected state-firm bargaining over 
California’s use of the worldwide combined unitary tax method, a method which 
conflicted with both federal and international tax norms. As we shall see, international tax 
norms are mired in controversy, and the lack of a consensus on international taxation 
standards fanned the flames of the debate over subfederal use of a controversial tax 
method. The debate over how best to tax MNEs is emblematic of the type of bargaining 
taking place between states and firms over the distribution of the benefits of international 
trade and investment. The debate over California’s tax method was complicated by the 
wide variety between different national tax regulations, priorities, and enforcement 
capabilities. At the same time, the U.S. federal and state governments practice very 
different methods of assessing a company’s taxable resources. These different methods 
could lead to conflict, since the U.S. states’ sovereign powers of taxation are often 
unrestrained by contravening federal law.1
This chapter will support the hypothesis put forth in Chapter One that, even in an 
era of mobile capital, powerful U.S. states such as California are able to maintain 
regulatory standards at odds with federal and international norms: California's unitary tax 
method differed from both U.S. national policy and America’s bilateral international tax 
agreements. This chapter also provides support to the hypothesis that international forces 
do not always have their primary policy impact at the national level: the debate over 
California’s state tax method was directly impacted by the larger policy debate among 
international tax bodies over the correct method of taxing companies which do business 
across different national jurisdictions.
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This chapter will describe the theoretical issues which lay behind the debate over 
international tax norms, and how California’s use of the worldwide combined unitary tax 
method fit into this debate. It will explain the international norm used for evaluating the 
prices of the intrafirm trade of an MNE across national jurisdictions, the arm’s length 
standard (ALS). It will describe what formulary apportionment and unitary taxation 
methods are and how they function to combat tax avoidance by MNEs which can 
manipulate the prices they charge on their intrafirm trade when using the ALS. It will then 
describe the economic theories supporting the arm’s length standard and the various 
formulary apportionment methods, along with criticisms of these different methods.
2) Issues in international taxation
It has proved difficult to create international standards for taxation beyond a very 
general level. There is no unifying tax principle that compares to ‘free trade’, and there is 
no international mandate for tax reform. Vernon states that “as long as no international 
rules exist on the allocation of costs and income, the tax decisions of any national 
authority accordingly must be arbitrary”. While most countries’ goal in international 
taxation was formerly to ensure equitable treatment from foreign countries for their 
national enterprises abroad, starting in the 1960s, the U.S. has led the way in focusing on 
collecting more tax revenue from MNEs.3 MNE tax revenue has become a growing 
source of government revenue, and, correspondingly, a growing source of international 
tension as countries effectively fight over the profits of MNEs.
Tax harmonisation would be one way to avoid this conflict. However, most 
countries do not have tax systems which are easily comparable across national borders, 
and most have strong reasons to maintain their current tax structures. Tax regulations are 
produced by various national historical precedents, and diverse political, administrative, 
and ideological considerations. Moreover, governments have different public spending 
needs, and tax efficiency may have to take a backseat to revenue considerations. Strange, 
Milward, Milner, Tanzi, and Baldwin note that it is unrealistic to expect a country not to
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take pressures besides economic efficiency into account when formulating economic 
policies.
Most national systems of taxation were developed in predominantly closed 
economies, and these systems have remained largely intact despite an enormous increase 
in capital movements across national borders. National tax regulations thus assume their 
tax subjects are predominantly individual or corporate citizens and, based on the principle 
of territoriality, that they have the right to tax the activities taking place within their given 
geographic jurisdiction in order to raise revenue for government spending which benefits 
the jurisdiction.4 There is a “traditional, or historical assumption that much of the income 
of the taxpayers originates from within the jurisdiction and thus benefits from the 
expenditure by the government”.5 Higher taxes can mean better infrastructure, a more 
educated workforce, or other benefits which may be valued by citizens at a higher level 
than any revenue losses from taxation. However, the activities of multinational enterprises 
go beyond the territorial boundaries of the state, thus exceeding the traditional boundaries 
of tax regimes. There is thus a disjunctive between where corporations reside and where 
they conduct their economic activity.
Increased international economic integration may constrain a government’s choice 
of tax structures or tax rates and erode a country’s capital income tax base since 
“(i)ntemationally mobile factors of production....can more easily avoid taxes levied in 
particular countries”.6 Although the ability of businesses to avoid onerous national tax 
systems can be seen as a healthy part of global economic integration, the potential 
degradation of their tax bases is obviously of great concern to national governments. In 
addition, MNE tax avoidance can adversely affect global economic efficiency, since the 
allocation of capital will be less efficient to the extent that it is driven by considerations 
other than pretax rates of return, such as avoiding high tax rates in a particular 
jurisdiction.7 There is thus “a friction between an institutional, legal and administrative 
structure which is tied to the principle of territoriality and economic activities that more
O
and more are losing a national or territorial character”.
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In an effort to conquer this friction, there are two general approaches used as 
international norms in the taxation of multinational enterprises:
i) Source of income
Under this system, anyone who generates income within a jurisdiction is taxed by 
its authorities on the basis that the foreign subsidiary profits “arise, or have their ‘source’, 
within the host’s territory”.9 Therefore, all foreign subsidiaries hosted within a 
jurisdiction are considered taxable, but the overseas subsidiaries of the home country’s 
MNEs are not taxed. Countries which follow the source principle, such as Canada and 
Germany, exempt what their MNEs earn abroad from their national tax base. This system 
raises the possibility of double taxation if a host country uses source taxation and a home 
country uses the residence principle.
However, in practice, bilateral tax treaties between countries create a system of tax
credits or deductions which can eliminate the possibility of double taxation. Under a tax
credit scheme, the home country taxes its MNEs but gives credit for the taxes they have
already paid abroad. The effective tax rate is then that of the home country, since the
MNE “as a whole will have been subjected only to the host state rate of tax”.10 If the
foreign tax rate is higher, in practice a home country will not rebate the foreign tax
liability to its MNEs. However, the company is still protected from having the same
income flow taxed by both the home and host state,11 although the home state may still
tax the distribution of foreign profits when they are remitted to the parent corporation as a
dividend to its shareholders in the home state. The Netherlands, Belgium, France, and
Switzerland use this method, which has been criticised as encouraging foreign investment
10in low-tax countries and the use of tax havens.
Credit with deferral This system allows for arbitrage due to delays in tax credit: 
MNE subsidiaries can pay the foreign tax rate on current profits, reinvest the balance in a 
third country, and earn income on the excess profits until they are repatriated. Credit 
deferral violates capital export neutrality by encouraging too much overseas investment if 
home-country tax rates are higher than host-country rates.
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Credit without deferral. Alworth states that the credit system without deferral is 
the only truly neutral tax system and under it, firms have no incentive to manipulate 
transfer prices.
In a deduction system, home countries allow taxes paid by MNEs to be deducted 
from the income base that the home country taxes. For example, if the host country’s tax 
rate was 30% and the home country’s was 50%, the MNE would pay an overall tax rate of 
65%. This means the MNE is subject to double taxation and neither capital export nor 
import neutrality will occur.
ii) Residence of taxpayer
Under this approach, a country taxes all of the income belonging to its citizens, 
both corporate and individual, resident in the taxing jurisdiction, no matter where that 
income is generated. This follows the territorial principle of tax jurisdictions. Money 
earned by overseas subsidiaries and remitted to parent companies which reside in the 
jurisdiction is taxable as part of the total income of the parent company, which the home 
state has jurisdiction over since the parent company is resident in the home country. In 
practice, countries which follow this approach (Japan, the U.S., and the UK) usually offer 
companies a credit, deduction, or exemption for income taxes already paid abroad, as 
described above. However, if the host country tax rate exceeds that of the home country, 
there will be excess foreign tax credits which are not refunded. The residence principle is 
usually only applied upon the repatriation of income, which allows a period of arbitrage 
while an affiliate has earned income but has not yet been required to repatriate it to pay a 
yearly income tax. This gives MNEs ruled by the residence principle an incentive to 
classify as much of their income as possible as foreign-sourced. The global integration of 
economies has reduced the effectiveness of the residence principle, as companies can 
more easily defer tax payments to their home countries, utilise overseas tax havens, and 
seek to weaken the flow of information on their increasingly large overseas activities to 
their home countries.
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The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), whose 
membership consists predominantly of developed, capital-exporting nations with many 
resident MNEs they can tax, supports the residence principle, fearing source-based 
methods of taxation will be used to minimise the repatriation of MNE profits. In contrast, 
the United Nations (UN), whose membership consists predominantly of capital-importing 
countries, questions the validity of capital flowing primarily in one direction under the 
residence principle. They view the residence principle as exploitive, since countries which 
are recipients of MNE investment see the transfer of profits made from their resources 
outside of their tax jurisdiction. The UN therefore favours the source-based method of 
taxing MNEs.
3) Transfer pricing
True multinational enterprises often trade in components as well as finished 
products, creating an international system of production within their own company. When 
transactions take place across national borders, even if they are internal transactions 
between different sections of a multinational firm, the company must set a price on them. 
Countries require prices on all goods crossing their borders in order to levy tariffs and 
income taxes; in addition, countries usually maintain accounting standards and legal 
requirements which require separate national profit-and-loss accounts. MNEs also often 
use separate national accounts to evaluate the relative profitability of their different 
national units.
The pricing of transfers between different units of an MNE does not take place 
according to traditional economic theories: it cannot be assumed that each actor’s 
objective is to maximise profit at the other’s expense, since both parties belong to the 
same ultimate concern. Both actors are trying to maximise joint profits, and price is 
merely being used as an accounting device. Transfer pricing thus introduces a divergence 
between the quantities of goods involved in intrafirm trade and their stated value, making 
comparative cost doctrines inapplicable. However, conventional trade theory does not 
distinguish between intrafirm and interfirm trade. The normative implications are intense:
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if profit is distributed differently from the predictions of conventional economic theory, 
there will be correspondingly wide differences in the net gains of trade.
a) Which firms use transfer pricing
The propensities of different industries to use intrafirm rather than open market
trade vary widely. Several surveys have tried to account for these variances by singling
out the economic factors which contribute to intrafirm trade. Most researchers have found
“intrafirm trade to increase with the parent’s research intensity, presumably indicating the
parent’s disincentive either to decentralise production of innovative goods...or to trade 
1 ^them at arm’s length”. ‘Intangible’ goods, which contain properties based on 
information, will often only be traded within firms, since information can be more easily 
copied if it is traded openly. Lall determined that intrafirm trade in intangible goods is 
most likely to occur in industries with a high level of technology and marketing 
requirements.14 Goldsbrough notes that intrafirm trade is likely to involve more 
distinctive and less substitutable goods than those traded at arm’s length.15
There can be many other reasons for a large level of intrafirm trade. Lall lists 
requirements for sophisticated after-sales service, aggressive promotion of a brand-name, 
the specificity of the product traded, the need for close coordination of marketing and 
production, specialised distribution networks, utilisation of unexploited capacity or scale 
economies, small or unstable markets, and the risk of price or quality variations in local 
supplies. Low advertising costs can also be an indicator of a large amount of intrafirm 
trade since firms may not be able to rely on their brand-name for marketing, instead 
needing to service overseas markets directly. Lall further states that an MNE with large 
assets overseas will be encouraged to trade internally across national borders to minimise 
country risk and exploit its relatively lower cost of collecting market information. 
However, Zejan found that MNEs with substantial host-country production do not use 
their parent companies to service local markets since scale economies can deter 
decentralised production.16
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While it is generally agreed that MNE intrafirm trade as a percentage of total trade 
varies widely according to industry, some theorists postulate differences based on 
nationality. Lall states that because transfer pricing requires a high degree of centralisation 
to coordinate prices, firms with different nationalities, histories, or control and accounting 
structures may have different ‘styles’ of intrafirm trade. Vaitsos’ theory that MNEs from 
small countries depend more on intrafirm trade to recoup fixed expenditures at 
headquarters, while seminal, has not been conclusively supported. More recently, 
Encamation states that since an MNE’s ownership structure, trading propensities, sectoral 
distribution, and industrial organisation vary across nationalities, a firm’s nationality could 
lead to a preference for intracompany shipments vs. arm’s length trade.17 For example, 
Japanese MNEs use far more intra-company trade than U.S. MNEs. Encamation feels this 
type of difference may lessen as MNEs become more internationalised and adjust to their 
host environments.
Given different levels of internal trade across firms, Lall states that the potential 
for manipulation of transfer pricing is highest when a product is not generally traded on 
the open market and has a high level of technology, and the MNE producing it conducts a 
great deal of intrafirm trade and holds a monopoly in pricing the product on the open 
market. Wilson states that the ability to flexibly set transfer prices is related both to high 
gross margins and the firm’s ability to decouple activities in its production value chain.18 
These characteristics can all reinforce each other. Most surveys done on transfer pricing 
manipulation have focused on large firms in technologically-intense industries, where it is 
accepted that firms overcharge subsidiaries for intermediate goods to recoup high research 
and development costs at headquarters. In these firms, the transfer price can represent the 
company’s view of the right rate of return for risky innovation in an oligopolistic 
structure. As such, it may be almost impossible to define a transfer price which is 
objectively ‘correct’.
b) Reasons for transfer price manipulation
The most obvious reason for an MNE to manipulate its transfer prices would be to 
adjust its profit levels across countries until all of the company’s profits have been shifted
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to the lowest-tax jurisdiction.19 However, Vaitsos’ seminal work on transfer pricing lists 
both profit and non-profit motivations for transfer price manipulation.20 Profit motivation 
can go beyond lowering a year-end tax bill, since there is an opportunity cost associated 
with declared earnings. Transfer pricing allows money to be transferred wherever it is 
needed at the time, while remitted earnings can only be transferred at the end of the fiscal 
year. Transfer price manipulation can make funds quickly available for investment in 
more profitable locales: this is especially useful when a firm is confronting continuous 
inflation and/or periodic adjustments in exchange rates, or any other high opportunity cost 
associated with keeping funds tied up in a host country.
Several business strategies can encourage transfer price manipulation: by affecting 
the cashflow of a subsidiary, altered transfer prices can help a unit meet liquidity 
requirements, which can affect its access to loans or meet local shareholder pressure for 
profits. Transfer price manipulation can also help an MNE maintain a monopolistic 
technological advantage, since a vertically integrated firm can declare returns wherever it 
has a technological advantage over competitors; the firm can then leverage this advantage 
and gain market share by undercharging on its products in select markets.
MNE motivation to manipulate transfer prices can occur when a host country has 
high tariffs, subsidies, or antidumping duties, multiple exchange rates for profit 
remittances vs. capital imports, or quantitative restrictions on profit remittances 21 
Transfer price manipulation can minimise risk by lowering profits in countries which 
have long-term balance of payment or exchange rate problems, political or social 
pressures, price controls, or a high rate of expropriation. These conditions frequently 
apply in developing countries, and transfer price manipulation often surrounds 
investments in less-developed countries (LDCs). Further, underdeclared subsidiary returns 
can avoid the appearance of LDC exploitation and lower a subsidiary’s risk of either 
nationalisation or increased competition.22
Of course, these goals can be accomplished through other means than simply 
changing the prices on transferred goods, and these other means are generally also lumped
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under the heading of ‘transfer price manipulation’. Companies can reduce profits in a 
country by financing investments through loans instead of equity. These are issues of ‘thin 
capitalisation’ or ‘earnings stripping’, where the local company shows lower profits 
because of limited equity capital. Instead of receiving dividend payments from a heavily 
indebted subsidiary, the parent receives tax-deductible interest payments; debt is also 
more often honored when companies are nationalised. In addition, MNEs can shift profits 
across national borders through their discretionary power to allocate fixed costs (research, 
advertising, and general management overhead) and to determine royalty charges for 
using brand-names and patents. Vaitsos postulates that firms may divide global overhead 
among their affiliates by transferring an excessive amount of affiliate profit back to the 
parent company to cover headquarter operations.
c) Limits on transfer price manipulation
Limits on transfer price manipulation can be internal: manipulating prices requires 
a great deal of intra-firm centralisation, communication, information processing, and the 
capacity to persuade subsidiaries to implement a transfer pricing system which may 
undermine their profits. There is often a large internal cost associated with determining 
and implementing a transfer pricing system to achieve certain goals, and firms that gain 
only on the margin from manipulation may choose not to fiddle transfer prices if these 
costs outweigh or equal gains. Lall argues that large MNEs which have superior 
administrative ability and knowledge of world conditions tend to centralise management, 
and are therefore more likely to be able to effectively manipulate their transfer prices. 
Some theorists have speculated that the problems associated with requiring subsidiaries to 
under declare profits, including lowered motivation of unit managers and difficulty in 
determining a subsidiary’s true profit, will prevent excess transfer pricing manipulation. 
However, it does not seem difficult in practice for an MNE to maintain two sets of 
accounts or use a supplemental evaluation method in conjunction with profit and loss 
accounts.23
The other limit to transfer price manipulation is, of course, government regulation. 
Here, customs and tax officials may be working at cross purposes: customs departments
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want goods valued as highly as possible, while tax departments want incoming goods 
priced as low as possible to increase taxable profits. Greater interdepartmental 
coordination may be needed to ensure regulation is effective for the country as a whole.
The past two decades have seen a tightening of government regulations regarding 
transfer pricing practices, along with the development of international standards under the 
aegis of the United Nations and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. With the growth of external pressures, firms may increase self-regulation 
of their transfer pricing in an attempt to pre-empt government penalties. However, 
Alworth argues that transfer price manipulation may have grown even larger over the past 
twenty years with the rising absolute value of intracompany trades, the increased 
instability of exchange rates, and the growing sophistication of MNE tax planning 
strategies, which have increased apace with government controls.24
4) The arm’s length standard
a) Definition
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United 
Nations, along with the U.S. federal government and most bilateral national income tax 
treaties, rely on the arm’s length standard (ALS) to judge transactions across national 
borders between related parties. Therefore, the ALS is considered by many to be the 
international norm for taxing internal company transactions across national boundaries. 
The ALS standard judges the correct transfer price between associated companies to be 
the price which would apply if the companies were not related. The different sections of 
an MNE are therefore judged to be using price as if they were at ‘arm’s length’ from each 
other. The ALS is also referred to as ‘separate accounting’, since it attempts to treat 
related company transactions as if they were being made by separate, distinct firms. As 
such, “the ALS is a classic example of attempting to limit jurisdictional scope (reach of 
tax powers) on territorial lines”. There are several different methods used to determine 
an arm’s length price.
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i) Comparable unrelated price (CUP)
The most direct way to compute an arm’s length price is to find a comparable 
transaction between an unrelated buyer and seller and use it as a reference price. This is 
based on the theory that unassociated enterprises operate in competitive conditions and 
that the competitive price, driven by market conditions of supply and demand, is the 
correct one. The method’s primary attraction is that it is easy to apply and straightforward. 
However, it is also seen as the most unreliable method of judging transfer prices.
It is often quite difficult to determine whether a market is truly competitive or not, 
and the arm’s length price is not correct unless the good being judged is sold in a 
competitive market. In addition, companies which become multinationals are often 
monopolies or oligopolies which have the market power to purchase goods at lower prices 
than their competitors. They may be able to segment markets in different countries, so that 
the market price for their product varies between countries, leading to confusion over 
which market should be used to find a comparable price.27 Companies may also be able to 
confuse authorities by using third-party sales to create artificial prices. Moreover, an 
integrated firm is able to save on costs, and this is not reflected in market prices.
As well, intermediate goods are often not traded on the open market because they 
are goods used by only one company (‘specific goods’). The arm’s length standard is 
especially problematic with intangible goods: knowledge or marketing expertise which 
often has no market price due to the risk that it will be copied if it is traded on the open 
market. In addition, it can be difficult to find a truly comparable transaction. Even if 
another company’s transactions look quite similar, each company has different levels of 
risk that it deems acceptable, and each MNE unit performs slightly different functions 
from others in its sector. In the U.S., the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) can only use 
public companies as a basis for comparable prices, since these are the only firms whose 
financial records it can legally access. The IRS has tried, under section 7602 of the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Code, to use its “summons power” to gain voluntary information from 
non-listed companies, but without much success. Lall argues that the arm’s length
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standard should not use an open market reference price at all: the firm should simply state 
at what price it would be prepared to sell the good to an unrelated concern.
If the comparable unrelated price cannot be found, the correct arm’s length price is 
essentially ‘reconstructed’ from scratch.
ii) Cost-plus
This method looks at the cost of manufacturing a product and adds an appropriate 
margin for distribution services. It is easiest to use this method if the costs of production 
are straightforward and easily determined: it is most often used to set transfer prices for 
manufacturing facilities, or where related parties have long-term buy and supply 
agreements. This method is not economically neutral since it can affect the firm’s 
production and allocation decisions if returns to scale are not constant.
iii) Sales-minus
This method takes the final price at which the product would be sold to unrelated 
buyers and subtracts an appropriate margin for distribution services. It is most often used 
to set transfer prices for sales and distribution centers. Again, this method’s effect on 
output depends on the degree of monopoly that an MNE holds. If the firm is competitive, 
its marginal costs will exceed the final price at which it sells its goods, and the 
reconstructed price will force the firm to substantially alter its production and allocation 
decisions if it is to remain in the market. Even if the firm is non-competitive, “the tax on 
profits will always reduce output because the tax base is no longer computed on profits 
alone”.28
iv) ‘Fourth’ methods
This refers to any other method used to allocate an MNE’s profit to arrive at a 
‘correct’ transfer price. While this may sound arbitrary, in practice any of the methods 
listed can be arbitrary, and compromise methods often allow both governments and firms 
to avoid costly litigation: they are therefore widely used in practice. However, Alworth 
suggests that since firms often use ‘fourth’ methods to pre-empt government action and
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associated penalties, they may be simply “window dressing” their accounts to “achieve 
the level of profitability expected by the authorities for firms of their type”.29
v) Profit splitting
The ‘fourth method’ most often used is the profit split method, splits the product’s 
total profit among the different parts of a corporation in proportion to the assets and 
activities each unit contributes, based on benchmark market rates of return for each factor 
of production. This is a functional analysis, and it is often used to determine the price of 
intangible goods, where there are frequently no comparable uncontrolled transactions. In 
addition, a profit split may more clearly show the true economic value of a transaction 
involving an intangible because intangibles gather income both by themselves and by 
enhancing the value of other assets.
Although profit splitting was criticised by the U.S. Court of Appeals as “an 
inherently imprecise method of allocation” whose “outcome may be largely determine by 
bargaining between the fiscal authorities and the tax-paying company”, the method was 
adopted by the U.S. IRS in the finalized 1994 amendments to Section 482 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Further amendments in 1995 and 1996 still reflect the approach of the 
1994 revisions relating to transfer of tangible and intangible property. In 1996, the IRS 
issued final regulations of cost sharing arrangements for income related to intangibles 
which imposed qualifications on the definition of controlled participants involved in a 
transaction: these regulations sought to ensure that each participant in a transaction stood 
to benefit, in a manner that could be reliably measured, from the use of intangibles it had 
helped develop by either exploitation of the intangibles or from transferring or licensing 
those intangibles to others.
b) Criticisms of the arm’s length standard
This section describes criticisms brought against the international norm for 
judging transfer prices, the arm’s length standard. The arm’s length standard judges the 
intrafirm transfer price against the price the transaction would have had if it had taken 
place between unrelated parties. However, the prevalent theory explaining the existence
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of multinational enterprises holds that MNEs exist to capture transaction-based cost 
advantages. MNE cost advantages occur when two entities in separate countries that are 
part of the same corporate structure trade with each other at a lower price than they could 
on the open market. There is therefore an inherent tension associated with the ALS since 
MNEs, by their very reason for existence, will not have arm’s length prices for intrafirm 
transactions. Caves divides transaction-cost advantages into horizontally-integrated, 
vertically-integrated, and portfolio-based investments.31
Horizontally-integrated enterprises perform similar production functions in 
different countries. However, they transact with each other through commonalities such as 
marketing strategies, management direction, or common brand-names. All these goods 
fall under the category of ‘intangibles’. Companies which gain cost advantages from 
intangibles guard them closely, and will typically only trade intangibles in other countries 
if they can control their use through an inter-firm structure, thus ensuring these intangibles 
remain under their corporate control. Horizontally-integrated firms tend to be those which 
rely heavily on intangibles such as patents, specific high-technology or managerial skills, 
or marketing and advertising (a ‘brand-name’ advantage). Casson and Teece also stress the 
intangible advantages MNEs can create through investments in technology and marketing 
which allow firms to differentiate their products and services from those of their 
competitors. Such firms are able to compete in areas besides price.32
Vertically-integrated enterprises integrate their production across countries, basing 
each stage of the production process in the country where it can be performed most 
efficiently. A vertically-integrated company gains benefits from keeping different parts of 
its production process spread among different countries under the same corporate 
structure. Open market economies can have high contracting and monitoring costs for 
transactions, particularly if a firm is highly reliant on certain goods. Presuppositions of 
competitive markets such as easily-obtained price information, frequent trades, and 
homogenous products with large numbers of buyers and sellers often do not hold in 
certain industries, particularly commodities. In the case of such market failures, long-term
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alliances, exemplified by vertical integration, may be in all parties’ best economic interest 
since they allow resources to be allocated without reliance on a faulty price mechanism.
Portfolio-based MNEs invest in different countries in order to diversify their 
business risk. Different political economies have different levels of systemic risk, and a 
company which is located in more than one economy can lower its overall exposure to 
market conditions, ensuring profit stability. Multinationals created to lower risk are 
known as ‘diversified multinationals’, and typically contain several different industries 
under one company umbrella. Although these MNEs, like the previous two types, extract 
benefits from investing abroad which cannot be captured in the marketplace, the benefits 
to portfolio-based investments do not come from their transactions, but from the nature of 
their diversified business.
If MNEs exist to capture gains that would not exist if their international 
transactions took place on the open market, the arm’s length price will by definition not 
be the correct transfer price for an MNE. Furthermore, a continuum of ‘correct’ transfer 
prices exists within most industries, and there may be an automatic bias by both 
companies and tax authorities to push transfer prices towards a more favourable end of 
the scale. In addition, it can be difficult to determine exactly which tax jurisdiction is the 
source of MNE profits if a functionally integrated and interdependent MNE has spread its 
production between different countries.
Many argue that it is wishful thinking to believe there is an international norm on 
the correct method for taxing the internal transactions of an MNE across national borders: 
that there is no arm’s length ‘standard’ and certainly no uniform application of such a 
standard, since different national tax authorities do not operate in similar ways and have 
not agreed on the definition or application of the ALS beyond very general terms.
National rules which follow the arm’s length standard are “thus not neutral instruments of 
tax policy and may bring about non-negligible reallocations of resources”.34
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The arm’s length standard is also criticised as being quite difficult to administer 
and requiring a large deployment of government resources. Full implementation of the 
method requires the collection of a large quantity of information on company activities, 
and the determination of which specific transactions are comparable.35 Determining a fair 
and reasonable price for goods exchanged between related corporate entities is difficult, 
sometimes impossible, and the allocation of indirect expenses, such as advertising costs, 
among corporate entities can be based on arbitrary criteria. Some companies may be 
reluctant to discharge even the basic information needed to make it possible to evaluate 
the arm’s length standard properly. In practice, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service tends to 
reference industry standards or sectoral averages, which are more easily compiled than a 
list of specific comparable unrelated prices, especially for unique high-profit intangibles 
which do not exist in other firms.37
Governments with smaller resources protest that the cost and time of auditing tax 
returns under this method is considerable, and that their ensuing difficulty in monitoring
-JO
arm’s length prices will result in MNE tax evasion. Opponents of the ALS contend that 
a true arm’s length standard, which seeks a comparable unrelated price for every MNE 
transaction, is too complicated to administer, and that most countries do not even attempt 
to correctly administer it. They therefore feel that the ALS is a policy failure, and that the 
international “standard” has in fact become a free license for companies to declare the 
amount and location of their profits to their ultimate advantage.39
5) Formula apportionment
a) Definition
Formula apportionment is a response to the problems which critics of the ALS feel 
are inherent in finding an arm’s length price. The philosophy behind this method is that it 
is basically impossible to construct a comparable arm’s length price, and extremely 
difficult for government officials to monitor multijurisdictional accounts in order to verify 
that proper transfer prices have been used. Formula apportionment therefore disregards 
profit as the basis for taxation, and instead concentrates on taxing the resources which a
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\business uses to generate income, relying on a simple formula to compute how many 
resources a company uses in each tax jurisdiction. In its reliance on the underlying 
resources used to generate profit, it is similar to the ‘profit splitting’ methods used under 
the ALS. Formula apportionment is the standard way of taxing corporate income between 
states in the U.S., since it provides a simple means of dividing income across state lines. 
The standard formula apportionment approach is to tax equally-weighted proportions of 
payroll (as a measure of labour used), property (as a measure of capital used), and sales 
(to encompass the role of market demand in generating income). This is known as the 
‘Massachusetts formula’ after the U.S. state which first employed it.
This method is an attempt, in a world of increased economic integration, to 
determine the taxable benefits a company derives from each tax jurisdiction in which it 
operates. It is, in effect, a shorthand approach to international taxation standards, simple 
to define and to apply, which seeks to avoid the pitfalls of the ALS method. As Weiner 
points out, “(p)resent systems that assign profits to a geographical location become 
obsolete when companies no longer operate within those geographical limits”.40 Use of a 
standard formula forjudging the internal transactions of MNEs across national borders 
may eliminate differences between government tax codes which allow MNEs to 
manipulate their transfer prices between countries and avoid taxation. Formula 
apportionment also avoids the inherent contradiction, under the lowered transaction cost 
theory, of using an arm’s length price to evaluate transactions between units of an MNE.
b) Unitary taxation
While non-unitary formula apportionment respects the legal limits of 
incorporation and excludes operations incorporated in other tax jurisdictions from the tax 
base, unitary taxation refers to the process whereby, before apportioning the firm’s 
earnings by formula to different jurisdictions, the taxing body first gathers together the 
total activities of the enterprise in different jurisdictions. The different methods of unitary 
taxation are as follows:
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i) worldwide combination gathers together the worldwide activities of any 
company connected with the taxing jurisdiction. This method therefore 
combines the resources of all affiliates remotely associated with a company 
doing business in the tax jurisdiction into the apportionable base, 
regardless of whether these affiliates are operating in other countries. It 
includes foreign parent companies and their worldwide foreign subsidiaries 
in the base.
ii) domestic worldwide combination is similar in that it combines all the 
affiliates of a company operating in the tax jurisdiction into the 
apportionable base, but this method excludes the foreign subsidiaries of 
any foreign-incorporated parent companies; it looks only at the worldwide 
activities of domestically-incorporated firms.
iii) domestic combination combines the domestic activities of domestic- 
incorporated companies operating in the taxing jurisdiction, but does not 
look at any of their overseas activities.
iv) water’s edge combination ignores the nationality of a company: it gathers 
together all the domestic business activities of any company doing business 
in the tax jurisdiction, and excludes the resources of all overseas affiliates 
from the taxable base.
Formulary apportionment methods have been used by U.S. states since the 1930s 
to allocate the unitary income of multistate corporations, as more and more U.S. 
companies began to conduct business in more than one state. Since much U.S. multistate 
business is now conducted through subsidiary companies, many states have adopted a 
combined method of apportionment.41 For example, although each of the 46 U.S. states 
that tax corporate income use formula apportionment, fewer than two-thirds of these 
states use combined, or unitary taxation 42
c) Criticisms of formula apportionment
This section of the chapter further describes the various problems associated with 
the use of formulary apportionment methods. Use of a standard international method for
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evaluating transfer pricing is of key importance in avoiding the overtaxation, 
undertaxation, or double taxation of an MNE operating between different countries. If 
jurisdictions apply diverse standards and there is no overarching international tax 
authority to ensure their coordination, discrepancies are inevitable. Indeed, several 
theorists contend that the actual standard used to evaluate transfer prices is less important 
than the need for a uniform norm between countries.43 Since use of the ALS is far more 
widespread, many argue its very predominance makes it a better international standard 
than formula apportionment.44
Even if formula apportionment is theoretically a better system, its widespread use 
as an international norm may not be workable in practice. On purely political grounds, the 
worldwide use of formula apportionment would create difficulties: countries would have 
to agree to standard definitions of a taxable income base, taxable factors of production, 
the apportionment formula itself, and the tax rate, and simultaneously convert their 
accounting systems to avoid an enhanced risk of double taxation from the inclusion of 
different components in each taxable factor of production. Since harmonisation of 
apportionment formulas is still incomplete between the U.S. states, it is difficult to 
imagine countries agreeing to harmonise their tax systems to the extent needed within a 
reasonable period of time.
The use of formula apportionment evolved within the United States as it became 
more difficult to divide economic activities by U.S. state boundaries, and accordingly 
more difficult for state tax authorities to verify their jurisdiction’s income. This method 
was fairly easy to adopt in the U.S., where the states have no physical borders; share a 
common language, currency, tariff structure and integrated economic conditions; have 
similar accounting systems, laws, and effective tax rates; and, most importantly, are 
bound within a federal system of taxation which allows all states to access full corporate 
records for business activities within the U.S.
These criteria are not present at the international level. Variations in currency 
exchange rates can be a significant factor behind variations in profits or resource costs
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across countries. In addition, apportionment does not account for cross-country variations 
in the rates of return to capital and labour due to risk differentials, imperfect capital 
markets, and various degrees of labour-capital intensity. This may make a worldwide 
standard formula using payroll, property and sales factors inaccurate, since it would 
allocate an unduly high proportion of income, and corresponding tax revenue, to 
developed countries where wage rates, property values and sales prices are higher. There 
is an argument, however, that higher costs for factors of production in developed 
countries are justified since their productivity is correspondingly higher, and that, in any 
case, MNE decision-makers would only use these more expensive factors of production if 
they were seen as advancing their business objectives, which include the maximisation of 
overall company profits.
Another prime objection to the use of formulary methods at the international level 
has been the burden of compliance. The technical problems associated with pooling 
standardised financial information about MNEs between countries with different 
accounting and legal systems are formidable. Different definitions of ‘income’ across both 
subnational and national lines (i.e., whether to include interest, dividends, royalties, 
capital gains, etc.) have proved troublesome. Efforts to obtain company information 
across national lines are often seen as infringements on jurisdictional sovereignty.
Foreign-domiciled business may encounter further problems. Many countries do 
not maintain historical cost data, making accurate computations of the property factor 
difficult; cultural differences may affect the relative ratio of wages to benefits, so that 
payrolls differ widely; and foreign laws regarding confidentiality may make it impossible 
to share financial information with overseas jurisdictions, especially with subfederal 
governments which do not hold bilateral treaties with secrecy provisions. MNEs argue 
they would have to recalculate their entire worldwide profits according to each set of local 
rules. When it is used by U.S. states, the burden of compliance for worldwide formula 
apportionment is considered to be heavier on foreign-domiciled corporations, since U.S.- 
domiciled MNEs normally prepare U.S. federal consolidated tax returns which 
incorporate their worldwide income in a standardised format.
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When worldwide unitary formula apportionment is used in the U.S. at the 
subfederal level, MNEs further argue they must define their profits and the cost of their 
resources according to the different criteria applied in each U.S. state. They claim this 
imposes a heavy administration burden, particularly for foreign-domiciled MNEs, since 
U.S. state accounting principles must be applied to overseas subsidiaries which do not 
normally pay tax in the United States. At the same time, there is simply a “feel bad” factor 
associated with having to meet separate legal requirements for the subfederal level of a 
foreign government.45
However, jurisdictions which advocate the use of formula apportionment claim 
that compliance costs are not as prohibitive as companies insist since intergroup financial 
reports exist, MNEs already have to administer currency conversions to assess the relative 
profitability of subsidiaries in different countries, and most MNEs which borrow money 
in foreign countries or list subsidiaries on foreign stock markets have already converted 
their worldwide financial records to a standard format.
The OECD protests that formula apportionment methods are arbitrary and 
disregard market conditions, producing an allocation of profits which may have no real 
relationship to economic facts and inherently running the risk of allocating profits to an 
MNE which is actually losing money 46 In addition, the OECD argues that tax 
jurisdictions often have too much discretion in determining what constitutes a unitary 
business.
At base, the problem with any formulary apportionment method is that it is at best 
only an approximation of what contributes to the profitability of a firm. A system with 
more accurate measurements will be proportionately more difficult to administer. In fact, 
proponents of formula apportionment have argued that, since any system of measurement 
is an approximation, the formula’s simplicity and uniformity across jurisdictions is more 
important than its accuracy. They believe the separate accounting method is at least as 
arbitrary as formula apportionment.
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d) Criticisms of worldwide combined unitary taxation
The worldwide combination unitary method (WWC) has been the most heavily 
criticised of all formula apportionment methods. Its opponents claim the WWC system 
taxes extraterritorial income by including foreign source income in its taxable base. The 
ALS is enshrined in most countries’ laws and treaties, including U.S. federal laws and 
treaties, because it upholds separate accounting, which maintains the principle of 
jurisdictional sovereignty based on territoriality. If the host country of an MNE uses 
worldwide unitary taxation, it could end up taxing profits in the MNE’s home country by 
including them in its apportionable income base. If the MNE home country uses the arm’s 
length standard, the firm then risks paying tax to two jurisdictions on profits in its home 
country. Further, the system effectively credits WWC unitary jurisdictions with relatively 
higher profits earned elsewhere and subjects them to tax, while firms which make 
relatively higher profits within the WWC home jurisdiction are credited against losses 
elsewhere so that they pay fewer taxes. A WWC system thus rewards locally profitable 
firms at the expense of other taxing jurisdictions.
WWC supporters argue that in an international economy, national boundaries 
must, to a certain extent, be ignored. Unitary taxation developed within the United States 
when it becomes more and more difficult to define company activities as belonging to one 
state; proponents of the worldwide method argue WWC is simply a technical conclusion 
from supporting the use of formulary apportionment methods in an integrated global 
economy.47 Others contend that MNEs are opposed to the WWC method because they 
fear its use by developing countries, where the ease of administering the method in 
comparison to the ALS makes WWC attractive. As developing countries become more 
integrated in the global economy, their potential use of a method which will increase their 
tax revenue, by including the higher-priced factors of production in developed countries 
in an MNE’s apportionable income base, may be alarming to both MNEs and their home 
governments 48
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e) The international regime for transfer pricing standards
No national governments have ever adopted worldwide unitary combination 
methods for taxing international income.49 Although formula apportionment methods are 
source-based, even countries which follow the source principle, such as Germany, uphold 
the arm’s length standard of judging interfirm prices across national boundaries. The use 
of formula apportionment forjudging the transfer pricing practices of MNEs is accepted 
only at the subnational level of government, most notably by the U.S. states.50 As such, 
the method is not explicitly eligible for tax credits under most bilateral treaties.51
The apportionment system was evaluated early on by the League of Nations as a 
means of harmonising the international taxation of foreign income and relieving the 
double taxation of MNEs by competing jurisdictions. However, a League committee 
reported in 1942 that variations in rates of return were likely to differ more between 
countries than between economically similar states within a federation. Therefore, 
although apportionment was advantageous for use within a federal system, it was not 
advisable to use the system on an international basis. Instead, the use of separate 
accounting was recommended by both the League and the International Chamber of 
Commerce.
The Model Tax Treaty of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development53 rejects the apportionment approach, along with a 1974 United Nations 
report establishing treaty guidelines between developed and developing countries.54 The 
OECD Model Treaty, which promotes the use of the arm’s length standard, is the basis for 
most bilateral tax treaties between developed countries. The OECD has criticised the 
U.S. Internal Revenue Service for any departures from the arm’s length approach as 
risking increased international double taxation by having two methods of judging transfer 
pricing practices at use in the international system.55 The OECD instead prefers a 
transaction-based approach to judging transfer pricing practices.
Despite this codification of the ALS as the international norm forjudging the 
internal transactions of MNEs across national boundaries, there is continued controversy
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over the method’s accuracy. This has particularly been the case in the U.S. Section 482 of 
the U.S. Internal Revenue Tax Code, passed in 1968, endorses the use of the arm’s length 
standard, but the IRS has allowed companies to use, as a last resort, “other methods” of 
pricing, which could, in certain cases, include profit splitting: allocating profits between 
units based on a functional analysis of the contributions of various factors of production 
to a company’s profit. Profit splitting’s emphasis on taxing the contribution of the 
resources which a business uses to generate income has led many to call it, in essence, a 
formulary apportionment method. Section 482 was amended in 1986 to mandate that 
cases involving the transfer or licence of intangible goods follow a ‘commensurate with 
income’ standard.56 This standard incorporates the profit splitting approach by examining 
“the relative economic contributions which each of the related parties involved has made 
to the income which has been generated”.57 U.S. states framed the 1986 amendment to 
Section 482 as an admission on the part of the federal government that the ALS was not 
working and that formulary apportionment methods were more accurate.
The U.S. Internal Revenue Service issued temporary regulations in 1993 which 
further appeared to accede to proponents of formulary apportionment methods by 
extending the ‘commensurate with income’ standard to transfers of tangible goods as well 
as intangible goods. This was done by introducing the possibility of using the comparable 
profit interval (CPI) method, which requires that transactions between related parties fall 
within the range of profits earned by unrelated parties. These regulations were criticised 
by the U.S. states as further proof that the ALS was a policy failure and formulary 
apportionment methods were more accurate; they were also criticised by the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Commission on Taxation as a departure from U.S. 
endorsement of the ALS as the only legitimate method for determining correct transfer 
prices.58 The IRS temporary regulations were made permanent in 1994 and further 
updated in 1995 and 1996 with amendments which dealt with cost-sharing arrangements 
between related businesses.
Propelled by the debate over U.S. state use of the worldwide combined unitary 
method, the U.S. federal government led efforts to revitalise the ALS at the international
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level by updating OECD transfer pricing principles which endorsed the ALS.59 In April 
1993, the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs established a special task force to revise 
its 1979 transfer pricing standards and develop clear guidelines for the application of the 
arm’s length standard. Members of the 1993 Task Force noted that comments they had 
received from the OECD’s Business and Industry Advisory Council (BIAC), composed of 
leading MNEs, declared that the unitary approach presented intolerable compliance costs 
since companies were required to gather information about their entire worldwide 
business and present this information in accordance with each jurisdiction’s particular 
accounting and tax regulations.60 Companies would have to disregard their already 
agreed-upon commercial contracts and “apply artificial pricing rules based on 
hypothetical profits”.61 Moreover, MNE recordkeeping costs would balloon if the unitary 
approach was in use, since companies would still have to maintain records in accordance 
with the arm’s length principle in order to comply with customs rules and accounting 
requirements. At the same time, the BIAC argued, the detailed tax information demanded 
would “often be unavailable and, as a result, the IRS would have to make subjective 
judgments about profit comparisons”.62 The BIAC argued that the proposed U.S. method 
would “increase double taxation to an unprecedented scale”.
Ironically, it proved difficult to get the U.S. government to agree to the revised 
OECD guidelines, since the IRS wanted the rules to include some discrepancy for their 
formulary apportionment-style profit splitting and comparable profit interval methods,64 
now incorporated as permanently available U.S. methods in the IRS’ 1994 regulations. 
This resistance was criticised by European countries, who feared it demonstrated the U.S. 
was not fully committed to the arm’s length standard 65 Americans countered privately 
that the Europeans were only holding to the ALS without exception because they were not 
enforcing their transfer pricing regulations as strictly as the IRS.66 In turn, the U.S. was 
criticised by other countries for applying the international standards too rigorously, and 
being out of sync with the other developed countries’ more relaxed application of transfer 
pricing rules. In the end, OECD regulations continued to firmly endorse the arm’s length 
method of taxation and protest the use of formulary apportionment for international 
transactions except as a means of verifying an arm’s length price when the countries
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concerned agree that all other methods of evaluating an MNE’s transfer prices pose
iTQ
insurmountable difficulties.
6) Summary
This chapter has examined the different methods used to tax the profits from an 
MNE’s internal transactions across national borders. As we have seen, consensus is not 
present on the ‘rules of the game’ in international taxation between the arm’s length and 
formulary apportionment methods. Governance in the area of international tax policy is 
complex and fueled by a multilayered network of institutions69 that compete as much as 
they coordinate and attempt to harmonize; subjecting international taxation to “a 
bewildering complexity of layers of interacting regulation”.70 Since transfer pricing 
policies are governed by “soft law principles, regulators need informality and 
confidentiality” 71 to retain the flexibility needed for reconciling the national and 
international levels of decision making and avoiding binding international arbitration. 
“Thus, tax officials have long been reluctant to accept a binding obligation with a right to 
international arbitration to avoid international ‘double taxation,’ through, for example, a 
mandatory ‘corresponding adjustment’ of transfer prices. They consider that such matters 
must be inherently discretionary, given the complexity of the issues and the interlocking 
nature of the policy interests involved”.72
The lack of consensus over the proper means of regulating MNE transfer prices 
has led to conflicts between tax authorities, and between these authorities and the 
companies they tax. These conflicts are further exacerbated in the U.S. by differences 
between the U.S. federal government, a proponent of the arm’s length method with 
modifications, and the U.S. states, which use formulary apportionment methods to tax 
companies operating within their jurisdiction. With the growth of international economic 
activity in U.S. states, the conflict between the U.S. federal and state governments over 
the correct method of evaluating the transfer pricing practices of MNEs has been 
exacerbated by foreign companies doing business in U.S. states whose home governments 
adhere to the arm’s length standard and protest both the U.S. states’ use of formulary
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apportionment methods, particularly the worldwide combined method, and the U.S. 
federal government’s own perceived departures from the ALS.
The growth of international economic transactions within U.S. state tax 
jurisdictions has therefore placed the states which use worldwide unitary taxation methods 
firmly within the international debate over the correct method of taxing the internal 
transactions of a multinational enterprise across different tax jurisdictions. International 
organisations and bilateral tax treaties, agreed to by the U.S. government, which enshrine 
the ALS heightened protests from MNEs over California’s use of the WWC method, and 
led MNEs and their home governments into a series of negotiations and legal protests 
against both the U.S. federal government and the state of California. This chapter 
therefore provides support to the hypothesis in Chapter One that international forces do 
not always have their primary policy impact at the national level: the international arena is 
increasingly intruding on the policies of subfederal governments. In addition, the chapter 
provides support to the hypothesis that powerful U.S. states such as California can 
maintain regulatory standards which are at odds with federal and international norms, 
since California maintained unitary tax regulations which conflicted with both U.S. 
national tax policy and America’s bilateral international tax agreements. As we shall see 
in the following chapter, California was not directly bound by U.S. federal laws and 
international agreements which promulgated the ALS method, and no enforceable 
international tax regime existed to curtail the state’s use of formulary apportionment 
methods.
This chapter has described the international policy implications of California’s use 
of the worldwide combined unitary tax method in the context of growing concern over the 
ability of multinational enterprises to practice tax evasion through manipulation of their 
transfer prices. The next chapter will provide an overview of the different actors involved 
in the debate over U.S. state use of formulary apportionment methods, focusing on the 
players involved in the negotiations over California’s use of the worldwide combined 
unitary tax method. Through defining these actors, the thesis will begin the process of
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modeling fixed dimensions to state-firm bargaining over U.S. subfederal economic 
policies which conflict with international norms such as the arm’s length method.
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Chapter 3: The Actors
1) Introduction
The increasing number of international economic interactions taking place within 
the U.S. has increased the number of actors influenced by U.S. state regulations. It is 
necessary to define the motivations and resources of the various actors operating within 
the U.S. subfederal arena in order to understand the diverse negotiations taking place over 
U.S. state economic policies with international implications. This thesis supports 
Hocking’s view that actors at the subfederal level operate in a complex “multi-layered 
policy milieu” where various regulatory institutions compete and coordinate, preventing 
the dominance of any one actor.1 This chapter will begin modeling fixed dimensions to 
state-firm bargaining at the subfederal level by examining the participants in the debate 
over California’s unitary tax method.
Chapter Three will describe the role of various actors in the formulation of U.S. 
state tax policy, their policy agendas on subfederal tax issues in general and with regards 
to the unitary tax method, and the political and economic assets which each actor had at 
its disposal. It will thus describe the first three components of the model being built to 
evaluate state-firm bargaining at the subfederal level: the actors, their agendas, and their 
assets. Chapter Six will then complete the model of state-firm bargaining at the subfederal 
level by examining how effectively the actors outlined in this chapter used their assets to 
influence the debate over California’s unitary tax policy. As a lead actor in the unitary tax 
debate, the state of California will be examined separately in Chapter Four; Chapter Five 
will provide a factual case study of the debate.
As defined in Chapter One, assets are resources which give an actor the potential to 
affect subfederal economic policies in a state-firm bargaining relationship. Political assets 
are those which allow an actor to influence policy directly, and include resources such as an 
actor’s rights under a jurisdictional legal structure, access to key decision makers, hold over
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popular opinion, or the ability to marshal support for a political leader who can formulate 
policy. Economic assets are defined as resources which allow an actor to indirectly influence 
subfederal economic regulations by the weight of their importance to the marketplace (such 
as access to proprietary technology, capital, key skills, natural resources, or markets). Both 
political and economic assets can give an actor power in the regulatory arena since other 
jurisdictions may model their legal systems in an attempt to gain access to their market. 
Possession of these political and economic assets gives actors the potential to affect the 
outcome of a policy debate: however, actual influence over the outcomes of a debate comes 
only from the successful conversion of these assets into influence through bargaining. This 
chapter will define the potential power that each actor possessed upon entering into 
negotiations over California’s tax policy. Chapter Five will describe the policy debate; 
Chapter Six will then evaluate the successful conversion of these assets into influence on 
the policy debate.
Chapter Three will also provide a broad overview of the legal issues involved in 
U.S. state action in the international arena in order to more fully define the legal 
parameters within which U.S. state actors operate in the American federal system. This 
chapter will provide further support to the hypothesis that powerful U.S. states such as 
California can maintain regulatory standards at odds with federal and international norms, 
demonstrating that the nature of U.S. federalism limits a straightforward imposition of 
international or federal law on the economic regulations of powerful U.S. states with 
international implications. U.S. courts have not always used their power to overturn state 
laws which potentially conflict with federal regulations or international treaties, instead 
ruling that only congressional laws which specifically contradict state law can override 
state economic policies. This has resulted in increased lobbying of the U.S. Congress, 
which has proved reluctant to preempt state interests. The United States’ accession to 
international economic policy agreements has been followed by broad exceptions for state 
policies in the federal legislation implementing these agreements into U.S. law. These 
weak constraints provide a broad legal arena for U.S. state regulations, within which 
various actors can seek to influence subfederal economic policies.
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In addition, U.S. states have proved they can be adept at experimentally putting 
forth models of regulation in opposition to dominant international regulatory frameworks. 
As stated in Chapter One, persistent application of this strategy can eventually draw out 
contradictions in the dominant model, creating a minority constituency for the 
oppositional model.2 In the case of international transfer pricing regulations, as shown in 
Chapter Two, California proved adept at putting forth the unitary tax model in opposition 
to the dominant arm’s length standard (ALS) model and forcing the modification of the 
dominant model in the U.S. after the ALS was called into question by the international 
epistemic community of tax officials.
Further, this chapter will support the second hypothesis put forth in Chapter One, 
that U.S. state governments can bargain directly in the international arena. Examination 
of the legal issues surrounding U.S. subfederal action in the international arena will 
demonstrate that the U.S. federal government does not always asset itself as the 
preeminent negotiating channel for international actors which protest U.S. state economic 
regulations, nor is it allowed to by the U.S. judiciary. This acquiescence on the part of the 
federal government allows U.S. state governments to bargain directly with foreign 
governments and multinational enterprises as actors in the international arena.
2) Federal government
a) Actors
The Judiciary. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article 4) allows 
the courts to overrule any state law which conflicts with the U.S. Constitution, a federal 
law or a U.S. treaty. However, the Supreme Court has tried to reconcile state and federal 
laws, stating that “federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed”, and ruling many 
federal laws and policies ambiguous. “Conflict between the taxing powers and revenue 
needs of the states and the requirements of a unified, national economy is inherent in the 
federal system.. .Each new means of production and transportation has generated 
commerce and due process clause controversy relative to the taxing power of the states”.4
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The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article 1, Section 8, clause 3) 
gives Congress the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, and the judiciary 
has the ability to overrule state laws which conflict with congressional laws on interstate 
or foreign commerce. Even if there is no specific law or treaty in place (if Congress has 
been dormant by not taking action to pass a law banning a state practice), if a state law 
interferes with the nation’s commerce, U.S. case law had supported the right of the 
Supreme Court to rule the law an unconstitutional burden on the nation’s commerce. This 
authority is known as the ‘dormant commerce clause’.
However, the courts have not been aggressive in their use of the commerce clause 
to restrict state taxation of interstate and foreign commerce; instead, Supreme Court 
rulings have merely fixed the “outside limits of decency”, allowing the states to tax 
interstate commerce if it does not create an undue burden such as multiple taxation.5 
There have been roughly three hundred U.S. court rulings on whether state tax measures 
are in accord with the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, resulting in a 
“quagmire” of decisions that are “not always clear, consistent or reconcilable”.6 The 
courts have ruled invalid state taxes on interstate or foreign commerce which conflict 
with specific federal legislation,7 and which frustrate the purposes and objectives of 
federal legislation.8
However, cases where the courts have ruled state taxes illegal simply because they 
frustrate the policy intent behind congressional legislation are rare.9 In addition, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of combined unitary 
apportionment methods to determine the state’s share of the income of the U.S.-domiciled 
multicompany group operating across several states.10 Unless Congress explicitly 
exercises its legislative power to limit state taxing authority, U.S. states, for the most part, 
are free to go their own way in matters of tax policy, even if their tax policies deviate 
from those adopted by the federal government.11 U.S. courts have preferred to ask 
Congress to decide questions on the legality of state powers of taxation, viewing the 
federal legislature as the proper forum for the balance of state and federal interests 
necessary in this area.
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In addition to commerce clause considerations, the courts have considered due
process clause restrictions on state taxation. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that no state shall “deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”. Due process issues at their heart are
concerned with “the fundamental fairness of governmental activity”12: in state taxation
this generally applies to questions related to a state’s legal jurisdiction to tax or fair
apportionment among tax jurisdictions. The due process clause “requires some definite
link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it 
1 ^seeks to tax”. It restricts a state’s tax on income from interstate commerce to the portion 
of a corporation’s total interstate income earned in and reasonably attributable to the 
taxing state.14
The U.S. Supreme Court had established a four-part test to ensure that state tax 
schemes comply with the due process and commerce clauses by having a connection with 
the object of taxation while simultaneously not burdening interstate commerce: the tax 
must be fairly apportioned, non-discriminatory against interstate commerce, fairly related 
to the services provided by the state, and applied to an activity which has a ‘substantial 
nexus’ with the taxing state (<Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady)}5 In the 1979 case 
Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles}6 the U.S. Supreme Court further stated there 
was a greater need for uniformity in interstate commerce when foreign commerce was 
involved, and created two additional tests for the constitutionality of state tax schemes: 
the tax must not create a substantial risk of international multiple taxation, and must not 
prevent the federal government from ‘speaking with one voice’ when regulating 
commercial relations with foreign governments.
The 1968 case of Zschemig v. Miller is another legal obstacle to the involvement 
of U.S. subfederal governments in foreign affairs. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down an Oregon statute, directed at the U.S.S.R., which did not allow resident 
foreign citizens to inherit property if their home country barred U.S. residents from 
inheriting property.17 This was seen as overruling the 1947 case Clark v. Allen, where the 
Supreme Court had let stand an identical California law because it held the law only 
indirectly affected U.S. foreign relations.
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In addition, the 1799 Logan Act bans efforts by individual Americans to change 
foreign officials’ positions on controversies involving the United States. However, this 
Act has never been enforced, indicating a general tolerance on the part of the federal 
government for the participation of individual citizens in U.S. foreign affairs.18
The U.S. Congress has the authority to regulate U.S. state taxation of both 
interstate and foreign commerce. The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution states 
that “The Congress shall have the power...to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several States and the Indian Tribes”. Therefore, Congress has the authority to 
pass laws outlawing any state policy which interferes with interstate or foreign 
commerce, as well as passing laws on interstate or foreign commerce which legally 
override conflicting state laws.
However, despite this authority, Congress has remained largely on the sidelines in 
the regulation of state taxes, driven by the desire of both the state and federal 
governments to maintain state sovereignty over taxation. Despite the fact that the courts 
have asked Congress to consider the legality of certain state taxation powers several 
times, Congress has only once restricted the power of the states to tax income from 
interstate business: Public Law 86-272 in 1959 restricted state powers to impose 
corporate income taxes on exclusively interstate businesses. However, this law does not 
apply to foreign commerce: Congress has never acted to restrict U.S. state taxation of 
income from foreign commerce.
There is a debate whether this hesitancy by Congress is due to approval or inertia: 
the courts’ claim of jurisdiction in this area under the dormant commerce clause may at 
least marginally deter congressional action. Moreover, state and local taxes often yield 
concentrated benefits to one state and only diffuse harm to others, providing little impetus 
for a nationwide consensus. At the same time, state political processes may provide a 
primary forum for resolving state tax policy, relegating Congress to a “somewhat 
duplicative” forum for dispute resolution.19 Attempts at the federal level to set up broad 
general rules on state and local government taxes are likely to meet with sustained 
opposition from Congress, which fundamentally represents state interests. Although
82
powerful U.S. states can maintain regulatory standards at odds with federal and 
international norms, states can also perceive that their interests lie in changing their 
regulations to comply with external norms if doing so attracts more trade and investment 
to their jurisdiction, particularly if they are more economically dependent on out-of-state 
trade and investment.
The White House can make treaties which outlaw U.S. state regulations. Under
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article 4), any state law in conflict with a
U.S. treaty is considered void. In 1890, Geofroy v. Riggs20 ruled that all areas of a state’s
power can be superseded by diplomatic commitments except for “surrender of republican
91forms of government and the cession of physical territories of particular states”. In a 
1936 decision, United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corporation 22 the Supreme Court 
ruled that the power of the national government was an inherent attribute of sovereignty 
“in origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs”, since the 
federal government’s powers were based in the U.S. Constitution, whereas sovereignty 
had been immediately conferred upon the country’s leadership when the United States 
declared its independence from Britain.23 However, since U.S. treaties cannot be enacted 
without Senate approval, Congress still holds the ultimate power to override state laws by 
treaty. Whether it will use this power is another question. The states may perceive that 
their interests are aligned with those of foreign companies.
The Supreme Court has also refused to overrule state laws which conflict with 
administrative policies promulgated by the president. The president does hold persuasive 
power over the states in attempting to convince state legislatures to change their laws, 
since he can marshal support among congresspeople and governors for an administrative 
policy, especially if they belong to the same political party. This may lead to pressure 
from a governor or a state political party organisation on a state legislature to support a 
presidential policy in return for presidential backing in gubernatorial or congressional 
reelection campaigns. Presidential administrations with a strong pro-business stance may 
oppose the spread of U.S. state tax regulations, while presidential administrations 
supportive of states’ rights may be more inclined not to limit state tax powers.
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The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is responsible for determining, assessing, 
and collecting internal revenue in the United States, including corporate income taxes.24 
In the United States, transfer pricing has been regulated since 1921 by Section 482 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which gives broad powers to the Internal Revenue Service to 
increase corporate tax payments by shifting income between businesses under common 
control, regardless of whether the firms in question are deliberately trying to avoid taxes 
or not. The federal government has long promoted the arm’s length standard (ALS) in its 
Internal Revenue Code. However, a September 30,1981 report by the General 
Accounting Office accused the IRS of being lax in its interpretation of the arm’s length 
standard. Further, 1986 revisions of Section 482 included formulary apportionment-type 
profit splitting and comparable profit interval methods as options for the IRS to use in 
evaluating transfer pricing. These revisions were criticised by U.S. states who felt they 
proved the IRS was tacitly admitting formulary apportionment methods were more 
accurate while still attempting to stop the states from using these methods. After its 1986 
revisions, the IRS insisted on discrepancy for its profit splitting and comparable profit 
interval methods before the U.S. government agreed to the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s 1993 transfer pricing guidelines promoting the use of the 
arm’s length standard.25
The Department of the U.S. Treasury’s mandate includes advising the president 
on domestic and international financial, monetary, economic, trade and tax policy; the 
Secretary of the Treasury is responsible for formulating and recommending domestic and 
international financial, economic, and tax policy. The Office of Tax Policy assists the 
Secretary of the Treasury by developing and implementing tax policies and programs; 
establishing policy criteria reflected in regulations and rulings; guiding preparation of 
these policies for the IRS to implement through the Internal Revenue Code; negotiating 
tax treaties for the United States; representing the U.S. in multilateral organisations 
dealing with tax policy matters; and providing economic and legal policy analysis for 
domestic and international policy decisions 27 The Treasury Department advises 
presidential administrations on state tax law, but does not interact directly with the states.
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The U.S. Treasury Department has historically been one of the main proponents of 
the arm’s length method at the international level. The department has promulgated the 
use of the arm’s length method in U.S. bilateral international tax treaties and in 
multilateral organisations, such as the OECD, which attempt to set international tax 
policy.28 The Treasury Department is “totally unsympathetic” with U.S. state desires to 
maintain formulary apportionment systems and remains opposed to having an 
inconsistent method for evaluating transfer pricing practices in use at the U.S. subfederal 
level. The Treasury Department was widely viewed as pushing various presidential 
administrations to propose federal laws outlawing worldwide combination unitary 
(WWC) formulary apportionment methods at the state level, in order to prevent a 
divergent system for evaluating transfer pricing from taking hold at the U.S. subfederal 
level29
The Department of State is the lead institution for the conduct of American
-JA
diplomacy, and the Secretary of State is the president’s principal foreign policy adviser. 
All bilateral tax treaties which the U.S. has signed name the arm’s length standard as the 
method to be used for evaluating transfer pricing policies within multinational enterprises. 
In order to maintain the integrity of these treaties, the State Department sought to 
accommodate foreign governments which protested U.S. state use of the WWC method. 
Moreover, the Department feared use of the WWC method at the state level created a risk 
of double taxation which could distort international investment decisions and reduce the 
flow of foreign investment to the U.S.31
b) Agendas
The different sections of the federal administration responsible for setting tax 
policy promote the use of the arm’s length standard (ALS), both within the U.S. and other 
countries, for evaluating transfer pricing practices. The U.S. federal government believes 
that enshrining the use of the ALS through its web of bilateral tax treaties will ensure a 
more secure international trading and investment environment for U.S. MNEs. This goal 
is most strongly pressed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the U.S. Department 
of State, which both wish to avoid the possibility of retaliation by foreign governments if 
the U.S. is seen as breaking international treaty commitments by allowing the states to use
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an alternate system for evaluating transfer pricing. These departments also fear their 
credibility will be threatened if they are seen as backing down from a policy position they 
previously lobbied other countries to adopt, and that any lessening in credibility could 
undermine U.S. negotiations on a range of other international issues.
However, the U.S. Congress, and to a lesser degree, the various presidential 
administrations, need to maintain a base of state political support. Congressional 
members feel this need most strongly since they are directly dependent on their home 
state political apparatuses for support in their re-election campaigns. In addition, 
members of Congress depend on state voters for reelection: any policy they support 
which deprives their state of tax revenue might incur censure from voters. The president 
is also dependent on state electoral votes and on state political apparatuses for his 
reelection prospects. However, since the voting relationship here is less direct, the 
political importance of a state to a presidential reelection campaign and the popularity of 
an administration provide variations in presidential dependence on state approval.
c) Assets
i) Political
The federal government holds substantial assets allowing it to regulate state 
policies which interfere with international commerce. Under the Commerce Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution (Article 1), Congress can pass laws outlawing any state policy which 
interferes with interstate or foreign commerce, and the White House can make treaties or 
executive agreements which outlaw any state regulation. In addition, the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution (Article 4) allows the judiciary to override any U.S. state law 
which is in opposition to a specific federal law passed by Congress or, under the 
informally developed ‘dormant commerce clause’, to repeal any state law which 
interferes with national commerce if Congress has not passed a federal law on the matter.
The federal government can also promulgate policies or pass laws to solve state 
problems at the federal level, eliminating the need, at least theoretically, for state 
regulations. For example, states do not have the same degree of access as the federal 
government to the financial records of MNEs, since the IRS has the power to demand
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information from foreign tax authorities through its network of bilateral treaties. This was 
a particularly potent federal asset in the debate over state use of the WWC method: one of 
the chief justifications states gave for using the method was that lack of access to 
company records made it impossible for states to accurately use the ALS. If the IRS could 
offer to share details of MNE transfer pricing arrangements with the states, or help them 
audit MNEs, they could remove one of the states’ chief arguments for using the WWC 
method. At the same time, the IRS could promise to strengthen its own policies and 
enforcement capabilities to stop transfer pricing violations from occurring within its 
jurisdiction.
ii) Economic
The federal government can influence state policies by promising or withholding 
economic help to states in the form of grants or subsidies. The United States has been 
cited as an example of “classical federalism” in fiscal matters, embodying the concept of 
financial autonomy for subfederal units: each state is responsible for raising its own 
resources and for spending them.32 Despite the existence of this model, the U.S. federal 
government has traditionally given money to the states, although the amounts have varied 
widely. Starting on a small scale early in this century, and expanding during the New 
Deal and Great Society eras of the 1930s and 1960s, intergovernmental federal 
cooperation in the U.S. came into being through the grants-in-aid system of transferring 
funds for some specified purpose from the federal government to the subfederal 
governments.
However, during the period when the unitary tax controversy reached its peak 
(1980-1993), the federal government was undergoing both a period of fiscal deficits and a 
policy shift towards placing more of a revenue burden on the states through ‘fiscal 
federalism’. In January 1982, President Reagan’s Federalism Initiative promoted the role 
of state policies as experimental laboratories in spending federal ‘block grants’ which did 
not specify how aid was to be spent. Reagan placed a much greater responsibility on the 
states to function without stringent federal supervision. In this environment, “the stage 
was set for high levels of fiscal tension and conflict in the intergovernmental system”.33
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3) State governments
a) State corporate income tax
Elazar claims that Reagan's fiscal federalism policies helped states realise they 
were polities in their own right, not just arms of the federal government: in the face of 
scarcity and decreasing federal aid, all of the states eventually began to formulate policies 
and increase taxes to meet their expenditure needs.34 From 1975 to 1992, state and local 
tax collections nearly quadrupled. One of the ‘growth’ taxes at the state level has been the 
corporate income tax, which 46 states currently impose. Many states require that 
corporations pay an annual franchise or privilege tax, which is levied on the right or 
privilege of doing business in a state; these are measured by either the corporation’s net 
income or its capital stock. In addition, numerous states have direct corporate net income 
taxes. However, these corporate taxes still do not provide states with nearly as much 
revenue as general sales and individual income taxes.35 In 1995, state corporate income 
taxes generated only 7.3 percent of state tax collections.36
Although the U.S. Constitution declares that each state has the right to any tax 
source, except those outside of its territory, in practice, each level of government in the 
U.S. has tended to focus on particular revenue sources, with local governments relying on 
property taxes, states on sales taxes, and the federal government on income taxes.37
The states’ net corporate income tax base broadly conforms to the federal 
corporate income tax base, prior to the division of this base among the states, and many 
states have incorporated “key operative terms” from the federal statute into their tax 
statues in order to meet taxpayer demands for ease of compliance and auditing.38 Some 
states have been unwilling to broadly incorporate the U.S. Internal Revenue Code into 
state statute, for fear of providing Congress with a de facto empowerment to change state 
tax laws. However, every state except Alabama, Arkansas and Mississippi uses federal 
taxable income as the starting point for the determination of state corporate income tax 
liability.39
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b) Legality of state activity in the international arena
The U.S. Constitution forbids subfederal governments from assembling their own 
armies or navies, declaring war, entering into treaties, violating national treaty 
commitments, or levying duties on imports or exports.40 However, most state 
international activism does not fall into any of these forbidden categories, and most of the 
few court pronouncements in this area have been ambiguous enough to encourage 
subfederal governments to put forth policies to see if they are in fact illegal41 They have 
been further encouraged by the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which 
declares that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”. 
Under this amendment, states have held that they are not bound by federal laws or 
international treaties unless it becomes apparent that state laws interfere with international 
commerce or U.S. foreign policy 42 They therefore view the national government’s power 
to regulate foreign affairs as limited to overruling explicitly contradictory state laws.
Similarly, despite the constitutional prohibition on state and local governments 
entering into treaties with jurisdictions abroad, ‘compacts’ with foreign jurisdictions are 
allowed if they receive congressional approval. However, a large number of bilateral 
agreements between subfederal U.S. governments and foreign authorities have been 
signed without congressional consent, and the U.S. Supreme Court has only once 
invalidated such an international agreement, in an 1840 extradition case 43
The executive and legislative branches often denounce subfederal activism but do 
little to stop it in practice.44 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) asked U.S. 
cities not to create sanctuaries for illegal immigrants, and the Department of Commerce 
expressed concern that state export-financing programs might violate the GATT. Yet in 
neither of these cases did the federal government take legal action against subfederal 
activities that it denounced 45
c) State tax autonomy
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution is primarily concerned with 
preventing a state from favouring its own goods over those from other states or countries,
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and with preventing local regulations from interfering with the free flow of national 
commerce. Indeed, the desire to avoid trade wars between states using their tax powers to 
promote their own economies at the expense of neighbouring states compelled the 
framers of the U.S. Constitution to subject interstate commerce to the power of the federal 
government.46
The federal courts have consistently overruled state and local taxes which benefit 
local companies at the expense of out-of-state businesses 47 These decisions have been 
applied not only to state taxes limited to out-of-state businesses or which explicitly tax 
out-of-state products at higher rates than those of local sellers, but also to taxes that have 
the effect of discriminating against interstate commerce, even if the effect is 
unintentional48
However, the courts have also implicitly balanced any harm to locational 
neutrality from discriminatory state laws against the benefits ascribed to state and local 
government tax autonomy: economic efficiency from state level decisions on how to 
finance state public goods; the promotion of desirable tax competition between separate 
jurisdictions; increased government responsiveness to voter preferences; and the 
promotion of government experimentation with tax regulations, which may lead to new 
policy solutions 49
At the same time, states do have incentives to coordinate their tax laws, since a 
more uniform trading environment will generally be more attractive to business. 23 of the 
46 states with corporate income taxes have adopted the Uniform Division of Income for 
Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), which was approved by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July 1957.50 UDITPA provides rules which 
attribute the income of a corporate taxpayer to the various states in which it is taxable. In 
a few of the states which have adopted the act, taxpayers may chose to use an alternative 
apportionment or allocation method. However, several states have enacted modifications 
to UDITPA, especially with regard to the definition and weighting of the three-factor 
formula of property, payroll, and sales, since UDITPA apportions business income of 
interstate operations among states using property, payroll, and sales (excluding
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intracorporate sales) as equal weights; nonbusiness income (such as royalties and capital 
gains) is allocated to the state of corporate domicile.51
Although existing tax compacts between states are impressive, the sheer number 
of state legal and tax provisions makes it difficult for subfederal jurisdictions to 
coordinate their regulations completely. At the same time, businesses may not desire 
complete uniformity between state tax laws, since regulatory differences sometimes allow 
them to lower their corporate tax burden or otherwise arbitrage state regulations to their 
advantage.
d) Actors
Debates over subfederal powers to enforce tax regulations are viewed by the states 
primarily as an issue of states’ rights. Because of this, individual U.S. states lobbying at 
the federal level for the right to enforce a specific state tax or economic regulation are 
often helped by state group associations. As the federal grants progress increased in 
importance and complexity from the 1940s to the 1960s, U.S. state and local officials 
increasingly set up operations in Washington, DC to influence the federal government 
and gain information about the grants process. Increasingly, these organisations became 
the lead representatives of state interests in national policymaking.52 However, although 
U.S. states represent their interests at the federal level through such organisations, if states 
see their own interests as aligned with changing their regulations to attract business, even 
foreign business, they may not exercise their assets through these channels.
The Multistate Tax Compact is an interstate compact enacted by its member 
states in 1967 under the aegis of the Council of State Governments. An interstate compact 
promulgates a uniform law among U.S. states, as well as constituting an agreement 
among states to jointly exercise their authority in a particular area 53 MTC regulations are 
advisory in nature, and are only binding on states if they adopt them internally.54 Starting 
from an original seven, the MTC now has twenty member states and sixteen associate 
members; California entered the Multistate Tax Compact in 1974.55 The core purpose of
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the Multistate Tax Compact is to promote uniformity and compatibility in significant 
areas of state tax systems.
The Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) was created by the Multistate Tax 
Compact members in 1967 as a means to recommend uniform measures to the states.56 
MTC works to administer state tax laws which apply to multistate and multinational 
enterprises, and serves as the governing and administering agency of the Multistate Tax 
Compact. In addition, the MTC attempts to protect state fiscal authority before Congress 
and the courts, and encourages business compliance with state tax laws through 
education, negotiation and enforcement. Forty-five states (including the District of 
Columbia) participate in the MTC.57
A major focus of the MTC’s work on state tax uniformity work has been the 
development of business income tax allocation and apportionment regulations, since it 
views the UDIPTA, embodied in Article IV of the Compact, as providing only a broad 
framework. The MTC’s allocation and apportionment regulations are intended to remove 
ambiguity and ensure tax laws and regulations in this area are substantially uniform 
across states, lessening the compliance burden on taxpayers, avoiding duplicative 
taxation, and ensuring that all of a business’ property, payroll, and sales are assigned to 
the numerator of only one state’s apportionment factors.
The Multistate Tax Commission also conducts joint audits for the states, on 
request, on income and sales and use taxes in order to try to avoid conflicting audits from 
several different states. The MTC generally works with smaller states which have fewer 
resources; large states such as California rarely use these services.58 States which use the 
MTC’s auditing services can chose whether or not to accept their evaluations.59
Substantial animosity exists between the MTC and business groups.60 A number 
of major corporations have been resistant to audit inquiries from MTC staff, despite a 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in February of 1978 sustaining the validity of the Compact.61 
In United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, the Supreme Court rejected 
the plaintiffs contention that, among other things, the Compact violates the Compact
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Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 10), which provides that “(n)o State 
shall, without the Consent of Congress.. .enter into any Agreement or Compact with 
another state, or with a foreign power”. The court ruled that congressional consent is 
required for a compact between states only if the compact would increase the political 
power of the states to the extent that it “may encroach upon or interfere with the just 
supremacy of the United States”.64
The MTC supports the principle of worldwide combination, and a resolution 
endorsing state use of this method was unanimously adopted by Compact members in 
May 1977. The MTC became viewed in the 1970s and 1980s as “the most active and 
effective group” at the federal level in support of the states’ right to use the WWC unitary 
method.65
The National Governors’ Association (NGA) is a bipartisan organisation which 
provides a forum for U.S. state governors to influence national policies, provide 
information on state innovations and practices, and help solve state-focused problems, 
including state tax and international trade issues. The NGA established an Office of State 
Federal Relations in Washington, DC in 1967, which provides lobbying and policy 
support for priorities set annually by state governors. The NGA tries to protect state tax 
bases, and feels states should be able to determine their own taxation systems, including 
use of the WWC method.66
The Western Governors’ Association (WGA) is an independent, non-partisan 
organisation of governors from 18 western states, including California. Established in 
1984, the association was formed to address important policy and governance issues in 
the West, advance the role of Western states in the federal system, and strengthen the 
social and economic fabric of the region. The WGA seeks to develop and carry out 
programs in the areas of “economic development, international relations, and state
( \ 7governance”. This organisation protested against possible federal interference with state 
unitary tax policies and expressed concerns about state sovereignty in the face of 
international tax policies embodying the arm’s length standard. WGA member states also 
lobbied the federal government for protection for state sovereignty during the
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establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and for the expansion of that 
protection in negotiations for the proposed Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA).
The Federation of Tax Administrators (FTA) was organised in 1937 as a non­
profit association representing all the principal U.S. state government tax agencies. The 
FTA seeks to avoid the preemption of state tax sovereignty and authority in international 
trade agreements, and supported the right of the states to determine their own taxation 
policies, including use of the WWC method.69
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) is a bipartisan organisation 
whose goals include ensuring state legislatures have a strong, cohesive voice in the
70federal system. NCSL has lobbied to include protection for state authority in U.S. 
legislation implementing international agreements which liberalise world trade and 
investment, and supports the states’ right to use the worldwide combined unitary 
method.71
The Council of State Governments (CSG) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit 
organisation whose goal is to promote the sovereignty of the states within the U.S. 
federalist system of government. CSG’s principal constituents are state legislators, state 
cabinet and agency officials, and state constitutional officers and their staff.72 CSG has a 
committee responsible for developing activities in the international arena of importance to 
U.S. states, including the coordination of exchanges and discussions between U.S. state 
and foreign government officials, and the development of special conferences on 
international issues. CSG also helps in the preparation of amicus briefs to the U.S. 
Supreme Court in cases involving states’ rights. CSG views are coordinated with the 
National Conference of State Legislators, the National Association of Attorneys General, 
and the National Governors’ Association. The CSG was supportive of the states’ right to 
use the WWC method.73
Citizens for Tax Justice is a research and advocacy organisation which focuses 
on federal, state and local tax policies. CTJ was founded in 1979 “to give ordinary people 
a greater voice in the development of tax laws.. .against the armies of special interest
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lobbyists for corporations and the wealthy”.74 It is in favour of fair taxes for middle and 
low-income families, “requiring the wealthy to pay their fair share”, closing corporate tax 
loopholes, adequately funding important government services, reducing the federal
ne
deficit, and taxation which minimises the distortion of economic markets. Citizens for 
Tax Justice was the only lobbyist at the federal level to join with state organisations in 
support of the states’ right to use the unitary tax method.
On an individual basis, in addition to California, states which were active in 
defending their use of the unitary method included Colorado, Florida, New York, North 
Dakota, Oregon, Washington, Montana, and Alaska.76
e) Agendas
The policy agendas held by U.S. states during the debate over California’s unitary 
tax were divided between desires to promote their jurisdictions’ competitiveness, and 
strongly-held beliefs that states had the right to formulate their own economic policies. 
Even if states do not employ a particular economic regulation themselves, they typically 
support other states which implement controversial regulations on the grounds that each 
state has the right to formulate its own economic policies under the U.S. federalist 
system. This is particularly true in regards to revenue-raising policies, such as taxes, 
which are considered a key component of state sovereignty. States may also wish to 
support another state’s right to implement an unpopular regulation they are not 
themselves employing in order to attract business to their own jurisdiction. This is 
especially true if a regulation has international implications, since there is a strong 
element of competition between U.S. states in international trade promotion.77
All U.S. states strive to attract investment to and trade with their state in order to 
promote their economies. Local regulations which violate international norms are often 
put in place to promote specific state economic interests, or help local populations cope 
with the impact of external economic forces by providing special help. If such regulations 
lead to sanctions from the U.S. federal government, foreign governments, or international 
organisations, or to diminished trade and investment from businesses upset with a state 
policy, states may have to reevaluate the efficiency of such regulations. However, state
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officials may seek to maintain regulations which violate international norms if they 
provide a large source of income, or a revenue source difficult to replace, in order to 
provide services to their constituents and gain reelection.
Furthermore, the states maintained that their use of the WWC method did not 
cause large problems or interfere with economic development or international 
commerce.78 As foreign direct investment in the U.S. grew throughout the 1980s and the 
number of U.S. MNEs expanded, a larger proportion of state revenue became dependent
7Qon taxing overseas assets and the states’ position hardened. Many state advocates felt 
they must follow the principle of “equal treatment of similarly-situated taxpayers” when 
accounting for the income within a state’s jurisdiction, and they viewed worldwide 
combined formulary apportionment as a means to place all businesses on an equal 
footing, whether they operated exclusively in-state, exclusively within the U.S., or 
worldwide.80
The WWC method was seen as a means to cope with increased international 
activity in the state, and revenue raised from a special fee imposed on MNEs electing not 
to be taxed under the WWC method after California’s 1986 unitary reforms was 
specifically earmarked to help cope with the impact of increased international activity in 
the state. In addition, the early 1980s saw a dramatic rise in the level of foreign direct 
investment in the U.S.,81 and there was a belief that foreign MNEs operating in the U.S., 
especially Japanese companies, were not shouldering their fair share of the U.S. tax 
burden.82 The unitary tax issue was therefore framed by the states as a way to prevent tax 
avoidance by large multinational enterprises, especially foreign MNEs. California, 
along with other states, ultimately reversed this belief with the growing realisation that 
the state was economically dependent on out-of-state, and particularly, foreign business, 
and that maintaining the unitary tax method was ultimately harming state interests by 
driving away investment. However, the state of California always sought to maintain the 
principle that it could use the WWC tax method in order to avoid paying back taxes the 
state had already collected under the method.
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f) Assets
i) Legal
Article 10 of the U.S. Constitution declares that “the power not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people”. The courts have been stout defenders of most states’ 
rights arguments in the area of taxation, viewing the ability to provide revenue as central 
to state sovereignty. State regulatory powers are both strong under the highly developed 
U.S. legal system, and wide in that state laws cover a broad range of areas.
However, in the 1985 case Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 
the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the “principal means” by which the role of the states 
in the federal system is to be ensured “lies in the structure of the Federal Government 
itself’.84 The court thus ruled that the main protector of the states’ status as vital decision­
making entities in the U.S. system would have to be the clout of states within the political 
institutions of the national government, rather than constitutional safeguards enforceable 
by the Supreme Court. States, in short, would have to look out for themselves by lobbying 
in Washington against possible national intrusions into their policy domain.85 On April 
20, 1988, South Carolina v. Baker reaffirmed the Garcia decision that the Constitution 
contains no substantive protections for state and local governments against national 
regulatory powers. Instead, national intervention may be limited by the courts only if the 
U.S. political structure that authorised it is proven defective in representing state 
governments.86
Under the U.S. constitutional framework, states have political power in the federal 
government through two means: representation in Congress, which has the power to pass 
federal laws, and possession of the electoral votes needed to technically elect a U.S. 
president. These two channels give states additional informal means of influencing 
national policymaking, since state-level political networks are vital in providing ground- 
level support to elect congresspeople and the president and, subsequently, in supporting 
the passage of congressional legislative packages. These channels of influence support 
much of the substantial legal maneuvering room for states within the American federalist 
system. In addition, since state governors have essentially the same electoral base as U.S.
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Senators, the governors are seen as a particularly effective channel for state input on 
national policies.
ii) Economic
In their negotiations with business, U.S. states have the power of controlling large
0*1
economies on an international scale which cannot easily be ignored by MNEs. Certain 
states may possess attractive economic resources specific to their jurisdiction, such as 
dominance in a specific industry (computers, aerospace, entertainment), natural resources 
(agricultural, timber, oil), or human resources (highly educated, skilled, or technical 
workers). U.S. states also possess strong marketplaces with relatively high spending 
power; more populous and wealthier states have an obvious advantage in state-firm 
bargaining over issues that involved market access. As well, states which, through 
immigration, possess cultural or economic links to foreign countries may be particularly
attractive to those countries as partners in trade and investment.
\
iii) Institutional
U.S. states hold substantial institutional power through the size and strength of 
state government bureaucracies. The U.S. federal government’s “War on Poverty” under 
President Johnson's Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 laid the basis for the bureaucratic 
growth of U.S. state governments, and thus their ability to act independently of the 
federal government. Under President Nixon, the administration of these programs was 
decentralised in an effort to increase local initiative. The high level of bureaucratisation 
that remained in place at the subfederal level, no longer tightly controlled by the U.S. 
federal government, led to an increase in state activism in all areas of government.
This increased bureaucracy also supported the increasingly institutionalised 
involvement of subfederal governments in international affairs. The past twenty years 
have seen a surge in state executive agencies and legislative committees which monitor 
and promote state involvement in international economic affairs. These groups work in 
conjunction with national and regional multi-state associations, relevant federal 
institutions, and foreign governments. Such state institutional arrangements for 
conducting international relations have developed from initiatives put forth by individual
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governors, pressures from local business constituents, and encouragement from the 
executive branch of the federal government.88
4) Firms
a) Actors
State taxes often differ in their impact on small and large companies, especially if 
they are intended to discriminate in favour of in-state business. Most large U.S. 
businesses do not confine their activity to one state, making regulations which promote a 
specific state less beneficial for them. In addition, state revenues lost from revoking a 
targeted tax are often recouped through increases in the overall level of state sales or 
corporate taxes. Since multinational enterprises are outnumbered by small and medium­
sized businesses in most states, most companies operating in a state would favour a 
§pecific tax, which may not impact them at all, over an overall increase in the level of 
business taxes. However, groups which support the removal of an unpopular targeted 
state tax can argue that its repeal will attract more corporations to the state, raising the 
level of economic activity and boosting state sales and income tax revenue so much that 
an increase in overall tax levels will not be needed.
State economic regulations can also divide the lobbying tactics of U.S. and 
foreign-domiciled MNEs if the impact of the regulation differs based on a company’s 
nationality. In particular, since U.S. courts in the 1979 Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los A n geled  
case held that the “enhanced risk of multiple taxation” and foreign retaliation means U.S. 
states must be especially sensitive in areas of taxation which involve foreign commerce, 
foreign-domiciled companies have a stronger legal case against U.S. subfederal tax 
regulations.90
The Committee on State Taxation (COST) consists of more than 400 U.S. 
companies with income from multistate and international sources; a minority of its 
members have foreign headquarters. COST was formed in 1969 as an advisory committee 
to the Council of State Chambers of Commerce in direct response to the California 
Franchise Tax Board’s decision to apply the WWC method to the foreign activities of
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U.S.-based MNEs on a mandatory basis. COST lobbies against any arbitrary definition of 
a unitary company and seeks to defend MNEs on charges that they are deliberately 
shifting taxable income out of a state. COST was incorporated as a separate organisation 
on January 1,1992.
COST has been actively involved in the analysis of all aspects of state taxes and 
their impact on domestic and international business transactions, especially state taxation 
of foreign source income. It is against what it sees as extraterritorial taxation under state 
WWC methods, viewing the WWC method as radically departing from accepted 
principles of federal and international taxation, and interfering with the foreign relations 
and commerce of the United States.91 COST further objects to the method’s use because 
no deferral of payment is allowed, and dividends from foreign subsidiaries are taxed with 
no allowance for taxes already paid oversees. COST contends that both of these actions 
violate the tax principles embodied in the U.S. network of bilateral tax treaties, and
92supports the need for federal guidelines on state taxation of foreign source income. 
However, COST is in favour of letting companies elect whether they wish to be evaluated 
under the worldwide unitary method or the arm’s length standard.
The debate over state use of the WWC method was sensitive for COST because 
the Multistate Tax Commission lobbied heavily in favour of the states’ right to use the 
method, and the relationship between COST and MTC in the early 1980s was “not 
good”.93 At this time, there was an impression among COST members that anything the 
MTC supported as tax policy must be bad for business, and therefore, business should 
oppose it.94 COST and the MTC had almost no interaction during the 1980s, due to the 
feelings of COST members.95
The U.S. Council for International Business (USCIB) is the official U.S. 
affiliate of the International Chamber of Commerce, the Business and Industry Advisory 
Committee of the OECD, and the International Organisation of Employers. USCIB was 
founded in 1945 to promote an open system of free trade and bring the collective views of 
business to bear on regulatory issues and business practices around the world 96 USCIB
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has over 300 member U.S. corporations, including some foreign-headquartered U.S. 
affiliates, and lobbies U.S. and international policy makers.
USCIB has policy committees on Taxation, Trade Policy, Multinational 
Enterprises, and Investment. The Taxation Committee has over 250 corporate tax 
counsels as members, and seeks to enhance the competitiveness of U.S. business by 
promoting sound international tax policy, including the simplification of foreign taxes for 
U.S. multinationals and the deferral of U.S. taxes on income from foreign business 
activities. USCIB produces extensive recommendations on all proposed U.S. regulations 
on transfer pricing and revisions to the U.S. Model Tax Treaty. Through the BIAC, it also 
provides input on the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Model Double Taxation 
Convention.97
USCIB’s Taxation Committee has said it will continue to “oppose adoption of 
formulary apportionment in the U.S. on a federal basis, and other legislation which would 
override U.S. tax treaty obligations or otherwise discriminate against foreign taxpayers, in 
part on the grounds that such action would expose U.S. companies abroad to 
retaliation”.98 However, the USCIB was originally split on whether to lobby for optional 
use of the WWC unitary method or a total ban, because several of its foreign-domiciled 
members benefited from filing under the method. The matter rose to the USCIB’s 
Executive Council, which gave permission for the group to come out in favour of 
outlawing the method completely, despite fears that some members would leave the
99organisation.
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is a world business 
organisation which promotes international trade, investment, and the market economy 
system. Located in Paris, the ICC communicates with the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Union, the World Trade Organisation, and other U.N. 
organisations to establish the business stance on broad issues of trade and investment 
policy as well as on subjects such as international taxation. The ICC supports the 
undiluted use of the international arm’s length standard as the only legitimate approach to 
transfer pricing regulations.100
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In 1986, the International Chamber of Commerce condemned unitary taxation, 
stattimg that: “The ICC views with concern the inevitability than an increase in cases in 
whiiclh profits taxes are levied by political sub-divisions unencumbered by treaty 
obligations will result in mounting double taxation of profits (which tax treaties set out to 
avoid). The dangers of double taxation and the administrative problems arising from the 
taxation policy of California, and other political sub-divisions, have undoubtedly deterred 
would-be investors from making investments which would otherwise have been 
undertaken”.101
The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) is a nonprofit business 
association comprising more than 14,000 manufacturing and related businesses operating 
in the U.S., of which approximately 10,000 are small manufacturers. The vast majority of 
the ir membership consists of U.S.-domiciled companies.102 NAM’s mission is to enhance 
the competitiveness of manufacturers by shaping a legislative and regulatory environment 
conducive to U.S. economic growth; in this vein, it strives to reduce foreign trade barriers 
as a means of increasing U.S. exports. NAM has a Vice President of Taxation and 
Economic Policy, whose goals include simplifying the international tax regime to reduce 
the overhead costs of export production and foreign investment.103
NAM feared state use of the worldwide unitary tax method might trigger foreign 
retaliation which would interfere with foreign trade, disrupt international flows of capital 
and technology, and harm U.S. commercial interests abroad.104 However, the organisation 
was not strongly involved in lobbying against the unitary method, since most members 
did not view the issue as a priority.105
The Business Roundtable is an association of approximately 200 CEOs from 
U.S. headquartered companies seeking to ensure that U.S. public policy helps the 
competitiveness of U.S. business. The Business Roundtable maintains a task force on 
fiscal policy and a task force on international trade and investment, which has aims to 
enhance the competitiveness to U.S. business in global markets.106 Although there was 
mixed sentiment among the organisation’s membership over whether to take a strong 
stance on the unitary issue, since some members benefited from filing with the states
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under the WWC method, The Business Roundtable opposed state use of the WWC 
method as contrary to established international norms.107
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, represents an underlying membership of more 
than three million businesses, of which over 96% have fewer than 100 employees. The 
Chamber is an advocate for the American business community, particularly small 
business, and champions the principles of private enterprise before Congress, the White 
House, regulatory agencies, and the courts. The Chamber was opposed to state use of the 
WWC method and started a ‘red-flag’ campaign to encourage companies not to invest in 
states which used the method.108
The Tax Foundation was founded in 1937 as a non-profit, non-partisan 
educational organisation to promote “tax consciousness” in the public by distributing 
“objective, unbiased” information on public sector finance at all levels of government and 
the general public.109 The Tax Foundation promotes the following principles: simplicity 
of tax compliance, stability through non-frequent changes in the tax code, a well- 
informed citizenry which understands the tax system, neutrality, no retroactivity in tax 
legislation, and the promotion of the free flow of goods, services, and capital, 
domestically and internationally.110 Although the Tax Foundation did not take a position 
on the states’ use of the WWC method, it issued documentation describing the 
controversy and decrying uncertainty over the method’s legality as a complicating factor 
for both business and the states.
The Tax Executives Institute (TEI) is a professional association of 4,000 
business executives responsible for tax affairs. TEI is concerned with the administrative 
aspects of tax policy, with the goal of reducing the costs and burdens of taxpayer 
compliance. TEI has a State and Local Tax Committee, and has long been interested in 
minimising and rationalising the administrative and fiscal burdens placed upon 
multijurisdictional businesses through the use of the worldwide combined unitary tax 
method.111
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However, TEI held no uniform opinion on whether worldwide combination was a 
fair method of taxing a business, since TEI contains a large number of both California and
117foreign-based companies. The broad-based nature of the group’s membership means it 
often fails to reach a consensus on controversial policy questions.113 However, TEI stated 
it was in favour of allowing taxpayers a yearly election to use the worldwide unitary 
method if they so chose, along with more precise definition of which members of a 
corporate group could be included in a combined tax return; they also opposed the 
inclusion of foreign subsidiary dividends in any unitary income base subject to 
taxation.114
The American Tax Association, The National Association of Tax 
Practitioners (NATP), and The National Tax Association (NTA) are leading non-profit 
professional associations for people who work on tax issues in the U.S. Although they do 
not generally take positions on tax policy issues, these groups sponsor continuing 
education classes which are required for all U.S. Certified Public Accountants (CPAs), 
and hold meetings to decide on common tax practices. Participation in these bodies 
ensures that all the professionals involved in any taxation controversy in the U.S. know 
each other and meet on a regular basis. This means that, in effect, foreign and domestic- 
owned companies, small and large firms, and companies from every U.S. state are in 
constant contact with each other through professional tax bodies: an argument over 
subfederal taxation could travel among different cities through different meetings of these 
organisations.115
The European-American Chamber of Commerce (now known as the 
European-American Business Council) has a membership of European and American 
companies which lobby to promote non-discriminatory, unrestricted transatlantic trade 
and investment.116 The Chamber was against state use of the WWC method both on the 
grounds that it contravened U.S. federal principles and that it might provoke retaliation
117from European governments, sparking a transatlantic trade dispute. The Chamber 
lobbied against the WWC method in part by trying to convince both policymakers and the 
public that foreign-domiciled companies contributed greatly to the U.S. economy, and
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that any discrepancy in the amount of tax these companies paid to the U.S. federal or state
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governments could be at least partly explained by other means.
The National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) promotes “an open international
trade and investment regime”, and supports multilateral agreements and rules-based trade,
NAFTA, and the new WTO round.119 Its members consist of 500 U.S. companies with
substantial international interests.120 The NFTC supports tax legislation which allows
U.S. businesses to successfully compete against foreign companies. In keeping with this
goal, the Council supported reform legislation on the unitary method which would ensure
that states “equitably” taxed foreign source income, including dividends, earned by U.S.
companies, so that U.S. businesses could successfully compete against their foreign 
121counterparts.
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) represents the views of all sectors 
of British companies. The CBI opposed the mandatory application of worldwide unitary 
taxation in California as contrary to international tax policies and leading to an excessive 
burden of compliance on British firms.122 The Confederation of British Industry formed 
the Unitary Tax Campaign (UTC), a group of 65 British firms operating in the U.S., 
which led British efforts to fight U.S. state use of the WWC method. The UTC lobbied 
for: a) worldwide application of the international standard of arm’s length/separate 
accounting; b) determination of the water’s edge definition in state law according to the 
principles set out in the U.S./UK tax treaty; c) U.S. state corporate taxes not exceeding 
the burden of compliance required for U.S. federal tax purposes.123
The Organisation for International Investment (OFII) was founded by foreign 
investors in the U.S. to be their representative on tax issues, in particular on the debate 
over U.S. state use of the WWC method. OFII worked on this issue in coordination with 
the Union of Industries of the European Community, the Unitary Tax Campaign, and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Business Industry Advisory 
Committee (BIAC).
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OFII argued that foreign investors were discriminated against in the states’ 
application of the WWC method, since: a) foreigners were taxed on financial income 
(book income) from sources outside the U.S., not taxable income. Under the Internal 
Revenue Code provisions, corporate taxable income averages only 40-50% of book 
income. Because of this alone, they argued, foreigners were double taxed compared to 
U.S. companies; b) all of the failings of the unitary formula concept, such as factor 
distortions and currency exchange rate distortions, have a significantly greater impact on 
foreign investors than U.S. companies because they generally have more of their business 
activities located outside of the U.S.124
The Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development represents private sector interests from the 
OECD’s 29 member countries. Located in Paris and founded in 1962, the BIAC was also 
opposed to the use of the worldwide combined unitary method by any tax jurisdiction.125
Japanese groups which lobbied on the unitary tax issue included the U.S. Japan 
Businessmen’s Conference, the Japan-U.S. Economic Relations Group, and the 
Electronic Industries Association. All of these groups sought the abolishment of the 
unitary tax through either state or federal laws, and argued their members would reduce 
investment in U.S. states using the method, increasing unemployment in the U.S. and 
worsening U.S.-Japanese trade relations. Sony CEO Akio Morita also founded a 
Worldwide Unitary Tax Council for the Keidanren (the Japan Federation of Economic 
Organisations), of which he was vice chairman. In December 1987, the Keidanren 
replaced this group, and its California branch, the California Investment Environment 
Council, with an Investment Promotion Council, made up of 171 Japanese firms, to 
promote non-contentious Japanese investment in the U.S. Japanese lobby groups were 
most concerned with the high costs the mandatory WWC method was imposing on their 
companies, since Japanese firms were making large new capital investments in 
California. These subsidiaries often had high start-up costs in the U.S., but, under the 
WWC method, the U.S. states effectively taxed their parent company’s high profits in 
Japan. In addition, companies in Japan had a very different system of fringe benefits, so
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they argued that payroll comparison between the two countries, in particular, were 
inaccurate.
In addition to group organisations, U.S. companies who were particularly active 
lobbyists against California’s use of the WWC method included: General Mills, Ford 
Motor Co., Firestone Tire & Rubber, Honeywell, Allegheny Ludlum Industries, Kraft, 
TRW, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., PPG Industries, and Hewlett-Packard 
Company. IBM was also a strong lobbyist against the unitary tax,126 along with The 
Coca-Cola Company.127
b) Agendas
All firms want to maximise profits by paying as few taxes as possible. Therefore, 
the bottom-line financial benefit or disadvantage of a state tax regulation will often 
determine a firm’s stance on a subfederal policy issue. Moreover, since tax laws differ in 
their specific impact on various companies, there will always be companies that want 
these laws fine-tuned in their favour, through adjustment of definitions or ratios, in ways 
that have little to do with ideology.
However, there will also be U.S. companies concerned with the economic 
consequences of incurring retaliation from foreign governments offended by U.S. state 
regulations. Equally, companies may believe that in the long-term, adherence to one 
disadvantageous international norm will be overcome by the benefits of belonging to a set 
of standards which allow businesses to operate more easily on an international basis. U.S. 
firms with extensive overseas involvements strive to promote the principle of a ‘level 
playing field’ between themselves and their foreign competitors by having all MNEs 
adhere to the same set of international norms, equally applied. A business group 
organisation may opt for a compromise option if some of its members benefit from a 
certain regulation and others do not.
Many smaller firms which do business only in the U.S. may not care about U.S. 
state violations of international norms; instead, they may feel that such ‘violations’ are 
measures designed to help them against competition from global business or global
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economic events. Small or in-state firms may also fear that any measure which results in 
fewer taxes for MNEs will result in a loss to state revenue, leading to a rise in general 
state tax levels which will more heavily affect small firms.
c) Assets
i) Political
U.S.-domiciled companies can argue their status as constituents, stressing that 
they should not be hampered by burdensome state tax regulations or suffer losses from 
foreign retaliation over state laws. MNEs domiciled in an offending state can make these 
arguments even more potently, especially if the threatened foreign retaliation is directed 
against a specific state. Foreign-domiciled MNEs, meanwhile, can enlist the support of 
their home governments to impose country-wide sanctions against a particular U.S. state, 
or against the U.S. as a whole, if subfederal regulations remain unchanged. Although 
there is no quantitative work in this arena, the trend points clearly towards a growth in 
this type of lobbying as U.S. state regulations have increasingly impacted foreign 
companies over the past twenty years. Examples of foreign companies enlisting their 
home governments to pressure U.S. states started with the California unitary case,
198 190detailed in Chapter Five (especially by the British, the Japanese, and other 
governments130), and the Massachusetts Burma law.131 Further examples include recent 
foreign government protests against U.S. state procurement practices and U.S. state 
standards and labeling requirements, included in complaints about U.S. barriers to 
trade.132 In addition, several countries have tried to subject U.S. state treatment of foreign 
investors to the disciplines of the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment and to 
the disciplines of the North American Free Trade Agreement.133
Foreign-domiciled MNEs can also lobby their home governments to present their 
case through diplomatic channels before the U.S. federal government and international 
organisations. They can try to convince policymakers that any reduction in their business 
activities in the U.S. from diplomatic sanctions over a subfederal policy will harm the 
U.S. national economic interest.134 These companies also have a stronger legal argument 
than domestic-domiciled companies against state laws which violate international norms
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since they can argue that such laws threaten the foreign policy of the U.S. by impeding 
the flow of foreign commerce.
ii) Economic
Businesses are able to threaten diminished investment or trade with a U.S. state 
enforcing unpopular tax laws, either because the regulations actually make business with 
the state prohibitively expensive compared to other locations, or in order to more 
forcefully lobby the state to change its regulations by stressing the company’s importance 
to the local economy. At the same time, companies can promise increased investment and 
trade if a U.S. state will change its regulations, even promising certain types of jobs or 
other resources which are particularly important to the local economy. Politicians may be 
influenced to change their position on state regulations in order to be able to claim that 
they have provided more jobs and investment for their constituents, and companies can 
also directly contribute money to the state election campaigns of politicians which 
support their position.
5) Foreign governments
a) Actors
Countries which are home to a large number of firms investing in the U.S. are 
often directly involved in seeking to influence U.S. subfederal laws which violate 
international norms. The Japanese government and the member states of the European 
Union protested the U.S. states’ use of the WWC method of unitary taxation: they felt the 
method harmed MNEs from their countries by forcing them to pay large tax bills and 
subjecting them to a risk of double taxation. Since no overarching mechanism operates 
between countries to ensure a company is not double-charged on its profits by different 
jurisdictions, MNEs operating in California ran the risk of paying money on one set of 
profits to several tax jurisdictions using competing transfer pricing regulations.
Foreign governments viewed U.S. state use of the WWC method as 
discriminatory to foreign-based MNEs: since foreign-domiciled MNEs generally 
conducted a larger part of their business outside of the jurisdiction of U.S. states, their
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governments contended they were subject to a higher risk of double taxation. In addition, 
foreign governments argued that the WWC method subjected foreign-based MNEs to 
greater compliance costs, since they had to overcome currency fluctuations and language 
barriers, and were forced to gather financial information from countries whose accounting 
standards and legal climates differed from the U.S.. Further, it was felt that the method, 
by effectively penalising firms which lost money in the U.S. while profiting overseas, 
inhibited the spread of new foreign startup companies, which typically lose money during 
their first years in the U.S.
The British government, moreover, saw the unitary issue as a matter of 
principle, fearing that use of the method would spread worldwide if the U.S. federal 
government, previously seen as the standard-bearer for the ALS, allowed the use of an
I «
alternative method to continue at the subfederal level. Other foreign governments also 
appeared concerned that the U.S. federal government might be weakening in its support 
for the ALS.136
b) Agendas
The governments of the U.S.’s major trading partners, in common with the U.S. 
federal government, wish to encourage a uniform international tax system to promote 
global economic growth through increased international trade and investment. To this 
end, the arm’s length standard has been widely promoted as the international norm for tax 
jurisdictions to use in evaluating MNE transfer pricing policies. Subfederal use of the 
WWC method created concern among foreign governments that the U.S. was weakening 
in its support for the ALS. This was particularly worrisome since America had led efforts 
to develop a tax treaty network among the major trading countries after W.W.II.,137 a 
network which enshrined the use of the ALS as the international norm.
Fear among foreign governments that U.S. support for the ALS was weakening 
grew after 1986 revisions of IRS transfer pricing regulations included the formulary 
apportionment-style profit splitting and comparable profit interval methods as optional 
methods to use in evaluating transfer prices. This was criticised by European 
governments, who felt it showed the U.S. was not fully committed to the arm’s length
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standard. At the same time, European governments also criticised the U.S. government 
for applying the arm’s length standard too rigorously and being out of sync with the 
Europeans’ more relaxed application of transfer pricing rules.138 Americans countered 
privately that European governments were only holding their transfer pricing regulations 
to the arm’s length standard without exception because they were not enforcing their 
regulations as strictly as the IRS.
The European, British, and Japanese governments were concerned that the use of 
the WWC method by any U.S. state would prompt other states to adopt the method. Such 
a spread at the U.S. state level, coupled with the optional use of formulary apportionment- 
type methods at the federal level, might lead to the establishment of the WWC method as 
an alternative standard for evaluating transfer pricing practices in the U.S. This, the 
governments felt, would worsen the global trade and investment climate by creating 
uncertainty for international business. In addition, it was feared that widespread adoption 
of the WWC method in the U.S. would encourage developing countries to begin using the 
method, which would disadvantage all MNEs by taxing them on an income base which 
included their much more expensive factors of production in developed countries. 
Moreover, all governments were concerned with the extraterritorial nature of the WWC 
method, and the risk of double taxation from having two systems of evaluating transfer 
prices in use.
Of all the European governments, the British were the most active lobbyists on the 
California unitary tax issues, since the British were the largest foreign investors in 
California during the early 1980s, when the debate took place (see Figure 14 in Chapter 4, 
p. 164) and since the British government in particular was concerned with stopping any 
spread of the worldwide unitary principle of taxation: the UK had seen itself as a 
standard-bearer in pushing for adoption of the arm’s length principle prior to this debate, 
and was particularly concerned with upholding the arm’s length standard in all 
jurisdictions, even subfederal ones.
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c) Assets
i) Political
In negotiating with the U.S. federal government, foreign governments have as 
political assets their prestige and standing within the international system, their power 
within international organisations to press other countries to change their policies, and the 
U.S. federal government’s need to maintain good relations with them to pursue American 
goals in other areas. When dealing with U.S. states, foreign governments have the 
additional asset of the novelty of their presence at this level of government, which may 
accord them greater attention. However, they can also be at a disadvantage at the 
subfederal level, since U.S. state governments have less experience than the U.S. federal 
government negotiating with foreign governments, and fewer institutions developed to 
interface with them effectively.
ii) Economic
Foreign governments can threaten to revoke bilateral tax treaties, or other bilateral 
economic treaties, if the U.S. federal government does not prevent U.S. states from 
propagating regulations which violate international norms. In addition, governments can 
threaten diminished investment and trade from their country by imposing sanctions or 
penalties against the United States as a whole or against specific offending states. On an 
informal basis, they can lend credence to MNE threats to lessen trade and investment with 
offending countries by encouraging a boycott by companies from their country. They can 
also refuse to grant market access or regulatory concessions to U.S. MNEs seeking to 
invest in their country, or exclusively to MNEs headquartered or doing business in an 
offending U.S. state.
6) International organisations
a) Actors
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is the
main intergovernmental forum for consultation and cooperation on economic and social 
policies, including taxation practice, among the free-market democracies of North 
America, Western Europe, and the Pacific.139 Most countries bilateral tax treaties are
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based on the OECD Model Tax Convention (revised in 1994, 1995, 1997,2000, and 
2003), which seeks to avoid double taxation “by allocating taxing rights between the 
resident and source countries and by requiring the former to eliminate double taxation 
when there are competing taxing rights.140 There are close to 350 tax treaties between 
OECD member countries, and another 1500 worldwide which are based on the Model 
Tax Convention.141 Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital lays out the basis for the adoption of the arm’s length standard in international tax 
arrangements, and for the treatment of MNE group companies as separate entities, instead 
of as a unitary group. The OECD model in this area has remained the same since 1963, 
and has provided the basis for the approach to transfer pricing policies used by most 
countries.
The OECD Model Tax Convention endorses the primary use of the ALS method, 
and allows countries to use formulary apportionment methods only if they have been 
customary in a country and if their results are not too different from those obtained under 
the ALS. The Model Convention also provides for non-discrimination in taxes, since 
Article 24 of the Model forbids OECD members from imposing any tax requirements on 
companies from other OECD countries more burdensome than those they impose on their 
own domestic companies.142 The reporting requirements of the WWC method have been 
condemned by foreign governments under Article 24 as effectively imposing a more 
burdensome tax requirement on foreign companies.143
The 1979 OECD report “Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises” rejected 
the use of worldwide unitary formulary apportionment except to verify an arm’s length 
price or in “specific bilateral situations” where other methods give rise to serious 
difficulties and the concerned countries are able to agree on a common approach to the
144use of formulary apportionment.
In 1984, the OECD’s follow-up report, “Transfer Pricing and Multinational 
Enterprises: Three Taxation Issues”, announced guidelines for specific parts of the 
banking sector, the problem of corresponding adjustments, and the handling of central 
management and service costs. In 1984 and 1985, the OECD Working Party on Taxation
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and Multinational Enterprises examined the use of the WWC method in several U.S. 
states and submitted a report to the U.S. administration pointing out problems which 
resulted from the worldwide unitary approach.145 In 1987, the OECD published a further 
report, “Thin Capitalisation”, which dealt with MNE tax avoidance through manipulative 
interfirm financing methods. In April 1993, the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
established a special task force to revise the 1979 transfer pricing standards.
The OECD special task force report of July 1995, “Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations”, stated that the OECD did not 
“consider global formulary apportionment a realistic alternative to the arm’s length 
principle”.146 Instead, the report stated that a global consensus had formed in favour of the 
arm’s length principle, and that OECD member countries supported this consensus.147
The 1995 report thus rejected worldwide taxation much more specifically than in 
previous OECD reports, and explicitly distinguished it from profit split methods. Profit 
splitting was to be allowed as a tax method of last resort, and its use was strictly curtailed. 
However, the permission given for use of the profit split method in any circumstances 
was itself condemned by French and German business, with support from their 
governments, as a breach of the arm’s length standard and a capitulation to U.S. 
government lobbying on behalf of its revised 1993 federal transfer pricing regulations 
which allowed for the use of profit splitting and the comparable profit interval method, 
both considered by the Europeans as formulary apportionment in essence.
The United Nations model income tax treaty also prescribes the use of the arm’s 
length standard.148 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) of the United Nations, 
which was created in April 1994, was not in existence at the time of California’s unitary 
tax controversy, but its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) was. The GATT had no explicit rules on taxation, but tax policy was seen as 
falling under GATT rules requiring national treatment and guaranteeing Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) status. The former prohibits a government from favouring its own citizens 
and enterprises over foreign citizens, and the latter prohibits favouring the producers of 
one nation over those of another. These principles were seen as applicable only to indirect
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taxes, such as sales, use and excise taxes, not direct income or capital-based taxes.149 
Therefore, the GATT did not issue an opinion on the use of formulary apportionment 
methods. However, in December 1981, in conjunction with a European Community 
complaint about the operation of the United States’ Domestic International Sales 
Corporations (DISCs), the GATT Council ruled that Article XVI: 4 of the General 
Agreement, which outlaws export subsidies, required that arm’s length pricing be 
observed; it therefore imposed parameters on the prices that may be charged between 
related parties in export transactions, but did not prohibit “the adoption of measures to 
avoid double taxation of foreign source income”.150
As a result of this GATT ruling, the EC and U.S. negotiated an agreement in 1981 
which replaced DISCs in the U.S. with Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs), foreign 
corporations responsible for certain sales-related activities of goods produced in the U.S. 
for export. The U.S. allowed a portion of a FSC’s export-related foreign-source income to 
be exempted from U.S. income tax. However, in June 1999, after further protests from the 
European Union, a WTO panel ruled this exemption was also a prohibited export subsidy 
under the WTO Subsidies Agreement since it created a financial benefit to companies by 
foregoing government revenue that would otherwise have to be paid.151 The U.S. 
government, however, claimed the 1981 EC-U.S. Agreement excluded Foreign Sales 
Corporations from the GATT list of prohibited export subsidies since FSCs were 
designed to prevent foreign-source income from being subject to double taxation.
Since the 1999 WTO ruling, the U.S. Congress passed a law modifying the tax 
treatment of FSCs; the EU has stated this modification is still unacceptable. The WTO 
panel reviewing the U.S. FSC replacement law ruled on June 22, 2001 that the new law 
did not bring the U.S. into compliance with its WTO subsidy commitments. On October 
15, 2001, the U.S. appealed this decision, but on January 14, 2002 the Appellate Body 
upheld the decision that the American FSC replacement law violated WTO disciplines on 
subsidies. The WTO Dispute Settlement Board then adopted the Appellate Body report. 
The EU has received WTO authorisation to retaliate against US$4 billion of U.S. 
merchandise imports annually, the maximum amount allowed by the WTO in such a
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case.152 The U.S. Congress is currently trying to pass FSC/ETI replacement legislation to 
that comply with the WTO ruling.
The GATT system has traditionally held a stricter view than U.S. law on the
discriminatory effects of U.S. state legislation. For example, in the “Beer H” case, a U.S.-
Canada GATT panel ruled in 1992 that Minnesota tax preferences for small beer makers,
allowable under the U.S. Constitution because they only favoured in-state companies by
default, since the tax was conditioned solely on the size of the brewery and was neutral
with regard to the location of the business, were in violation of GATT national treatment
1rules because they discriminated against large Canadian beer producers.
b) Agendas
International organisations such as the OECD and the GATT, designed to promote 
the free flow of international trade and investment, seek to encourage a uniform 
international tax system in order to facilitate more international trade and investment. In 
pursuit of their goal of uniformity, they have promoted the arm’s length standard as the 
international norm, not only for ideological reasons about the superiority of this method, 
since it taxes companies according to national legal boundaries, but in large part because 
the standard is already in widespread use. In their promotion of the ALS, international 
organisations sought to stop any U.S. state use of the WWC method for fear it might 
encourage the spread of an alternative transfer pricing standard and worsen the world 
trade and investment environment by creating a climate of uncertainty for business.
c) Assets
International organisations which regulate trade and investment establish 
guidelines and make public pronouncements to encourage national governments to 
enshrine international norms in their policies, providing political support to national 
legislation which embodies these norms. International organisations can also authorize 
retaliation by member countries against a country which violates international norms by 
suspending or withdrawing economic concessions agreed to by signatory members. In 
addition, the member countries of these organisations can seek to enforce an agreed-upon
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international norm outside of the organisation’s domain by threatening diminished trade 
and investment to or sanctions against a country which violates its rules.
The OECD’s main functions are policy surveillance and policy dialogue. The 
OECD has no direct enforcement powers over either governments or companies, but 
operates a consultation mechanism with regards to its Guidelines, a code of conduct for 
multinational companies, through the Committee on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprise (CIME), a management group associated with the OECD. 
However, this committee has left the dissemination of its opinions to national 
governments.154 Its codes are designed to be implemented through peer review and 
pressure.
Although the Contracting Parties to the GATT could, under Article XXIII, 
authorise the offended nation to retaliate against a country which had not honored a 
GATT decision by withdrawing or suspending concessions, its decisions could be 
ignored, and often were, in favour of compromises or political solutions.155 GATT dispute 
settlements operated on the principle of ‘consensus’ whereby a single member could 
exercise a veto, including the defendant. This meant GATT’s enforcement powers over 
national governments were very weak, took a long time to adjudicate, and were often 
viewed as overly politicised by member countries.156 Moreover, GATT provisions had 
generally been regarded as only applicable to subnational governments under GATT 
Article XXTV: 12, which provided that “(e)ach contracting party shall take such 
reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of 
this Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities within its 
territories”.157 Thus, the U.S. government had to implement GATT rulings on U.S. state 
laws.
In April 1994, after the debate over California’s unitary tax method had ended, the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was created. Unlike the GATT, the 
GATS implicates direct taxes, such as income or capital-based taxes, and allows countries 
to use different methods of direct taxation on companies from other member countries, 
provided that the difference in treatment is intended to result in an equitable imposition of
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1 sstaxes on companies from all the GATT member states. This may include allocating or 
apportioning a company’s income and profit in order to protect a member country’s tax 
base.159 GATS is also explicitly made applicable to subnational policy regulations,160 
since GATS Article 1:3(a) defines “measures by Members” as meaning “measures taken 
by...central, region or local governments and authorities”.161
The World Trade Organisation, created in 1994 as the umbrella organisation of 
the GATT and the GATS, established a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) whose 
procedures are explicitly made applicable to measures taken by subfederal governments 
or authorities located within the territory of a WTO member.162 The WTO dispute 
settlement mechanisms, unlike those of the GATT, operate on the principle of ‘reverse 
consensus’, whereby a veto of any decision requires unanimous support among all WTO 
members. There is also a structured setting of timetables for completing a case. Initial 
rulings are made by a panel established by the Dispute Settlement Body, with the 
possibility of appeals to an Appellate Body based on points of law. The panel report, 
including any changes made during the appeals process, is then passed to the Dispute 
Settlement Body for adoption. The losing party must report on its full implementation of 
the panel report within a “reasonable period of time”, or negotiate compensation with the 
victorious party.163 If no agreement is reached on compensation, the Dispute Settlement 
Body may authorise the winning country to implement retaliation, such as higher tariffs, 
against the offending country.164
U.S. states lobbied intensively to guarantee state interests in the federal legislation 
implementing the Uruguay Round Agreements, which established the GATS and the 
WTO, into U.S. law. As a result, the U.S. Uruguay Round Agreements Act declares that 
only the U.S. federal government can bring a court case against a state law for being 
inconsistent with the Uruguay Round Agreements.165 In addition, the Statement of 
Administrative Action of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act holds that the Agreements 
“do not automatically ‘preempt’ or invalidate state laws that do not conform to the rules 
set out in those agreements - even if a dispute settlement panel were to find a state 
measure inconsistent with such an agreement”.166 Moreover, the Statement of 
Administrative Action makes clear that “the Attorney General will be particularly careful
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in considering recourse to this authority where the state measure involved is...a state tax 
of a type that has been held to be consistent with the requirements of the U.S. 
Constitution”.167 This is seen as a direct reference to state use of the WWC tax method.
Further, the U.S. Trade Representative’s office submitted a formal list of U.S. 
reservations to the GATS which withholds U.S. agreement to national treatment of 
subnational taxes if state taxes provide favourable treatment to in-state services. The 
“Schedule of Specific Commitments for the U.S.” of June 29,1994 directly assures states 
of their freedom to tax foreign corporations under formulary apportionment methods by 
stating that subfederal tax measures which discriminate against companies from other 
WTO member countries by allocating or apportioning their income in order to protect a 
subfederal tax base are reserved from the scope of the GATS by the U.S.
7) Summary
This chapter has described the actors involved in lobbying to change U.S. state tax 
policies, focusing on the actors which took place in the debate over California’s 
worldwide combined unitary tax method. It has described each actor’s role in influencing 
U.S. state tax policy, its agenda on subfederal tax policies in general and with regards to 
subfederal use of the WWC method, and the economic and political assets each actor had 
at its disposal during the debate over California’s unitary tax method. It has thus 
described the first three components of the model being built to evaluate state-firm 
bargaining at the subfederal level: the actors, their agendas, and their political and 
economic assets.
Chapter Three supports the hypothesis put forth in Chapter One that powerful U.S. 
states such as California can maintain regulatory standards at odds with federal and 
international norms. As this chapter has made clear, the U.S. courts have proved 
ambiguous in their evaluation of the legality of international economic activism by states, 
which is less constitutionally clear-cut than U.S. state international political activism. The 
Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution holds that states are not bound by federal laws 
or international treaties unless it becomes apparent that state laws directly interfere with
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international commerce or U.S. foreign policy. Court rulings have declared that such 
‘direct interference’ is clear only when state laws diverge from specific congressional 
laws. However, Congress has joined the U.S. courts in its reluctance to consistently 
constrain states which violate international norms. U.S. entrance into multilateral 
agreements which seek to constrain state regulations have been followed by broad 
exceptions for state policies in the federal legislation implementing these agreements into 
U.S. law.
Federal reluctance to control U.S. state governments when their economic actions 
have adverse international consequences increases the power of U.S. state governments to 
bargain directly with foreign governments and multinational enterprises as actors in the 
international arena. This chapter thus provides support to the thesis’ second hypothesis 
that during state-firm bargaining over subfederal economic regulations, the U.S. federal 
government will not always be the preeminent negotiating channel for international 
actors.
This chapter has defined the relevant actors in the debate over California’s unitary 
tax, their policy agendas as they approached the debate, and the economic and political 
assets they had at their disposal. Chapter Five will be a detailed factual account of the 
debate over California’s unitary tax. Chapter Six will then evaluate how effectively the 
actors deployed their political and economic assets through various channels of 
negotiation during the debate, thereby completing the model of state-firm bargaining at 
the subfederal level in the case of California’s unitary tax. The following chapter will 
now examine the state of California as a lead actor in the debate over U.S. subfederal 
taxation of MNEs and in U.S. state activism in the international economic arena.
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Chapter 4: The State of California
1) Introduction
The previous chapter described the actors who took place in the debate over 
California’s worldwide combined unitary tax method. Chapter Four will now examine the 
state of California as a lead actor both in the debate over U.S. subfederal taxation of 
MNEs and in U.S. state activism in the international economic arena. It will describe the 
state’s political economy in order to provide a better understanding of the subfederal 
setting for the unitary tax debate and to examine the state of California as an actor in the 
bargaining process. This chapter will analyse California’s political and economic structure 
and its political and economic assets. It will follow Hocking’s definition of significant 
factors in determining a non-central government’s involvement in multilayered 
diplomacy: its physical location within the federal system (core vs. periphery regions of 
political and economic power), international linkages (geography, transborder relations, 
and cultural links), general resources (which include political culture and membership in 
cooperative mechanisms such as the National Governors’ Association),1 bureaucratic 
resources, the degree of asymmetry within federal systems, and the powers assigned to 
non-central governments within the federal system.
Chapter One asked the question: What capabilities do U.S. states possess when 
their economic regulations conflict with international norms? California has the largest 
U.S. state economy and one of the largest economies in the world. It is a leader in key 
technology and service industries, and is highly influential culturally. Further, as the 
largest exporting state and home to the most foreign direct investment in the U.S., it is 
interlinked with the international economy. The state has developed government agencies 
to assist its businesses internationally and a proto-trade policy to promote its unique 
economic interests. California also holds strong political assets. Its political structure is
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highly developed and strongly independent, and California is an important political force 
within the U.S. federal system.
As we shall see, California enormous political and economic assets helped 
convince the U.S. federal government to allow the state to continue to use a tax method at 
odds with federal and international norms. The legal ambiguity inherent in U.S. 
federalism, described in Chapter Three, combined with California’s strong political and 
economic assets to allow the state to defend its economic regulations against international 
and federal protests. Therefore, this chapter will lend support to the hypothesis put forth 
in Chapter One that powerful U.S. states such as California can maintain regulatory 
standards at odds with federal and international norms. However, it is important to note 
that as California became more economically dependent on foreign investment in the mid- 
1980s and went into a recession in the early 1990s, the state’s economic assets 
depreciated enough that California modified its unitary tax regulations in order to 
continue to attract foreign business to its jurisdiction.
This chapter also lends support to the second hypothesis put forth in Chapter One, 
that international forces do not always have their primary policy impact at the national 
level. This is particularly true in the case of California, one of the largest economies in the 
world, which maintains extensive international links through tourism, immigration, trade 
and investment.
Chapter Four will first describe the political structure of California’s state 
government, the state’s political culture, its corporate tax authorities, and the development 
of state institutions to implement California’s international objectives. A brief description 
of California’s economy and changes in its economic base, along with the state’s 
economic culture and foreign trade and investment picture, will follow. Chapter Four will 
then describe California’s particular political and economic assets, and how they changed 
over time. It will conclude by describing California-based lobbying groups which 
attempted to influence the state’s unitary tax reform legislation in 1986 and 1993.
126
2) Political structure
a) State government
Originally settled by Spain in 1769, California became a province of Mexico in 
1822 and was annexed by the United States after the Mexican-American war of 1846. The 
state government’s current powers are rooted in the state constitution, ratified on 
November 13,1849. In an unusual reversal of practice, and a precedent of the state’s 
future independence in formulating law, California ratified its state constitution before its 
formal admission into the United States of America as a territory. The U.S. Congress, 
divided over admitting another ‘free soil’ state which did not permit slavery, had 
repeatedly failed to grant California the territorial status which normally preceded 
statehood. California was therefore being ruled by laws which existed at the time of the 
American annexation: a frontier application of Mexican civil law ill-suited to its rapidly 
growing population. At the suggestion of U.S. President Zachary Taylor, California 
independently framed a constitution, written in both English and Spanish, and elected a 
legislature, which then elected two Senators to the U.S. Congress. The Senators went, 
state constitution in hand, to petition Congress for statehood, which was granted on 
September 9 ,1850.3
In 1879, California held a second constitutional convention, led by the 
Workingmen’s political party and small farmers, in hopes of breaking the power of 
railroad interests which had set up a political machine controlling the state legislature.
The new state constitution mandated regulation of big business, although the reform 
movement died out in the next several years and the railroad interests continued to 
dominate state-wide politics until the Progressive movement of the early 20th century 
again weakened the political party system in California.4
i) Legislature
The California state government, headquartered in Sacramento, California, has 
three branches: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. The California legislature 
passes laws, appropriates public funds, and confirms or rejects the governor’s appointees
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to positions in the executive branch of government. The California legislature contains 
two houses: the Senate, with 40 members, and the Assembly, with 80 members. Both 
houses have numerous standing committees which put forth legislation on specific issues. 
Within the California Senate, tax legislation originates in the Senate Committee of 
Revenue & Taxation. The Senate Committee on Finance, Investment & International 
Trade and the Senate Budget & Fiscal Review Committee review tax legislation. Within 
the California Assembly, tax legislation originates from the Revenue & Taxation 
Committee, and there are corresponding International Trade & Development and Budget 
& Appropriation committees which review tax legislation. Prior to 1995, during the time 
of the unitary tax debate, these last two committees were combined in the Assembly Ways 
& Means Committee.5 The Senate Revenue and Taxation Committee consists of 9 
members and 2 permanent staffers and meets twice a month; the Assembly Committee 
has 11 members and 2 permanent staffers, and meets weekly. The majority of the 
members of these committees, along with their chairs, come from the political party 
which has the majority of seats in each legislative house: in California, both the Assembly 
and the Senate are typically dominated by the Democratic party.
All state bills are nominated by an ‘author’, a legislator who submits the bill, and 
considered by one or more committees in either the Assembly or the Senate. If approved 
by a majority of a committee’s members, the bill goes to the floor for debate by the entire 
house. If passed, the bill moves to the other legislative house for consideration through 
the same process of committee and floor votes (see Figure 4 on p. 132 for a diagram of 
the typical path of legislation in California).
If a legislative house proposes amendments to a bill which the originating house 
does not agree with, three senators and three assembly members will form a two-house 
conference to agree on common language. If the conferees do not agree, the bill dies. 
However, if they present a recommendation for compromise, known as a conference 
report, and both houses vote to pass the report, the report goes to the governor for 
signature into law. If either house rejects the report, second and third conference 
committees may be formed. All state legislation must be approved by both the Senate and
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the Assembly and be signed into law by the state governor in order to become law. 
Appropriation bills, constitutional amendments, and urgency bills require that two-thirds 
of each legislative house vote in their favour before they become law; all other bills need 
the approval of a simple majority vote of each house. The governor may veto any bill 
passed by the legislature; however, a two-thirds vote by both houses can override a 
gubernatorial veto. According to the California Constitution, most bills go into effect as 
law on the next January 1st following a 90-day period from their enactment.
ii) Executive
The governor’s office, with its agencies and departments, serves as the executive 
branch of state government. The governor shapes the state budget, appoints key 
policymakers in the executive and judicial branches, and participates in reapportionment 
of the legislature and the California congressional delegation.6 Although many high-level 
state officers are appointed by the governor upon approval by the legislature, the 
governor’s powers are circumscribed: he shares power with five executive officers who 
are directly elected and can come from opposing political parties.7 In addition, his 
patronage opportunities are limited since the vast majority of positions in the executive 
branch are filled by the state’s civil service system based on merit.8 Since the executive 
branch officially only administers and enforces laws the legislature makes, “the policy 
priorities of the governor cannot be directly imposed”. 9 When working with state 
legislators, governors must rely on their “power to persuade”.10 The governor and his staff 
initiate, recommend, and influence legislation in an attempt to put the governor’s policy 
agenda into practice. The governor also influences legislation through his veto power and 
through his ability to submit the state budget, which often has wide-ranging policy 
implications.
Further, many ideas for statutory changes in the law originate within the agencies 
or departments of the executive branch. Some statutory changes, such as the 
implementation of the worldwide combination unitary tax system, are put into practice by 
the agencies of the executive branch simply upon the approval of the agency’s officials; if 
legislation is required to implement a change in agency practice, the governor’s legislative
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counsel will either draft a bill or request that a legislator do so. In addition, since many 
state laws are “broadly drawn”,11 it often falls to the agencies and departments concerned 
to work out the details of a new law through administrative decisions and regulations.
iii) Judiciary
The state courts, consisting of the justice courts, municipal courts, Superior 
Courts, Courts of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court, comprise a third branch of 
state government which enforces the statutes made by the state legislature (see Figure 5 
on p. 133 for a diagram of the judiciary structure in California). The California judicial 
system exists side by side with the U.S. federal court system. The California Supreme 
Court is the ultimate authority on the legality of state legislation, but the U.S. Supreme 
Court is the final interpreter of any decisions involving an application of U.S. federal law 
within the state. The U.S. Supreme Court also rules on whether state constitutions and 
state laws conform to the federal constitution; state courts are bound by its decisions.12
Although the state judiciary is often considered to be removed from political 
influence, California judges are appointed by the state’s governor for their accordance 
with his political views. Some judges are also subject to recall and public elections, 
leaving them open to the political process, including influence from special interests.13 In 
fact, the California judiciary has been called a ‘shadow government’ because of its 
increasing importance in shaping public policy.14
iv) Lobbyists
Seeking to influence the state of California are roughly 800 permanent lobbyists in 
Sacramento, the state capitol. These lobbyists consist of:
- contract lobbyists, who work for almost any client willing to pay their fees
- corporation lobbyists, who work for one company, primarily on bills directly 
affecting their firms, but who may work in concert with other lobbyists who 
share their companies’ goals, including contract lobbyists
association lobbyists, who represent groups of firms, agencies or professionals
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- public-agency lobbyists, who represent numerous cities, countries, and special 
districts, as well as state agencies
- public-interest lobbyists, who work on behalf of special interest groups, such 
as environmentalists, consumers, or women.15
In the year 2000, there were 1,024 registered lobbyists and over 350 registered 
lobbying firms representing some 1,956 paying interest groups in California.16 In the 
1988-1990 California legislative session, $194 million was spent on lobbying the 
California state government; this increased to $234 million in the 1990-1992 session, and 
$250 million in the 1992-1994 session.17
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Figure 4: Typical Path of Legislation in California
Source: League o f Women Voters, “Guide to California G o v e rn m e n t1992, p.39.
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Source: League of Women Voters, “Guide to California Government 1992, p. 59.
Supreme Court
1 Chief Justice and 6 Associate Justices
Courts of Appeal
18 divisions with 88 justices
Third District
1 division, 7 justices 
in Sacramento
Sixth District
1 division, 6 justices 
in San Jose
Superior Courts
58 (1 for each county) with total of 
789 judges and 131 commissioners 
and referees
First District
4 divisions, 4 justices each, 
and 1 division,
3 justices in San Francisco
Second District
5 divisions, 4 justices each, and 
one division, 3 justices in Los 
Angeles; 1 divison, 3 justices 
in Ventura
Fourth District
1 division, 8 justices in San Fifth District
Diego; 1 division; 5 justices 1 division, 9 justices in Fresno
in San Bernardino; 1
division, 5 justices in Santa
Ana
Municipal Courts
90 (in 38 counties) with total 
of 616 judges and 156 
commissioners and referees
Justice Courts
53 (in 29 counties) with 
total of 53 judges equal to 
53.3 full-time equivalent 
judges
Line of appeal
Line of discretionary review
133
The most common political resources lobbyists have “include bureaucratic 
knowledge, a network of contacts, citizen backing (size of constituency), an ability to make 
political contributions, and an ability to mount a public relations campaign”.18 Groups that 
are well-funded and well-organized are most able to decisively persuade politicians on their
19views.
b) State corporate tax authorities
The California Franchise Tax Board (FTB), created in 1929, is the division of the 
state executive branch which collects and administers state taxes based on income: personal 
income taxes and bank and corporation taxes. The board itself is composed of three officers: 
the state controller, the state director of finance, and the chairman of the state Board of 
Equalization (BOE).20 The state controller and the chairman of the BOE are both directly 
elected, and can come from a different political party than the governor; the state director of 
finance is appointed directly by the governor.21 The Franchise Tax Board is expected to be 
politically neutral. It is to function as a technical body of staff administering tax statutes, 
advising the state government on the consequences of tax policy changes, providing data, and 
reviewing revenue projections.
California’s bank and corporation tax is called a ‘franchise’ tax because paying a tax 
on corporation earnings is required as a privilege of doing business, or ‘having a franchise’, 
in the state.22 A corporation franchise tax is a prepaid tax for the privilege of doing business 
in the following year, and is measured by the amount of income the corporation earned in the 
preceding year (Chart 1 in Appendix 16 shows the amount of revenue California received 
from its bank and corporation tax in the 1980s compared to other sources of tax revenue. 
Chart 2 in Appendix 16 shows the amount of bank and corporation tax collected during the 
1980s from each section of the state’s apportionment formula: property, payroll, and sales). 
The state bank and corporation tax was set at 9.3% of net corporate income at the time of the 
unitary tax debate; it is currently 8.84%.23 The FTB has a staff of over 4,000 full and part- 
time employees, an annual budget of over $200 million, and processes nearly half a million
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bank and corporation tax returns each year.24 The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) runs 
annual continuing professional education courses for state examiners and briefs state 
examiners on international law.
The auditing staff of the FTB has had a poor reputation among the corporations it 
regulates as being adversarial and inflexible on regulations, and companies have frequently 
appealed to the board’s politically-elected commissioners to override staff “intransigence”.25 
Companies which disagree with FTB auditor judgments can protest them by filing an appeal 
to an FTB notice of proposed assessment; most of these protests enter into administrative 
hearing processes, handled by auditors, although a small percentage of cases which involve 
legal issues are addressed by FTB staff attorneys.26 If a resolution within the FTB is not 
found on a disputed assessment, taxpayers can file an appeal with the California Board of 
Equalization (BOE), the appellate body for Franchise Tax Board decisions on income and 
corporate taxes, which functions as a tax court.27 If the FTB loses before the Board of 
Equalization, the matter is settled. If the taxpayer loses the appeal, they can appeal to the 
California Superior Court, and further to the California Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme 
Court.28
The Board of Equalization (BOE) is a division of the executive branch of the state 
government which ensures that property throughout the state is uniformly assessed for 
taxation, directly assesses the property of railroads and public utilities, and administers state 
retail sales and use taxes, along with various other direct taxes. The board consists of four 
members elected from equalisation districts representing areas of the state nearly equal in 
population and the state controller, the chief fiscal officer of the state, who is directly elected.
When examining where power lies within the California state government, it is 
important not to discount the importance of the bureaucracy. In the case of taxation, this 
bureaucracy consists of members of the governor’s staff, the Franchise Tax Board, the Board 
of Equalization, and legislative assistants who work for the Senate and Assembly Revenue &
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Taxation committees. There is a great deal of networking among state staff working on 
specific policy areas, and a large amount of expertise has been built up in the small 
community which establishes tax policy in California. In particular, staff members of 
legislative committees generally stay in their positions much longer than their elected 
supervisors, particularly since the California legislature tends to stay consistently under the 
control of the Democratic political party. Staffers get relatively little publicity and have less 
contact with lobbyists than elected legislators.29 However, they generally have a greater 
knowledge of many policy issues than their elected representatives, and may feel more 
passionately about certain technical issues. They are therefore highly influential.
c) Development of state institutions for international relations
Before 1992, the primary state agency which dealt with California’s international 
trade was the Economic Development section of the California Department of Commerce, 
housed within the state’s Business, Transportation and Housing Agency. However, this 
agency concentrated mostly on California’s trade with the rest of the U.S. In 1983, in 
recognition of California’s growing international trade links, the California W orld T rade 
Commission (W TC) was established as a joint private-public body to create demand for 
California products overseas, provide assistance in financing exports, communicate the 
benefits of trade to the California business community, and influence public policy which 
might affect the state’s trade performance. The WTC statement of principles committed the 
Commission to promote free trade, increase exports, resist curbs on imports, and encourage 
the state and national governments to remove foreign trade barriers.30
In 1992, California Governor Pete Wilson, recognising the growing importance of 
promoting economic development and developing international links for California’s 
economy, consolidated all of the state bodies dealing with international trade and investment 
in a new Trade and Commerce Agency, headed by a Secretary for Trade and Commerce, 
who is a member of the governor’s cabinet.31 The agency’s mission is to encourage the state’s 
economic development and business competitiveness by promoting state exports and foreign
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direct investment, effectively marketing California in the world economy, and pushing for 
pro-business state policies, regulations, and tax reforms.32 The Trade and Commerce agency 
is divided into three functional areas: Tourism, Economic Development, which handles 
mostly local and domestic issues, and International Trade and Investment. The International 
Trade and Investment division includes the Office of Foreign Investment, which serves as a 
liaison with foreign companies, the Office of Trade Policy and Research, which provides 
trade statistics and advocates state and national policies which promote the development of 
California businesses, the Office of Califomia-Mexico Affairs, the Office of Export 
Development, which helps small and medium-sized companies with export marketing 
services, the Export Finance Office, which provides working capital loan guarantees to 
financial institutions for the export transactions of small and medium-sized California 
companies, and the World Trade Commission.33 The World Trade Commission now 
primarily functions as an advisory body dealing with policy formation. The WTC often 
lobbies the U.S. federal government on policy issues of importance to California business: for 
example, the WTC was very active in promoting the North American Free Trade 
Agreement.34
The International Trade and Investment division of the California Trade and 
Commerce Agency also contains California’s six overseas offices, in Tokyo, Hong Kong, 
Frankfurt, London, Taipei, and Mexico City, as well as two smaller offices in Johannesburg 
and Jerusalem.35 Although California policymakers sometimes refer to these offices as “mini­
embassies”, in reality their functions are far more limited.36 Office services vary, but they are 
designed to help state businesses contact joint venture partners, identify marketing 
opportunities, assist in trade fairs and investment missions, assist with local import 
regulations, and serve “as a constant reminder of the commitment of California to 
international trade and investment”.37
Within the California legislature, the Assembly Committee on In ternational T rade 
& Development, established in 1987 and reorganised and strengthened in 1997, handles
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international trade and foreign policy issues for the Assembly. This committee works with the 
federal government, notably the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Trade Representatives 
Office, on state issues which impact U.S. trade policy, from proposed state legislation 
sanctioning foreign countries on ethical grounds to the inclusion of provisions beneficial to 
California in multilateral agreements.38 The committee also oversees all state agencies 
dealing with international trade and investment, conducts state-wide hearings on international 
issues impacting California’s economy and export potential, and hosts foreign delegations 
visiting the Assembly.39 The Senate Committee on Finance, Investment & International 
Trade handles these duties for the California Senate; in addition, the Senate Committee on 
Economic Development occasionally looks at international trade issues. The Senate also 
maintains its own Office of International Affairs.40
d) Political culture
i) Individualism and pluralism
California has the most diverse population and geography of any U.S. state, with 
hundreds of distinct ethnic cultures, and huge economic and racial diversity 41 California’s 
diverse populations means that politics in California are “robust and no-holds barred.42 At the 
same time, the wide variety of competing interests within the state has strengthened the value 
California’s political culture places on individualism and led to “independent-minded voters 
who refuse to hew to a party line”.43 As a result, the state has a political culture with a strong 
reliance on direct democracy, policy innovation, and a mistrust of large traditional political 
influencers such as political parties and big business.44 As a result, “(i)n politics, as in many 
other fields, California often acts as the pacesetter” 45
ii) Isolation
California has long viewed itself as a land apart from the national centers of power 
located on the East Coast. This remove was most strongly felt during the early years of the 
state, before the widespread use of air travel and the development of the U.S. highway system 
in the 1950s. Before the mid-20th century, the Western mountain ranges and deserts provided
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a formidable physical barrier to contact with the population centers of the East Coast that was 
bridged only by the railroads. The relative isolation of California from other parts of the 
country helped fuel a sense of political independence which contributes to the state’s often 
defiant attitude towards the U.S. federal government.
iii) The North/South divide
California has an enduring political, social, geographic, ethnic and economic split 
between the northern, southern, and central sections of the state.46 On the political landscape, 
Southern California is conservative and Republican, with the exception of Los Angeles; 
Northern California is generally liberal and Democratic; and the Central Valley is politically 
split, with Democratic urban counties and Republican agricultural areas. Southern California 
has shifted since the mid-1970s from a manufacturing economy based on aerospace and 
shipbuilding to a service economy. Outside of the high-tech belt of Silicon Valley, northern 
California is mostly rural. The Central Valley is California’s heartland: primarily agricultural, 
with small cities and farms 47
These geographical splits, when added to the state’s tremendous ethnic and economic 
diversity, can keep the state from reaching a consensus on important policy issues 48 Such 
divisions can even preclude state unity. In a non-binding 1992 referendum, rural northern 
counties voted overwhelmingly to split the state in two, with a division between northern and 
southern California. This was followed by legislation calling for a popular vote on splitting 
California into three independent northern, central, and southern states; this legislation passed 
the California State Assembly, only to die in the state Senate.49 Such a move, which now 
seems unlikely, would have to be approved by the U.S. Congress.50
iv) Weak political parties and strong interest groups
California is characterised by weak, ineffectual political party organisations.51 This is 
primarily a legacy of measures erected during the state’s Progressive Era in the early 20th 
century which legally limited the role of California’s political parties. The Progressives
139
distrusted politicians and were convinced that political independence was a great virtue. 
California’s system of nonpartisan local elections acts as a deterrent to the development of 
strong party organisations at the grassroots level; a comprehensive civil service system has 
limited the ability of political parties to distribute patronage; and the extensive use of 
initiatives, referendums, and recalls in California have diminished the role of political parties 
in the formulation of state policy.52
California political parties are further hampered by independent voting patterns. 
Heavy immigration and the mobility of the population do not contribute to stable local 
political party organisations.53 These independent voters are more willing to vote for 
candidates, regardless of party, with ideas similar to theirs.54 The vast size of the state 
discourages face-to-face campaigns, making the mass media the major campaign 
battleground in statewide races.55 Since mass media-conducted campaigns are highly 
expensive, money has assumed a pivotal importance in California elections.56
With weak state political parties, interest groups have moved in to supply the funding 
necessary to mount expensive state-wide mass-media campaigns.57 As a result, California has 
become known as a strong interest-group state.58 Interest groups further thrive in California 
because the state’s vast size and diversity tend to thwart the creation of inclusive, broad- 
based political positions. Instead, the state’s complexity drives a more narrow, interest-group 
dominated agenda.59 The combination of California’s weak political parties and strong 
interest groups often results in a difficult environment in which to build political consensus 
and coherent public policy formation.
3) Economic structure
a) Economic boom
After World War n , California experienced a prolonged economic boom which lasted 
until the early 1990s. Even during the 1970s, when recession plagued the rest of the U.S.,
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California’s manufacturing employment increased at a rate more than five times the rest of 
the country. This economic boom shaped California’s policy choices; particularly during the 
boom of the 1980s, when Silicon Valley rose to prominence, the state remained untroubled 
about its business climate, and convinced its relatively high wages and tax rates were the 
rewards of its success.60
“Historically, the state’s remoteness from the industrial states of the East and 
Midwest caused it, from the beginning, to develop a fairly complex economy, rather than one 
devoted to a few specialized industries”.61 California’s economic boom was originally fueled 
by a massive military build-up during World War II which transformed the state from an 
agricultural economy to an industrial powerhouse. The growth in the economy fuelled a 
growth in the population: the state’s population grew by half a million people a year in the 
twenty-five years following WWII, and California overtook New York as the nation’s most 
populous state in 1963 62 After World War n, continued U.S. military conflicts and the 
nuclear arms and ‘space race’ of the Cold War fueled a boom in California aircraft and 
electronics firms, turning the state into the uncontested U.S. leader in military and technology 
production.63 This military build-up provided the state with a large pool of skilled technical 
workers, “sowing the seeds of the electronic and computer industries” which grew during the 
1980s.64 However, farming and related activities remain the state’s single largest employer. 
California’s warm climate, along with its use of advanced technology and marketing 
methods, make it the largest food processing employer among the states, and the leading 
agricultural state in the U.S., a position it has held for fifty years.65 California is also rich in 
other natural resources: it is the U.S.’s third-largest oil-producing state, behind Texas and 
Alaska, and contains large timber reserves.
California’s high immigration rate, high caliber universities, and a solid based of 
skilled technical workers from California’s history as a military production center gave the 
state a deep pool of intellectual talent for the provision of specialised services, particularly in 
technology and science-based industries 66 California is recognised as the birthplace of the
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Internet, the integrated circuit, the vacuum tube, and the microprocessor. With Silicon Valley, 
the state leads the world in ‘new economy’ and computer industries: California is home to 
such companies as Hewlett Packard, McDonnell Douglas, Intel, Yahoo, Netscape, Sun 
Microsystems and Cisco Systems.67
b) Economic culture
California is so large and diverse, both economically and geographically, that it is 
difficult to speak of a uniform state-wide business climate. Nevertheless, certain aspects of 
California’s economic culture can be highlighted.
Californians believe they have more entrepreneurial and innovative values than the 
rest of the country in everything from morality and social class to business and technological 
innovation.69 The state’s own website asserts that: “America looks to California as its 
bellwether, as the place where new lifestyles and attitudes begin...California is more than a 
geographical or political state. It is also a state of mind, a way of life, and an evolving 
dream”.70
California contains a unique lure as a destination for economic activity: a free- 
enterprise economy with the image of a place where exceptional opportunity is possible. 
“California is an example of what the future has in store for the rest of the nation. It has been 
the birthplace of many of the world’s most significant technology innovations, social trends,
71and is a model of economic innovation and prosperity”. California remains an economically 
experimental state, a place where nationwide trends originate, and writers on the state’s 
political culture often refer to the phrase “the edge of novelty”.72 This experimentation has 
expressed itself at the level of enterprises, since the state’s economy consists predominantly
*7<5
of manufacturing firms 25 to 50 percent smaller than the national average.
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c) Growing internationalisation
From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the period of California’s unitary tax debate, 
California’s links to the international economy grew exponentially. Between 1987 and 1992, 
California manufacturing exports escalated from $34 billion to nearly $70 billion; from 1991- 
1993, exports produced more than half of the state’s total economic growth74 (Figure 17 on 
p. 164 shows California’s long-term growth in foreign trade share as a percentage of the U.S.). 
California accounted for 15% of U.S. exports by 1993,75 making it the lead exporting state: 
international trade produced 9% of California’s 1993 gross state product.76
From 1983 to 1993, foreign investment in California increased fourfold.77 By the 
early 1990s, California was the leading location for foreign direct investment in the U.S., 
garnering 20% of total foreign direct investment in the U.S. in 1994.78 California accounted 
for a high proportion of foreign investment in real estate, services, and wholesale trade, and a 
relatively low share of investment in manufacturing.79
Although fluctuations in foreign direct investment in California have closely matched 
national activity over time, the sources of foreign investment have been different for 
California compared to the country as a whole. In the 1980s and early 1990s, European 
investments were spread throughout the United States, while Asian investors preferred 
California by a sizable margin. California has the largest sea and air ports on the West Coast, 
the largest U.S. state marketplace close to Asia, and close historical and immigration ties 
with Asia (Chart 8 in Appendix 16 shows the amount of foreign trade passing through 
California’s ports in the 1980s and 1990s). In 1994, European investors in California 
accounted for 40% of total foreign investment in the state, but constituted 52% of foreign 
investment in the United States as a whole. However, Asian investments made up 44% of the 
California total compared to 25% of the U.S. total. By 1997, California was the U.S. window 
to two-thirds of all import/export activity with Asia.80
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California’s close geographic proximity to both Mexico and Asia also made the state 
a center for foreign immigration, helping fuel a 25% rise in the state’s population between 
1980 and 1990.81 The immigrant pool brought enormous entrepreneurial energy to the state 
and increased its international ties while diversifying the state’s ethnic base.82 The state 
sustains major populations of Mexican, Chinese, Filipino, Iranian, Armenian, Asian-Indian, 
and Vietnamese, the vast majority of them first-generation immigrants: one in four 
Californians was bom outside of the United States.
d) Promoting California’s international agenda
The increase of foreign direct investment in California in the 1980s was quickly 
followed by a recognition of both the need to promote California as a location for 
international investment, and of how much prominence an economy as large and attractive as 
California’s gave the state at an international level.
In 1986, the California legislature’s Joint Committee on the State’s Economy and 
Senate Select Committee on the Pacific Rim held state-wide hearings on “California and the 
Pacific Rim”. That same year, the California Economic Development Corporation, a quasi­
official agency composed of local business and academic leaders, issued a study with three 
dozen recommendations on how the state could benefit from its growing interdependence 
with the Pacific Rim. The report, "California and the Pacific Rim: A Policy Agenda", stated 
that the worldwide combined (WWC) unitary tax method discouraged foreign investment in 
California, and advocated its repeal. Other U.S. states had begun to compete intensely for 
Japanese investment, and the absence or presence of the WWC method in a state was seen as 
an easy way for Japanese firms to eliminate states from their list of possible locations.
When California Governor Deukmejian made his first trade promotion trip to Japan in 
January 1987, he announced the opening of a California trade office in Tokyo. However, he 
was seen as a latecomer in the competition among U.S. states to attract foreign investment: at 
the time, 30 other states already had investment promotion offices in Japan. In February
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1987, the California Assembly Committee on International Trade and Intergovernmental 
Relations was formed to lobby for more state trade offices overseas and more money to 
promote state exports as growing state and national trade deficits focused attention on state 
trade promotion.84
California’s Lieutenant Governor McCarty presented a 65-page book entitled 
“California Trade Policy” at a 1986 meeting of the California World Trade Commission.85 
The report argued that as the state economy becomes increasingly internationalised and 
shifted from a manufacturing to a service base, the state government’s responsibility for 
promoting economic prosperity and a healthy tax base for state programs now required taking 
an active interest in international commerce. In addition, the report stressed that because of 
the “distinctive mix of the California economy”, California often had “interests that tend to 
be distinct from the rest of the nation”, necessitating a distinct state international economic 
policy.86
The World Trade Commission, started in 1983, stated that “(w)hat sets California 
apart from the export promotion efforts of other states is our determination to influence trade 
policy”, 87 and the group claimed several successes in this area: “following two leadership 
missions to Tokyo.. .(in 1985).. .the Japanese agreed to lower duties on several California 
agricultural products. We even helped prevail upon Taiwan to toughen its intellectual 
property rights laws, at last giving relief to California manufacturers of aerospace parts, high-
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technology equipment, pharmaceuticals, and wearing apparel”. In 1986, the WTC presented 
a list of trade barriers to California products in Pacific Rim countries. This was intended to 
give information to U.S. federal officials for use in international trade negotiations, 
particularly the Uruguay Round talks of the GATT.89 In addition, the Washington D.C. office 
of the California governor, which lobbied the federal government on behalf of the state, 
contained a representative of the World Trade Commission who worked to ensure federal 
negotiators in the international trade rounds addressed the interests of California industries.90 ’
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In 1993, an article in Foreign Affairs stated that “California is so big, and its problems 
so immense, that it needs its own foreign policy. In an era when economics commands 
foreign relations, this does not mean embassies and armies, but it does mean more trade 
offices and state agents in foreign countries, its own relations with foreign nations and a 
governor and legislature willing to represent the state’s interests independently of 
Washington”.91
e) California’s deteriorating economy
After the state’s continuing economic boom from the 1940s through the 1980s, the 
early 1990s saw the start of a sudden, deep, and unexpected economic recession in
QOCalifornia. A series of natural disasters severely damaged California’s economy: the 
drought of 1987-1992 cost California farmers $3-4 billion; the Loma Prieta earthquake of 
1989 resulted in roughly $10 billion in losses, and property losses from the 1991 Oakland fire 
and the 1993 Southern California fires were estimated at $4.7 billion.93 The Los Angeles riots 
of 1992, precipitated by the acquittal of four Los Angeles police officers who beat Rodney 
King, cost the state approximately $1 billion, and the 1994 Northridge earthquake further 
stressed the state’s infrastructure.94 California’s economy had thrived for many years in part 
because of federal defense funding. However, the end of the Cold W ar brought with it a 
downsizing of federal money flowing into California’s defense, high-tech, and aerospace 
industries and the closure of many military bases in California.95 The state’s economy was 
further weakened by increased immigration in the 1980s of poor people from Mexico and 
Central America moving to California.96
The state’s downturn was compounded by a national recession which began in 1990. 
The California Commission on State Finance estimated that 50% of state job losses in the 
early 1990s were a result of the national recession, 25% had been lost due to the direct and 
indirect impact of national defense cutbacks, and 25% had been lost to various factors such as 
high state land costs, congestion, environmental concerns, and a difficult state regulatory 
environment for business.97
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Indeed, a widely cited study of manufacturing firm migration out of California helped 
establish the image of a state losing jobs to other, more business-friendly states as a result of 
government-induced problems.98 At the same time, a survey by the California Business 
Roundtable cited taxes, workers’ compensation costs, and labour and housing costs as 
problems contributing to a worsening state business climate, and portrayed California 
policymakers as “indifferent if not hostile to business”.99
California’s government faced the most severe fiscal crisis of any state in the 
recession.100 A series of state budget crises in the early 1990s repeatedly brought California 
to the brink of bankruptcy as the state’s ability to raise taxes was constrained by several state 
initiatives, most notably the Proposition 13 initiative of 1978, which severely limited 
California’s ability to collect revenue through property taxes. By 1992, the state, having run 
out of cash, was forced to issue IOU warrants, which were honored by many banks for only 
the first month. California’s budget shortfall totaled $38 billion from fiscal years 1991/1992 
to 1994/1995.101 Moreover, California’s governor and legislature seemed unable to 
effectively address the fiscal crisis, in part based on “the weakness of California’s policy­
making culture”.102 By June 1994, California’s jobless rate of 8.3% was the highest of any 
industrial state, and domestic migration to the state turned negative.103
At the same time that California was suffering economically, the foreign investment 
the U.S. had grown increasingly dependent on to generate employment began to drop. In 
1992, foreign direct investment in the U.S. fell 47% from the previous year in its fourth 
consecutive year of decline.104 Observers felt that several factors lay behind this trend: 1) 
global recession; 2) increased economic integration in the European Union and the opening 
up of Eastern Europe diverting investment from the U.S.; and 3) an increase in trade and 
investment barriers in the U.S. after resentment to a foreign take-over wave in the 1980s 
created a backlash against foreign investment.105
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Although the recession of the 1990s ran a full five years, California’s economy has 
since rebounded.106 By 1998, California had almost fully recovered from the recession, due 
largely to the diversity of its economy.107 The state seems to have made a successful shift 
from an economy dependent on defense contracts to a more service-based economy, with the 
rise of Silicon Valley and the continued growth of the entertainment industry.108 Even during 
the depths of the recession, the service sector never shrank, but only experienced slower 
growth for a few years.
4) Assets
a) Political
This section of the chapter will examine the factors Hocking defines as significant in 
determining the pattern of non-central government involvement in multilayered diplomacy: 
physical location within the federal system (core vs. periphery regions of political and 
economic power), general resources (which include political culture and membership in 
cooperative mechanisms such as the National Governors’ Association), bureaucratic 
resources, the degree of asymmetry within federal systems, and the powers assigned to non­
central governments within the federal system.109 A further significant factor, the 
international linkages (geography, transborder relations, and cultural links) of non-central 
governments, will be discussed in the following section describing California’s economic 
assets.
California is a core region of the U.S. political and economic landscape, yet its 
geographic distance from the East Coast policy establishment means it often experiences an 
asymmetry between its perceived power and its influence within the U.S. national arena, a 
feeling that it is ‘not getting its due’ from the central government. As a result, the state often 
views itself as a distinct region within the U.S. which needs the freedom to act independently 
of the federal government.110 California has a long history of formulating environmental 
protection, worker safety, and consumer protection regulations more restrictive than U.S.
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federal standards:111 in many policy areas, California laws are often created before federal 
statutes exist.112 There is a perception among state policymakers that a “California 
perspective” exists, and that such a perspective serves to raise both federal and international 
standards.113
At the same time, California holds important power at the national level. With the 
largest population of any U.S. state, California has the largest number of state electoral votes, 
20% of the number needed to elect the president, and these votes are heavily courted in any 
presidential contest.114 However, the state’s influence on East Coast decision-makers peaks 
during presidential election years, and falls off somewhat afterwards.
The state fields two Senators and 52 Congresspeople, the largest state delegation in 
the U.S. Congress.115 However, the state’s diversity means its representatives often lack the 
shared sense of perspective that would result in a unified state agenda around which to unite. 
Instead, California’s congressional delegation has traditionally divided sharply on partisan 
grounds, diluting its numerical strength.116
More evidence of California’s political strength is provided from the fact that 
“California is widely viewed as a cradle of cutting-edge social and political movements”.117 
Many of the recent political ideas which have sprung up in the United States started in 
California: the tax-revolt movement, the campaign finance reform movement, and debates 
over immigration, bilingual education, and affirmative action policies.118
Further, as detailed earlier, California has a strong political asset in its distinctive 
geography and ethnic composition. The state is geographically isolated from East Coast 
power centers, has links with Asia and Latin America instead of Europe, and contains a much 
more diverse ethnic base than the rest of the U.S. As a result, “California is in many ways not 
a state, but a nation”.119 Many California politicians, including former Governor Pete Wilson 
and ex-San Francisco Mayor Dianne Feinstein, have referred to the state as “the nation-state
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of California”.120 This attitude helped strengthen California’s willingness to confront foreign 
governments, multinational enterprises, and the U.S. federal government in the debate over 
its unitary tax method: in particular, federal threats of preemptive legislation created an 
“emotional forest fire”.121
In addition, California possesses extremely strong bureaucratic resources. It has a 
large pool of highly-skilled government workers to draw on. As described at the beginning of 
this chapter, California’s Franchise Tax Board runs a huge, efficient department with over 
4,000 employees and an annual budget of over $200 million.122 California has been at the 
forefront in developing state institutions, such as the World Trade Commission and the 
California Trade and Commerce Agency, to put forth a state international policy agenda. The 
California Assembly and Senate both house committees which promote the state’s 
international trade and investment. California is also a member of many state group 
organisations: the Multistate Tax Compact, the Western Governors’ Association, the 
Federation of Tax Administrators, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council 
of State Governments, and the National Governors’ Association. Such groups give California 
the ability to effectively represent its interests within the U.S. federal system by joining its 
political assets with those of other states.
b) Economic
California possesses extremely strong economic resources which have propelled the
state into becoming a “dominant player in national affairs”.123 In addition to having the
largest state economy within the U.S., California has what is often calculated as the seventh
largest economy in the world, with a gross state product of over $1 trillion.124 California’s
economy is further strengthened by its structural diversity, which usually spares the state
from regional economic downturns125 (Chart 3 in Appendix 16 shows the varied composition
of California’s gross state product). California leads the nation in several sectors of the
national economy: the computer, electronics, film and animation, multimedia, tourism,
1entertainment, biotechnology, semiconductor and aerospace industries. California has oil,
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natural gas, and timber reserves, and an extremely strong agricultural base, with important 
subsectors in citrus, livestock, cotton, timber, and specialty crops. This strong agricultural 
sector also accounts for the state’s economic productivity in the food processing, fertilisers 
and pesticides, and farm machinery sectors.127
As the most populous U.S. state, California offers a major consumer market of 33 
million people; the state accounted for roughly 12% of all retail sales in the U.S. in 1992.128 
In an age of increased international economic transactions, the state’s culturally diverse 
labour and consumer markets have helped serve as a jumping-off point between California 
business and both Asian and Latin American markets.129 California’s cultural links to 
international markets have grown tremendously in recent years, fueled by a surge in 
immigration which started in the 1980s.130 From 1982 to 1997, the state’s population 
increased at a rate double the nation’s population growth, with immigration coming mostly 
from Mexico and Central America, the Pacific Islands, and Southeast Asia. During the 1980s, 
“California’s Latino population increased by 55% and its Asian population went up by 
75%”.131 California’s population is also highly educated, particularly in technical fields.132
California’s large, ethnically diverse market and varied industry base position the 
state as a cultural leader, a trendsetter for both the U.S. and the world. California is an 
exporter of ideas, and the state’s popular culture is emulated not only within the U.S. but 
throughout the world.133 The California entertainment industry has proved the birthplace of 
many American trends, projecting an image of California worldwide. “Indeed, by the year 
2001 it could almost be said that the popular image of the United States outside the borders 
of the United States was California-oriented. From this perspective, California had become 
the prism through which the world was viewing the United States itself’.134 In addition to 
entertainment, Silicon Valley’s unique entrepreneurial business culture spawned a global set 
of imitators as California proved the predominant base for the ‘new economy’ of the 1990s.
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However, California’s economic assets, while extremely powerful, do fluctuate over 
time as its economy undergoes various phases. The state became increasingly dependent on 
foreign investment, particularly from Asia, during the mid-1980s (pgs. 143-144), and the 
economic recession of the early 1990s left the state in a much weaker position (pgs. 146- 
148).
5) California U nitary Reform  Lobbying G roups
Several unitary reform lobbying groups specific to the state of California were formed 
in the 1980s, at the time of the first debate over the state’s unitary tax method. At the same 
time, several California business groups already in existence became active lobbyists on the 
unitary issue. These groups and their policy agendas, detailed below, are summarised in Box 
2 on p. 156.
The California Business Council (CBC), a group of approximately 90 U.S.- 
domiciled multinational enterprises (MNEs) headquartered in California, was formed in 1984 
to demonstrate the collective strength of California companies opposed to the state’s unitary 
tax method. The CBC lobbied to ensure that U.S. companies were included in any California 
unitary reform legislation, and sought to ban use of the WWC method entirely. The CBC was 
seen as the coordinating organisation for all domestic-domiciled companies opposed to the 
WWC method, and served as a focal point for fund-raising efforts on the issue in California.
With the CBC, domestic MNEs became much better organised and more visible in 
their opposition to any unitary reform which did not include domestic-domiciled companies, 
publishing a newsletter, The Unitary Update. The CBC was the first time Silicon Valley firms 
became involved in lobbying on a policy issue before the California legislature, since the 
high-tech industry was just emerging as an important force within California in the mid- 
1980s.135 Silicon Valley firms were adamant that their foreign competition, notably Japanese 
firms, should not receive any advantage through a “foreign-only” solution to the problem.136
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The Organisation for the Fair Taxation of International Investment (OFTII) was
formed to represent foreign, mostly European, companies before the California legislature on 
the unitary issue. OF 111 included European companies not comfortable being identified with 
British firmis organised from London, or being viewed as foreign interests, as Japanese firms 
were.137 OFTII attempted to demonstrate the integration of European companies in the 
California economy and work within California’s local political system for unitary reform.138 
OFTn emphasised that a company’s position on the unitary issue resulted from the 
organisation of its worldwide business, not its home nationality, and that unitary reform was 
not a ‘foreign’ issue since many U.S. MNEs were opposed to California’s use of the WWC 
method.
The Japan Business Association of Southern California (JBA) had approximately 
360 companies as members, and included nearly every major Japanese corporation with 
operations in the United States. The JBA lobbied to completely eliminate the WWC method 
for foreign-based corporations. They argued that from “the perspective of the current and 
potential California businesses that have direct ties to Japan, the unitary method of 
apportionment has had a significant negative impact on decisions to establish new operations 
as well as decisions relating to possible expansion of current operations”.139 In addition, they 
claimed the method was inequitable, placed an unduly onerous burden on foreign 
corporations, and forced businesses to leave California for U.S. states which did not employ 
the WWC method.140
The California Manufacturers’ Association (CMA) is a group of both foreign and 
U.S.-domiciled companies operating in California which lobbies on general business issues 
before the California legislature. The CMA had a difficult time reaching a consensus on the 
unitary issue because its membership is very diverse.141 In the end, the CMA lobbied for 
equity between foreign and domestic companies, opposed charging companies a fee to elect 
not to use the WWC method, and pushed for correct information from the Franchise Tax
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Board on projected revenue losses from the elimination of the WWC method.142 They argued 
unitary reform was needed for continued job growth in the state.
The California C ham ber of Commerce had a membership of roughly 5,000 
companies, both U.S. and foreign-domiciled, at the time of the unitary debate. The Chamber 
lobbies the California legislature on issues of broad importance to the business community, 
and seeks to promote international trade and economic development.143 The California 
Chamber of Commerce sought to find a common position for its foreign and U.S. members 
on the unitary tax issue in order to avoid any split in the business community which would 
weaken unitary reform legislation, which they felt was necessary to promote California’s 
economy.144 As a result, it advocated a position acceptable to all, that companies should have 
the right to elect whether to be taxed under the WWC method. The California Chamber of 
Commerce coordinated its efforts at the national level with the Committee on State Taxation, 
the National Foreign Trade Council, and the Tax Executives Institute.
The California U nitary Tax Cam paign (CUTC), a small group of U.S.-domiciled 
companies based in California, was concerned with regulations the Franchise Tax Board 
proposed in 1986 which would have more strictly defined which companies were considered 
functionally integrated, and therefore eligible to file as unitary companies. The proposed 
change in regulations had been driven by the Committee on State Taxation, which argued a 
more definitive standard of what constituted a unitary business would make its use less 
subjective. The approximately 25 U.S.-domiciled MNEs that joined CUTC were all 
diversified U.S. businesses which had lower tax bills when filing under the WWC method, 
and resisted FTB reforms that would effectively exclude their companies from using the 
method. As a result of their efforts, the FTB withdrew the proposed regulations, and 
continued to use the more subjective ‘strong central management’ definition of unitary 
companies.
154
The California Tax Reform  Association lobbied against California’s unitary reform 
legislation in 1993 on the grounds that the legislation provided a tax break for big business at 
the expense of state social service and health care needs during an economic recession. The 
California Tax Reform Association was the only state-level group formed specifically to 
lobby against unitary reform, and led a coalition of local groups which opposed eliminating 
the WWC method: the California Council of Churches, the California Federation of 
Teachers, the State Building and Construction Trades Council of California (an affiliate of 
the AFL-CIO), the Education Coalition of California, the California Faculty Association, the 
Lutheran Office of Public Policy -  California, the California Teachers’ Association, and the 
California Taxpayers’ Association.
At the same time, state and local economic development agencies and chambers of 
commerce lobbied against state use of the WWC method on the grounds that it hurt their 
efforts to attract MNE investment. For example, the San Diego Economic Development 
Corporation was active in trying to repeal California’s WWC method after meetings with 
Japanese executives convinced them the method cost California jobs.
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Box 2: California Unitary Reform Lobbying Groups
Lobbying group Agenda
California Business Ban WWU method Coordinate domestic
Council (CBC) companies
Include U.S. companies in Serve as a focal point for
any reform legislation fund-raising among
domestic companies
Organisation for the Fair Represent non-British European Rise above questions
Treatment of International companies in California of nationality
Investment (OFTII)
Demonstrate integration of
European companies in the
California economy
Japan Business Association of Ban WWU method for Represent Japanese
Southern California (JBA) foreign-domiciled companies company interests
California Manufacturers’ Represent both foreign and Promote equity between
Association (CMA) domestic business in California domestic and foreign
businesses in California
Oppose election fee
Push for correct revenue loss
estimates from FTB
California Chamber Represent both foreign and Promote issues of broad
of Commerce domestic business in California importance to the California
business community
Promote international trade Support companies' right to
and economic development elect whether to be taxed
under the WWC method
California Unitary Resist Franchise Tax Board's
Tax Campaign tighter definition of which
companies were functionally
integrated and therefore
eligible to file as unitary
companies
California Tax Reform Assoc. Stop California unitary reform Argue the needs of state
legislation as a tax break for social services during an
big business economic recession
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6) Summary
This thesis examines newly evolving modes of state-firm bargaining over subfederal 
economic policies, policies which have increased international repercussions with the growth 
of foreign trade and investment within U.S. state jurisdictions. It has described California’s 
political economy in order to gain a better understanding of both the subfederal setting for the 
unitary tax debate and the state’s resources as a key actor during the debate. The chapter has 
analysed the political and economic structure of the state and its political and economic 
assets, considering such factors as physical location within the federal system, international 
linkages, political culture, bureaucratic resources, and the degree of asymmetry within the 
federal system.145 California has a large, rich and distinct economy and a political culture 
with a history of policymaking independence from the federal government. The state is an 
active participant in the international economy and has created various institutions to 
implement its international objectives, including the development of a state trade policy 
agenda.
As we shall see in the following chapter, these strong state assets, along with the legal 
ambiguity of U.S. federalism described in Chapter Three, gave California the ability to 
bargain directly as an actor in the international arena during the debate over its unitary tax 
method. California’s high level of international economic activity meant the state’s regulatory 
policies affected many foreign MNEs doing business within California. However,
California’s assets within the U.S. federalist system led the national government to refuse to 
effectively constrain the state’s regulatory deviance. At the same time, California’s assets 
strengthened the state’s ability to bargain directly and effectively with the foreign 
governments and MNEs which protested its use of the WWC unitary tax method. This 
chapter has therefore lent support to the hypotheses put forth in Chapter One that powerful 
U.S. states such as California have the ability to both maintain regulatory standards at odds 
with federal and international norms and to bargain directly within the international arena to 
defend those economic regulations.
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The following chapter will present a case study of the debate over California’s use of 
the worldwide combined unitary tax method, a subfederal economic regulation at odds with 
federal and international norms. California’s use of the WWC method conflicted with both 
U.S. national policy and international tax agreements, yet the state refused to change its 
method despite heavy lobbying by the U.S. federal government, foreign governments, 
international organisations, and MNEs. During the time of the unitary debate, the California 
economy both grew more dependent on the world economy and went into recession. Chapter 
Five will detail the bargaining which took place over California’s use of the WWC method 
and which ultimately led the state to change its unitary tax policy.
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Figure 6
California's Ethnic Mix,1990
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Figure 7
Long-Term Growth in High Technology
Source: Center for Continuing Study of the California Economy
159
Figure 8
------- ---
4,000
3,900
3,800
3,700
3,600
3,500
3,400
3,300
3,200
California Service Jobs, 1990-Aug.
(in thousands)
O O O -1- C \ J C \ I C \ J C O C O Tt T* S to i o ) ® o ) C T i a ) O i o ) 0 ) a O ) c p O )
- 3 - 3 Z < C / 3 U _  Q ^ O ^ - 3 2 :
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
96
m C O
05 05
C L n
Q ) CD
O D L i .
Figure 9
California Manufacturing Jobs, 1990-Aug. 96
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Figure 10
California Unemployment Rate
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Figure 11
Exports Produced in California
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Source: California World Trade Commission
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Figure 12
California's Economic Base in Transition
Aircraft/Space D efen se
Engineering/M anagem ent
Services
Figure 13
California: Net Domestic Migration 1987-1996
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Figure 14
Growth of Foreign Investment in California, Book Value
1984-1994
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Source: California Trade & Commerce Agency, Office of Foreign Investment “Foreign Direct 
Investment in California", February 1997, p. 2.
Figure 15
Growth of Foreign Investment in California, Employment
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Figure 16
Affiliate Book Value of Foreign Investment 
in California, Leading Countries 
1982-1992
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Chart 1:1998 Gross Product Ranking
($ billions)
1 United States 7,902.9
2 Japan 4,089.1
3 Germany 2,179.8
4 France 1,465.4
5 United Kingdom 1,264.3
6 Italy 1,157.0
California 1,118.9
7 China** 1,081.8
8 Brazil 767.6
9 Canada 580.9
10 Spain 555.2
* *  Includes Hong Kong, which was transferred to China on July 1, 1997.
(China $923.6 billion; Hong Kong $158.2 billion)
Estimates are from  the 2000 World Bank Atlas, except fo r  California, which is from  the 
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Chapter 5: The Case Study
1) Introduction
The previous chapters have demonstrated that powerful U.S. states such as 
California possess the capability to maintain regulatory standards at odds with federal and 
international norms and to bargain directly in the international arena. This chapter will 
provide further evidence towards these hypotheses as it presents a factual case study of 
the debate over California’s use of the worldwide combined unitary tax method. Chapter 
Three provided an overview of the actors who took part in the debate over California’s tax 
method, describing each actor’s role in influencing U.S. state tax policy, its agenda with 
regards to state use of the worldwide combined (WWC) unitary tax method, and the 
political and economic assets that it had at its disposal. Chapter Five will now provide a 
detailed look at the extent and direction of each actor’s involvement in the debate over 
California’s use of the WWC tax method. The following chapter will complete the model 
of state-firm bargaining over subfederal economic policies which conflict with federal and 
international norms by analysing this case study to determine how effectively the actors 
used their assets to influence the outcomes of the policy debate.
This chapter will start with a brief background on the use of the worldwide 
combined unitary tax method in California. It will then detail the first major international 
debate over U.S. state use of the method, the negotiations surrounding the 1979 U.S.-UK 
tax treaty. This will be followed by a look at different foreign government reactions to 
U.S. state use of the WWC method and the Reagan administration’s response to these 
protests. A brief survey of California’s initial legislative attempts to reform its unitary 
method is followed by a detailed examination of the federal Worldwide Unitary Working 
Group formed in 1984. The chapter will then describe foreign government threats of 
retaliation and U.S. federal government threats of preemptive legislation. The case study 
will next examine court cases which ruled on the method’s legality, as well as increased
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corporate lobbying at the state level. It will then describe the negotiations surrounding 
California’s 1986 unitary reform law, and reactions to this law.
Next, Chapter Five will examine legal attempts after 1986 to further modify 
California’s unitary tax method, focusing on the progression of the Barclays Bank and 
Colgate-Palmolive cases against the California Franchise Tax Board to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. It will examine the impact of the Bush and Clinton presidential administrations, 
along with accelerated threats of UK retaliation, on these legal cases. Finally, this chapter 
will present an examination of California’s second attempt at unitary tax reform in 1993 
in the face of these various pressures. Box 3, on p. 186, lists the milestones in the 
California unitary tax debate.
At the beginning of this thesis, the question was asked: what happens when U.S. 
state economic regulations conflict with international norms? The following case study 
will add to the body of academic literature on subfederal activity in the international 
arena. Stopford and Strange view negotiations over economic policies as existing within a 
complex and dynamic framework of state-firm bargaining. However, they state that “we 
shall make little progress on the vaster issues until we have collected and analysed much 
more data on the relations of firms to governments and governments to firms. We shall 
certainly not be able to make more sense of general theories of bargaining power between 
states and firms”.1 This chapter aims to collect relevant data on the relationships between 
national governments, subfederal governments, and MNEs during the debate over 
California's unitary tax method. The following chapter will analyse this data: both hope, 
on their own terms, to contribute to the application of state-firm bargaining theory to the 
subfederal level.
2) Case study
i) History of the worldwide unitary tax method in the U.S.
California’s franchise tax was enacted in 1929 to tax all corporations which derive 
income from sources within California. In order to help implement the franchise tax, the
171
California corporate income tax was enacted in 1937 to tax income from intra-state 
commerce. The theory of unitary apportionment was first given statutory authority in 
California in 1939, when the unitary tax method became part of the state’s Bank and 
Corporation Tax. The statute was worded so that the unitary combination method 
included foreign activities overseas as well as domestic; however, the tax code did not 
specify whether foreign-based companies were required to file on a worldwide unitary 
basis.2 In Butler Bros v. McColgan3 (1941), the California Supreme Court determined a 
test of “three unities” to establish whether a business could be considered unitary: unity of 
ownership; unity of operations, as evidenced by central merchandising, advertising, 
accounting, and management decisions; and unity of use, demonstrated by centralised 
executive control and general systems of operations.4 By the early 1960s, California’s 
Franchise Tax Board (FTB) had begun to apply unitary combination to the foreign 
activities of U.S.-based multinational enterprises (MNEs) on a widespread basis. The 
number of MNEs in California had risen enough by the 1960s to make overseas activities 
a bigger proportion of the state’s tax base, and its accurate measurement had assumed 
greater significance.
In 1964 and 1965, the U.S. House of Representative’s Committee on the Judiciary 
held a Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, popularly known 
as the Willis Committee, after its chairman. The Willis Committee severely criticised the 
lack of uniformity among states in apportioning income for taxation, and issued a report 
which called for states to tax the foreign income of companies incorporated in the U.S. 
only if their income was already subject to tax by the U.S. federal government.5 This 
requirement would have effectively required a replacement of the worldwide combination 
(WWC) method incorporated in California’s statute with the water’s edge combination 
method, excluding the resources of all overseas affiliates from the state’s taxable base.
In a successful attempt to forestall federal legislation introduced by Willis on 
October 22,1965 as House of Representatives (HR) 11798, the states held a National 
Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws, which drafted a proposed state 
code, the Uniform Division of Income for the Purposes of Tax Assessment (UDIPTA).
172
UDIPTA was unanimously enacted into law in California in 1966. Subsequent hearings 
were held in the House of Representatives on HR11798, but the bill was never acted on.
By 1967, California’s Franchise Tax Board had adopted the position that the 
unitary combination method was to be applied on a mandatory basis to all MNEs, both 
foreign and domestic-domiciled, with foreign activities. This advance in the use of the 
unitary method was not a statutory change in California’s law, but simply a new 
administrative interpretation by FTB staff as to how California state audits were to be 
conducted. Both U.S. and foreign MNEs increasingly began to complain, in both the 
California legislature and in the U.S. Congress, that the FTB was being unduly aggressive 
and taking the pretense that the WWC method had to be employed since corporations 
were deliberately trying to shift their taxable income out of the state. MNEs also 
complained that the FTB definition of a unitary business was arbitrary, determined mostly 
by a desire to collect more tax revenue for the state. In 1969, the Committee on State 
Taxation (COST), a group of mostly U.S.-domiciled MNEs associated with the Council 
of State Chambers of Commerce, was formed specifically to lobby against California’s 
application of the WWC unitary method.
At this point, a split developed between California companies with international 
links who opposed the WWC unitary method, and companies with purely domestic 
activities worried that unless the WWC method was used to force international business 
to shoulder a fair share of the tax burden, the state would implement higher overall tax 
levels, which would typically have a greater impact on purely in-state business. This 
division deepened as the number of MNEs in California grew.
In 1975, a Task Force on Foreign Source Income was held under the U.S. House 
Committee on Ways and Means. Its report, released on March 8,1977, had no significant 
disagreement with the states’ use of formulary apportionment over separate accounting 
methods, stating that the arm’s length standard produced significant problems at the 
federal level and was difficult to administer at the state level. However, the Ford and 
Carter administrations both opposed California’s extension of WWC to include the
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overseas income of foreign-domiciled corporations on the grounds that this tax method 
interfered with U.S. bilateral tax treaties based on the arm’s length standard. In 1977, the 
U.S. House of Representatives formed a second Task Force on Foreign Source Income. In 
line with the Willis Commission’s recommendations, the Task Force report recommended 
that states not be allowed to subject the income of foreign affiliates to state tax unless 
their income was subject to federal income tax. In the 96th Congress of 1979, these Task 
Force proposals were incorporated into a State Foreign Source Income Tax Bill.6 Despite 
the Carter administration’s support, no vote was ever taken on this bill.
ii) The 1979 U.S./UK Tax Treaty
The UK-U.S. tax treaty, initialed on December 31,1975, contained a provision 
under Article 9 (paragraph 4) which would have prevented U.S. states from applying the 
unitary business method to the income of British multinationals.7 Several states which 
stood to lose a substantial amount of revenue from this provision argued that federal 
limitations on their powers to tax should only come through legislation which had been 
debated in Congress, not through treaty negotiations which involved only the executive 
branch.
In response to state lobbying efforts, Senator Church from Idaho put forth a 
reservation to the treaty which nullified Article 9(4). The 1975 treaty finally came up for a 
full U.S. Senate vote on June 23,1978, but it did not obtain the majority vote it needed to 
pass until the Church reservation was inserted, removing the unitary tax exemption for 
British MNEs. The final treaty, which entered into force on April 25, 1980, specifically 
exempted U.S. state and local governments from any treaty prohibitions on worldwide 
unitary taxation.
The initial inclusion in the UK-U.S. tax treaty of the provision exempting British 
MNEs from state WWC unitary taxation seems to have been in concession for the British 
providing U.S. companies with partial refunds of the advance corporation tax (ACT) 
payment their British subsidiaries paid to UK Inland Revenue. Under UK law, only 
British shareholders could technically claim a refundable tax credit to offset the ACT;
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U.S. shareholders needed the treaty exemption to do so. Although the final treaty did not 
exempt British MNEs from U.S. state use of the WWC method, it still allowed U.S. 
companies to claim a British tax credit offsetting the ACT. It appears the British 
parliament approved the tax treaty containing the British concession under the 
understanding that Congress intended to instead pass legislation prohibiting U.S. states 
from using the WWC method.
The U.S. federal government continued to attempt to persuade the states that its 
use of the WWC method interfered with U.S. treaty obligations, since U.S. bilateral tax 
treaties enshrined the arm’s length standard. However, no vote was taken on several 
pieces of legislation introduced in Congress early in President Reagan’s term which 
would have limited state unitary taxation to the ‘water’s edge’ of business activities 
within the U.S., as there was little desire in Congress to take on the politically unpopular
o
issue of federal preemption of state taxation powers.
The UK government continuously pushed for U.S. Congressional legislation 
restricting the unitary method. The UK government at the time, firmly in Conservative 
hands, was a strong proponent of business interests. More generally, the UK economy has 
as a key component a large amount of foreign investment abroad by British MNEs, and 
the UK government is generally extremely supportive of international norms which 
support the free flow of foreign investment.
By 1982, the chairman of the British Conservative Party’s Industry Committee had 
threatened a retaliatory British unitary tax on U.S. companies unless the U.S. federal 
government passed legislation restricting the states. This threatened action was estimated 
to potentially cost U.S. companies up to $674 million a year.9 On July 12, 1983, the UK 
Chancellor of the Exchequer sent a letter protesting the states’ use of WWC unitary 
taxation to the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Donald Regan. Prime Minister Thatcher 
also tried to persuade President Reagan to outlaw the method, but, in one of the few 
incidents where their personal relationship failed, Reagan rebuffed her at the 1983 
Williamsburg Group of Seven summit meeting.
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iii) Other foreign protests
a) Japan
Japanese MNEs were the most prominent early protesters against U.S. state use of 
the WWC method. In October 1981, the Japan-U.S. Economic Relations Group urged 
U.S. Congressmen to examine the detrimental effect of state use of the WWC method on 
U.S.-Japanese relations. On December 8,1981, the Keidanren issued a “Resolution 
Urging Abolition of the Unitary Tax Formula Based on Worldwide Income by State 
Authorities of the United States of America”. In July 1983, “Agenda for Action”, a Joint 
Task Force Report by the U.S.-Japan Businessmen’s Conference, recommended that state 
WWC unitary tax methods be abolished by either state or federal laws.
The Keidanren Investment Expansion Mission visited 23 U.S. states during 1984 
to protest against state use of the WWC method and receive reassurances from non-WWC 
states that they would not change their tax systems. The Keidanren warned that Japanese 
companies would channel their investments only to states which did not use the WWC tax 
method. The Japanese received pledges from the following states not to enact a WWC 
method: Alabama, Hawaii, Kansas, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia. 
In April 1984, the Electronic Industries Association of Japan urged support for bills 
before the U.S. Congress which would abolish state use of the WWC method, stating that 
unless Congress actively opposed the states’ unitary tax methods, U.S.-Japan trade and 
investment relations would worsen.10 The Japanese government’s close ties to business 
and heavy dependence on foreign investment for economic growth led to the 
government’s support for Japanese MNEs protests that the unitary tax method was a 
potential inhibitor of investment in an important overseas market (see Figure 16, p. 164, 
Chapter 4).
b) Canada
Canada made numerous diplomatic protests to the U.S. federal government over 
state use of the WWC method: the attachment of a note to its tax treaty with the U.S.,11 
and letters from its charge d’affaires to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury12 and 
the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs13 asking for their
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support for a 1983 U.S. Senate bill which proposed limiting unitary taxation by U.S. 
states to the ‘water’s edge’ of business activities within the U.S.14
c) Germany
On November 28, 1983, the German Embassy issued a Memorandum to the U.S. 
Treasury Department condemning the states’ use of worldwide combination and formula 
apportionment methods. This document warned that “failure to bring this development to 
a halt and to eliminate the international incidence of unitary taxation might lead the 
international community to conclude that the United States has ceased to speak with one 
voice and thus is no longer contributing to the international tax order toward which the 
United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other nations have worked for so 
many years”.15
d) The Netherlands
Starting in 1973, consultations between the Dutch Ministry of Finance and Dutch 
industry were held to investigate the possibility of eliminating U.S. state use of the WWC 
method. These consultations were suspended when the UK government began negotiating 
with the U.S. for similar protection, as the Dutch decided to wait and request similar 
protection once it had been granted to the UK. However, after the U.S. Senate did not 
approve the exemption of British companies from state WWC methods in the 1979 
U.S./UK Tax Treaty, the Dutch government renewed the issue.
On March 26,1980, representatives of the Council of the Netherlands Federation 
of Employers testified before the California Senate Committee on Revenue and Taxation 
in support of California Assembly Bill (AB)525, which proposed limiting the state’s use 
of worldwide combination. Their testimony claimed that the 1956 Dutch Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the U.S. prohibited state use of the WWC 
method, since Article XI, paragraph 4 of the treaty stated that both parties “shall not 
impose or apply any tax, fee or charge upon any income, capital or other basis in excess of 
that reasonably allocable or apportionable to its territories”.16 The Netherlands State
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Secretary for Finance also stated that the unitary method amounted to extra-territorial 
taxation, violating international law.17
The Netherlands government repeatedly declared that continued U.S. state 
application of the WWC method was a serious obstacle to a successful revision of the 
existing Netherlands-U.S. double taxation convention. The Dutch Finance Ministry stated 
it was hopeful that once the U.S. states accepted a water’s edge limitation to their unitary 
methods, prohibition against applying the WWC method to foreign companies could be 
included in formal treaty arrangements with the U.S.18 In 1985, the Dutch refused to ratify 
a trade agreement with the U.S. in protest over the states’ continued use of the WWC 
method.
e) The European Community
In 1979, a statement from all nine European Community (EC) countries opposing 
subfederal use of the WWC method was submitted to the House Task Force on Foreign 
Source Income, with a copy sent to Governor Brown of California. The EC sent numerous 
such notes to the U.S. federal government protesting the international application of the 
unitary tax method by U.S. states.19 In addition, the unitary taxation issue was discussed 
during a December 1983 meeting between Commission members and U.S. cabinet 
ministers.20
iv) The Reagan administration
The Reagan presidential administration opposed U.S. state use of the worldwide 
unitary tax method, although Reagan himself had supported California’s use of the 
method when he was governor of California. The Reagan administration was also 
somewhat split over the issue. The Treasury Department had historically been one of the 
main proponents of the arm’s length standard at the international level, and was opposed 
to having an inconsistent method in use at the state level; the U.S. State Department 
clearly wanted to accommodate protesting foreign governments. In addition, the 
Republican administration generally wanted to support pro-business legislation.
However, there was a very strong push for federalism in the early Reagan administration
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through the Office of Intergovernmental Relations, a powerful group which represented 
the states’ view to the White House that the WWC method provided an important tax 
base which should not be preempted by a federal ban.22 The Reagan administration was 
lobbied heavily by the National Governors’ Association not to file briefs against state 
interests in court cases involving state use of the WWC method 23 In addition, the 
administration did not want to deny states a means of increasing their tax revenue at a 
time when it was asking the states to assume more fiscal responsibilities as President 
Reagan pursued his program of “fiscal federalism”.
A September 30, 1981 report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) was highly 
critical of the Internal Revenue Service's enforcement of the arm’s length standard under 
Section 482 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code 24 The GAO recommended that the 
Treasury Department study additional ways to allocate income under Section 482, 
including the use of formulary apportionment methods, in order to alleviate MNE income- 
shifting to take advantage of disparate corporate tax rates between countries. The Treasury 
Department disagreed with this recommendation, and remained opposed to the use of 
formulary apportionment.
However, the General Accounting Office issued another report in July 1982, “Key 
Issues Affecting State Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Need 
Resolving”,25 which stated that unitary methods were difficult to use since it was not easy 
to determine what should be included in a unitary business or how it should be defined, 
and that court decisions in this area had been vague, offering no further definition. The 
report was also fairly critical of nonconformities between state tax rules, stating these 
could lead to over or under-taxation of MNEs.
v) Early California attempts at legislation
In 1979, the California Assembly Revenue and Tax Committee held a hearing in 
Los Angeles on California Assembly Bill (AB) 525, which proposed the state shift to the 
water’s edge unitary method for foreign-domiciled corporations operating in California 
and continue to use the WWC method for U.S. MNEs (i.e., domestic worldwide
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combination). It was at this point that the unitary tax method became a more prominent 
issue in California. Seventeen witnesses testified on the unitary issue at the hearing, 
including representatives of MNEs from the UK, the U.S., and Japan; the Confederation 
of British Industry; the California Franchise Tax Board; the California Department of 
Finance; and the California State Office of International Trade. Witnesses testifying 
against the WWC method stated it was discouraging new investment in the state: since the 
property factor in apportionment was based on historic costs, new plants and equipment 
resulted in a disproportionately higher allocation of income to the state. In addition, they 
argued that although new businesses traditionally lose money in their early years, if these 
new business were foreign subsidiaries, they would still be taxed by the state if the 
worldwide operations of their parent companies were profitable.
Domestic-domiciled corporations were not included in the initial round of 
California bills proposing modifications in the state’s use of the unitary method because 
foreign companies were the most vocal lobbyists against the method. In addition, a 
foreign-only reform was considerably less expensive to achieve: the FTB estimated that 
eliminating use of the worldwide combination method for all MNEs would eliminate 
$400 million in state tax revenue, while eliminating WWC for only foreign-based 
corporations would cost the state only $25 million.27 AB525 passed the California 
Assembly. Then, at the request of the Shell Oil Company, this bill was amended in the 
California Senate to allow foreign energy companies the option of filing under the water’s 
edge method 28 However, U.S. oil companies were concerned that their foreign 
competitors would be more competitive in third-country overseas markets if they were not 
also subject to California’s WWC method. The Assembly thus refused to agree to Shell 
Oil’s amendment, and the bill failed to pass.
California Governor Jerry Brown was a “stout defender” of the unitary method 
early in his term, and had opposed the UK-U.S. treaty in 1976 at the behest of the 
executive director of the California FTB.29 There had been a long-standing tradition in 
California of defending the WWC method as a means to prevent MNEs from evading 
state taxes. It was also a popular tax politically, since it generated revenue for the state
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while falling to a large extent on non-constituents. However, Governor Brown had a 
change of heart in 1977 when he traveled to Japan to press for the removal of trade 
barriers to California agricultural exports. During the discussions, the Japanese raised the 
counterargument that California’s WWC method was a barrier to their trade. The 
governor returned from the trip convinced that worldwide combination was a bad tax 
method which should be removed in order to win market-opening concessions from the 
Japanese. However, Governor Brown did not realise the extent to which the FTB wanted 
to maintain the method or the institutional strength that the FTB held.30
Governor Brown then declared that his previous support of the WWC method had 
been incorrect since it had been based on “flaky data” he had received from the FTB.31 
This accusation infuriated the executive director of the FTB, Martin Huff, who took 
personal credit for promulgating the WWC method in California, and strongly believed in 
the method as a matter of principle. Huff was in a strong position to take a stance 
against the governor since a special protection existed in California law declaring that the 
executive director of the FTB could only be removed from office by a two-thirds vote of 
the California Senate. Huff publicly released the data he had sent to Brown to prove it was 
correct, embarrassing the governor.33 Governor Brown then publicly endorsed the 
provision in the U.S./UK tax treaty banning state use of the worldwide unitary method, 
while Huff organised opposition to the treaty among tax officials in both California and 
other states, helping to stall the treaty’s passage. Governor Brown and California State 
Controller Ken Cory, the chairman of the FTB, then proposed legislation eliminating the 
two-thirds Senate vote requirement for removal of the FTB’s executive director, but rather 
than being publicly forced out, Huff resigned in 1980.
Gerry Goldberg, the new executive director of the FTB, was more conciliatory on 
the WWC issue. Goldberg realised that supporting the WWC method was a politically 
untenable position, and opened FTB consideration of Governor Brown’s drive to 
eliminate the method. At this point, the FTB bureaucracy gradually began to realise that, 
although they would have preferred inaction, they would most likely be forced to modify 
the method.34
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In October 1981, the California Franchise Tax Board issued a Task Force “Report 
on the Unitary Method” in response to issues raised by State Controller Ken Cory, who 
expressed concern that the tax was a deterrent to investment in California and that it
O ff
engendered a “disproportionately emotional taxpayer response”. The FTB interviewed 
taxpayers and professional consultants on the tax to conduct an informal survey of 
interested opinion, which mostly concluded that interviewees disagreed over the 
application of the unitary method on an international basis. However, those surveyed 
suggested that the WWC method would be more readily accepted if the FTB was more 
flexible in its administration of the method and willing to allow factor adjustments to 
account for different national economic conditions.
In November 1980, the California Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee 
held a second hearing on the WWC method in San Diego in the wake of the failure of 
AB-525. A third hearing was held by the committee in Sacramento in December 1981. 
Members of the committee became convinced that the WWC method was a problem: 
however, there was no consensus on how to solve it.
vi) Federal court cases
Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton, Ltd. v. State Commission36 (1924) had seen the U.S. 
Supreme Court sustain the use of formula apportionment on a foreign-domiciled business 
operating in the U.S. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Vermont2,1 (1980) allowed the state of Vermont 
to include dividends Mobil received from its foreign operations in the state’s 
apportionable income base. Exxon Corporation v. Wisconsin (1980) also sustained U.S. 
state use of the WWC method, rejecting arguments that the arm’s length standard should 
be used instead.
However, corporations lobbying against state use of the WWC method had seen a 
victory in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles case in 1979.39 The 
court ruled that an ad valorem property tax, based on the average number of days property 
was present in California each year, was being illegally applied to large cargo shipping 
containers that belonged to foreign companies. In this case, the court ruled that
182
California’s unitary method resulted in double taxation since the Japanese government, 
following international custom, had taxed the full value of Japan Line’s containers. The 
court significantly held that the “enhanced risk of multiple taxation”40 and the risk of 
foreign retaliation meant that U.S. states had to be especially sensitive in issues of state 
taxation involving foreign commerce. This was especially true if the state tax “impairs 
federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential” 41
In 1981, Chicago Bridge & Iron Company V. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 
Illinois Dept of Revenue attacked the constitutionality of the worldwide combined unitary 
method in Illinois, and the case went before the U.S. Supreme Court. In an amicus 
(friendly) brief to the court, the U.S. Solicitor General supported an overthrow of the tax 
method, stating that the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Treasury, State, and the U.S. 
Trade Representative had received several complaints from foreign governments about 
state use of the WWC method, and warning that foreign retaliation could occur. Illinois 
then repealed its WWC requirement: this case was ultimately dismissed.
On June 27, 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Container Corporation of 
America v. Franchise Tax Board that California could include all the foreign subsidiaries 
of a U.S. corporation in the assessment of a unitary tax, but specifically refused to decide 
whether the state could include in its apportionable revenue base the foreign parents of 
subsidiaries operating in California. In its decision, the Supreme Court noted the Reagan 
administration had not filed an amicus brief objecting to California’s method of taxation, 
and this had contributed to its view that the WWC method, as applied to domestic 
corporations with operations overseas, was not adversely affecting the foreign policy of 
the U.S. The Reagan administration’s decision not to file an amicus brief in the Container 
Corp. case was seen as taking a new political position, since it was a change from the 
administration’s previous policy of filing amicus briefs in favour of banning the states’ 
application of the WWC method to foreign-domiciled companies 42 Reagan’s belief in 
states’ rights, combined with his strong political links to California, as a powerful former 
California governor who had supported the states’ use of worldwide combination,
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contributed to a weakening in federal government support for the arm’s length standard 
method of judging transfer pricing practices.
The Container Corp. decision was a source of considerable alarm to both U.S. and 
foreign-domiciled MNEs, since, for the first time, it specifically gave the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s backing to state use of the WWC method. MNEs immediately began to press for 
federal legislation to regulate the state taxation of foreign-sourced income. Many of the 
U.S.’s foreign trading partners filed diplomatic protests expressing alarm. Additional 
impetus to these protests was provided by Florida’s adoption of the WWC method in July 
1983.
The British protested that the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal in the Container Corp. 
decision to rule on the legality of applying the WWC method to foreign parent 
corporations was due to the U.S. government’s failure to file a brief objecting to 
California’s method of taxation, and that “the outcome of the court’s sharply divided (5-3) 
decision could well have been different had the federal government clearly restated what 
all parties originally understood to be its position”.43 Attention thus focused on whether 
the U.S. Solicitor General would support Container’s Petition for Rehearing of the case, 
and Container’s attorney wrote to the U.S. Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy to 
plead that “the government’s involvement is vital to our Petition for Rehearing”.44 The 
British were particularly alarmed that the Container decision came in addition to the fact 
that no federal legislation banning state use of the WWC method had been passed since 
the 1979 U.S./UK tax treaty was signed 45
In the wake of the Container Corp. decision, the Canadian Minister of Finance 
wrote to U.S. Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, objecting to the international application 
of state unitary taxes, and asking the Treasury Department to resolve the problems posed 
by state use of the WWC method 46 The Japanese Embassy in the U.S. also objected to 
the U.S. State Department over the international application of state unitary taxes,47 as did 
the government of the Netherlands 48
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On December 12, 1984, the European Parliament adopted a “Resolution on 
Taxation of Companies by American States”, urging the U.S. administration to support 
legislation in Congress exempting foreign companies from the unitary method, and stating 
that continued use of the method would damage EC-U.S. relations. Further, the resolution 
stated that since “the principle of unitary tax is contrary to the spirit of the various double 
taxation treaties and discriminates unfairly against European-based companies with 
operations in the United States”, if the U.S. did not pass federal legislation banning state 
use of the WWC unitary tax, the EC would consider it justifiable for its member states to 
suspend their double taxation treaties with the U.S.49
The Reagan administration did not introduce federal legislation to ban state use of 
the WWC method or support Container’s Petition for Rehearing. However, in an attempt 
to stem MNE and foreign government protests, the administration formed an 
interdepartmental study group under the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs to study 
potential solutions to the protests. On September 6, 1983, the Council voted unanimously 
in favour of federal legislation restricting the states’ use of the WWC method and seemed 
in favour of having the U.S. Solicitor General support Container’s Petition for 
Rehearing.50
However, the president rejected the Cabinet Council’s recommendation, and 
instead directed the Secretary of the Treasury, Donald Regan, to form a federal 
Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group to give recommendations on how to deal 
with growing concern over state use of the WWC method in the wake of the Container 
decision.51 This decision was apparently based on state lobbying efforts, Reagan’s 
commitment to federalism, Reagan’s opposition to federal efforts to restrict state taxation 
when he was governor of California, and an emphasis on providing for state revenue 
needs during his campaign for “fiscal federalism”.52 On October 11, the U.S. Supreme 
Court rejected Container’s Petition for Rehearing.
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Box 3: Milestones in the California Unitary Tax Debate
Date Milestone
1977 California Governor Jerry Brown returns from Japanese trip
convinced that unitary tax must be removed to win
market-opening concessions from the Japanese.
1979 Congress refuses to back U.S./UK tax treaty allowing British
MNEs an exemption from state unitary taxes.
1983 Container Corp. case rules state unitary taxes legal when
applied to U.S. MNEs; legality of applying the method to
foreign MNEs is left open. Reagan administration does not file
an amicus brief objecting to the state tax method.
1984 Worldwide Unitary Working Group. State, federal and business
interests attempt, unsuccessfully, to reach a compromise
on the unitary issue.
1985 UK threatens retaliation against U.S. MNEs based in Britain
over state unitary taxes.
1985 Reagan administration introduces federal legislation
mandating an end to state worldwide unitary practices.
1985 U.S. MNEs insist on their inclusion in California's proposed
unitary reform bill.
1986 California's Water's Edge Election bill passes. California allows
firms to exempt themselves from the state's worldwide
unitary method but retains right to disallow an exemption,
and forces firms electing the alternative water's edge method
to pay an 'election fee'.
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Box 3 (continued)
1986 Federal government withdraws pending legislation banning
state worldwide unitary methods.
1992 Presidential candidate Clinton promises to support California in
litigation over the state's unitary method.
1993 UK government sends out letters to U.S. MNEs in Britain
threatening retaliation over California's continued use
of the unitary method; MNEs increase pressure on
California legislature to approve further reform of the method.
1993 Second California unitary tax reform bill is passed, ending
Franchise Tax Board's ability to charge an election fee and
override a company's election of a water's edge assessment.
However, California maintains its right to use the worldwide
unitary tax method.
1993 U.S. Solicitor General files brief in Barclays/Colgate court
case tentatively supporting California.
1993 U.S. Supreme Court rules in Barclays/Colgate case
that, since Congress had not passed a law specifically
outlawing state unitary methods, these tax methods could
be applied to both U.S. and foreign MNEs.
vii) The Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group
The Worldwide Unitary Working Group included federal and state tax officials, 
the governors of California, Illinois, and Utah, and business executives from IBM, 
Caterpillar Tractor, Ford Motor Company, BATUS, Exxon, and Pfizer; there were also 
representatives from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and the 
National Conference of State Legislatures.53 The Working Group was announced as a way 
to produce recommendations that would be “conductive to harmonious international
187
economic relations, while also respecting the fiscal rights and privileges of the individual 
states”.54
The U.S. Treasury Department had led U.S. efforts to champion the arm’s length 
standard on an international basis, and was now invested in preventing the spread of an 
alternative system. Treasury Secretary Regan was therefore more sympathetic to some 
form of federal legislation banning state use of the WWC method than the Reagan 
administration in general. As a result, state representatives did not feel that the Treasury 
Department was a neutral convenor for the Working Group: they believed the Working 
Group would be unproductive for state interests, since they felt the Treasury Department’s 
only intention was to attempt to force a change in state tax methods.
Negotiations within the Working Group broke down almost immediately, with 
both corporate and state representatives starting the talks holding extreme positions in 
order to maintain leverage during the discussion. State interests wanted to first determine 
if the WWC unitary method was in fact causing problems for international business and 
deterring investment in the United States,55 and attempted to shift the debate to a 
comparison of the relative efficiency of arm’s length and unitary accounting.56
Corporate interests, along with the U.S. Treasury Department, started from the 
position that problems with state use of the WWC method were self-evident, and began 
presenting solutions which encompassed both foreign and domestic-company concerns. 
Although all but one of the corporate representatives on the Working Group were from 
domestic-based MNEs, U.S. MNEs felt their case would be strengthened if it was joined 
with that of foreign-domiciled MNEs, since the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the 
legality of applying the WWC method to foreign-domiciled MNEs: there were hopes that 
if foreign companies were exempted from state use of the method, domestic companies 
could successfully argue, under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, for an 
exemption in order to maintain their equity with foreign companies.
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The states prevailed in forcing the Working Group’s delegated Task Force to 
collect evidence of harm inflicted on corporations by state use of the WWC method. 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John Chapoton, however, opened the second set of 
Task Force meetings by strongly stating that the Task Force’s role was to propose solution 
to an obvious problem and that one of the options available to the Group was to suggest 
federal legislation banning the worldwide combination method.57 State representatives felt 
this was direct evidence that the Treasury Department was pressing for preemptive federal 
legislation, and came close to immediately ending deliberations at that point. After some 
argument, Secretary Regan agreed that the Task Force should continue “without the 
consideration of pre-emptive federal legislation of any type”,58 and the Task Force 
proceeded with the state agenda of determining whether a problem existed with regard to 
states’ application of the WWC method, holding public hearings to gather evidence of 
harm. State interests also pressed for federal help in auditing the arm’s length transactions 
of MNEs operating in their jurisdictions as a trade-off for switching to the water’s edge 
method. Although states felt the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was not as efficient as it 
could be, the IRS had superior capabilities for auditing MNE transfer pricing practices, 
since the federal government has access to information on corporate activity overseas 
through its network of bilateral tax treaties.
In an effort by both sides to not be seen as having caused the negotiations to fail, 
the Task Force agreed to develop a list of six options for solutions to the controversy at 
the state level. Option 1 had little support, since it would allow only foreign-based 
business an election between worldwide combination and water’s edge methods: this was 
seen as inequitable for domestic-domiciled corporations. Options 2-6 all provided a 
retreat from full worldwide combination and differed mainly as to what was included in 
the state’s tax base.59
At the final Working Group meeting in May, the states reiterated that they were 
willing to endorse a partial abandonment of the WWC method in return for increased 
federal audit assistance. At this time, Secretary Regan indicated the Treasury Department 
would budget an additional $50 million for international audit examinations.60 The
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Treasury Department’s draft Working Group report stated that three principles had been 
agreed to by the Group, the first of which was “Water’s Edge Unitary Combination for 
Both U.S. and Foreign-Based Companies”. The state representatives asked that the final 
report add the words “under Certain Conditions”: these conditions included increased 
federal audits of MNEs and increased federal auditing assistance to the states. The states 
further asked that any state substantially complying with any of the options listed by the 
task force would qualify for federal assistance. The state representatives agreed to sign the 
Working Group’s final report after these requested changes were included.
The revised Treasury report was first submitted to the corporate representatives, 
who responded by proposing further modifications which had not been discussed with 
state interests. On July 31, 1984, Secretary Regan, in apparent exasperation, and without 
advance notice, released his version of the Working Group report, signed by him alone. 
The Secretary’s Working Group Report returned to the Treasury Secretary’s original 
unconditional language in its first principle, recommending that the states change their 
laws to apply the water’s edge combination method to MNEs, and that, only after this had 
been done, the federal government provide audit assistance to the states on these 
companies’ overseas activities.61 Regan also recommended federal legislation banning 
subfederal use of the WWC method if the states did not make progress in changing to the 
water’s edge method within a year.
The states called Reagan’s report “a breach of faith”, and protested the Secretary’s 
threat of federal legislation and deadline for state changes.62 The state representatives of 
the Working Group then submitted both a letter expressing their disapproval and a full 
copy of the report they felt they had agreed to. On September 4, 1984, the Working 
Group’s final report was released unaltered from Regan’s draft version, although in his 
letter to the president transmitting the report, Regan proposed that the Treasury 
Department move immediately to implement federal assistance in order to demonstrate 
the “good faith and sincere intentions of the federal government”. The inability of the 
Working Group to file a final report agreed to by all participants demonstrated the extent 
of the animosity between state and business groups on the state unitary tax issue.
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In response to the recommendations of the Working Group’s Final Report and 
growing lobbying at the state level, in the one-year period after the Final Report was 
issued, five states stopped using unitary taxation on a worldwide basis, and Utah issued 
regulations that would end its use of the worldwide unitary method after the passage of 
federal legislation increasing federal audit assistance to the states.64 The five states which 
changed their law included Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Oregon, and Arizona. In addition, 
Massachusetts stopped using the method after its state Supreme Court struck down the 
state’s use of worldwide combination in Polaroid Corporation v. CIR.65 However, 
California, Alaska, Idaho, Montana, New Hampshire, and North Dakota resisted federal 
pressures to change their laws.66
viii) UK threats of retaliation
In response to the Working Group’s failure to propose federal legislation banning 
application of the worldwide combination method to foreign-domiciled corporations, the 
increasingly-frustrated British government proposed legislation giving UK Inland 
Revenue the power to deny Advanced Corporation Tax credits on dividends paid by UK 
subsidiaries to parent companies “having a qualifying presence” in WWC unitary tax 
states.67 This was in direct contradiction to the existing U.S.-UK income tax treaty, which 
explicitly granted these credits. The British government then announced that this 
legislation would not go into effect any sooner than January 1, 1987, to allow the U.S. 
Congress a grace period during which they could enact federal legislation banning state 
use of the WWC method. However, the threat of UK retaliation was not taken seriously 
by many U.S. interests, who felt it would constitute an abrogation of the existing U.S./UK 
tax treaty, and that such an abrogation would constitute discriminatory taxation, legally 
permitting the U.S. federal government to retaliate against the UK 68
vix) Proposed federal legislation
On November 8, 1985, in reaction to the introduction of UK legislation 
threatening retaliation over the unitary issue, and the failure of six states to pass 
legislation banning the WWC method in the year following the Working Group’s final 
report, the Reagan administration instructed the Treasury Department to draft federal
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legislation mandating a replacement of state worldwide unitary methods with water’s 
edge formulas.69
Since all prior attempts to pass preemptive federal legislation on the unitary issue 
had failed, many doubted this legislation had the political support needed to pass after so 
many states had already revoked their worldwide unitary tax requirements. Most 
observers felt the federal government remained wary of treading into an area of traditional 
state sovereignty.70 In addition, the proposed legislation most likely would have faced 
strong congressional opposition if it had come to a vote since it prohibited states from 
taxing intracorporate foreign dividends: at the time, 37 states counted these as part of their 
anticipated revenues, and the resulting revenue loss would have been a significant 
impediment to the bill’s passage.
Further pressure came from the federal government on January 30, 1986, when 
U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz wrote to the governors of Alaska, California, Idaho, 
Montana, New Hampshire, and North Dakota, asking them to stop using the WWC 
method. He argued that the foreign policy interests of the U.S. were being threatened, 
since the states’ method had become a point of conflict with foreign countries, and 
repeated arguments from U.S. trading partners that the WWC method created a risk of 
double taxation which was distorting investment decisions and reducing the flow of 
foreign investment into the U.S. Schultz stated that the U.S. federal government had long 
promoted the arm’s length standard in its Internal Revenue Code and bilateral tax treaties, 
and that the ALS was prescribed in the United Nation’s and Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s model income tax treaties.
In June 1986, alarmed that neither of the congressional bills initially proposed in 
December of 1985 had yet come to a vote, British Members of Parliament went to 
Washington D.C. to lobby U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker and U.S. Congressional 
leaders for federal legislation banning state use of the WWC method. Michael Grylls, 
chairman of the Conservative Trade and Industry Committee, stated the administration 
“might have done more to get things moving".71 In July of 1986, Michael Grylls, Tony
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Blair, Labor's Deputy Treasury and Economic Spokesman, and Ian Wrigglesworth, an 
Economic Affairs Spokesman for the Social Democrats, sent a letter to the U.S. Treasury 
Secretary stating that if there was not substantial progress made on the issue by the end of 
1986, UK retaliation would be inevitable. After much foot-dragging, hearings on the 
congressional bills were scheduled for September 29, 1986.
x) Corporate lobbying efforts in California
It had become conventional wisdom in California that as long as the state was seen 
to be making an effort to discuss modifications of its WWC method, the federal 
government would not act to ban the method.72 California bureaucrats felt they were in a 
strong position on the issue, since both state and national courts had been clear in ruling 
that use of the WWC method was a state matter unless the federal government explicitly 
banned the practice, and Congress had not passed legislation banning the method. 
However, corporate lobbying against the method kept the issue prominent at the state 
level. Many foreign and domestic companies voiced the view that the WWC tax method 
was a deterrent to investment in the state, but the perception was widely held that 
Japanese MNEs were the strongest objectors to state use of the method. The Japanese also 
commanded a great deal of attention in California at that time since they had become 
heavily involved in the state’s economy during the early 1980s.73
Sony Chairman and CEO Akio Morita repeatedly stated that California’s use of 
the WWC method was stopping Sony from investing in the state beyond its Rancho 
Bernardo television plant, and the company made prominent new investments in other 
states which did not use the WWC method.74 In 1984, in conjunction with the Electronic 
Industry Association of Japan, Morita stated that Sony’s continued contribution to 
California’s economy was now in serious jeopardy, and announced that 100 Japanese 
firms were considering investing nearly $1.5 billion in California, with the potential to 
create around 11,000 new jobs in the state. However, this investment would come only if 
California revoked its mandatory WWC method.75 Along with Sony, Kyocera, a major 
electronic components manufacturer, led the contingent of Japanese MNEs lobbying 
against the WWC method. In 1982, Kyocera stated it would not make further investments
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in California until the state’s unitary method was reformed, and also made very public 
investments in other states which it declared were in protest over California’s use of 
worldwide combination.
In addition, many large U.S. MNEs also lobbied to revoke California’s use of 
mandatory worldwide combination.77 IBM opposed the method on the grounds that it 
unfairly penalised MNEs compared to companies with purely domestic activities. IBM 
had lobbied successfully against Minnesota’s use of the WWC method by threatening no 
further investment in its Rochester, Minnesota plant unless the tax method was revoked.
In late 1985, IBM moved an operation with 500 jobs from San Jose to Arizona, a state 
which did not use the WWC method. Moreover, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce started a 
campaign to ‘red-flag’ states where a WWC method was in effect, sending out bulletins 
suggesting that its members avoid locating in these areas 79
xi) California attempts at legislation
California state bureaucrats argued that investment in the state had not slowed 
despite protests over California’s use of the WWC method: they were confident that the 
reason MNEs were so concerned about the method was that they felt they had to maintain 
a business presence in California.80 They feared unitary reform would be a huge revenue 
drain for the state and be perceived by the public as a tax break for large companies.81
However, California state government officials grew more became concerned 
when MNE threats of disinvestment were joined, in 1986, by threats of UK government 
retaliation and preemptive U.S. federal legislation. At the same time, California Governor 
Deukmejian had been directly prompted to reform the state’s tax method. When the 
governor’s chief of staff, Steven Merksamer, went on a four-day trip to Japan in August 
1986 to try to persuade Japanese officials to lift tariffs and restrictions on California 
agricultural imports, he was met with demands that California drop its WWC tax method. 
Merksamer said “I was told, point-blank, that if this (method) was changed, there would 
be substantial investment in California.. .It is very important, if we're going to be able to 
attract that foreign investment, that we deal with this issue”.82 It became increasingly hard
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to avoid the idea that it would be worthwhile for the state to modify its tax method.83 In 
addition, Governor Deukmejian, a Republican, was a strong supporter of President 
Reagan. Deukmejian wanted to avoid causing foreign policy problems which would 
embarrass the Republican president, and the confrontation that federal legislation banning 
the state's tax method would involve.84
In May 1984, after the federal Working Group had concluded its negotiations but 
before it had issued its final report, Deukmejian announced he would seek to modify 
California’s unitary tax method. Deukmejian made reforming the state’s unitary tax 
method a keystone of his 1984/85 legislative program, which was designed to encourage 
foreign investment in the state. In 1984, Governor Deukmejian formed a working 
committee on the issue of unitary reform, comprising representatives of California’s 
executive branch, legislative branch, and business community. This was a departure from 
traditional legislative procedures, but Deukmejian sought to reach a consensus on what
Of
had become a politically divisive issue.
Since the Japanese had originally led the fight against the WWC method in 
California, the working committee discussed several options for using a removal of the 
WWC method to specifically force the Japanese government to remove trade barriers to 
California products.86 However, the Senate legislative counsel concluded that it would 
violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution to exclude activities in a foreign 
country from the state’s apportionable income base depending on whether the foreign 
country concerned was guilty of erecting trade barriers against state products. A proposal 
to institute a statutory preference in state public purchases against goods from 
discriminatory countries was also seen as potentially unconstitutional. Another proposal, 
to have the California World Trade Commission publish a list of discriminatory countries, 
was viewed by the counsel as constitutional, but probably ineffective. It was also seen as 
constitutional to condition state water’s edge legislation on the federal government’s 
adoption of a plan to better identify and act on trade discrimination by foreign countries;87 
however, this suggestion was never acted on. In July 1984, the Japanese announced an 
Action Program to promote market accessibility, including tariff reductions on
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agricultural and fishery products, as well as zero percent tariffs on industrial products.
The Japanese government stressed to Senator Alquist that it was through such internal 
initiatives that foreign complaints about access to the Japanese market would be 
addressed, rather than through responses to “external demands”.88
California Senator Alfred Alquist (D-San Jose), chairman of the state Senate 
Budget and Fiscal Review Committee, decided to introduce legislation limiting 
California’s switch from the WWC method to the water’s edge method only to foreign- 
domiciled businesses, since protests at both the federal and state level had been led by 
foreign MNEs. In addition, it was felt that emphasising that the reform was needed to stop 
international condemnation would help state legislators avoid protests that the change was 
simply a tax break for large companies.89 Once it became apparent that the steering 
committee was close to agreement on a solution which allowed only foreign companies 
the option of a water’s edge election, companies in Silicon Valley’s growing high-tech 
community joined the Committee on State Taxation, which had been lobbying against 
state use of the WWC method since the 1970s, to protest the proposed change.90 The 
Silicon Valley companies argued that if Japanese MNEs received a tax break in 
California, it would be increasingly difficult for U.S. firms to remain competitive. Senator 
Alquist, whose constituency of Santa Clara county included Silicon Valley, quickly 
realised his exclusion of U.S. MNEs was a mistake, and changed the legislation to allow 
domestic-domiciled companies the option of a water’s edge election 91 He introduced 
legislation, SB85, on December 6, 1984, which allowed both foreign and domestic- 
domiciled companies in California to permanently elect either the water’s edge or the 
WWC method of assessment.
However, many U.S.-domiciled MNEs objected to SB85’s stipulation that 
California would continue to tax the dividends U.S. MNEs received from their overseas 
subsidiaries but not the dividends received by the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-domiciled
ft-}
MNEs. Despite these protests, the Alquist bill was seen as having a high chance of 
passing since, as the lowest-cost alternative presented before the state’s unitary tax 
working committee, it had the governor’s approval.93
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In an effort to somewhat mollify U.S. MNE groups on the issue, the unitary reform 
working committee introduced AB1300 in the Assembly as the successor to SB85.94 This 
bill offered relief on the taxation of foreign-sourced dividends for U.S. MNEs in the form 
of a 67-cent deduction against foreign dividends for every dollar of increased investment 
or employment in California.
Despite this revision, U.S. MNEs still objected to AB1300’s inclusion of their 
foreign-sourced dividends under any circumstances. The California Business Council 
(CBC) ran newspaper advertisements around the state protesting the legislation’s 
inclusion of U.S. companies’ foreign-sourced dividends in the water’s edge assessment, 
and urging U.S. MNEs to protest the bill before the California Assembly Revenue and 
Tax Committee. This advertisement prompted The Sacramento Bee newspaper to write an 
editorial supporting the exclusion of foreign-sourced dividends from the water’s edge 
election of U.S. MNEs. In August 1985, the CBC sent an “Uncle Sam” character to the 
offices of state legislators to lobby against SB85 and AB1300. The character delivered, in 
baskets covered in the American flag, a sample of six industry group products the CBC 
said were subject to severe trade barriers and market access restrictions abroad. The CBC 
claimed that most of the foreign companies which would benefit under the proposed bills 
came from countries which restricted the access of U.S. business to their markets and 
subsidised the export of their country’s products to the U.S. Although AB1300 was 
characterised as a bill which only benefited foreigners, according to the FTB, two-thirds 
of the bill’s total tax relief would go to domestic-domiciled companies.95
Assemblyman John Vasconcellos (D-San Jose), the Chair of the Assembly Ways 
and Means Committee, who had been lobbied heavily on this issue by both COST and the 
CBC, along with his Silicon Valley constituents, then refused to back the proposed 
legislation, and “blew up the deal”96 agreed upon by the state working committee in June 
1985. Vasconcellos drafted a competing bill in California’s lower legislature, AB2922, 
which excluded the foreign-sourced dividends of U.S. corporations electing water’s edge 
from state taxation, and granted unitary relief in three stages instead of all at once. This 
bill was supported by most U.S. MNEs over Alquist’s bill. The fact that Vasconcellos and
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Alquist were from the same congressional district of San Jose, whose constituents, Silicon 
Valley firms, were active on the WWC issue obviously drove both legislators to press for 
unitary reform.97 The coincidence that the two representatives from this district were also 
chairing the legislature’s two fiscal committees was important in giving the unitary reform 
movement political momentum.
However, since Vasconcellos’ modifications of Alquist’s proposals raised the 
bill’s cost, it stood a high chance of being vetoed by Governor Deukmejian, who was 
standing for reelection in 1986, and did not want to be accused of giving up a large 
amount of state tax revenue.98 The governor insisted that the total cost of unitary reform 
should stay in the $200-300 million range: the FTB estimated that the version of water’s 
edge election proposed by Senator Alquist in SB 85 would cost the state $200 million,99 
while Vasconcellos’ AB2922 would cost $585 million.100 Deukmejian also objected to 
Vasconcellos’ foreign dividend exemption for U.S. MNEs on principle, since he felt it 
would reward U.S. firms for creating jobs overseas. California Senate President David 
Roberti (Democrat-LA) also opposed the exemption, calling it “chutzpah” for U.S. MNEs 
to ask for tax relief for exporting jobs.101
xii) Impact on state revenues
In 1985, California had experienced several years of budget surpluses. However, 
there were growing fears in the California legislature that the U.S. federal budget deficit 
could combine with the Reagan administration’s push for fiscal federalism to renew 
revenue pressures on the state. The debate over unitary reform in California quickly 
became a debate over whether the state could afford the resulting revenue loss. There was 
also concern that the public would view unitary reform as a concession to large corporate 
interests.102
To some extent, the debate over unitary reform pitted small business against big
1 A -l
business. Since multinational enterprises in California were outnumbered by small and 
medium-sized businesses with no overseas activities, most companies operating in the 
state would have preferred the continued use of the WWC method over the overall
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increase in business taxes they feared might result from a state revenue loss due to unitary 
reform. Arguments over the repeal of mandatory use of the WWC method increasingly 
became a standoff between those who feared the loss of state tax revenue from unitary 
reform, and those who felt removing the unpopular tax method would attract new MNE 
investment to the state, increasing California’s overall tax revenues. Although tax 
methods are not generally the predominant factor influencing most MNE investment 
decisions, the unitary method, which engendered a “disproportionately emotional taxpayer 
response”, became increasingly to be seen as a signal of the attractiveness of a state’s 
regulatory environment for business.104
However, it was difficult to judge the increased amount of long-term investment 
which might result from reform of the state’s unitary method, since a state’s tax method is 
usually only one of many factors investors take into account.105 The economist Larry 
Kimbell of UCLA issued a report stating that repeal of the mandatory WWC unitary 
method in California would lead to an increase of around $3 billion a year in investment 
in the state. However, he stated that the state’s prospects for increased investment were 
good even if the WWC method was not removed.
In addition, the California legislature relied on FTB estimates of projected revenue 
loss when considering the revenue impact of modifications to the state’s use of the WWC 
method. Many MNEs in favour of reform felt that the FTB, which supported the use of 
worldwide combination, attached very high estimates of projected revenue loss to any 
retreat from the WWC method.106 FTB estimates were hotly contested by MNEs, since 
most estimates depended heavily on the number of companies it was estimated would 
elect water’s edge combination if worldwide combination was no longer mandatory. In 
addition, FTB estimates did not take into account the possibility of an increase in state tax 
revenue from new investment attracted to California by the removal of an unpopular tax 
method, since the FTB claimed the impact of unitary reform on the future location 
decisions of MNEs was impossible to quantify, despite public promises of increased 
investment from several Japanese firms.
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However, the FTB maintained the upper hand in any disputes over accuracy of 
data, since the Bureau held that the state tax return information it used to generate revenue 
estimates was confidential, and refused outside access to their numbers.107 Outside 
estimates were therefore dependent on publicly available information or figures 
volunteered by companies, and always suffered from charges of being less accurate.108
xiii) The election fee
AB1300 was quickly dubbed the unitary tax “quid pro quo” bill since it levied an 
annual fee of 2% of a companies’ payroll, property, and sales revenue in California on 
firms opting for water’s edge assessment instead of worldwide combination; this fee was 
seen as being the “price” MNEs had to pay the state for unitary reform.109 It was estimated 
the election fee would generate $67 million annually towards a Unitary Fund, of which 
80% would go to infrastructure development in California communities seeing increased 
foreign investment, and 20% to promote California exports. The fee became integral to 
having the legislation perceived as a fair solution, since it solved the primary political 
argument against reforming the WWC method, that WWC reform was a tax break for big 
business.110 Once the issue of a fee was raised, a political solution which did not include 
the election fee became practically unworkable.111
Although the Japanese viewed the fee as a cost they were willing to pay to achieve 
unitary reform, and indeed, Sony Corp. had originally proposed the idea of a fee to 
Senator Alquist,112 the British felt that an election fee was “an anathema”.113 Even though 
it would generate a very small amount of money, British companies felt the fee added 
insult to injury since, in their view, the California legislature was admitting they were 
wrong by agreeing to modify the WWC method.114 However, MNE protests against the 
fee only gave legislators more political protection to argue that they had not completely 
given in to corporate interests.115
xiv) Foreign vs. domestic lobbying
Foreign-domiciled MNEs, in particular the Japanese, originally led protests 
against the WWC method in California, and organised quickly to form unitary tax lobby
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groups. Foreign MNEs also placed pressure on the U.S. federal government through 
formal protests from their home governments: the U.S. federal government was therefore 
more insistent that states find a unitary reform solution for foreign-domiciled companies. 
In addition, foreign MNEs had a stronger legal case to make against the WWC method, 
since U.S. courts had not yet ruled on the legality of applying the WWC method to 
foreign MNEs. Foreign companies could further claim that worldwide combination 
constituted an extraterritorial application of state law, and forced them into onerous 
recordkeeping and currency conversion requirements which U.S. companies were not 
subject to.
The stronger position held by foreign MNEs contributed to an important difference 
in their lobbying tactics: they made more threats to leave California for other states which 
did not use the WWC method. U.S. MNEs felt they could not as plausibly threaten to 
leave California entirely, especially if their headquarters were in the state, and that any 
arguments in this direction would cause them to lose credibility with California 
legislators. U.S. MNEs did threaten not to increase their existing investment in California, 
although this was based not just on the state’s use of the WWC method, but on general 
arguments that other states had regulations more friendly to business. Domestic-domiciled 
companies tended to simply list the WWC method as one of the factors affecting their 
decision to locate in a particular state.
U.S. companies fought for their inclusion in unitary reform legislation mostly on 
the principle of equity with foreign companies. COST and the California Chamber of 
Commerce in particular argued that, in an increasingly internationalised economy, U.S. 
companies had to be on an equal footing with their foreign competitors. Further, they 
argued that domestic companies were the state’s true constituents. The constituency 
argument was not particularly effective: there was not a great deal of backlash at this time 
against foreign MNEs in California, and the WWC method was viewed by state 
legislators as equally onerous on both foreign and U.S. MNEs. However, after U.S. 
companies pushed to be included in SB85, foreign companies realised it would be 
politically difficult for them to attain unitary reform legislation in California that could be
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portrayed as a foreign-only tax break; therefore, U.S. MNE would have to be included in 
any unitary reform effort.
Domestic companies, however, continued to view foreign MNEs, especially the 
Japanese, as a threat to their inclusion in unitary reform. Although the Organization for 
the Fair Treatment of International Investment coordinated somewhat with U.S. 
companies, and there were a few lobbying groups, such as the California Chamber of 
Commerce and the California Manufacturer’s Association, which included both foreign 
and domestic companies, foreign and domestic companies never really came together on 
the unitary issue, and the various nationalities remained fairly separate in their lobbying 
efforts.
xv) Diverse foreign lobbying tactics
Foreign MNE lobbying groups argued that the WWC method incorrectly assumed 
homogenous economic conditions worldwide, was contrary to the internationally- 
approved arm’s length standard, and resulted in double taxation. They also played on the 
fear of threatened British retaliation against U.S. business in the UK, and argued the 
WWC method caused a drop in worldwide economic efficiency since it distorted 
international investment patterns.
The Japanese lobbying effort against California’s WWC method was led by Sony 
and Kyocera; Sony also chaired the California Unitary Coalition, and its California 
branch, the California Investment Environment Committee, which consisted solely of 
Japanese firms. The Japanese tended to use corporate lobbyists as opposed to more formal 
approaches from their government, since the Japanese government and business were 
combined within the Keidanren.
The Japanese were most concerned with the cost of the WWC method, since their 
firms were making big new capital investments in California: these new subsidiaries often 
had high start-up costs, resulting in losses in California which were being taxed under the 
WWC method against huge parent-company profits in Japan. In addition, Japanese
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companies argued that payroll comparison between Japanese and U.S. companies were 
inaccurate since companies in Japan had a very different system of fringe benefits. The 
Japanese also lobbied extensively on a more direct level to change California’s law, 
spending so much money on lobbyists and campaign contributions in the 1980s that their 
unitary lobbying was dubbed ‘Wada-gate’ after Chris Wada, Sony Corp.’s top executive 
in California.116
British interests were seen as less willing to compromise on unitary tax reform 
than the Japanese, since British companies were much more concerned with the principle 
that the WWC method was contrary to international norms. The British primarily used 
political figures as lobbyists: parliamentary delegations, Margaret Thatcher, and members 
of the British consulate in San Francisco. UK companies were also not as financially 
harmed as the Japanese by the method, since most of their subsidiaries in California were 
long-established. They therefore also could not threaten to withdraw their investments as 
plausibly as the Japanese.
There was a lingering feeling among state interests that a lack of appreciation for 
federalism among British interests may have been a contributing factor to their 
intransigence on state use of the WWC method. There was a sense that the British 
government did not really understand federalism, and did not understand how California, 
a subset of a friendly nation, could be punishing English companies in contravention of 
international norms. The UK government in fact asserted that the “states’ reach cannot 
exceed the grasp of their sovereign, the national government”.117 However, under U.S. 
federalism, “the Tenth Amendment ensures California’s sovereignty, thereby creating a 
dual system of sovereignty between California and the federal government under which 
neither entity may impair the sovereignty of the other”.118
However, not all foreign MNEs in California spumed the WWC method: British 
Petroleum spoke in favour of the WWC method at hearings in the California legislature, 
since the method lowered the company’s state tax bill.
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xvi) Moves towards a solution
Reform of California’s unitary tax method had been discussed extensively for 
several years, and most legislative observers thought neither the Vasconcellos or Alquist 
bill would pass in 1986. In particular, since 1986 was an election year in California, state 
legislators were seen as reluctant to repeal the WWC method for fear they would be 
blamed for the resulting loss in state tax revenue. Meanwhile, jokes circulated that the 
continuing debate over unitary reform had become a “cottage industry” in California.119 
Neither lobbyists nor legislators were seen as having an incentive to resolve the issue 
quickly, since it would have stopped a large source of their funding. Campaign 
contributions over the issue approached $500,000 in 1985, and Assemblyman Tom 
Hayden, at one point in 1985, jokingly proposed an amendment to SB85 that it could not 
become operative until every registered lobbyist in Sacramento had been hired to 
influence its passage or defeat.120 Unitary reform was described as a “bonanza” for the 
more than 100 corporate representatives and lobbyists focusing their attention on the 
bills.121
At the same time, there was a fear that if California did not act, the federal 
government might. In March 1986, Vasconcellos warned that the pending U.S. federal 
legislation, initiated to allay foreign government protests, could ban the unitary tax 
outright and force California’s hand on the matter unless the state acted quickly in some 
way. In early 1986, Senator Alquist had also written to Assembly Vasconcellos concerned 
that the upcoming state elections and budget process in late 1986 would supplant attention 
on unitary reform. He agreed with Vasconcellos that a failure to act soon might force 
federal action. On May 15, 1986, California’s Assembly passed a revised version of 
Alquist’s bill which incorporated Vasconcellos’ gradual phasing-out of the WWC tax 
method.
The State Senate sent the Assembly bill to a two-house conference committee to 
find a compromise with Alquist’s Senate bill. The legislative panel publicly stated they 
were anxious to reach a compromise quickly because a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate 
had scheduled a September 29th hearing on federal legislation banning state use of the
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WWC method. The passage of this federal legislation might mean California would have 
to absorb the full brunt of the resulting revenue loss without being able to legislate any
199offsetting revenue sources tied to unitary reform. Further, the state’s strong fiscal 
position served to make the revenue loss from reform palatable if the legislation would 
satisfy both foreign and domestic companies and dismiss the issue. A compromise was 
reached to allow a 15% tax deduction for the foreign-sourced dividends of U.S. MNEs, 
and both foreign and domestic companies agreed to support the bill.
xvii) The 1986 Water’s Edge Election Bill
The final Water’s Edge Election Bill, unanimously agreed upon by the state 
conference committee on August 21, 1986, was seen as a true compromise. It allowed all 
companies, regardless of nationality, to elect to file under the water’s edge or WWC 
method for a period of 10 years. Governor Deukmejian was reassured that the foreign 
dividend exemption would not cause jobs to be exported abroad by the insertion of a 
formula tying the dividend exemption to increases in an MNE’s U.S. payroll 
proportionate to its foreign payroll.123 Firms above a minimum size which elected to use 
the water’s edge assessment also had to file a domestic disclosure spreadsheet every three 
years to show their total U.S. income and describe how this income was apportioned 
throughout their operations in the U.S. The California Franchise Tax Board could, 
however, disallow a firm’s water’s edge election and force it to file under worldwide 
combination if it did not provide the necessary information required, or if the FTB 
determined that it could not prevent a company’s tax evasion with the audit tools 
available.124 The bill also required that MNEs electing to use the water’s edge method pay 
an annual 'election fee’ of 3% of their combined payroll, property, and sales in 
California.125
Tax relief granted to MNEs under this bill through the ability to elect a water’s 
edge assessment was estimated at $232 million, but since the election fee provided $38 
million and the closure of loopholes to conform California’s tax code with recent federal 
tax code changes supplied an additional $111 million, overall, the legislation cost the state 
an estimated $83 million in lost revenue.126 This was considered quite small in the face of
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the $4.3 billion California had collected in bank and corporation taxes in fiscal 1984-85. It 
also did not take into account any rise in state tax revenue from increased investment in 
California after the reform of an unpopular tax method. In the end, it was estimated 
foreign firms would receive 25% of the tax relief provided under the legislation; the 
remainder, over 75%, would go to American firms.127 Governor Deukmejian signed the 
bill making the WWC unitary tax method an optional election on September 5th, 1986, 
and the law went into effect on January 1, 1988.
xviii) Foreign reaction to the law
Japanese MNEs seemed fairly content with California’s unitary reform legislation, 
despite warning they would continue to lobby for a complete revocation of the WWC 
method. “We are satisfied 80 percent by the unitary tax change, but not 100 percent," said 
Masami Tashiro, a Keidanren official.128 A statement by Sony’s CEO on behalf of the 
Keidanren said that the legislation “will encourage investment in California by foreign 
and domestic multinational corporations...we expect that investment in California by 
Japan and other countries will be accelerated".129 The Keidanren announced it would send 
a study mission to California in the near future, presumably to look for new investment 
opportunities now that the tax was optional, and the Japanese Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry stated that the unitary reform legislation would help promote Japanese 
investment in California.130
Four days after the bill was signed into law, the Japanese MNE Kyocera 
announced it would expand operations at its manufacturing plant in California. One week 
after the bill passed, Sony announced it would spend about $30 million over the next three 
years to expand its California television factory. Sony then announced it would build a 
new $10 million joint venture sales/service facility in suburban Los Angeles. The 
chairman of Sony Corp. of America said the two investments were "Sony's answer to its 
pledge to bring production to the state", and mentioned the weakening dollar along with 
reform of the state’s unitary method as factors which had prompted the company’s 
decision.132
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British firms, however, were less enthusiastic about the state’s reform, since 
California could theoretically still force the use of worldwide combination on foreign 
companies, and MNEs were being charged a fee to opt out of a system the UK 
government considered a violation of extraterritoriality. They further protested that 
worldwide combined reporting had nominally remained California’s primary method of 
taxing multinational companies, offending the international norm of the arm’s length 
standard. The UK Chancellor of the Exchequer stated he was disappointed with the law, 
but announced the UK would now retaliate only if other U.S. states started to use the 
WWC method. Nonetheless, retaliatory UK legislation remained on the books to be 
available at a later date, and the British government continued to state that California’s 
tax system was contrary to accepted international tax practice and to urge the U.S. federal 
government to take action to ban state use of the WWC method.
Howard Davies, director general of the Confederation of British Industries, stated
that while “the CBI welcomes this positive move,” California’s legislation “does not
solve the problems of the past”: refunds for taxes already paid under the mandatory WWC
1 ^method, a sum then estimated at 600 million pounds. The Organization for the Fair 
Treatment of International Investments also protested California’s use of the election fee, 
and continued to lobby, without success, for the fee’s elimination before the law went into 
effect in 1988. "Today, the Japanese are as satisfied as anyone", California Chamber of 
Commerce counsel Fred Main stated. "The British are less satisfied. It's going to be an 
issue for a long time".134
xix) Domestic reaction to the law
Domestic proponents of unitary reform argued the law was overwhelmingly 
positive since it removed an obstacle to investment in the state. In signing the legislation, 
Deukmejian stated the new law "will send out a very clear message to people around the 
state and around the world that California intends to continue to be the job-creating 
capital of the nation".135 He declared that California was “going global”, and stated that 
California’s removal of a barrier to international trade would be matched by the state’s 
toughness in knocking down restrictive trade barriers in other countries. In general,
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U.S. MNEs agreed with foreign MNE objections to the election fee, and to the FTB's 
ability to disregard a water's edge election. At the same time, 80/20 companies, U.S. 
MNEs with more than the 80 percent of their operations overseas, objected to the new law 
since they would remain subject to the WWC method while their main competitors,
117overseas firms in foreign markets, would not.
The strongest domestic critics of the law argued it cost the state too much money. 
“This is nothing more than welfare for corporations”, declared Assemblyman Jack 
O'Connell.138 Senator Tom Hayden, a long-time opponent of the bill, stated such a large 
“tax break” for multinational corporations was "voodoo economics".139 Bill Bennett, a 
member of California’s Board of Equalization, noted that Sony Corp. had given more than 
$46,000 to state officials during the 1985-86 legislative session, and called the bill "a 
tribute to the lobbying power of the foreign nationals. They bought the legislation, it's as 
simple as that".140
xx) Withdrawal of federal legislation
At the U.S. Senate Finance Subcommittee hearings of September 29, 1986 on 
federal legislation to reform state use of the WWC method, the Reagan administration 
formally recommended the withdrawal of the legislation in the wake of California's new 
law. Now, only Alaska, Montana and North Dakota still employed mandatory worldwide 
combined unitary taxation. “The sheer size of California's economy, and sheer number of 
multinational corporations operating there, makes its final resolution of the issue most 
significant to the debate on the federal level," Senator Pete Wilson (R-CA) stated.141 In 
addition, California’s unitary reform was seen as symbolically important: since California 
and New York state companies conduct the most international business, their state laws 
are generally taken as the standard for all U.S. MNEs.
However, J. Roger Mentz, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Treasury, 
stated at the September 29th hearing that the administration still had some "serious policy 
concerns" with the California bill, including the provisions for payment of an election fee, 
80/20 corporations, and foreign dividends.142 He further noted that if progress was not
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made towards changing these provisions, the federal government might reintroduce 
preemptive legislation in the future.143 Although bills to further restrict U.S. state use of 
the WWC tax method continued to be annually introduced at the federal level through 
1993, Congress did not show any interest in legislating on the issue.
xxi) Continued lobbying efforts in California
In the end, not as many companies as predicted elected to file under the water’s 
edge method in California since they felt the restrictions attached to its election were too 
onerous.144 In particular, the law’s requirement that companies elect to use the water’s 
edge method for a period of 10 years was seen as an undue constraint, since most 
companies were unwilling to plan that far in advance.145 Many companies also did not 
elect to use the water’s edge in order to avoid paying the election fee.146
Lobbying efforts for unitary reform in California decreased significantly after the 
1986 Water’s Edge Election Bill passed. Although most lobbying groups which opposed 
the state’s use of the WWC method were not satisfied with the final bill, there was a 
recognition that the California legislature felt that unitary reform had taken place, and 
there was not enough political momentum to drive forward further changes.147 Many of 
the issue-specific lobbying groups most active on unitary reform, including the 
Organization for the Fair Treatment of International Investment and the California 
Business Council, disbanded after the bill’s passage.
Those who wanted to press the unitary reform issue further placed their faith in 
continuing court cases to rule state use of the WWC method unconstitutional, feeling this 
was the only way to obtain a complete removal of the method.148 Several companies 
refused to file under the water’s edge method in the belief that the restrictions surrounding 
the election of the method would soon be declared unconstitutional.149 Among British 
interests, in particular, there was an assumption that because the U.S. administration was 
against state use of the WWC method, it would be ruled unconstitutional by U.S. 
courts.150 This assumption was fueled by the continued British belief that it was lack of 
support from the Reagan administration which had led to a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in
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favour of the states in the 1983 Container Corp. case.151 However, the fact that a 
California legislative solution had been reached, even if it was incomplete, relieved 
pressure on the courts to rule against the states.152
xxii) Investment promotion turns to negotiation
In Governor Deukmejian’s annual State of the State address after the passage of 
California’s 1986 unitary reform legislation, the governor noted: "we recently addressed a 
barrier to investment in our state, which many (foreign investors) had requested us to do, 
the unitary method of taxation. And I will ask them now to respond to our showing of 
good faith by lowering their own trade barriers and increasing their investment in our
11 153state .
During Deujkmejian’s 1987 trip to Japan, the governor’s advisors stated that after 
the Japanese had complained about the WWC method, California had changed its law, 
and “now we want them to put their money where their mouth is" by removing barriers to 
California agricultural products, especially rice.154 Sony CEO Morita responded that 
"When we were tackling (a repeal of) the unitary tax method, we took as long as 10 years, 
and exercised patience...We hope our American trading partners will exercise similar 
patience”.155
Deukmejian then threatened that California would revert to compulsory worldwide 
unitary taxation if the Japanese did not make more investments in California and open up 
their markets to California products; at the same time, he stated California would consider 
eliminating the state’s water’s edge election fee if the Japanese increased their investment 
in California. He said, referring to the unitary system, “we don't have the jurisdiction over 
a lot of these international questions of trade and the like, but there are some things we 
can do. And this is an option. We're going to try to be as influential as we can".156 The 
governor stated that he viewed his role not as negotiating directly with the Japanese 
government to remove trade barriers, but as simply applying pressure.
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Deukmejian also pressed Taiwan to toughen its intellectual property rights laws to 
help California manufacturers, and visited Europe to press for reduced trade barriers, new 
markets for Californian exports, and increased foreign direct investment in the state. In a 
speech to the London Chamber of Commerce, he declared that California expected to see
1S7more investment by British companies after the reform of the state’s unitary method. 
Asked whether California would retaliate against countries which did not provide equal 
access to California products, the governor said, "These are options that have to be 
considered down the road".158
xxiii) U.S. 1992 federal transfer pricing regulations
The same year that California passed the Water’s Edge Election Bill, the U.S. 
federal government modified federal transfer pricing regulations further away from a 
complete endorsement of the arm’s length standard (ALS). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
modified Section 482 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code to declare that profit on transfers 
of intangible goods, such as intellectual property, should be allocated ‘commensurate with 
the income’ attributable to the intangible good. This established that the Internal Revenue 
Service could examine the income attributable to a company’s factors of production in 
determining the company’s tax payment. This prompted criticism from U.S. states that the 
federal government should not be criticising state use of formulary apportionment 
methods since, by looking at underlying factors of production, the federal government 
was tacitly admitting that formulary apportionment methods were more accurate. The 
1986 Internal Revenue Code revisions also prompted criticism from MNEs and foreign 
government that the U.S. was retreating from its endorsement of the ALS.
By the 1980s, the persistence of low taxable net income among foreign-controlled 
companies in the U.S., compared to U.S. firms and to standard worldwide rates of return, 
had become controversial. Suspicions grew that these tax underpayments were due to 
transfer price manipulations.159 These suspicions increased with worries over the rising 
U.S. budget and trade deficits: the IRS estimated that transfer price manipulation by foreign 
MNEs resulted in an annual loss of US$ 3 billion at the federal level.
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In 1992, U.S. Representative Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) and Willis D. Grudison, Jr. 
(R-OH) proposed the Foreign Income Tax Rationalization and Simplification Act, HR 
5270, which would have effectively eliminated the use of the arm’s length standard at the 
federal level and instead required U.S. companies with at least 25 percent foreign 
ownership to pay an alternative minimum tax on 75 percent of the average profits earned 
by U.S. enterprises in the same industry. The Rostenkowski/Grudison bill did not pass, 
but it focused further attention on this area.
In 1992, the IRS proposed new regulations which attempted to extend the 
‘commensurate with income’ principle to tangible goods, stating that an MNE’s operating 
income should fall within “the range of profits that would have been earned by similarly 
situated uncontrolled taxpayers engaging in comparable uncontrolled transfers”.160 This 
was known as the ‘comparable profit interval’ method (CPI), and it was to be used to 
double-check all other methods of setting transfer prices.
MNEs and the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs widely criticised the proposed 
U.S. regulations as a departure from the ALS.161 Accordingly, when the IRS regulations 
were issued in temporary form (as the OECD had requested) in 1993, they stated that 
firms should use the “best method” to give “the most accurate arm’s length result”, and no 
longer required the CPI method to be used to double-check other assessment methods: it 
should only be used if all other methods were deemed unreliable. However, the CPI 
method was still listed as a possible means of evaluation. To counteract the increased 
flexibility in judgment, penalties for transfer price manipulation were increased. The 1993 
IRS regulations were criticised by the International Chamber of Commerce’s Commission 
on Taxation as continuing to give the comparable profit interval method too high a status 
at the expense of the ALS. These temporary regulations remain in place today.
xxiv) Barclays Bank’s initial suits
Barclays Bank brought suit against the California Franchise Tax Board in 1984, 
stating that in 1977 the FTB had assessed the bank liable for $250,000 more in taxes than 
it should have; Barclays paid the tax, but sued for a refund on the grounds that applying
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the WWC method to the overseas income of foreign-based corporations was 
unconstitutional. Barclays argued that use of the WWC method resulted in international 
double taxation and violated the Foreign Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by 
interfering with the U.S. federal government’s ability to ‘speak with one voice’ when 
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments. Barclays further argued the 
WWC method violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution since it resulted in 
unreasonably high and burdensome taxes.
In June 1987, the California State Superior Court ruled in the Barclays Bank case 
that the WWC unitary tax method was unconstitutional when applied to foreign-based 
MNEs, since only the U.S. Congress, not the state, had the power to regulate commerce 
with other nations. Additionally, the Superior Court found that that WWC reporting 
requirements for foreign-based MNEs violated the due process clause because, due to the 
difficulty of producing accounting data on foreign activities acceptable to the FTB, the 
only way Barclays could comply with California’s tax method was by “supplication and 
negotiation” with the FTB.164 The Franchise Tax Board immediately appealed the 
decision.
On November 30, 1990, the 3rd District Court of Appeal upheld the Superior 
Court’s judgment against California in the Barclays Bank case, and the court’s power to 
do so based on the dormant commerce clause theory, since the states’ use of the WWC 
method had “caused friction with U.S. trading partners and led to retaliatory legislation 
passed by the United Kingdom”.165 In addition, the court restated that the method 
discriminated against foreign commerce, calling the accounting requirements for the tax 
an “administrative nightmare”.166 California again appealed the decision to the California 
State Supreme Court.
In May 1992, the California Supreme Court justices unanimously reversed the 
California Third District Court of Appeal’s decision, stating that only the U.S. Congress 
holds the power to regulate foreign commerce, and Congress had never passed legislation 
banning state use of the WWC method: therefore, the method was a legally valid method
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of state taxation. This decision held that the lower courts had been incorrect in their 
interpretation of the dormant commerce clause theory. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1986 
decision in Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department o f Revenue had weakened the 
judiciary’s ability to act under this clause, since it held that the courts should be more 
sensitive to issues of congressional intent, above and beyond concrete congressional 
action.
The California Supreme Court’s analysis of congressional intent rested on three 
types of international agreements approved by Congress: bilateral tax treaties, Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation treaties, and the 1979 U.S./UK income tax treaty. None of 
these banned the use of formulary apportionment by U.S. subfederal governments. 
California Supreme Court Justice Armand Arabian stated the law “does not give 
executive officials carte blanche to declare state tax methods null when they irritate our
i fntrading partners”. However, the high court ordered further proceedings before a state 
appeals court on the issue of whether the state’s demands for financial data under the 
WWC method were overly burdensome, thus violating Barclays’ right to due process.
Barclays then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review of the case, which was 
denied on the basis that the company had failed to exhaust the available state remedies. 
The California Court of Appeal decided, on remand, that although the burden of 
supplying information was greater for foreign companies, it was not discriminatory, but 
only part of the greater administrative cost for a company doing business in a foreign 
country; thus, it did not violate the due process clause. The Supreme Court of California 
declined further review of the case, and Barclays again appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court for review.
By this time, the Barclays case had become a rallying point over whether 
California had the right to use unitary taxation in any form. The UK Financial Secretary to 
the Treasury stated that the best means of eliminating the WWC method in the U.S. was 
for governments to lend strong and active support to companies litigating in U.S. courts 
against state use of the method. Britain, backed by the EU, felt that allowing unitary
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taxation to stand in California in any form posed a challenge to bilateral tax agreements 
founded on the arm’s length standard, and might encourage other U.S. states, and even 
other countries, to use formulary apportionment methods.
xxv) Alcan/ICI
Alcan Aluminum of Canada and ICI of Britain, which both had subsidiaries in 
California, filed a joint suit against the California Franchise Tax Board in 1986 in the U.S. 
District Court in Chicago, Seventh Circuit, opposing the unitary tax method on the 
grounds that it subjected them to double taxation by assessing a state tax on income from 
their operations outside of the U.S. In March 1986, the Reagan administration’s Justice 
Department filed a brief in support of these companies, contending that unitary taxation 
interfered with the federal government’s “exclusive power” to conduct foreign relations 
and regulate foreign commerce, since the tax method had become a source of conflict 
with foreign countries. This brief mentioned that the ambassadors of fourteen foreign 
countries had sent a diplomatic note stating that the unitary method was "a serious 
obstacle to further development of trade and investment relationships”,169 and added that 
"it is the clearly expressed policy of the United States that the separate accounting, or 
arm's length method, is the appropriate method of allocating income among commonly 
controlled multinational corporations".170
Foreign-parent MNEs had tried several times to file suits challenging U.S. state 
use of the WWC method on the grounds that the method violated the Foreign Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, the courts consistently dismissed their 
arguments on the procedural grounds that foreign parent corporations could not present 
arguments because they were not technically ‘the taxpayer’ mentioned under the laws: 
only the foreign parent’s domestic subsidiary could file suits in U.S. courts, as had 
occurred in the Barclays case. These rulings came despite parent companies’ protests that 
their U.S. companies could not invoke the treaty provisions which are “at the heart of the 
claim that unitary tax impairs the conduct of foreign relations”.171 However, the Seventh 
Circuit Court in Chicago agreed to hear the Alcan/ICI case, holding that the foreign parent 
companies did have the standing to challenge California’s method.
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Canada, the UK, the EC, Japan and Australia all filed amicus curiae (friend of the 
court) briefs supporting Alcan’s case against the California Franchise Tax Board. The 
Circuit Court decision on standing was immediately appealed by the FTB to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, who dismissed the Alcan/ICI case in January 1990 on the grounds that 
the case should not be heard at the federal court level before it had been fully aired in the 
state courts.
As directed by the U.S. Supreme Court, Alcan and ICI refiled their case in 
California. However, the California Superior Court ruled against Alcan and ICI on May 
31, 1991, holding that worldwide combined reporting was constitutional. “On December 
7, 1992, following the California court’s November opinion in Barclays Bank, the court of 
appeals in Alcan Aluminium affirmed a lower court decision upholding California’s use 
of the worldwide unitary method of taxation”.172 Appeals of the case then stalled pending 
the resolution of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in the Barclays/Colgate case.
xxvi) Colgate-Palmolive
In April 1984, Colgate-Palmolive had filed suit with the California State Court 
seeking a refund of the taxes it had paid California under the WWC method from 1970- 
1973. Colgate challenged the tax method on the grounds that the Foreign Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution effectively precluded California from forcing companies 
to report their worldwide income to the state.173 As the Barclays case gained momentum, 
Colgate also began to argue that it would be discriminatory to continue applying the 
WWC method to domestic MNEs if it could not legally be applied to foreign-based 
MNEs. The California Superior Court in Sacramento County found in favour of Colgate 
in April 1989. This decision went against the 1983 Container case, where the U.S. 
Supreme Court had upheld California’s right to apply the WWC method to U.S. parent 
companies. But by 1989, after the federal Working Group on Worldwide Unitary 
Taxation and the introduction of several pieces of legislation in Congress banning state 
use of the WWC method, there seemed to be more examples of federal opposition to the 
WWC method which had not been present at the time of the Container case.
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However, federal support for U.S. companies opposed to the WWC method was 
not as strong as for foreign companies.174 Although both the Reagan and Bush 
administrations had filed amicus briefs in support of Barclays at all levels of its court 
case, neither the Reagan or Bush administration filed amicus briefs in support of Colgate 
at any stage. Instead, Colgate’s claim of federal support relied on informal statements 
made by the Reagan administration condemning the Container Corp. decision to assert 
that the WWC method placed an undue burden on U.S. foreign commerce. During appeal 
of the California Superior Court ruling against Colgate, the U.S. Justice Department under 
President Bush submitted letters in Colgate’s defense which cited only cases of unfair 
unitary taxation involving foreign-based companies. The Third District Court of Appeal 
in Sacramento interpreted this to signify that the Bush administration was concerned only 
with the impact of the WWC method on foreign-based MNEs, particularly since it came 
in addition to the fact that the U.S. Justice Department had filed an amicus brief with the 
same court in support of Barclays. The Appeals Court re-applied the Container Corp. 
ruling against Colgate-Palmolive in August 1991.
Despite weak official support from the federal government on unitary reform for 
U.S. MNEs, a 1991 letter from the U.S. Treasury Secretary to the head of Colgate- 
Palmolive declared that “As a tax policy matter, we are equally opposed to the use of 
worldwide unitary apportionment to determine the income of domestic-parent, 
multinational corporations and that of foreign-parent multinational corporations”.175 In 
June 1992, the California State Supreme Court ordered the appeals court to reconsider its 
opinion in the Colgate case in view of the court’s decision in favour of California in the 
continuing Barclays case.176
In November of 1992, the California Supreme Court found that in both the 
Barclays and Colgate case, the WWC unitary method of taxation was constitutionally 
valid, and ruled in favour of California on the grounds that Congress had consented to 
state use of the WWC method through its failure to pass legislation banning the
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method.177 The California Supreme Court declined to further review the case, and Colgate
178petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review.
xxvii) The Bush administration
The Bush administration of 1988-1992 did not attempt to introduce federal 
legislation banning state use of the WWC method, but it actively supported foreign 
companies challenging the method in court cases. This administration was seen as less 
conflicted over the WWC issue than the Reagan administration had been, since there was 
not a strong push for fiscal federalism under the Bush administration.179 On December 16, 
1991, a report on unitary taxation jointly produced by the UK Inland Revenue and the 
U.S. Treasury reiterated the two governments’ commitment to the elimination of 
worldwide combined unitary methods.
At an April 1992 hearing of the Barclays Bank case before the California Supreme 
Court, a U.S. Justice Department lawyer testified that the federal government was 
concerned the case could have a grave impact on foreign relations, and papers filed in the 
case by the Bush Administration called the tax system “an egregious interference with the 
federal executive’s conduct of foreign affairs”.180 In March 1992, Brad Sherman, the 
Democratic chairman of California’s State Board of Equalization, urged the federal 
administration to withdraw its support for MNEs in the unitary tax debate or risk having 
the unitary issue used against Bush in the 1992 presidential campaign as an example of 
tax avoidance by big business.181
In August 1992, the Department of Justice under President Bush filed a brief with 
the U.S. Supreme Court, urging it to hear the Barclays case on appeal and attacking state 
use of the WWC method, saying it “has created an irritant in the commercial relations of 
the United States and its major trading partners”,182 and “prevents the United States from 
speaking with one voice on this sensitive and important matter of foreign commercial 
relations”.183 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the Barclays case.
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xxviii) The Clinton administration
During his 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton promised to support 
California in the unitary tax debate.184 Clinton needed California’s electoral votes to win 
the 1992 presidential election; in addition, the Democrats were generally less
185ideologically bound to free-trade and business interests than the Republicans. In June 
1992, Clinton wrote a letter to Brad Sherman, the chairman of California’s State Board of 
Equalization, stating “I assure you a Clinton administration will be pro-California in this 
litigation”. Sherman would use this letter to pressure Clinton after his election.
During his election campaign, Clinton alarmed foreign companies with claims that 
they were unfairly dodging their U.S. tax burdens and promises his administration would 
raise an additional $45 billion in taxes from foreign MNEs operating in the U.S.187 There 
had been several out-of-court settlements by Japanese companies in the 1990s over
alleged transfer pricing violations, and the American political atmosphere was fearful of
188increasingly successful Japanese economic competition. This led to a general feeling in 
the U.S. that foreign companies were not being good corporate citizens,189 which fed into 
Clinton’s populist campaigning style. He supported state use of the WWC method as a 
means to prevent tax avoidance by foreign companies.190 As a further hint of how the new 
administration was leaning, Lawrence Summers, Clinton’s Undersecretary of 
International Affairs in the Treasury Department, reiterated his theoretical support for 
international formula apportionment during his U.S. Senate confirmation hearing in 
March 1993.
However, Clinton came under intense pressure from both foreign trade partners 
and MNEs to break his promise to Brad Sherman after he took office.191 The National 
Association of Manufacturers (NAM), the Tax Executives Institute (TEI), and Black and 
Decker Corporation sent letters urging the Clinton administration to support Barclays in 
its U.S. Supreme Court case. The TEI letter said that the administration’s decision would 
affect the government’s ability to speak uniformly when implementing international 
commercial policy. The NAM letter noted that the executive branch had appeared as 
amicus curiae in all three levels of the California court system in the Barclays case, and
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urged the Clinton administration not to change this position now. Black and Decker’s 
letter argued directly that California’s use of the WWC method offended foreign trading 
partners, and that affirmation of California’s right to use the method would likely spark 
foreign retaliation against U.S. business abroad.
Tom by competing interests, Clinton tried not to take an official position on the 
Barclays Bank case. In 1992, the new Clinton administration urged the U.S. Supreme 
Court not to hear the case, hoping instead to work out a political compromise that would 
satisfy both sides. However, the president’s initial neutrality was seen as supporting 
California, since it appeared to demonstrate that his administration was not unduly 
worried over its ability to conduct foreign relations.
xxix) Accelerated threats of UK retaliation
The Clinton administration’s neutral stance on the Barclays/Colgate case against 
California provoked an intense lobbying campaign by the British government and 
business interests, which had pinned a great deal of hope on the lawsuit and were now 
convinced that the administration’s neutrality would precipitate a court ruling in favour of 
California.192 UK Prime Minister John Major was under mounting pressure from both 
backbench Ministers of Parliament and UK business leaders to take a tougher line with 
the U.S.: critics of his government argued that the U.S. had stopped believing the UK’s 
continued threats of retaliation. The UK government announced on May 13, 1993 that it 
planned to activate Parliament’s retaliatory tax legislation unless there was a solution 
found to the unitary tax problem by the end of 1993. After the announcement, UK Inland 
Revenue sent letters to over 900 U.S. companies with headquarters or operations in 
California, warning that they would lose their right to Advanced Corporation Tax credits 
on dividends paid by UK subsidiaries to their parent companies, a right granted under the 
U.S./UK tax treaty, if California did not change its law. It was estimated that revocation 
of the ACT credits could cost U.S.-based MNEs more than $1 billion.193
The threat of UK retaliation against U.S. MNEs operating in the UK helped spur 
these companies to increase their lobbying efforts before the California state government.
220
The threat of retaliation was seen as a “huge factor” in moving the unitary reform issue 
before the California legislature again, since many U.S. MNEs were more concerned with 
avoiding a retaliatory tax war than avoiding state imposition of the WWC method.194
Suspicions lingered, however, that the British were not serious about their 
threatened retaliation: the stakes were too high.195 Many speculated that if the UK did 
retaliate, the U.S. Congress would see such an action as overriding the existing U.S.-UK 
tax treaty and retaliate against the UK. California State Senator Leroy Greene introduced a 
California Senate ‘Joint Resolution’ in early September 1993 requesting that if the UK 
government retaliated against California’s unitary method, the U.S. President impose 
Section 891 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code on companies headquartered in the UK, 
which would double U.S. tax rates on British citizens and corporations.196
xxx) Foreign pressures mount
The European Commission joined the European Parliament in warning that if 
California continue to use the WWC method it would lead the European Union (EU) to 
suspend double taxation treaties with the U.S. EU Tax Commissioner Scrivener stated in 
early 1993 that the re-introduction of mandatory WWC unitary taxation in any U.S. state
107might force the EU to retaliate against American companies. On June 30, 1993, the 
Finance Committee of the German Bundestag asked the German government to consider 
retaliation if the unitary issue was not resolved quickly. The Japanese had also continued 
lobbying on the issue, although they were not as concerned with the tax method at this
198point.
xxxi) Build-up to reform in 1993
Renewed UK threats of retaliation and continued threats of withdrawn investment 
by MNEs opposed to California’s use of the WWC method held more force now than they 
had during the 1986 unitary reform debate, since the state’s economy had weakened 
considerably by the early 1990s. California experienced a series of natural disasters in the 
early 1990s, foreign investment in the state began to slow, and a national economic 
recession took hold.199
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MNE threats to leave the state over the WWC method were an important stimulus 
towards converting the California legislature to believe that the tax was harming the 
state’s economy simply by contributing to the perception that California was not friendly
900to business. The same legislation included measures which California’s high-tech 
companies had been lobbying for: a 6% investment tax credit for the purchase of 
manufacturing equipment, a 5% sales tax exemption for new companies, and a permanent 
research and development tax credit. This added to the view that reform of the unitary law 
in 1993 was part of a more general effort to improve the state’s business climate.
Increasingly, California began to feel that it was in competition with other states
901for investment. In the early 1990s, 34 states and cities had located full-time staff in
909California seeking to attract businesses away from the state. Between 1987 and 1992,
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an estimated 708 manufacturing plants either left California or expanded elsewhere. In 
1984, Oregon was one of the first U.S. states to repeal its WWC method, and a member of 
a Portland Development Commission task force stated that "the repeal was critical in 
attracting new Japanese investment. You can't underestimate the importance of 
intangibles, and a state's attitude toward business is one of the most important factors".204 
Washington state, which never imposed a WWC tax method, succeeded in attracting 
Kyocera Northwest Inc., SEH America, and American Kotobuki Electronic Industries to 
its state after all had considered settling in California.205 Arizona, another state without a 
WWC unitary method, had also seen the relocation of several businesses previously based 
in California.
California’s weakened economy prompted the state legislature to attempt to 
change California’s image as a high-tax, overregulated market and to reverse the outflow
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of capital taking place to neighbouring states. At the same time, California’s shift from 
a manufacturing economy, with the downsizing of aerospace and defense industries at the 
end of the Cold War, to a service economy, with a newly developing high-tech industry, 
pushed the state legislature to assist the business community during a period of structural 
change.207
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In the early 1990s, there was a bipartisan effort by the California legislature to 
pass pro-business legislation. By 1993, California politicians had formed economic 
development committees which were touring the state to try to find ways to improve the 
state’s economy. In this environment, legislation to modify the WWC method was seen as 
part of an effort to promote the state’s willingness to provide a favourable business 
climate.209 At the very least, in a downtumed economy, California politicians did not wish 
to be publicly blamed for anything which could be portrayed as hurting state business 210
At the same time, a series of state budget crises in the early 1990s repeatedly 
brought California to the brink of bankruptcy. While most observers expected California 
to win the Barclays case before the U.S. Supreme Court, the possibility was always 
present that the state might lose.211 An unfavourable court ruling would mean California 
would lose a revenue stream already included in projected State budgets and might be 
forced to pay back taxes already collected under the WWC method. California, along with 
several other states which submitted amicus briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court, argued 
explicitly that the revenue loss alone from a Barclays victory would be too damaging to 
the state’s economy to countenance. California then filed a separate amicus brief with the 
Supreme Court asking that, in the event of a ruling against the state, California not be 
forced to pay back taxes it had collected under the WWC method due to the state's 
precarious fiscal position.
xxxii) 1993 California legislation
Driven by its downtumed economy, the threat of British retaliation against MNEs 
doing business in California, intensified lobbying efforts from U.S. MNEs worried over 
UK threats of retaliation, and the pending U.S. Supreme Court verdict, California 
policymakers began to debate Senate Bill 671, again authored by Senator Alquist, to 
reform the state’s unitary tax method. Many of the same lobbyists and California 
bureaucrats which had been present in 1986 were involved in the 1993 legislative debate. 
However, the general consensus in California remains that 1986 was the year when the 
issue of unitary reform was really decided, and the 1993 legislation was simply a
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modification of the 1986 law.212 Many of the most active groups who had lobbied on the 
unitary issue in California in the 1980s, such as the California Business Council and the 
Organisation for the Fair Treatment of International Investment, disbanded after the 1986 
legislation and did not regroup for the 1993 legislative debate.
However, the California Chamber of Commerce, the California Manufacturers’ 
Association, and the California Taxpayers’ Association put together a task force of 
technical experts from both U.S. and foreign-domiciled companies to review the 
California reform bill. U.S. companies were eager to address what they viewed as 
continued restrictions on a water’s edge election, including the requirement that 
companies file a domestic spreadsheet listing all of their U.S. business activities, the 
FTB’s option to disregard a water’s edge election, and the election fee. By eliminating 
some of the restrictions on a water’s edge election, SB671 was designed to make electing 
companies feel less like “second class citizens” 213
The issue of equity between foreign and domestic companies was not as great in 
1993 as it had been in 1986 214 Although most California legislative staff saw foreign 
governments and MNEs as the primary drivers of the 1993 legislation, reform of the 
state’s tax method was viewed as a ‘big business’ issue which affected both foreign and 
domestic MNEs equally.215 The California Manufacturers Association argued SB671 was 
important because it would remove the threat of British retaliation against U.S. MNEs 
while helping California’s position in the Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board case, 
which represented a potential loss of $4 billion in state revenues. Although most of the
state’s top business groups supported the bill, California Governor Pete Wilson did not 
take a position on SB671. Opposition to the bill came from local groups arguing further 
unitary reform was a tax break for big businesses which came at the expense of funding 
for social issues during an economic recession.
California’s unitary reform legislation of 1993 eliminated the domestic disclosure 
spreadsheet requirement, requiring instead that companies which had at least $1 billion in 
U.S. assets submit a list of any 20% or more-controlled affiliates in other states with their
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tax returns. In addition, the election period was shortened from ten to seven years, with 
automatic annual renewal unless the taxpayer notified non-renewal, and the sales factor in 
the apportionment formula was double-weighted. This was considered a pro-business 
investment provision, since it primarily hurt companies that sold into California without 
investing in the state.217
However, since the state was suffering fiscally, U.S. companies did not receive 
rectification of their long-standing complaint that 80/20 companies should not be included 
in the water’s edge definition, since this would have cost the state a great deal in lost 
revenue; it was estimated that eliminating the election fee alone would cost the state an 
estimated $45-100 million in lost revenue.218
President Clinton had given the impression that he would not file an amicus brief 
supporting California in the Barclays case before the Supreme Court unless the state first 
changed its unitary method to mollify the method’s protesters, and a favourable amicus 
brief was seen as crucial to California’s case.219 Arguments from Senator Alquist in 
support of SB671 stressed the “urgent need” to influence the U.S. Solicitor General’s
fyyc\
brief in the Supreme Court case and head off the threat of British retaliation. The 
California legislature was concerned that, unless California’s law was changed in a 
manner acceptable to the Clinton administration, the state would not receive a favourable 
brief from Clinton, and California would lose the Barclays case.
Representatives from the U.S. Treasury Department, along with concerned MNEs, 
met with a group of senior California tax committee staff to work on the state bill.221 The 
Fiscal Policy Office of the California Senate Rules Committee was also in touch with the 
federal government. California legislators then faxed a copy of the pending 1993 unitary 
reform bill to President Clinton in order to ensure that the proposed changes were 
acceptable to the administration.
The UK government had threatened retaliation against U.S. MNEs if California’s 
unitary tax law was not changed by the end of 1993. According to California’s
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constitution, passed bills go into effect as law on the January 1st following a 90-day period 
from their enactment.222 If California’s unitary change was to be enacted in time to meet 
the UK government’s deadline, the bill had to be passed on September 10,1993. After a 
vote on September 11, 1993, SB671 was passed, and just made the deadline. The new law 
removed both the election fee and the Franchise Tax Board’s right to override a 
company’s election of a water’s edge assessment, a right it had never used; instead, 
companies that failed to provide enough information to the FTB would be subject to 
substantial fines. What remained unchanged was that corporations incorporated in the 
U.S. and more than 50 percent owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the same 
interests were considered unitary businesses, far less than the 80 percent common 
ownership required to file federal consolidated income tax returns. Moreover, California 
maintained its right to use the WWC method. The bill went into effect on January 1,
1994.
California’s 1993 unitary reform was included in a bipartisan package of more 
general economic improvement legislation.223 The press release issued by California 
Governor Wilson announcing the passage of SB671 was entitled “Wilson Signs 
Landmark Legislation to Spur California Jobs”, and Wilson stated that “These tax reforms 
are the centerpiece of an economic growth agenda”, enabling California to compete for 
new investment with other states.224
Revenue loss was ultimately not an issue in the 1993 legislation, since the final 
reform bill contained provisions that raised an additional $140-150 million in annual state 
tax revenue by limiting deductions for business entertaining and private club dues to 
conform with changes in the U.S. federal tax code. These changes offset losses from 
modifications in the WWC method and made the final state reform law revenue-neutral.
There were lingering complaints over the new legislation. U.S. MNEs remained 
concerned that the playing field between foreign and domestic companies was not level, 
since the foreign dividends of U.S. companies were still partially taxed by California
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while dividends received by the subsidiaries of foreign-domiciled companies operating in 
California were not.225
Although the British would have preferred a mandatory water’s edge combination, 
the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer stated on September 15, 1993 that the UK would 
defer retaliation. However, he said the British government would keep its retaliatory 
legislation in reserve in case mandatory use of the WWC method was reintroduced in the 
future by California or any other state.226 Moreover, the UK government repeated that it 
remained fully committed to supporting Barclays’ case before the U.S. Supreme Court, 
since a successful resolution of this case would permanently end state use of the WWC 
method and establish the arm’s length standard as the only valid method of taxing foreign 
companies in the U.S.
xxxiii) The Barclays case goes forward
After Governor Pete Wilson signed California’s unitary reform legislation into law 
on October 6, 1993, the Clinton administration filed an amicus brief on October 7, 1993 
which asked the U.S. Supreme Court to drop the Barclays case, arguing the legislation 
meant the state now sufficiently conformed to the federal and international arm’s length 
standard.227 However, Barclays pressed on, arguing that the state’s new law still held to 
the principle that California had the right to use the WWC method and did not resolve the 
issue of whether the state owed Barclays a refund of taxes previously paid under the 
WWC system.228
The UK government supported the continuation of Barclays’ case in a desire to 
see state use of the WWC method ruled illegal once and for all and out of fear that other 
U.S. states would be encouraged to adopt the method if the U.S. Supreme Court did not 
definitively rule against California.229 Foreign governments also appeared concerned that 
Clinton’s request that the court drop the Barclays case, along with Clinton’s pre-election 
support for California’s use of the WWC method, meant the U.S. federal government was 
weakening in its support of the arm’s length standard.
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On October 14, 1993, EC member countries joined with Australia, Austria, 
Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland to file an amicus brief with the 
U.S. Supreme Court stating that they did not consider California’s legislation to have 
solved the unitary debate, since a conclusive solution would establish the arm’s length 
principle as the only legitimate basis for taxing foreign companies in any U.S. state.231 
Additional amicus curiae briefs were filed with the Supreme Court in support of Barclays 
Bank by the Keidanren, Banque Nationale de Paris, Nestle, the Confederation of British 
Industries, Reuters, the Japan Tax Association, the Federation of German Industries, and 
the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce. The principal foreign 
country criticisms of combined reporting were that it imposed a large administrative 
burden, led inevitably to extra-territorial and double taxation, was contrary to standard 
international practice, might encourage the use of the method by developing countries, 
and discouraged foreign investment in the U.S., since any state might adopt the method if 
it was not ruled illegal by U.S. courts 232 Briefs were filed with the court in support of 
California by the Committee on State Taxation, the Council of State Governments, and 
Citizens for Tax Justice.
Despite the Clinton administration's request that the Supreme Court dismiss the 
Barclays case, in November 1993, the court decided to continue with its review of the 
case, and to join it with a review of the pending Colgate-Palmolive case to decide the 
issue of U.S. state use of the WWC method once and for all. The U.S. Supreme Court 
then pressed the Clinton administration to formally file a brief stating its opinion on state 
use of the WWC method in order to help the court determine if the federal government 
viewed California’s law as harming its ability to conduct foreign policy.
Foreign lobbying associations were clearly upset by the Supreme Court’s joining 
of the two cases: since U.S.-domiciled companies had a weaker legal case, given that the 
Supreme Court had already ruled in the Container Corp. case that states could apply the 
WWC method to U.S. MNEs, it now seemed there was a much lesser chance of victory 
for foreign companies 233
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In addition, foreign companies were upset that the court had joined the Barclays 
and Colgate cases because, although secondary arguments were made by Barclays under 
the supremacy and due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution, the main argument used 
by both Barclays and Colgate was that state use of the WWC method violated the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and thus seriously interfered with the federal 
government’s ability to conduct foreign relations. This argument more strongly favoured 
foreign companies alone, since the 1979 Japan Line case had created two additional tests 
for foreign companies to ensure that state tax schemes complied with the commerce 
clause by not burdening international commerce. At this point, most legal commentators 
felt that Barclays and Colgate would lose their case.234
The California FTB’s argument before the Supreme Court followed the reasoning 
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida 
Department of Revenue235 by stating that the U.S. Senate’s 1979 refusal to ratify the 
U.S./UK tax treaty containing a provision (Article 9(4)) barring state use of the WWC 
method meant that Congress agreed with California’s use of the method. The State of 
California argued that only violations of treaties violated the U.S. Constitution’s foreign 
commerce clause, and state use of the WWC method had not been outlawed by any treaty. 
Although the federal government had endorsed the use of the ALS, unitary methods were 
not necessarily completely incompatible with ALS, since the federal government itself 
employed portions of both methods by using the profit splitting and comparable profit 
interval methods alongside the ALS. The COST organisation’s amicus brief argued that 
MNEs were attempting to make a default foreign policy with the Supreme Court case, 
bypassing Congress, which had not acted through either treaty or federal law to ban state 
use of the WWC method. It was not the place of the court to decide foreign policy, they 
argued, but Congress.
xxxiv) U.S. Solicitor General Brief
When pressed by the U.S. Supreme Court to take a stance in the Barclays/Colgate 
case, Clinton decided to officially support California. His decision reflected his “intense 
political interest” in the state and concerns over California’s economy, battered by a
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national economic recession and steep cuts in federal defense funding. The state faced 
an estimated $10.7 billion budget deficit in 1993, which would be substantially worsened 
if the Supreme Court ruled against the state.237
U.S. Solicitor General Drew Days filed an amicus curiae brief on January 19, 1994 
arguing against both Barclays' and Colgate's claims. Days claimed that the Bush and 
Reagan administrations’ previous briefs were flawed in focusing too much on the 
government’s present position that state use of the WWC method was unconstitutional.
He argued that the court need focus only on what the government’s position had been at 
the time the state taxes were imposed on the companies. Since it was not until the mid- 
1980s that the federal government strongly express the view that state use of the WWC 
method was unconstitutional, Days stated that at the time the taxes under dispute were 
collected, the U.S. government had expressed “a preference and not a policy”.
Therefore, California’s assessment against Barclays in 1977 and against Colgate- 
Palmolive in 1970-73 were constitutional. The Solicitor General brief was seen as quite 
weak in its support of Barclays and Colgate, since it refused to take a principled stance on 
state use of the WWC method, and most observers viewed the brief as a political solution 
which tried to avoid offending both California and the UK.
The Clinton administration’s Solicitor General brief was seen as having an 
important bearing on the outcome of the case since the Supreme Court had specifically 
demanded that the administration take a position on the case, and the positions of U.S. 
administrations had been cited in several previous court decisions, including the 
Container Corp. and earlier Colgate cases, as important in determining whether the 
federal government’s ability to “speak with one voice” had actually been impaired. 
Administration officials sought to cushion the federal government’s changed stance in the 
Barclays case by stating they would work with foreign governments to resolve disputes 
about California’s current law. However, FTB Board Member Brad Sherman said the 
administration’s new stance “took all the steam and momentum out of Barclays’ 
position”.239
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In retrospect it seems that the Clinton administration’s weak brief had less impact 
on the Supreme Court decision than expected. The Supreme Court’s final decision in the 
case was based on arguments over the constitutional separation of powers, and did not 
mention the foreign commerce clause, which most legal commentators at the time had felt 
would be the deciding factor in the case. Ironically, the one consistent argument between 
the amicus briefs of the Clinton and Bush administration in the Barclays’ case was a 
rejection of California’s argument that Congress, since it was undoubtedly aware of the 
controversy, was in agreement with California’s tax policy simply because it had failed to 
pass legislation prohibiting the state’s use of the WWC method. In fact, this was precisely 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the case.
xxxv) Barclays/Colgate ruling
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favour of California on June 20,1994. Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in the decision that: “We leave it to Congress - whose voice, 
in this area, is the nation’s - to evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax 
uniformity, or state autonomy. This court has no constitutional authority to make the 
policy judgments essential to regulating foreign commerce and conducting foreign 
affairs”.240 The court added that since double taxation was not the inevitable result of 
worldwide combined reporting and since no other method could be guaranteed to alleviate 
this risk, the WWC method was as good a method as any. While they agreed the WWC 
method might violate the due process clause by posing unduly onerous compliance 
requirements on foreign companies, they ruled that in this case, Barclays had exaggerated 
its compliance costs. In addition, foreign companies had to expect that doing business in 
foreign countries would engender additional costs. Since this ruling, there has been no 
further action to modify California’s unitary tax method.
3) Summary
This chapter has presented a descriptive case study of the debate over California’s 
use of the worldwide combined unitary tax method as an example of state-firm bargaining 
over a subfederal economic regulation which conflicted with federal and international
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norms. The presentation of this case study adds to the body of academic literature on both 
state-firm bargaining and on subfederal activity in the international arena. It also provides 
further evidence towards the hypotheses presented in Chapter One that powerful U.S. 
states such as California possess the capability to both maintain regulatory standards at 
odds with federal and international norms and to bargain directly in the international 
arena.
As we have seen from the case study, California was able to maintain a regulatory 
standard at odds with federal and international tax norms. The federal government, 
international organisations, foreign governments, and multinational enterprises, both 
foreign and domestic, which protested California’s tax method were unable to quickly 
force the state into line. Further, the U.S. federal government did not simply take over 
negotiations following protests against the state’s violation of international norms: 
California was able to use its political and economic assets, outlined in Chapter Four, and 
resources under the U.S. federalist system, detailed in Chapter Three, to bargain directly 
with international actors. The following chapter will analyse this case study to complete 
the model of state-firm bargaining over subfederal economic policies which conflict with 
international norms, and to determine the strategies which actors can use to effectively 
influence such policies.241
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Chapter 6: The Outcomes of the Debate
1) Introduction
Chapter Three defined the first three components of the model being built to 
evaluate state-firm bargaining at the subfederal level: the actors, their agendas, and their 
assets. This chapter will complete the model of state-firm bargaining over subfederal 
economic policies which conflict with international norms by i) evaluating how 
effectively the various actors used, or failed to use, their assets to achieve their policy 
agendas in the debate over California’s unitary method; ii) evaluating how effectively the 
actors used various channels of negotiation to influence California’s policy; and iii) 
determining the most effective uses of assets and channels of negotiation, key initiatives 
which influenced the outcome of the policy debate. Chapter Six will thus prove the key 
analytical chapter of the thesis.
This chapter will demonstrate that the actors’ effectiveness in achieving their 
agendas during the California unitary tax debate was strongly determined by the political 
and economic assets they possessed and how effectively they deployed these resources. It 
will also support Hocking’s view that negotiations over U.S. state economic policies are 
fluid and dynamic, and that actors must therefore use many different levers of influence 
when engaged at the U.S. subfederal level.
At the same time, Chapter Six supports the hypothesis put forth in Chapter One 
that U.S. states can bargain directly with foreign governments and multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) by describing the different channels of negotiation actors used to 
influence state policy during the debate over California’s tax method. Further, it will 
demonstrate that California was able to effectively deploy its assets to delay a change in 
its regulation, adding support to the thesis’ second hypothesis, that powerful U.S. states 
such as California can maintain regulatory standards at odds with federal and 
international norms.
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Chapter Three defined the potential power, the political and economic assets, that 
each actor possessed upon entering into the debate over California’s unitary tax method. 
How much of the actors’ potential power was successfully translated through state-firm 
bargaining into influence over the outcome of the debate? According to Keohane and 
Nye, political bargaining converts power measured by type of resources into power 
measured by effects on outcomes.1 This chapter will assess the successful strategies needed 
to turn an actor’s potential power into influence over outcomes when bargaining over 
subfederal economic regulations which violate federal and international norms.
2) The use of assets
The assets that actors possess upon entering the bargaining process give them the 
potential to affect the outcomes of a policy debate. As defined in Chapter One, political 
assets are those which give an actor the ability to influence policy direcdy, and include 
resources such as an actor’s rights under a jurisdictional legal structure, access to key 
decision makers, hold over popular opinion, or the ability to marshal support for a political 
leader who can formulate policy. Economic assets are defined as resources which allow an 
actor to indirecdy influence subfederal economic regulations by the weight of their 
importance to the marketplace, and include access to proprietary technology, capital, key 
skills, natural resources, or markets. The following section of Chapter Six will use the case 
study from the previous chapter to analyse how effectively each actor used their assets to 
fulfill their policy agendas in the debate over California’s unitary tax. In doing so, it will 
reiterate the assets and policy agendas, detailed in Chapter Three, that each actor held during 
the debate.
a) The federal government
i) Executive
The goals of the executive branch of the U.S. federal government in the debate 
over California’s unitary tax included: appeasing foreign governments which objected to 
U.S. state use of the worldwide combined unitary (WWC) tax method; fulfilling 
commitments made through U.S. bilateral tax treaties to support the arm’s length
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standard; keeping the support of state congressional delegations by avoiding preemptive 
federal legislation; and maintaining the ability of U.S. states to raise tax revenue during a 
period of increased fiscal demands. In addition, presidential administrations needed to 
preserve the support of the California congressional delegation for their legislative 
proposals, and ensure California’s electoral votes supported their reelection. Since 
California is the most populous U.S. state and has the largest state economy, its continued 
prosperity was also of key concern to the national government.
Although the federal government was generally consistent in its support of the 
arm’s length standard (ALS), these conflicting goals resulted in a compromised stance 
against state use of the WWC method. Despite the federal government’s public 
endorsement of the arm’s length standard, there were also internal doubts about its 
accuracy. Further, the 1986 and 1993 revisions to the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, with 
their use of formulary apportionment-type methods such as the comparable profit interval, 
further weakened the federal government’s stance against state use of the WWC method.
Since state use of the WWC method was not a highly visible public issue, the 
presidents in office during the 1986 and 1993 California unitary reform legislative 
solutions had little need to resolve their compromised positions: President Reagan 
publicly supported business interests while trying to avoid a preemption of state interests, 
while President Clinton publicly supported state interests while trying to convince the 
states to change their laws to appease business and foreign governments. As a result, both 
presidential administrations mustered only weak support for their chosen side and did not 
effectively use their substantial assets in the policy debate. While President Bush, 
unhampered by Reagan’s federalist concerns, was an active supporter of business 
interests opposed to the method, his administration did little to move the issue besides file 
a brief of support for Barclays Bank before the California Supreme Court: this was 
ineffective, as the court ruled in favour of the state.
The American Republican party has traditionally represented business interests, 
which were supportive of the arm’s length standard. Since California constituted a strong 
base of Republican support during Reagan’s presidency, he did not need to cater to the
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state. However, Reagan had supported the state’s right to use the WWC method when he 
was governor of California, and Reagan wanted to help all the states maintain robust 
revenue bases during his push for fiscal federalism. Although the Reagan administration 
reassured business interests and foreign governments that it was opposed to subfederal 
use of the WWC method, many viewed this as a “throwaway line”.2 Despite implied 
promises to the British, Reagan avoided introducing federal legislation banning 
subfederal use of the WWC method after the 1979 U.S./UK tax treaty failed to do so, and 
his Solicitor General did not file an amicus brief supporting the 1983 Container 
Corporation law suit against California’s Franchise Tax Board. Reagan then ignored the 
recommendations of both his Treasury Secretary and the 1983 Cabinet Council of 
Economic Advisors to support Container’s Petition for Rehearing and introduce federal 
legislation banning the WWC method, buying time for states to change their unitary laws 
on their own.
Given Reagan’s ambiguity, his most effective deployment of federal government 
assets proved to be his use of the government’s prestige through the formation of the 
Worldwide Unitary Working Group to draw the different actors in the policy debate 
together to make progress towards a solution. Reagan’s instructions to his Treasury 
Department to draft federal legislation banning state use of the WWC method in 
November of 1985 were seen as only “a necessary good faith follow-up” to the Working 
Group report’s promise to implement federal legislation if states did not act within a year 
to pass their own legislation.4 In addition, it was made clear that the White House would 
not take an active role in supporting this legislation, which was withdrawn after 
California modified its unitary method in 1986.5
Bill Clinton was much more dependent on California’s electoral votes for a 
victory in the 1992 presidential election. Fear of Japanese economic competition had 
contributed to a political environment where foreign investors in the U.S. were seen as 
not being good corporate citizens: Clinton played to this populist sentiment by 
championing a crackdown on tax evasion by foreign MNEs.6 In this, he was propelled by 
the traditional labour base of the Democratic political party, which supported protectionist 
measures against foreign investment. As a result of these pressures, Clinton promised to
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back California in the unitary debate and urged the U.S. Supreme Court not to hear the 
1993 Barclays case. However, Clinton also sought to mollify business interests: when 
forced to file an amicus curaie brief in the Barclays case, he only weakly supported 
California, and pledged to work with business and foreign governments to help resolve 
problems stemming from state use of the WWC method.
In addition to making only qualified use of its political assets, the executive branch did 
not effectively employ its shrinking economic assets. Although the federal government 
can theoretically influence state policies by promising or withholding economic help to 
states in the form of grants or subsidies, during the period when the unitary tax 
controversy reached its peak (1980-1993), the federal government was undergoing both a 
period of fiscal deficits and a policy shift to place more of its revenue burden on the states 
through ‘fiscal federalism’. This meant the national government did not have a large 
amount of revenue available to use as an enticement to states, and its increased reliance 
on the states to finance unfunded mandates in a wide range of areas made the prospect of 
economic censure over state tax policies untenable.
ii) Judiciary
The goal of the judiciary in the debate over California’s unitary tax was ultimately 
to maintain the separation of powers of the different branches of the national government 
by upholding Congress’ right to decide whether a state economic regulation interferes 
with federal powers. Although U.S. courts have the ability, under the Supremacy Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution, to overrule state laws which conflict with federal laws or treaties 
on interstate or foreign commerce, this political asset was not invoked by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which ruled in the 1993 Barclays Bank Pic v. Franchise Tax Board case 
that California’s tax method could stand in contravention of federal tax practice since 
Congress had not passed a law or a treaty explicitly banning state use of the WWC 
method. The arm’s length standard, codified in various U.S. bilateral tax treaties which 
did not specifically include subfederal laws in their domain, was judged not to overrule 
state laws if the treaties were not accompanied by U.S. implementing legislation which 
specified preemption of subfederal tax methods.7 The judiciary also refused to use its 
power under the informally-developed dormant commerce clause to repeal a state law
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which potentially interfered with national commerce if Congress had not passed 
legislation preempting the state law. The judiciary thus effectively acted through inaction, 
placing the impetus to overrule California’s use of the WWC method clearly on Congress.
iii) Legislative
Congress held strong assets in the unitary tax debate, since under the Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Congress can outlaw any state policy which interferes 
with interstate or foreign commerce. However, Congress did not seriously attempt to pass 
preemptive legislation outlawing California’s use of the WWC method, viewing state 
taxation powers as an issue of state sovereignty. Frequently introduced congressional 
legislation was instead a means for the federal government to seem to address the unitary 
issue while waiting for California to resolve the matter on its own, and never proceeded
o
beyond committee hearings to a full vote. In fact, California did resolve the matter on its 
own by modifying its regulatory environment in order to attract business to the state. The 
U.S. Congress is at heart a forum of state interests, and a ban on the WWC method would 
have deprived many states of tax revenue.9 In addition, the California congressional 
delegation, the largest in Congress, was very supportive of the state’s desire to maintain 
the WWC method, or at least modify the method in the manner most beneficial to the 
state, and its assistance would have been vital in any attempt to pass preemptive federal 
legislation.10
Although any state law which conflicts with a U.S. treaty is considered void, since 
U.S. treaties cannot be enacted without Senate approval, Congress holds the ultimate 
power in any executive branch attempt to override state laws by treaty. Congress 
effectively used this asset during the 1979 U.S.-UK tax treaty negotiations, when the 
Senate refused to allow the passage of a treaty denying California’s right to apply the 
WWC method to British firms. In this case, state interests successfully argued that 
preemption of state powers through the treaty-making process would unlawfully deprive 
states of their rights: only a congressional law could ban a state tax practice.
Therefore, Congress effectively employed its assets in the unitary debate by 
refusing to use its power to ratify a tax treaty or pass legislation banning state use of the
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WWC method.11 As the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately decreed, Congress acted through 
inaction.12 However, the continued introduction of legislation proposing to ban state use 
of the WWC method and the various subcommittee meetings to consider the issue from 
the 1960s through the 1980s did pressure the states to resolve the problem on their own.13
b) The State of California
California held considerable economic and political assets in the unitary tax 
debate: it is the largest U.S. state economy, has the largest U.S. congressional delegation, 
and holds the largest number of electoral votes. These assets gave the state a considerable 
amount of power at the national level to maintain its right to use the WWC tax method.
As a result, there was “tremendous restraint” shown by both the executive branch and 
Congress to allow California to change its unitary method on its own.14
The state also benefited from its belief that California is different from the rest of 
the United States. State policymakers strongly believed that California has a separate 
perspective on most policy issues, which the state was free to act on until stopped by the 
judiciary.15 In addition, California has a large, independent tax bureaucracy, which was 
able to enforce the WWC method very effectively.16 This efficiency and independence 
led to “intransigence” on the part of California’s Franchise Tax Board (FTB): a refusal to 
be flexible about ceding its position during the unitary debate.17 The FTB also maintained 
the upper hand in much of the negotiations since it possessed confidential data on 
companies’ state tax returns, and could therefore claim its estimates of the revenue impact 
of any proposed changes to the unitary method were the most accurate. Although 
California modified its unitary method in 1986, the state maintained its right to use the 
WWC method, its right to charge companies a fee for exemption from the method, and its 
right to revoke a company’s exemption, rights other U.S. states did not attempt to enforce.
However, the states’ goals of maintaining a healthy economy and attracting 
investment grew increasingly more difficult as California both became more dependent 
on foreign investment in the mid-1980s and underwent an economic recession in the early 
1990s. California’s declining economy and rising state budget deficits gave it a strong 
incentive to modify its WWC method in order to make the state more attractive to
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business at a time of increased competition for foreign investment. Despite this, the 
state’s considerable economic assets in the 1980s allowed California to be the only U.S. 
state to maintain the right to overturn a company’s decision to file under the ALS method 
and to charge companies a fee for filing under the ALS. In 1993, the state’s political 
assets allowed it to negotiate a favourable U.S. Solicitor General brief from President 
Clinton in the Barclays court case, and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld California’s right 
to impose the WWC method, allowing the state to avoid paying back taxes already 
collected under the method. California was therefore very effective in using its, although 
depreciated, still-considerable assets to achieve its goals.
c) State associations
State association groups sought to maintain state taxing authority as “one of the 
basic tenets of state autonomy”, particularly during the early 1980s, when state finances 
were under growing strain in an era of fiscal federalism, and in the early 1990s, when
1 Rstate finances suffered during a nationwide recession. This goal constituted part of the 
U.S. states’ policy agenda during the unitary tax debate.
At the time the unitary debate was originally coming to a head in the early 1980s, 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1985 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
and 1988 South Carolina v. Baker rulings declared that the U.S. Constitution contained 
no substantive protection for state and local governments against national regulatory 
powers. These court cases were of grave concern to the states, who feared federal 
legislation preempting subfederal powers would now go unchallenged by the courts. The 
cases further mobilised state interest groups to fight for the states’ right to use the WWC 
tax method by lobbying Congress and the executive branch.19 In addition, state groups 
filed numerous amicus curaie briefs defending their right to implement the WWC method 
in court cases contesting the legality of the method. Individual states and state 
associations possessed various assets during the debate. In general, state association 
groups were effective in using their political assets before Congress, the executive branch, 
and the courts to prevent federal legislation or a court decision from preempting state 
sovereignty.
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However, states were less effective in their use of economic assets. State 
cooperation on the WWC issue was hampered by interstate competition to attract MNE 
investment, an area where money and prestige are at the forefront and cooperation is at a 
minimum.20 Many states were pleased to gain a competitive edge over California, a prime 
destination for investment, and did not effectively make use of their main economic 
assets, their control over U.S. market access, by banding together to implement the 
method.21 At the behest of Japanese companies, several states made promises not to use 
the WWC method, and states openly bragged of new foreign investment they claimed to 
have received at California’s expense as a result of not implementing the WWC method. 
Although state use of the WWC method was generally agreed to be on the margin of 
MNE investment decisions, many states did not feel the additional revenue they could 
gain from using the method was worth the effort of defending it against court cases and 
the business community.24
d) Domestic-domiciled MNEs
The goals of U.S.-domiciled MNEs in the unitary debate included wanting to pay 
as few taxes as possible and promoting the principle of a ‘level playing field’ between 
themselves and their foreign competitors by having all MNEs adhere to the same set of 
transfer pricing standards.
Although the Committee on State Taxation had been lobbying quietly on the 
unitary tax issue for years, domestic-domiciled companies had found it difficult to 
support concrete legislation modifying state unitary methods because their interests were 
too diverse. While foreign MNEs wanted the WWC method banished entirely, some U.S. 
companies benefited from the tax method, some were completely opposed to its use, and 
others wanted the method to be optional. In addition, in the early 1980s, most American 
companies in California did not belong to political action committees that lobbied on state 
tax issues; pressures within the state to change the method came primarily from Japanese 
MNEs. Pressures from the federal government to change California’s WWC method 
focused mainly on how the method affected foreign-domiciled MNEs, since foreign 
governments had been lobbying the U.S. government over the method’s perceived treaty 
violations. Further, a foreign-only solution was seen as an appealing solution for the state
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government: since it involved fewer companies, a foreign-only solution would cost less.25 
Accordingly, initial proposals for unitary reform in California did not include domestic- 
domiciled companies.
Since foreign-domiciled companies had originally raised the cry against 
California’s unitary method, U.S. companies were “playing catch-up”26 on the issue in a 
“defensive reaction” 27 to fears that California would only exempt foreign-domiciled 
MNEs from the WWC method. When foreign-only exemption legislation was close to 
passage in the California legislature, U.S. companies realised they needed to press for 
their inclusion, and formed lobbying coalitions alongside the principle Japanese groups. 
The creation of the California Business Council (CBC) in 1985, along with increased 
membership in the Committee on State Taxation (COST), helped demonstrate the
98collective strength of U.S. MNEs in California. Although they were late to the game, 
and working at a disadvantage to foreign-based MNEs, domestic-domiciled MNEs were 
ultimately effective in insisting on their inclusion in any exemption from the WWC tax 
method.
Led by the CBC and COST, U.S. companies used their newly-discovered political 
assets to stress their status as constituents in California and effectively play the “foreign 
card” by arguing they should not be disadvantaged by state legislation which gave an
9Qexemption only to foreign-domiciled companies. Silicon Valley firms in particular 
argued any measure which helped Japanese high-tech firms would come at their expense. 
This constituency argument was especially effective since both sponsors of the California 
state legislation (Senator Alquist and Assemblyman Vasconcellos) were from the San 
Jose district, home to California’s nascent high-tech industry. These arguments were 
ultimately successful in gaining the inclusion of domestic-domiciled MNEs in the 1986 
California unitary reform legislation.
Domestic companies also used their economic assets at the state level by 
threatening to diminish their investment in California. However, they had less leverage 
here than foreign companies, as their investments were longer-standing and their ties to 
the state greater. Threats not to increase their existing investments in the state became
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effective only during the recession of the early 1990s. In the lead-up to California’s 
1993 unitary tax reform, U.S. MNEs also argued they feared retaliation from foreign 
governments offended by California’s use of the WWC method. The UK’s threatened 
retaliation, made concrete by a letter-writing campaign to MNEs, encouraged many U.S. 
firms to press California to change its law.31
Domestic-domiciled MNEs were effective in latching on to the more persuasive 
court cases being waged by foreign-domiciled MNEs. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
in the 1983 Container case that domestic-domiciled MNEs could be taxed under the 
WWC method, their legal position was weak. However, they reasoned that if foreign 
MNEs were exempted from the method through foreign policy considerations, domestic 
MNEs could argue for a similar exemption on the grounds of equity with foreign 
competitors. Colgate-Palmolive successfully used this argument to have its case against 
California’s Franchise Tax Board joined with Barclays Bank’s suit before the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
e) Foreign-domiciled MNEs
While U.S. MNEs most often favoured making the WWC method optional, since 
some benefited from using the method, most foreign companies favoured a complete 
abolishment of the tax. Foreign-domiciled MNEs effectively used their economic assets at 
the state level by simultaneously contributing large amounts of money to political 
candidates, promising new investment in California if the WWC method was removed, 
and threatening to withdraw existing investments if it was not. Pressure in this direction 
from Japanese MNEs was particularly effective because California saw its economic 
interests as closely aligned with the Pacific Rim, and because the Japanese held the 
promise of desirable high-tech manufacturing jobs.
Indeed, Japanese MNEs were seen as “playing hardball” since they directly 
stressed the link between their investments and a change in California’s WWC method, 
announcing increased investment in the state immediately after the WWC method was 
modified in 1986.32 While the Japanese were effective in relying on their economic 
assets, the British initially did not. Since most British subsidiaries in California were
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long-established, they could not threaten to withdraw their investments from the state as 
plausibly as the Japanese. British MNEs were also seen as less willing to compromise on 
the unitary issue than the Japanese, since they were much more concerned with the 
principle of worldwide combined unitary being an incorrect tax method. In line with 
arguing the issue on principle, British MNEs primarily used political figures as lobbyists: 
parliamentary delegations, Margaret Thatcher, and members of the British consulate in 
San Francisco. However, they were not familiar with state lobbying procedures33 and 
their “lack of understanding of legislative ego and protocol” hurt their cause.34
Foreign-domiciled companies did not ultimately benefit from the stronger legal 
assets they held, as their legal position was severely weakened when foreign MNEs were 
paired with U.S. MNEs after the Barclays case was joined with Colgate-Palmolive’s in 
the 1993 U.S. Supreme Court hearing which finally decided the legality of state use of the 
WWC method.
f) Foreign governments
Foreign governments pressured the U.S. federal government to outlaw any state 
use of the WWC method, arguing the method violated U.S. bilateral tax treaties. The 
British were most effective in negotiating with the White House since good U.S./UK 
political relations gave them strong political assets.35 Although only weakly supported by 
the U.S. federal government, the Worldwide Unitary Working Group and the 1985 
introduction of federal legislation, which resulted in large part from British pressure on 
the Reagan administration, did add to pressure on California to change its unitary method.
However, pressure from foreign governments and foreign MNEs at the federal 
level set off an argument between the national and state governments over federal 
preemption which harmed the foreign governments’ case, since it cast the debate in 
federalist terms, which ultimately led to a ruling in favour of California in the decisive 
Barclays court case. The British in particular raised hackles with their perceived 
assumption that the federal government could unilaterally change California’s law: this 
added to the states’ perception that foreign governments were colluding with the national 
government against them.37
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At the state level, the most effective asset foreign governments had was their 
prestige and the novelty of their involvement at the subfederal level. These assets were 
fully neutralised by a strong California sense of prestige and the fact that foreign 
governments were not state constituents. The Japanese government, which relied on its 
corporate representatives to lobby and was quicker to approach the states directly, was 
more successful than European governments in lobbying at the state level. In particular, 
the 1984 Keidanren Investment Expansion Mission received pledges from seven U.S. 
states not to enact a WWC method.
However, foreign governments were fairly effective in converting their economic 
assets into political assets. Both the Japanese and EU member governments threatened to 
revoke bilateral tax treaties with the U.S. if the U.S. federal government did not prevent 
the states from applying the WWC method to their countries’ MNEs, and the UK 
government threatened economic retaliation over the issue in both 1985 and 1993. 
Although these threats most probably did not seriously worry the U.S. federal 
government, since they would constitute treaty violations justifying U.S. retaliation, they 
encouraged the White House to introduce federal legislation banning the WWC method in 
1985 and contributed to California’s introduction of further reform in 1993, when the 
state had entered an economic slump and could little afford any damaging action directed 
against companies operating in California.
g) International organisations
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the only 
prominent international organisation actively working on tax policy at the time of the 
debate over California’s unitary method, sought a uniform application of the arm’s length 
standard (ALS) to all national and subfederal jurisdictions to promote a uniform global 
business environment. Debate over U.S. state use of the WWC method led the U.S. 
government to push the OECD in 1993 for a more precisely defined and circumscribed 
ALS system, which it hoped would be more effective. However, the U.S. government 
also sought discrepancy in these negotiations for its optional profit splitting and 
comparable profit interval methods of evaluating transfer prices, methods which were
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seen by both MNEs and European governments as at odds with the ALS. While 
supporting a more effective international norm, European governments opposed any 
dilution of the arm’s length standard. Both foreign and U.S. MNEs also lobbied against 
any U.S. use of formulary apportionment-type methods through the Business and Industry 
Advisory Committee of the OECD.
These internal divisions over the use of optional formulary apportionment-type 
methods meant the OECD was not an effective forum for resolving the debate over U.S. 
state use of unitary tax methods. In addition, the OECD had no direct power to enforce its 
standards at the U.S. state level, and it was reliant on a U.S. government unwilling to 
preempt state tax powers to enforce OECD transfer pricing norms. The only other 
international organisation which could have had an influence on the debate was the 
GATT, which, at that time, did not consider forms of direct taxation within its remit, had 
extremely weak enforcement powers, and had no direct rule over subfederal governments. 
The incoherence in international taxation norms meant that international organisations 
were not effective players in the debate over California’s unitary tax. Further, the political 
and economic assets held by international organisations at the time of the unitary tax 
debate were weak.
3) The use of different negotiating channels
State-firm bargaining takes place within institutional settings for negotiation, and 
these settings play an important role in structuring and influencing the bargaining process. 
As described in Chapter One, when actors deploy their assets, they do so through 
channels of negotiation: actors who can be used to influence a host government.39 The 
model of bargaining at the subfederal level detailed here includes the negotiating channels 
of the U.S. federal government, the state of California, the U.S. court system, and 
international organisations. Therefore, several of the actors active in state-firm bargaining 
at the subfederal level can also be considered to be channels of negotiation. This section 
of the chapter will examine which actors used, or failed to use, the channels listed below 
effectively.
255
a) The U.S. federal government
Lobbying at the level of the U.S. federal government was undertaken by:
i) Multinational enterprises, both directly, and through their home 
governments, MNE interest groups, and international organisations (see Figure 18, on p. 
258, for a diagram of the various actors which used the federal government as a 
negotiating channel during the unitary tax debate). MNEs were particularly successful in 
appealing to the U.S. Treasury Department, which pressed their case within the White 
House as part of its continuing effort to support the arm’s length standard. Influenced by 
the Treasury Department, the Reagan administration attempted to deal with MNE 
complaints through the formation of the Worldwide Unitary Working Group. However, 
companies relied too heavily on the executive branch to achieve a solution at the federal 
level. MNEs were less effective in gaining support in Congress, which more strongly 
represented state interests. At this level, although foreign business interests were 
generally unsuccessful in gaining Congressional support for preemptive legislation, lobby 
group such as the European-American Chamber of Commerce, the National Foreign 
Trade Council, and the Organization for International Investment argued forcefully that 
foreign-domiciled companies investing in the United States were worthy of support since 
they were strong contributors to the U.S. economy and, particularly, to U.S. employment.
Foreign-domiciled companies were more effective at the level of the U.S. federal 
administration, where foreign governments could pressure the U.S. administration on 
perceived treaty violations; domestic-domiciled companies were more successful in 
lobbying Congress, where they held a stronger constituency argument, although state 
interest groups ultimately held sway in this arena. Moreover, MNE lobbying at the federal 
level turned the unitary debate into an issue of federal preemption of state economic 
powers. This dynamic made the issue more contentious and often overrode any discussion 
of the merits of the tax method itself.40
ii) Foreign governments first became involved in the unitary debate during 
negotiations over the 1979 U.S./UK bilateral tax treaty, when British MNEs pressed their 
government to ask that British firms be exempted from state WWC methods. After the
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treaty exemption failed to pass the U.S. Senate, the British government lobbied the U.S. 
federal government to introduce legislation banning state use of the method in 1985 and 
to push the legislation into congressional hearings in 1986, threatening economic 
retaliation if the White House did not move the issue forward. EC national governments 
also threatened to suspend their bilateral tax treaties with the U.S. if Congress did not 
pass a law banning state use of the WWC method after the 1983 Container decision. 
Foreign governments were effective in lobbying the U.S. Treasury Department and the 
U.S. Secretary of State, both of which were concerned that state use of the WWC method 
violated U.S. tax treaties. However, foreign governments were most comfortable dealing 
with the executive branch of the federal government, and the unitary issue was ultimately 
not decided here. Although there was only limited foreign government lobbying in 
Congress, it is unclear whether an increased effort here would have been effective.
iii) The State of California, which pressured the federal government through its 
large congressional delegation, the participation of state personnel in the Worldwide 
Unitary Taxation Working Group, and membership in various state association groups 
which lobbied the federal government (again, see Figure 18 on p. 258). California was 
very effective in using its powerful congressional delegation to halt any attempts at a 
legislative ban on state tax practices, but only moderately effective in lobbying the 
executive branch. Although successive presidents and presidential candidates were eager 
to curry favour with the state’s large base of electoral votes, federal agencies were under 
simultaneous and effective pressure from business interests and foreign governments to 
change California’s tax method.
There were also less formal interactions between the state and federal level: 
California Governor Jerry Brown publicly endorsed an early version of the 1979 U.S./UK 
tax treaty banning state use of the WWC method, while the head of the California FTB 
simultaneously organised opposition to the treaty among tax officials in other states; 
Governor Deukmejian proposed state legislation banning the WWC method in 1984 in an 
attempt to avoid an embarrassing conflict with the Reagan administration; and the 
chairman of California’s Board of Equalization successfully lobbied presidential 
candidate Bill Clinton in 1992.41
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iv) State group associations have a long history of lobbying the U.S. federal 
government in support of the states’ right to use the WWC method.42 They were 
successful in forestalling the introduction of preemptive legislation in Congress until 
1985, which allowed many states time to modify their unitary tax regulations themselves. 
State groups also lobbied the federal government through their participation in the 
Worldwide Unitary Working Group. Although unable to achieve their goals within the 
Group or to halt the issuance of a final report which did not incorporate their position, 
state assets were strong enough to allow them to refuse to agree to the final report. In 
addition, state groups received support from the Office of Intergovernmental Relations, a 
powerful force for state sovereignty within the early Reagan administration 43
Figure 18: Lobbying the U.S. federal government
MNEs—n
International organisations Foreign govts MNE interest groups
State group associations
b) Lobbying the state of California.
Lobbying the state of California was undertaken by:
i) Multinational enterprises, both directly, through industry associations, and by 
influencing their home governments (see Figure 19 on p. 260 for a diagram of this dynamic, 
along with that of other actors lobbying the state of California). The unitary debate was the 
first time Japanese and Silicon Valley companies mobilised to lobby extensively in 
California,44 as the level of foreign investment in the state reached a critical mass in the mid- 
1980s. This channel of negotiation proved extremely effective in its directness, since the
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business community is considered highly influential in California’s political process;45 in 
addition, the industries most affected by the unitary tax method were high-tech 
manufacturing companies, the industries the state most wanted to attract. This lobbying 
channel became even more effective in 1993, when MNE threats of withdrawn investment 
were taken more seriously as the California economy declined.
ii) Foreign governments. During the time of the unitary debate, California’s 
political structure did not have established channels to effectively handle direct lobbying 
by foreign governments: there was no “port for the modem” of foreign governments at the 
state level46 At the same time, foreign governments, particularly the British, had a “lack 
of appreciation” for the states as sovereign entities which held power independent of the 
national government47 Furthermore, foreign governments did not want to have to 
negotiate with U.S. subfederal governments since it “feels bad” to have a subfederal 
government put forward a law with extraterritorial reach 48 This perspective may have 
been a contributing factor to the conflict, since foreign governments initially did not 
approach California directly, bypassing the state level in favour of lobbying the U.S. 
federal government through established diplomatic channels (see Figure 18 on p. 258)49 
Eventually, however, there was a realisation that it could be “extremely difficult” for the 
U.S. Congress to pass legislation banning state use of the WWC method, and foreign 
government lobbying began to focus on the subfederal level;50 the unitary issue therefore 
triggered a “much more acute awareness of California” on the part of foreign 
governments.51 As show by Figure 19, p. 260, foreign governments did eventually 
approach the state of California directly.
The Japanese were the first foreign government to open up a direct channel of 
negotiation with California in 1977 when Governor Jerry Brown requested agricultural 
trade concessions from the Japanese government, who in return demanded a removal of 
the WWC method. The Japanese government was viewed as an effective lobbyist in 
California in part because it relied on Japanese companies to approach the state, which 
“looked like something California expected to see”.52 In addition, California was very 
interested in developing an economic and strategic alliance with the Pacific Rim and 
looked to Japan for important technological input and manufacturing investments 53
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The British government was less effective in lobbying California. Although the 
UK government felt they “naturally were put in the lead as the largest investor in the 
U.S.”, and brought in delegations of government officials to hold meetings with state 
personnel, to state government officials, they appeared condescending.54 They were 
therefore seen as ineffective in presenting their case until they directly threatened 
California with economic retaliation in 1993 55
iii) The U.S. federal government pressured California by attempting to exempt 
British firms from state WWC unitary tax methods during negotiations over the 1979 
U.S./UK tax treaty, holding various congressional subcommittee meetings on legislation 
to modify state use of the WWC method,56 and introducing federal legislation banning 
state use of the WWC method in 1985 (again, see Figure 19 below). However, states felt 
the Reagan administration “wasn’t serious” about the legislation, and it was withdrawn 
after California reformed its unitary method in 1986. At the same time, the federal 
government attempted to cooperate with California through the Worldwide Unitary 
Taxation Working Group, and through offers to assist the states in collecting financial 
information from MNEs.
Figure 19: Lobbying the State of California
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Although these efforts kept pressure on California to reform its unitary tax, the 
national government showed tremendous restraint during the debate over California’s tax 
method because the political ramifications of acting in a way which would significantly 
harm California fiscal interests were “dramatic” and “there was great reluctance for the 
federal government to tell the states what to do with their tax policy”.58 Attempts at 
coercion were unsuccessful because of this deference, and because it became evident that,
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constitutionally, it would take an act of Congress to force a change in the state’s tax 
policy.59 This was an unpromising channel for change, since most congressmen did not 
want to vote to preempt a state power while concurrently depriving their constituencies of 
a potential revenue base.
c) Contesting the legality of the WWC method in the courts.
i) Multinational enterprises filed various lawsuits against California alleging 
that the state was overstepping its powers in applying the WWC method.60 In addition, 
MNEs and MNE interest groups filed numerous amicus curaie briefs in support of 
companies contesting the WWC method’s legality in court cases (Figure 20, p. 263, 
shows the various actors which used the U.S. courts as a negotiating channel).61 This 
channel of negotiation proved a highly effective means of intimidating California, since 
any ruling against the state could have forced California to pay back all the revenue the 
state had collected under the method, while drastically reducing state revenue 
projections 62 This threat proved particularly effective in the 1993 Supreme Court hearing 
of the Barclays/Colgate-Palmolive case, when the state was in dire financial 
circumstances 63
ii) The U.S. federal government was a potent lobbyist within the court system, 
since its ability to conduct foreign policy was a key factor in decisions on the legality of 
state use of the WWC method (see Figure 20, p. 263). The federal government filed 
amicus curaie briefs supporting an overthrow of state use of the WWC method in the 
1981 Chicago Bridge & Iron Company v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, Illinois 
Department of Revenue case, the 1986 Alcan/ICI suit against California’s Franchise Tax 
Board, at all stages of the Barclays Bank Pic. v. Franchise Tax Board case in the 
California court system, and at a 1992 U.S. Supreme Court hearing to decide whether the 
Barclays case would be heard on appeal. However, the federal government refused to file 
a supportive brief in the 1983 Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board 
case or support Container’s Petition for Rehearing. As well, neither the Bush nor the 
Reagan administration filed amicus briefs in support of Colgate-Palmolive’s legal battles, 
fueling claims that the White House was more concerned about the effect of the WWC 
method on foreign companies.
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There is also evidence to suggest that the desire to ensure a supportive U.S. 
Solicitor General brief in the 1993 Barclays Bank Pic. v. Franchise Tax Board case 
convinced the California government to modify its unitary method in 1993.64 President 
Clinton had given legislators in California the impression that he would not ask for a 
favourable Solicitor General brief without a change in California’s law, and a favourable 
brief was seen as crucial to overcoming Barclays’ arguments that the WWC method 
violated the national government’s ability to conduct foreign policy.65
iii) The states also sought to maintain their legal right to use the WWC tax 
method even if they chose not to implement it, since revenue-raising policies are 
considered a key component of state sovereignty.66 The states effectively used the 
judiciary as a negotiating channel by arguing the unitary tax issue on federalist grounds, 
winning rulings in the following court cases: Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton Ltd. v. State 
Commission (1924), U.S. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Vermont (1980), Exxon Corporation v. 
Wisconsin (1980), Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board (1983), 
Alcan Aluminium/ICI v. Franchise Tax Board (1992), Barclays Bank Pic. v. Franchise 
Tax Board (1993), and Colgate-Palmolive v. Franchise Tax Board (1993).
State group associations filed numerous amicus briefs supporting the states’ right 
to use the WWC method 67 These associations also lobbied the U.S. Solicitor General to 
support the states. In particular, the National Governors’ Association successfully lobbied 
President Reagan to support California by not filing an amicus curaie brief in the 1983
f a
Container Corp. case.
iv) Foreign governments assumed early in the unitary fight that because the U.S. 
administration opposed state use of the WWC method, it would be ruled unconstitutional 
in federal court. They assumed the lack of a supportive U.S. Solicitor General brief in the 
1983 Container case had led the U.S. Supreme Court to rule in favour of state use of the 
WWC method as applied to domestic corporations. Foreign governments unsuccessfully 
lobbied the White House to support Container’s Petition for Rehearing (again, see Figure 
20 on p. 263). The British government then applied political pressure on the U.S.
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administration at the final stages of the 1993 Barclays litigation for a favourable U.S. 
Solicitor General brief, to no avail. Foreign governments also filed numerous amicus 
curaie briefs in support of companies fighting state use of the WWC method through U.S. 
courts.69
Figure 20: Lobbying the U.S. courts
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d) Lobbying international organisations
Lobbying at the level of international organisations, most notably the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), was undertaken by various 
national governments and MNE interest groups (Figure 21, p. 264, shows the various 
actors which used international organisations as a negotiating channel during the unitary 
tax debate). These groups sought to use international organisations both to influence U.S. 
state governments and to put pressure on the U.S. federal government to push the states to 
reform. International organisations proved a weak intermediary channel for negotiations, 
since, at the time of the unitary debate, no international organisation regulating tax issues 
had an effective enforcement mechanism or mandate to act at the subfederal level, and 
there was no definitive consensus among the OECD member countries on transfer pricing 
standards.
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Figure 21: Lobbying international organisations
MNEs
MNE interest groups
Foreign governments ► International organisations < U.S. federal govt.
The debate over California’s unitary tax method did lead to increased efforts 
within the OECD, led by the UK and U.S. governments, to resolve national differences on 
transfer pricing standards through more stringent OECD definitions. The 1995 report of 
the OECD’s special task force of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs rejected the use of 
unitary taxation much more specifically than in previous OECD reports, condemning the 
“pre-determined and mechanist nature of global formulary apportionment methods”.70 
However, the 1995 report still reflected an incoherent regime for international taxation, as 
the U.S. successfully lobbied for the inclusion of its federal formulary apportionment- 
style methods over the protests of European governments.
4) Key initiatives
Initiatives occur when actors deploy their assets through channels of negotiation 
in bargaining over subfederal government policies which violate international norms. If 
actors find a highly effective use for their assets, their initiatives can push a policy debate 
towards a solution. Such highly effective uses of assets and channels of negotiation are 
examples of the successful culmination of state-firm bargaining since they demonstrate an 
actor’s conversion of their potential power into actual influence over the outcome of a 
policy debate.71 This section of the chapter will highlight key initiatives, shown in Box 4, 
p. 265, which brought the various actors towards a solution in the debate over California’s 
unitary tax method.
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Box 4: Key initiatives in the California unitary tax debate
UK threats of retaliation 
The Worldwide Unitary Working Group 
Threats of federal legislation 
U.S. Solicitor General briefs 
The Barclays court case
a) UK threats of retaliation
In May 1985, the British government, frustrated that the federal Worldwide 
Unitary Working Group had not succeeded in eliminating state use of the WWC method, 
sponsored parliamentary legislation proposing the denial of advance corporation tax 
(ACT) credits on dividends to companies having a “qualifying presence in unitary tax 
states”72 if the U.S. Congress did not pass legislation banning subfederal use of the WWC 
method by January 1987.
The threat of UK retaliation did not carry a huge amount of weight at this time, 
since it would have been a violation of the existing U.S.-UK tax treaty, and thus a legal 
justification for U.S. economic retaliation.73 However, it added to pressure on President 
Reagan, and helped lead him to introduce federal legislation in 1985 banning state use of 
the WWC method. This meant the UK was effectively employing an additional 
negotiating channel, the U.S. federal government, to influence U.S. states. The proposed 
federal legislation, combined with the threat of UK retaliation, helped convince the 
California legislature to reform its unitary tax method in 1986.
The UK government threatened economic retaliation again in May of 1993, 
announcing it would revoke ACT credits for all companies which had headquarters or 
operations in California unless the state revoked its WWC tax method. UK threats of 
retaliation were taken more seriously this time, since the UK government was now 
directly targeting California-based companies.74 More importantly, the threat was 
amplified when UK Inland Revenue sent letters to 900 U.S. companies operating in
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California. This provided concrete evidence U.S. MNEs could use to argue their case 
before the California legislature and that the federal government could use as evidence to 
pressure the state.75 In this instance, the UK government was effectively using two 
additional negotiating channels to influence the California government: the federal 
government and MNEs. In addition, threats of economic retaliation had more weight by 
1993, since the California economy had deteriorated considerably since 1985.
Although California bureaucrats working on the unitary issue seemed to view the 
UK’s retaliation threats with bemusement, state politicians took the warnings more 
seriously.77 California Senate Committee staff stated they had been unofficially assured 
by the UK government that their proposed 1993 unitary reform law would be enough to 
remove the threat of retaliation, and Senator Alquist stressed the need to head off UK 
reprisals with the passage of his bill. California’s unitary reform law needed to be passed 
by September 10,1993 to ensure the bill would be made into law by January 1,1994, the 
UK government’s deadline for avoiding retaliation. The bill, voted in on September 11, 
1993, just made the cut-off. These threats of retaliation were an example of a foreign 
government successfully converting its economic asset, its host government status with 
many American MNEs, into a political asset, the threat of suspended economic rights for 
those U.S. MNEs, in a way that successfully prompted California legislative staff to pass 
a unitary reform bill.
b) The Worldwide Unitary Working Group
The 1983 Worldwide Unitary Working Group was a product of the U.S. federal 
government’s incoherent policy agenda over state use of unitary tax methods. The Reagan 
administration sought to reassure foreign governments and business groups, upset over 
the Container decision, that the federal government was working to resolve problems with 
state use of unitary tax methods. At the same time, it sought to avoid the introduction of 
preemptive federal legislation which would have violated Reagan’s federalist principles.
A divided final report proved the Working Group had made no progress in getting state 
and business groups to compromise and ensured hard-line states like California would not 
be persuaded to change their laws.
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However, the Working Group was successful in that it allowed the federal 
government to demonstrate that the WWC method was a problem which needed to be 
addressed, laid out a blueprint of different possible solutions, and educated state
*7Qrepresentatives on the issue. In particular, California Governor Deukmejian returned 
from participation in the group convinced that the WWC method was a problem, both for 
the business community and the Reagan administration, and determined to resolve it by 
introducing state legislation to reform California’s unitary method.80 In addition, the final 
report of the Working Group, in conjunction with increased MNE lobbying, helped lead 
five states to stop using the WWC method.
Therefore, although the very existence of the Working Group, in the absence of 
other clear federal government action on the unitary issue, was an example of the 
government’s incoherent policy agenda, the Working Group can be said to be a successful 
attempt by the U.S. federal government, which lacked the internal resolution and political 
will to resolve the unitary tax debate itself, to use its political power to draw together the 
relevant actors in the debate and force resolution of the issue onto the states.
c) Threats of federal legislation
Although the Reagan administration introduced federal legislation banning state 
use of the WWC method in November 1985, there seemed little chance that the law 
would be approved. Federal legislation banning the WWC method had been proposed for
0 1
many years, but had never proceeded beyond committee hearings to a full vote: there 
seemed even less chance the legislation would have enough political support to pass now, 
when fewer states were using the method.82 A divided Working Group report had 
demonstrated the states’ refusal to accept federal preemption of their taxation powers. In 
addition, state groups felt it would be difficult for Congress to preempt the states on an 
issue which had not been ruled illegal or unduly egregious by the courts.83
However, the California House/Senate conference committee working on unitary 
reform legislation publicly stated in May 1986 that they were anxious to reach a 
compromise before a scheduled September 29th congressional subcommittee hearing on 
the proposed ban. After California changed its law on September 5, 1986, the federal
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government withdrew its proposed legislation at the subcommittee’s opening hearing, 
stating it was satisfied that California’s legislation resolved the problem. There is a 
general consensus that although the threat of preemptive legislation was not serious, the 
federal government’s threat had served its purpose by adding to pressures on California to 
change its unitary method on its own.84 The mere threat that the federal government 
would use its ultimate political asset, its ability to overrule state regulations, was 
sufficient to affect the progress of legislation at the state level.
d) U.S. Solicitor General briefs
There is evidence to suggest that the desire for a favourable U.S. Solicitor General 
brief from the Clinton Administration led the California legislature to pass its unitary 
reform law in 1993, since the California legislature’s report on the legislation states that 
“California officials have been assured that if our law is changed in a manner which will 
remove the threat (of retaliation), then a neutral brief (to the effect that the Administration 
does not advise the court to take up the Barclays Case) would be filed”.85 California 
Senator Alquist, the sponsor of the state’s 1993 unitary reform bill, stressed the need to 
influence the Solicitor General’s amicus brief in the Barclays case, and the Fiscal Policy 
Office of the Senate Rules Committee in California contacted the White House and the 
U.S. Treasury Department, who helped state tax committee staff work on the bill’s 
language. The California legislature then faxed a copy of the proposed bill to President 
Clinton to ensure it was sufficient to prompt an amicus brief in support of California.86 
California’s unitary reform bill, which effectively neutered the WWC method but 
maintained the state’s right to enforce it, passed on September 11,1993, and Clinton 
asked the Supreme Court to drop the Barclays case on October 7, 1993.
Although many credit the Clinton administration’s subsequent Solicitor General 
brief, which weakly supported California, as a decisive factor in the 1993 Barclays case, 
in the end, it proved tangential to the court’s ruling, which concentrated on the need for 
Congress to maintain its jurisdiction over state economic laws.87 Nonetheless, the 
presidential administration’s apparent power to politically influence a decisive court case 
had been enough to prompt the California legislature to action. Moreover, it inadvertently 
proved to be a deft use of presidential influence: if Clinton had filed in favour of
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Barclays, as he was urged to do by MNEs and foreign governments, it ultimately would 
not have affected the court’s ruling, which did not focus on the federal government’s 
ability to conduct foreign policy. Instead, by filing in favour of the state, the presidential 
administration managed to extract a concession from the state to change its law without 
alienating state interests, since, without a legal ruling against it, California was able to 
avoid paying back taxes it had collected under its previous regulations.
e) The Barclays court case
The Barclays Bank case had assumed great importance since it provided a means 
for the national government to decisively settle the principles involved in the unitary tax 
debate after the congressional and executive branches had effectively relinquished their 
jurisdiction on the issue to the courts.88
In particular, by the early 1990s, the Barclays litigation had become the main 
focus of the unitary debate for foreign interests: even after California’s unitary reform 
legislation in 1993, the EC Commission and the European Parliament warned that a legal 
decision against Barclays could lead to the suspension of EC tax treaties with the U.S.
O Q
Foreign interests had placed much hope in the Barclays lawsuit. However, some 
observers felt that California’s 1993 unitary reform legislation, introduced just before the 
Barclays case was decided, allowed the U.S. Supreme Court to hand down a decision 
which was not economically damaging to California or a preemption of state taxation
90powers.
Although the unitary debate had landed in the courts for a final decision, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in the Barclays case firmly gave jurisdiction over subfederal 
economic regulations to Congress. The court’s ruling reinforced the power of Congress to 
overrule state laws which violate international norms, at the same time that it 
strengthened the court system’s importance as a channel for influencing the ability of 
U.S. states to implement regulations at odds with international norms.
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5) Effective use of federal assets
When evaluating the strategies actors used to deploy their assets in the debate over 
California’s unitary tax, it is interesting to note that in several of the examples of highly 
effective uses of assets, the federal government influenced the outcome of events by 
merely threatening to use its ultimate political asset: its power to overrule California state 
legislation. The presidential administration could deploy this asset through Congress, by 
introducing federal legislation or treaties overriding California’s use of the WWC 
method, or through the courts, by filing amicus curiae briefs in court cases deciding 
whether to overrule the method on foreign commerce clause grounds. In particular, 
Congress, through its power to pass preemptive legislation, is a key institution in 
determining the exercise of state power. These federal assets were so powerful that even 
in cases where states did not actually believe the federal government would follow 
through on a threat to pass preemptive legislation or rule a state law illegal, the threat 
alone was sufficient to affect the outcome of the debate.
Ultimately, the federal government, in particular Congress, could stop state use of 
the unitary tax method by passing preemptive legislation. Congress is thus the key U.S. 
institution controlling the exercise of state regulatory power. However, Congress has 
rarely exercised this power, preferring to leave debates over state power to the U.S. court 
system. The states actively seek to keep this boundary flexible through direct lobbying of 
Congress and the U.S. judiciary. Despite the introduction of preemptive federal 
legislation in 1985, the federal government withdrew its threat after the state reformed the 
unitary tax method on its own. In the process, California managed to maintain the right to 
overturn a company’s decision to file under the alternative ALS method and charge a fee 
to companies which did so, despite bitter opposition from powerful MNEs and foreign 
governments. Congressional preemptive power does, however, remain on the sidelines of 
any debate over U.S. state regulations which conflict with international norms as a 
constraining factor on state power which forms the legal boundaries around a state’s 
independence in asserting its interests on the international stage.
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6) Summary
This chapter has completed the model of state-firm bargaining over subfederal 
economic policies which conflict with international norms. Chapter Three defined the 
first three components of the model being built to evaluate state-firm bargaining at the 
subfederal level: the actors, their agendas, and their assets. Chapter Six has completed the 
model by: i) evaluating how effectively the various actors employed, or failed to employ, 
their assets to achieve their policy agendas in the debate over California’s unitary tax 
method; ii) demonstrating the effective use of various channels of negotiation to influence 
California’s policy; and iii) examining the most effective uses of assets and negotiating 
channels, key initiatives which influenced the outcome of the policy debate. This chapter 
has analysed how successfully actors converted their potential power, their political and 
economic assets, through bargaining into influence on the outcomes of the debate over 
California’s unitary tax policy.
Further, this chapter supports the hypothesis that the U.S. national government 
will not always be the preeminent channel of negotiation for foreign governments and 
MNEs seeking to influence U.S. economic policies. During the debate over its unitary 
method, California bargained directly with foreign governments, foreign-domiciled 
MNEs, and international organisations, as well as with domestic-domiciled MNEs and the 
U.S. federal government. The increase in international economic interactions at the U.S. 
subfederal level has multiplied the number of actors which seek to influence U.S. state 
economic policies, and resulted in an increased diversification of U.S. foreign economic 
policy processes. The debate contained negotiations between U.S. federal and state 
governments, between MNEs and U.S. state governments, between firms within industry 
associations, between the U.S. federal government and foreign governments, and between 
foreign national governments. These actors used many different types of assets and 
channels of negotiation to influence California’s unitary policy, supporting Hocking and 
Stopford and Strange’s view of a complex and dynamic state-firm bargaining framework 
for international economic negotiations.
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This chapter also supports the hypothesis that powerful U.S. states such as 
California can maintain regulatory standards at odds with federal and international norms: 
the U.S. federal government refused to effectively constrain California’s use of a tax 
method which violated federal and international tax norms. This chapter has demonstrated 
the various ways actors can effectively influence U.S. state economic policies which 
conflict with international norms, even those put forth by very powerful U.S. states. As 
we will see in the final, concluding chapter, this will provide a useful means of looking at 
how other international conflicts over the economic policies of U.S. states may develop.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions
1) A new subfederal bargaining model
The concluding chapter will summarise the findings of the thesis and further 
explore the implications of applying state-firm bargaining to the subfederal level. It will 
examine other clashes between U.S. state economic policies and international norms, 
describe international activism by subfederal jurisdictions in different countries, and 
discuss the possible implications of new and proposed multilateral agreements on U.S. 
subfederal economic regulations which violate international norms. It will then speculate 
on how future conflicts over U.S. state economic policies which violate international 
norms might best be negotiated.
Through analysis of the debate over California’s unitary tax method, this thesis 
has described newly-evolving modes of state-firm bargaining over U.S. subfederal 
economic policies. The increase in international economic interactions at the U.S. 
subfederal level has multiplied the number of international actors which influence U.S. 
state economic policies, facilitating diverse negotiations over subfederal economic 
policies which violate international norms. As Hocking demonstrates, multilayered 
bargaining offers a more dynamic view of foreign policy processes at the subfederal level 
than traditional models of paradiplomacy. This thesis has expanded the paradiplomacy 
theories of Hocking, Soldatos, and Duchacek by applying Stopford and Strange’s theories 
of state-firm bargaining to the subfederal level.
The thesis has modeled the bargaining which takes place over U.S. state economic 
policies that violate international norms by:
1) determining the actors involved in lobbying to change a U.S. 
state economic policy which violated international norms;
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2 ) determining the actors ’ policy agendas;
3) determining the different types of assets each actor possessed, and how 
effectively the actors used these assets to achieve their policy agendas;
4) determining how effectively the actors used various channels 
of negotiation to influence California's policy; and
5) determining the most highly effective uses of assets and channels of negotiation, 
key initiatives which influenced the outcome of the policy debate.
As stated in Chapter One, this thesis is not attempting to draw general conclusions 
from one case study as to how international actors influence U.S. state laws which 
conflict with international norms. The debate over California’s unitary tax method is only 
one example of a U.S. state economic regulation which violated international norms. 
Nevertheless, it is the most prominent and hard-fought example to date. The California 
unitary tax debate was the first U.S. state policy issue which had a substantial foreign 
lobbying presence; forced California to be one of the first states to develop institutions to 
handle international issues; made foreign governments more aware of the need to act at 
the U.S. state level; and helped all U.S. states realise they needed to obtain specific 
exemptions for their laws in emerging multilateral organisations such as the World Trade 
Organisation if they wished to avoid international conflict over their policies.
2) Hypotheses
The chapters thus far have presented evidence in support of the following 
hypotheses:
1) Powerful U.S. states such as California can maintain regulatory standards 
at odds with federal and international norms. Growing global economic
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interdependence does not eliminate the regulatory options of powerful U.S. states such as 
California, since the U.S. federal government often refuses to effectively constrain states 
which violate federal and international norms. Chapter Two demonstrated that U.S. states 
have been able to maintain formulary apportionment methods of taxing MNEs at odds 
with the prevailing international norm of the arm’s length standard. Chapter Three 
showed how, under U.S. federalism, the federal government often refuses to rein in U.S. 
state regulations with international implications. Chapter Four described the political and 
economic assets which gave California the ability to maintain a regulatory standard at 
odds with prevailing federal and international norms. Finally, Chapter Six demonstrated 
that California’s growing interdependence with the international economy did not 
eliminate its regulatory options, since the state was able to effectively bargain to delay a 
change in its tax method.
2) U.S. state governments can bargain directly with foreign governments 
and multinational enterprises as actors in the international arena. The national 
government will not always be the preeminent negotiating channel for foreign actors 
seeking to influence U.S. economic policies. The international arena is increasingly 
intruding on the affairs of subfederal governments. Chapter Two described the current 
international regime governing the taxation of MNEs, demonstrating that the debate over 
California’s use of the worldwide combined unitary tax method took place within the 
context of a larger policy debate between international and national tax authorities over 
the correct method of taxing the transfer prices of MNEs.
Chapter Three demonstrated that the U.S. national government does not always 
assert itself as the preeminent negotiating channel for international actors seeking to 
influence U.S. subfederal regulations, nor is it allowed to by the U.S. judiciary. This 
permits U.S. state governments to bargain directly with foreign governments and 
multinational enterprises over their economic policies. Chapter Four described 
California’s extensive economic and cultural links overseas and the evolution of state 
institutions to implement California’s international agenda. Chapter Six demonstrated that 
during the debate over its unitary tax method, California bargained directly with foreign
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governments, foreign-domiciled MNEs and international organisations, as well as with 
domestic actors such as the U.S. federal government and domestic-domiciled MNEs.
3) The dynamics of U.S. federalism
The increased globalisation of economic activity has led to a greater emphasis on 
economics in U.S. foreign policy, facilitated more diversity within the formulation of 
America’s foreign policy, and accelerated tensions between the U.S. federal and state 
governments. “Global interdependence is the primary stimulus to non-central government 
participation in foreign relations” since the “impact of international economics on the 
health and well-being of domestic jurisdictions (has) led non-central governments into the 
foreign policy arena”.1
When applying state-firm bargaining theory to the subfederal level, it is important 
to acknowledge the qualities inherent in U.S. federalism which allow U.S. states to 
bargain directly in the international arena: the power of the U.S. on the world stage, the 
overlap of authority between the U.S. federal and state governments, and the frequent 
divergence in the U.S. between what is constitutionally permissible and politically 
expedient. Although subfederal economic policies which violate international norms 
would seem natural candidates for traditional channels of diplomatic negotiation, the 
federalist makeup of the U.S. is exceptional. Under the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, states have held that they are not bound by federal laws or international 
treaties unless it becomes apparent that state laws directly interfere with international 
commerce or U.S. foreign policy.2 States therefore view the national government’s power 
to regulate their involvement in foreign affairs as limited to Congress’ power to pass 
federal laws which override explicitly contradictory state laws, and the U.S. judiciary has 
generally upheld this view.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “federal supremacy is not lightly to be 
presumed”, and has ruled many seemingly contradictory federal laws and policies 
ambiguous enough to be deemed consistent with state laws.3 Conflicts between the U.S.
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federal and state governments over overtly political issues have a strong history of legal 
precedents favouring the national government, and future court rulings in this area will 
likely defer to these precedents. However, “issues with a larger economic content face a 
more uncertain future in the courts where states have greater legal standing on such issues 
and precedents appear less clearly applicable to the complexities of interdependent 
economic processes”.4
Further, many such intergovernmental conflicts would be dealt with by the U.S. 
Congress, not the courts. In this forum, a decision in favour of the executive branch of the 
federal government is “far less certain”.5 The U.S. Congress consists fundamentally of 
state interests, and is usually reluctant to overrule U.S. state law. Assertions of federal 
authority over state economic regulations are often viewed with an eye to the political cost 
of congressional preemption of state authority. The question thus becomes not whether 
state actions interfere with U.S. foreign economic policy, but whether U.S. foreign 
economic policy is important enough to override domestic economic and political 
considerations.
Given the refusal of the federal government to consistently constrain states which 
violate international norms, the California unitary tax debate demonstrates the importance 
of the use of multifaceted tactics by international actors engaged in negotiations over U.S. 
state economic policies. In the case of California’s unitary tax, international actors more 
easily found a political solution at the level of the states, eager to attract and retain 
investment by U.S. and foreign MNEs, than at the level of the U.S. national government, 
which did not want to impose a preemptive federal solution.
4) Implications of new multilateral agreements on U.S. subfederal activism
During the debate over California’s unitary tax method, the main international 
organisation dealing with the regulation of taxation, the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), lacked both an effective enforcement mechanism 
and direct jurisdiction over subfederal regulations. Therefore, international organisations
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were not effective actors during the unitary tax debate. However, the rise of new 
international trade agreements and institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have qualitatively 
changed the relationship of subfederal governments to international law. These new trade 
regimes specifically apply to subnational governments, with some exceptions and lesser 
standards of application; greatly broaden the spectrum of covered economic activity 
beyond a traditional concern with goods to address services, government procurement, 
foreign investment, and intellectual property rights, making a large portion of the 
economies of subfederal government subject to international rules for the first time; and 
attempt to remove non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) by creating a uniform body of 
international rules on government subsidies, government technical regulations, product 
and service standards, and health and safety regulations, areas largely under the 
jurisdiction of states in the U.S.
Although Scheiber and other paradiplomacy theorists predicted the U.S. would 
bargain away U.S. state powers in order to gain concessions from other countries within 
multilateral agreements, this has not proved true so far. Instead, the federal government 
has provided broad exceptions for U.S. state regulations in its accession to new 
international organisations such as the WTO, leaving open both the possibility of U.S. 
state deviance from international norms and the necessity of multilayered bargaining by 
international actors seeking to change U.S. subfederal economic regulations.
a) The World Trade Organisation
While previous GATT dispute panels operated on the principle of ‘consensus’ 
whereby a single member could exercise a veto, the arbitration panels of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), formed in 1994, operate on the principle of ‘reverse consensus’, 
whereby a veto of an arbitration panel’s decision requires unanimous support: they are 
therefore much more effective. As well, under Article 22:9 of the WTO, dispute 
resolution procedures are explicitly made applicable to measures taken by “regional or 
local governments or authorities within the territory of a Member”.
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In July 1994,42 U.S. state attorney generals sent a letter to President Clinton 
expressing serious concerns about the WTO’s proposed sovereignty over state 
regulations. In particular, the states feared the WTO’s application of GATT rules of non­
discrimination, which, starting in the mid-1980s, had been expanded to address ‘de facto’ 
discrimination. GATT panels started to be more strict with countries seeking to exempt 
trade-restrictive internal regulations from GATT rules of non-discrimination under article 
XX,6 which provides exceptions for national measures necessary to protect public morals, 
human, animal or plant life or health, and artistic or endangered natural resources. More 
alarmingly, the GATT had ruled in the 1992 ‘Beer II’ dispute between the U.S. and 
Canada that tax preferences for small businesses, allowable under the U.S. Constitution 
because they only favoured in-state companies by default, were a violation of the GATT’s 
national treatment clause.7 To states’ rights groups, the “kernel of the court verdict 
indicated that the mere fact of variation of standards within the United States could 
constitute a violation of national treatment”: this has been “the lead example of the 
potential implications of WTO rules for federal systems”.8
In order to mollify state concerns,9 the U.S. federal government sought to strictly 
limit the WTO’s power over U.S. subfederal law in the U.S. implementing legislation for 
the Uruguay Round Agreements which created the WTO.10 This legislation provides that 
the Uruguay Round Agreements “do not automatically ‘preempt’ or invalidate state laws 
that do not conform to the rules set out in those agreements - even if a dispute settlement 
panel were to find a state measure inconsistent with such an agreement”.11 The 
implementing legislation also states that the mere fact of variations between U.S. state 
laws does not constitute a barrier to trade, and that states are not bound to observe the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body rulings under the U.S. Constitution’s supremacy 
clause.12
The U.S. Uruguay Round Agreements Act further says that only the U.S. federal 
government may bring court cases against the states which attempt to declare state law 
inconsistent with the Uruguay Round Agreements.13 The 11th Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution also provides that foreign citizens and citizens of another state may not sue
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American states in federal court unless the state consents or Congress waives state 
immunity.14 Finally, provisions were made constraining U.S. federal government lawsuits 
against the states as a means of enforcing WTO decisions. The federal government bears 
the burden of proof in such a lawsuit to show that a state law is inconsistent with WTO 
rules, regardless of the finding of a WTO panel. Notice must be given to Congress prior to 
filing suit, along with a justification for preempting state law. In the event of an 
unfavourable judgment, states are protected from retroactive liability.15
The United States also secured country-specific reservations in the Agreement on 
Government Procurement (AGP), which exempted several state procurement preference 
programs.16 However, in an effort to make their jurisdictions attractive to international 
business, 37 U.S. state governors have agreed to bind their states to the AGP.17 Although 
state governments are free to choose whether to join the AGP, once they have signed the 
agreement, they cannot exclude any future state laws from the AGP. However, this issue 
is partly unresolved since it is unclear whether governors have the power to bind state 
procurement practices to an international standard without accompanying state 
legislation.18
i) Massachusetts’ Burma law
The state of Massachusetts entered into controversy when it passed a June 1996 
bill19 barring state entities from buying goods or services from companies on a state
9 0‘restricted purchase list’ of firms doing business with Burma. The EU and Japan filed 
suit against the U.S. under the WTO, claiming the state act violated provisions of the 
Agreement on Government Procurement, which Massachusetts had agreed to join. In 
September 1996, three months after the state statute was approved, the U.S. federal 
government passed its own sanctions act against Burma.21
By 1998, members of the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), an association 
representing companies engaged in foreign commerce, were on the Massachusetts 
restricted purchase list. The NFTC filed a lawsuit claiming the state law was an 
unconstitutional infringement on the federal government’s ability to conduct foreign
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affairs, a violation of the foreign commerce clause, and a preemption of federal sanctions 
against Burma.22 In order to avoid the gray area of whether it was legal to sue a state, the 
NFTC sued the Massachusetts official responsible for enforcing the law. The federal 
district court struck down the Massachusetts statute in November 1998 as an 
impermissible encroachment on the federal prerogative to conduct foreign policy. The EU 
and Japan agreed to withdraw their WTO dispute proceedings in light of the district 
court’s ruling. The U.S. Court of Appeals backed the district court’s reasoning in June 
1999, and further stated that the Massachusetts law discriminated against foreign 
commerce and, as such, violated the Foreign Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled in June 2000 that the Massachusetts 
law, which had more extensive sanctions against Burma than the federal sanctions, 
contradicted the U.S. federal law and interfered with Congress’ specific delegation of 
discretion to the White House to speak for the U.S. on the matter of sanctions against 
Burma, violating the principle of federal supremacy.24 The court explained this decision 
differed from their ruling in the Barclays case because in that case, Congress had 
specifically rejected both foreign government objections to a state law, by removing a 
section of the 1979 U.S.-UK tax treaty prohibiting state use of the worldwide combined 
unitary method, and U.S. executive branch objections, by refusing to pass federal 
legislation banning state use of the WWC method introduced by the Reagan 
administration. However, Congress had passed a specific law regarding sanctions against 
Burma. Therefore, the Massachusetts law was illegal since it interfered with Congress’ 
foreign policy objectives, as put forward in the federal sanctions act.25 This decision, and 
the explicit reference to the Barclays case, further strengthened the role of Congress in 
determining the role of states in U.S. foreign policy, to the dismay of the U.S. Solicitor 
General, who argued that Congress should not have to pass a law every time it wanted to 
pre-empt state action on foreign policy matters, since “sometimes diplomacy is best 
conducted quietly”.
Although seen as a defeat for the states, the Supreme Court did not rule on 
whether the Massachusetts statute violated the foreign commerce clause by discriminating
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between foreign and domestic commerce, explicitly setting this question aside in their 
decision. The court further set aside the question of whether federal laws are generally 
presumed to pre-empt state laws on matters of foreign policy. As such, the decision left 
open the possibility that U.S. states could formulate their own laws regarding foreign 
policy on a case by case basis. In July 2000, the U.S. District Court ruled that the city of 
Miami’s 1996 law against artists with Cuban connections performing within city limits, 
which violated a U.S. government law encouraging artistic exchanges with Cuba, was 
now illegal in the light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision against Massachusetts. 
However, it remains to be seen whether U.S. state economic sanctions against foreign 
countries, or other subfederal foreign policy stances, will be ruled illegal if there is no 
congressional act concerning the issue in question, and several states are preparing test 
laws on various issues.27
Further, the U.S. Court of Appeals stated that “The passage of the Massachusetts 
Burma Law has resulted in significant attention being brought to the Burmese 
government’s human rights record. Indeed, it may be that the Massachusetts law was a 
catalyst for federal action”, since Massachusetts’ congressional representatives28 played a 
role in crafting the federal law, which was enacted only three months after the 
Massachusetts law.29 Thus, even though the state law was ruled illegal by the courts, it 
affected the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.
State economic sanctions, such as the Massachusetts Burma law and threatened 
sanctions against Swiss banks over asset claims by Holocaust survivors and their heirs, 
are separate from aspects of state government involvement in the international arena 
examined in the debate over California’s unitary tax, in that sanctions are not instances 
where state governments “seek to promote their jurisdictions’ economic welfare, but 
rather an overlapping subset of issues where economic policy is used to serve more 
political foreign-policy objectives”.31 Nevertheless, it is useful to examine such cases to 
gather further information on the actors, negotiating channels, strategies, and legal issues 
involved in debates over U.S. subfederal economic policies which conflict with 
international norms.
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ii) U.S. state government procurement and labeling
State procurement practices which discriminate against foreign products, 
particularly “buy domestic” programs and small business set-asides, feature prominently 
in EU, Canadian, and Japanese complaints about U.S. barriers to trade.32 Although many 
U.S. states have acceded to the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement, states 
have only applied the Agreement to a portion of their procurement practices, and foreign 
complaints have continued. For example, the European Commission claims California 
state preferences for small and minority-owned businesses close 20% of the state 
government market to foreign competition.33
Further, foreign governments protest state standard and labeling requirements 
which are more stringent than U.S. federal law. However, in the Florida Lime & Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a California law prohibiting 
the importation of avocados which fell below prescribed quality standards was not 
preempted by federal regulation setting different quality standards because the mere fact 
of federal regulation did not automatically overrule state regulation unless Congress had 
specifically declared it preemptive.34 The court therefore ruled that if the state and federal 
government concurrently have authority over an area of regulation, U.S. state law is not 
invalid merely because it is more restrictive than federal law, but only if it directly 
interferes with a federal law or policy. This leaves open the possibility that U.S. courts 
would let stand U.S. state standards more stringent than federal regulations despite a 
negative WTO ruling. At the same time, the WTO has made provisions that member 
nations are not required to accept lower international standards for food safety or public 
health, and can require a ‘zero risk’ standard if they so choose.35
b) The proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment
Member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s Ministerial Council started negotiating in 1995 for a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) which would further regulate international investment 
and trade in services. These efforts were halted in October 1998. However, further
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international regulation of services, an area largely governed in the U.S. by the states, may 
surface again in the form of future international agreements or a strengthening of the 
WTO.
One of the chief goals of the EU during the MAI negotiations was that the 
disciplines of the MAI be made applicable to subfederal governments: this chiefly 
targeted the U.S. states.37 U.S. states were concerned that the proposed MAI would 
impact the law-making power of state and local governments in several areas.38 In 
particular, a proposal put forward during the negotiations would have required the 
uniform treatment of foreign investors within national borders, which would have likely 
conflicted with the ability of laws and regulations to vary among states.39 In this instance, 
the GATT Beer II decision was often cited with alarm as demonstrating that the WTO and 
MAI would find U.S. state laws illegal simply because of their diversity.
Protests by U.S. states over the possible implications of the MAI prompted the 
U.S. national government to initially propose an exclusion of all U.S. state and local 
regulation from the scope of any MAI, a “rather breathtaking omission” given the amount 
of investment and services that U.S. states regulate.40 The presidential administration 
worried that unless such concessions were made, the MAI would not be approved by the 
U.S. Senate 41 Further, during the negotiations, the U.S. Treasury Department consulted 
with the states extensively on MAI proposals, particularly, after the California unitary tax 
debate, on provisions regulating subfederal taxes.
c) The North American Free Trade Agreement
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which went into effect in 
1994, has requirements similar to those of the WTO regarding national treatment in 
procurement, standards, sanity and phytosanitary measures; covers investment and 
financial services; provides a boarder coverage than the GATT of other service sectors; 
and contains side agreements on labour and environmental standards. It therefore covers 
large areas of policy regulated in the U.S. by subfederal governments.
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NAFTA gave state and local governments deadlines by which they could exempt 
some of their activities from coverage under the agreement. However, after those 
deadlines passed, subfederal governments were forbidden to pass any new measures 
which discriminated against foreign goods or services.42 NAFTA further applied the 
WTO’s general exceptions for U.S. state economic regulations to most of its investor 
protections, and added exceptions for subfederal grant and loan programs, all local 
government measures, and all existing subfederal tax laws.43 NAFTA’s U.S. 
implementing legislation likewise provides that only the U.S. federal government may use 
U.S. courts to bring action against states which pass laws that violate the NAFTA.44 
However, NAFTA’s provisions for foreign investment guarantees under Chapter 11 allow 
MNEs from a NAFTA country to sue the subfederal jurisdictions of any other NAFTA 
country that imposes laws or regulations which injure the company’s property, “including 
the intangible property of expected profits” 45 Thus, although NAFTA arbitration panels 
cannot overturn U.S. state laws, fear of potential damage awards by the panels under this 
provision may inhibit U.S. states from passing regulations harmful to foreign MNEs.
d) Strategies
Can U.S. states still bargain with international actors and the U.S. federal 
government under the constraints imposed by these new, more powerful multilateral 
agreements? In the case of Massachusetts’ Burma law, the only action thus far that the 
WTO has brought against a U.S. state, the WTO action was suspended by the EU, the 
plaintiff, when the U.S. court system ruled the state action illegal. Past WTO rulings 
against the U.S. for actions declared legal by the U.S. court system have either been 
ignored (Beer II and the Tuna-Dolphin case)46 or suspended following a political 
negotiation with the offended party (in the case of EU objections to the U.S. Helms- 
Burton law)47 It seems likely that strengthened international regimes do not avoid the 
need for bargaining.
There seem to be several bargaining options in the new environment created by 
these multilateral agreements:
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1) Informal bargaining between the states and the federal government when the 
U.S. is negotiating for the establishment or extension of a multilateral agreement.
Informal bargaining took place during negotiations for the proposed MAI and the 
NAFTA, and before U.S. implementing legislation for the WTO was presented to 
Congress. There was a realisation by the U.S. government that these multilateral 
agreements would not be approved by Congress unless concessions were made to state 
interests during the negotiations.
2) Informal bargaining between the states and the federal government on a case- 
by-case basis after an international regime has been established. Although U.S. states do 
not automatically have to abide by a WTO finding against their laws, the U.S. federal 
government can ask states to follow a WTO decision in order for the U.S. national 
government to avoid foreign retaliation or international embarrassment. In return, the 
national government could promise increased federal aid or action on the issue under 
contention.
3) The federal government could sue the states for violating an international 
agreement, demanding payment of damages caused by foreign retaliation against the U.S. 
authorised under an international agreement against a state action. The U.S. implementing 
legislation for the WTO and the NAFTA allows the federal government to bring legal 
action against a state, although the same legislation exempts many state laws which 
potentially conflict with the rules of multilateral organisations from their organisations’ 
jurisdictions.
Moreover, provisions in the U.S. implementing legislation of the WTO limit the 
federal government’s ability to sue the states to enforce WTO decisions. In particular, 
requirements that the presidential administration notify Congress prior to filing suit 
against the states seem to trigger automatic grounds for a successful U.S. Supreme Court 
appeal by the states if Congress does not then pass a law preempting the state law in 
question. If Congress does not then pass such a law, the court will most likely not
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support the right of the federal government to overrule state laws which conflict with the 
international obligations of the executive branch.
4) The federal government may decide to sacrifice the damages caused by foreign 
retaliation authorised under a multilateral agreement against an offending state law; this 
calculation may depend on the domestic politics surrounding the state policy in question.
5) If the case involves a U.S. state political stance, as it did with Massachusetts’ 
Burma sanctions law, the states may be able to argue that the First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution protects their right to use public procurement protests as a form of free 
speech, so long as there is not a U.S. federal law on the issue in question.
The legal power of all the states within the U.S. federal system, and the economic 
and political power in particular of several states, such as California, has allowed the 
states a great deal of room for bargaining with the U.S. federal government under recent 
multilateral agreements. The enforcement power of these multilateral agreements on U.S. 
states is not straight-forward, and states will still be able to bargain with the U.S. federal 
government and international actors to attempt to avoid multilateral punishment or gain 
some form of compensation for compliance. Multiple actors and negotiating channels will 
still be called into play.
5) Subfederal activism in other countries
U.S. states have a great deal of latitude compared to subfederal jurisdictions in 
other countries. The U.S. federal government often gives state governments free rein in 
formulating economic policies which conflict with national government policies, and U.S. 
states have relatively large economies on an international scale. At the same time, the 
economic and military status of the U.S. on the world stage gives the U.S. less reason than 
other countries to resolve internal tangles on federalist issues. The bargaining power of 
several U.S. states, such as California, is therefore quite high.
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However, paradiplomacy by subfederal jurisdictions takes place in other countries 
besides the U.S. (see Box 5 below). It is explicitly constitutional for Swiss cantons and 
German and Austrian Lander to have substantial autonomy when interacting with the 
international arena and for French and Belgium subunits to develop their own trans­
sovereign contacts; Canadian provinces and the Australian states are implicitly allowed 
this freedom as well.49
Box 5: Subfederal jurisdictions with the legal ability to act 
in the international arena
Swiss Cantons 
German Lander 
Austrian Lander 
Belgium communal and regional subunits 
French regions and departments 
Canadian provinces 
Australian states
The 1848 Swiss Constitution authorises the border cantons to enter into direct 
negotiations with their neighbouring counterparts, regional subnational authorities, in 
minor matters which do not affect federal responsibility.50 The German Constitution gives 
major responsibilities to the Lander for the execution of national legislation.51
In addition, Article 32, Section 3 of the German Constitution states: “Insofar as the 
Lander have power to legislate, they may, with the consent of the Federal Government, 
conclude treaties with foreign states”. The Lander have reserved powers in education 
and culture, although these are legally fairly strictly defined areas. However, these 
reserved powers can still hold sway on international issues. In 1957, the German 
government challenged Lower Saxony legislation establishing a nondenominational 
school system for all children, on the grounds that the German-Vatican Concordat of 1933 
constitutionally guaranteed Catholic students separate schools. Although the court
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accepted the treaty, it stated that the “treaty power of the national government could not 
extend to an infringement of the reserved power of the Lander in the field of education” 
and let the Lander legislation stand.54
The Austrian Constitution requires that the federal government consult with the 
Lander before concluding treaties which could affect their regional jurisdiction.55 In 
France, the regions and their departements have begun developing their own trans­
sovereign contacts: since 1983, their initiatives have been centrally coordinated by means 
of an office established as an adjunct to the Secretary General of the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs: “Delegue pour 1’Action exterieure des Collectivites locales”.56 This 
office seeks to ensure that the initiatives of towns, departements and regions do not 
interfere with the foreign policy of France.57
The 1970 Belgian Constitution granted the communal and regional subunits of 
Belgium the right to engage in international contacts, albeit limited to such issues as 
health, culture, and education.58 Both the Flemish and Walloon communities have 
established their own foreign offices, and there are permanent missions of Wallonia- 
Brussels in Paris, Quebec and Geneva, and Wallonia-Brussels cultural centers in Paris and 
Kinshasa, Zaire; the Flemish community has a cultural center in Amsterdam.59
Canada exists as a confederation, which leaves open the possibility of serious 
provincial policy involvement in foreign affairs. The power of the Canadian central 
government to legislate the implementation of treaties is in question, since no 
constitutional supremacy clause exists to automatically give precedence to the central 
government in conflicts between national and provincial legislation. However, since all 
political powers are considered exclusive and belong either to the national or provincial 
governments, the actual incidence of jurisdictional conflict is low.60
Canadian provinces are quite active in international relations. The Canadian 
province of Quebec is a prominent player in international diplomacy, and had permanent 
delegations in Paris and missions in Texas, Louisiana, and California before most were
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closed recently.61 In 1984, Quebec established a Department of External Trade and 
reorganised its Department of Intergovernmental Affairs into a Department of 
International Relations. Other Canadian provinces followed Quebec’s lead by 
developing large-scale bureaucracies to pursue international affairs and permanent 
overseas offices: Alberta has a Permanent Mission in New York City; Ontario had 
missions in Paris, London and Brussels, although many of these have been closed 
recently.63 Alberta also has an international relations divisions within its ministry of 
intergovernmental affairs and, along with Quebec, a significant trade ministry.64
Australian federalism is weak compared to that of the U.S. or Canada.65 The 
Australian Senate is a party-based chamber which only rarely serves the interest of the 
states.66 Australia has broad areas of concurrent jurisdiction in the distribution of powers 
between its federal and subfederal levels, and a constitutional clause grants supremacy to 
the national government in areas of disagreement. Further, both Canadian and Australian 
political parties are split between the national and subnational levels, so separate policy
fnissues can more easily evolve at the subfederal level.
Of course, the stated framework of federal power-sharing may differ markedly in 
practice. The Soviet Constitution of 1944 declared that “each Union Republic has the 
right to enter into direct relations with foreign States and conclude agreements with 
foreign States and exchange Representatives with them. Each Union Republic has its own 
Republican military formations”.68 Evidently, there is a difference between legal 
federalism and actual political control.
In India, many states have been going abroad to encourage international trade and 
investment within their jurisdictions: Andhra Pradesh’s Prime Minister is particularly 
active on the international stage. However, the Indian Constitution is very clear that all 
foreign relations, including foreign commercial relations, are to be handled by the central 
federal government, so subfederal dealings with foreign governments or international 
organisations are forbidden. The World Bank may deal directly with state governments; 
however, this is done with the knowledge, agreement and permission of the central
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government, which usually signs a Memorandum of Understanding first with the World 
Bank that sets out an agreed programme. There is a move to allow Indian states to borrow 
abroad, but, under the Indian Constitution, all debt liabilities for the country are 
automatically assumed by the central government. If the states start borrowing abroad, 
they would be incurring liabilities for the central government: therefore, such external 
borrowing is currently not allowed.
Subnational governments in Latin America saw a rise in incipient economic 
foreign activity during the 1980s, when central governments in this region began to view 
subfederal economic paradiplomatic activities as valuable instruments to promote 
economic integration, development, and regional cooperation.69 Although the capability 
for subfederal units in Latin America to act abroad is restricted in regimes whose 
regulatory capacity has been eroded by drug trafficking or guerrilla warfare, states such as 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, which have seen recent periods of political and 
institutional stability, have seen a concurrent strengthening of subnational autonomy.70
Under Brazil’s constitution, its individual states have a great deal of scope to 
influence macroeconomic policies; by the early 1990s, virtually every state in Brazil had 
at least one autonomous state bank, and neither the federal government nor the Central 
Bank had authoritative control over these banks’ international borrowing activities: the 
state banks could effectively print their own money by issuing huge bond offerings.71 By 
the mid-1990s, the impending bankruptcy crisis of virtually all of the state banks had 
forced the federal government to become the liquidator of last resort. However, the 
Brazilian states still maintain the power to tax exports and to negotiate, with national 
Senate approval, international agreements. Further, the new Brazilian Constitution of 
1988 is not overly concerned with the supremacy of federal law over state law, and allows 
Brazilian states to maintain their own military police forces.72
The European Union’s recent emphasis on the concept of ‘subsidiarity’ is another 
route to potential ‘subfederal’ activism. Under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union, subsidiarity applies in areas of concurrent competence between the EU and the
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member states, and provides that “the Community shall take action, in accordance with 
the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore, by reason of the 
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the community”.73 However, 
the concept of subsidiarity has not been widely applied by the European Commission, 
since it is not clearly determined which competences have been assigned to the EU. 
Therefore, “the question of what is a concurrent power is essentially a political decision of 
the European Council”.74 Further, the principle of subsidiarity is essentially contrary to 
the idea of a federal system, where both the national and subfederal government have 
limited powers: instead, the EU presumes that power is centralised and is being given to 
subfederal units when it is judged proper by the ‘national’ European government.
The transfer of regional aid to subnational European governments follows this 
model by granting money to regions and cities, which, as a result, have set up lobbying 
offices in Brussels. However, the significant amount of EU regional aid dispersed has also 
given impetus to European regional and city activism and allowed subnational 
governments in the EU to gain an economic power base independent of their national 
governments. This has led to movement towards an enfranchisement of regional European 
governments. Thus, both the principle of subsidiary and the growth of regional aid have 
weakened the power of the EU national governments.
When examining conflicts over subfederal economic regulations with international 
implications, it is important to assess the resources of the actors involved. The resources 
each subfederal actor can deploy depend not only on its own political and economic 
power, but on the federal structure it belongs to, the relative power of its subfederal 
jurisdiction within the country’s political structure, and the relative power of its country 
within the international system. The international activity of non-central governments 
frequently depends on “the character and traditions of the federal system and the attitudes 
that these produce”. It is therefore necessary, as this thesis has done, to examine the 
relative freedom subfederal jurisdictions have within their country’s political structure 
and the different channels of influence subfederal governments have on national
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government policy. Federalism scholars have done extensive work exploring the 
framework of power within various federal systems, providing a solid base for future 
exploration of possible subfederal activism by International Relations theorists.76
This thesis has concentrated on the dynamics of negotiations involving U.S. 
states.77 However, other subfederal countries or confederations may provide fertile ground 
for future research. It may be particularly interesting to examine a country such as China, 
whose activist provinces are increasingly involved in the regulation of economic 
international activity at a time when the Chinese national government is attempting to 
impose a new economic regulatory framework on the country as it joins the WTO.
6) Towards a new model of regulation
This thesis expands the field of paradiplomacy by modeling negotiations over U.S. 
subfederal economic regulations with international implications, and expands the base of 
state-firm bargaining theory by applying it to the subfederal level. The thesis has 
examined a prominent case of negotiations over a subfederal economic policy which 
violated international norms, and analysed how effectively the actors used various assets 
and channels of negotiation to achieve their agendas in the debate. Examining bargaining 
at the subfederal level will become increasingly important as the growth of both 
international economic activity at the U.S. subfederal level and multilateral agreements 
governing policy areas traditionally regulated by U.S. states increases the incidence of 
conflict over U.S. state regulations which violate international norms.
In the case of California’s unitary tax, the state’s power to defend its regulations 
against the U.S. federal government, MNEs, and foreign governments waned as its 
growing dependence on the world economy constrained its policy options. Although the 
state had unusually strong resources for a subfederal unit, California modified its tax 
method to accord with international norms in order to remain an attractive destination for 
international trade and investment. California made the same calculations as countless 
nations before it, and decided that a short-term revenue loss from changing its regulations
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would be outweighed by long-term gains from joining the world trading order. However, 
the state had enough power to modify its regulations in the manner most advantageous to 
it: initially, California maintained the right to overturn a company’s decision to file under 
the ALS method and charged a fee for companies which did so; in 1993, despite 
eliminating these restrictions, California maintained the principle that the state could 
apply the unitary tax method, avoiding the payment of back taxes under a legal decision at 
a time when the state was suffering financially.
Kline points out that while U.S. states are not required to adhere to the new GATT 
government procurement code, they often do so anyway in order to gain market access for 
the firms. Increasingly, U.S. states may realise, as national governments have done, that it 
is in their own broad self-interest to adhere to international agreements and maintain 
credibility in the international arena.78
Kincaid asserts that since U.S. subfederal involvement in foreign affairs is so new, 
diverse, and dynamic, one should be cautious about trying to impose overly rational or 
tightly demarcated organisational structures or regulations on this nascent activity.
Instead, he suggests an informal development of “soft law” rules of the game. As such, 
actors can “avoid clashes over the application of ‘hard law’ regulations that force 
federalism players into conflictual zero-sum solutions. This concept accords with 
Hocking’s view that federal systems are ‘an amalgam of constitutional norms, judicial 
interpretation and pragmatic political considerations’” which favour informal behavioural 
norms to regulate the encroachment of these systems in the international arena.79 Kline 
agrees that “improved foreign policy management in this milieu is more likely to arise 
from practiced patterns of cooperative involvement than from the assertion of 
constitutional constraints or the premature institutionalization of intergovernmental 
consultations”.80
The multilayered bargaining taking place over U.S. subfederal economic 
regulations demands new responsibilities from its participants. As subfederal 
governments increasingly locate themselves within the U.S. foreign policy process, the
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U.S. federal government must continue to involve U.S. states in the formulation and 
implementation of international agreements which impact state law, avoiding the potential 
for conflict.81
At the same time, foreign actors are realising that in order to achieve certain policy 
objectives in the U.S., the American system of federalism often necessitates that they 
negotiate directly with U.S. state governments over subfederal regulations.82 In this 
environment, increased knowledge of state government policymaking and a strengthening 
of regular contacts with subfederal actors will provide a firm basis to resolve conflicts 
stemming from foreign investment and trade within the U.S.
Further, U.S. states must go beyond overseas offices and an attitude of entitlement 
over their policymaking power within the U.S. federalist system to develop their 
knowledge of international policies and institutions.83 As international economic activity 
increasingly affects U.S. state jurisdictions, their need to understand and communicate 
with international actors on the implications of state regulations has become urgent. U.S. 
states which are becoming increasingly integrated with the world economy will need to 
accelerate their relations with foreign governments. State policymakers will increasingly 
have to take into account the potential affect of deviations from international norms as 
they seek to ensure their policy environments promote international trade and investment 
which benefits the state economy.84 Regulations which violate international norms may 
result in state businesses being discriminated against overseas or in a withdrawal of 
foreign trade and investment from the state.85
How can international actors effectively influence U.S. state economic policies 
which conflict with international norms? The debate over California’s unitary tax 
indicates that actors engaged in negotiations over U.S. state economic policies which 
violate international norms are effective when they employ many different types of assets 
and channels of negotiation in order to achieve their objectives. The nature of U.S. 
federalism does not allow for the straightforward imposition of international or U.S. 
federal law on U.S. state economies. Instead, bargaining will take place.
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Appendix 1: States Adopting UDIPTA, Multistate Tax Commission 
Regulations, and the Multistate Tax Compact
State Adoption of UDIPTA Adoption of MTC 
Regulations
Membership 
in Multistate 
Tax Compact
Alabama Yes Substantially all Yes
Alaska Yes Substantially all Yes
Arizona Yes Substantially all No
Arkansas Yes Small number Yes
California Yes Substantially all Yes
Colorado Yes, option to apply Substantially all Yes
UDIPTA provisions or
state's significantly
different provisions
Connecticut No, but similar statute None No
Delaware No, but similar statute None No
District of No, but substantially None Yes
Columbia similar provisions
Florida Yes Most No
Georgia No, but many similar None, but several No
provisions similar provisions
Hawaii Yes, but option to apply Substantially all Yes
state's alternative and
significantly different
provisions to non­
business income
Idaho Yes All except one on airlines Yes
Illinois Yes Many No
Indiana No, but many identical Many generally No
provisions to non- consistent provisions
Iowa No, but statute with Only a few No
some of same features
Kansas Yes Most Yes
Kentucky Yes, with many Generally No
variations consistent provisions
Louisiana No, but some similar None No
provisions
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State Adoption of UDIPTA Adoption of MTC Regs Membership 
in Multistate 
Tax Compact
Maine Yes, but allocation Abbreviated version No
provisions deleted
Maryland No, but similar None No
apportionment factor rules
Massachusetts Yes, but some changes None No
Michigan Yes, but similar None Yes
apportionment provisions
Minnesota No Most Yes, but
no UDIPTA
option
Mississippi No None No
Missouri Yes, option to apply Substantially all Yes
state's one-factor
formula or separate
accounting
Montana Yes Substantially all Yes
Nebraksa No, but several MTC apportionment No
provisions identical factor regulations adopted
New No, but similar treatment None, but similar No
Hampshire of business income apportionment formula
New Jersey No, but similar None, but rules that follow No
apportionment rules general pattern
New Mexico Yes Substantially all Yes
New York No, but some similar None, but several No
provisions comparable regulations
New York City No, but substantially None No
similar apportionment
formula
North Carolina No, but substantially None No
similar provisions
North Dakota Yes Substantially all Yes
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State Adoption of UDIPTA Adoption of MTC Regs Membership 
in Multistate 
Tax Compact
Ohio No, but similar provisions None, but similar rule for No
determining sales factor
Oklahoma No, but some None No
apportionment factors
taken from UDIPTA
Oregon Yes Substantially all Yes
Pennsylvania Yes, but some significant None, but generally No
changes consistent regulations
Rhode Island No, but somewhat None No
similar provisions
South Carolina No, but somewhat None No
similar provisions
South Dakota No, but many similar No Yes
provisions
Tennessee Yes Most No
Texas No, but some features No Yes
followed
Utah Yes Most Yes
Vermont No, but some features None, but some similar No
followed regulations
Virginia No, but substantially None, but several No
similar apportionment comparable regulations
provisions
West Virginia No Some, but with No
significant differences
Wisconsin Yes, many same or Some No
similar provisions
Source: “State and Local Taxation, Cases and Materials Jerome R. and Walter Hellerstein. Sixth Edition, 
American Casebook Series, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1997, Sixth Edition, p. 567. The authors 
note the table is based on [1] Multistate Corporate Income Tax Guide (CCH) para. 145 (1997) and is used 
with the permission o f Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
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Appendix 2: States Imposing the Worldwide Combined Unitary Tax Method
(at the time of the formation of the Worldwide Unitary Taxation 
Working Group in September of 1983)
Alaska
California
Colorado
Florida
Idaho
Indiana
Massachusetts
Montana
New Hampshire
North Dakota
Oregon
Utah
States Which Subsequently Repealed The 
Worldwide Combined Reporting System
California
Colorado
Florida
Idaho
Indiana
Massachusetts
Montana 
New Hampshire 
North Dakota 
Oregon 
Utah
Substantially revised in 1986 and again in 1993.
Legislature overrode Governor’s veto of unitary reform
on June 12, 1985
Repealed December 20, 1984
Changed to water’s edge election on January 1,1988.
Repudiated by Governor Orr on February 23,1984
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled against
the state’s practice on December 11, 1984
Repealed 1987
Repealed 1986
Repealed 1987
Repealed August 15, 1984
Repealed 1987
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Appendix 3: Potential Impact of Uruguay Round on California Laws
State law provisions Cite Potential conflict
with GATT
A. Agriculture and Food
1. Commercial Quality
Food quality - standards for Cal. Food Agric. Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
fruits, nuts and vegetables 42681 et seq. Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Unneces. obstacle, TBT 2.2.
Food quality - standard for 3. Cal. Admin. Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
grape products 1436 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Unneces. obstacle, TBT 2.2.
Fertilizer control - registration Cal. Food & Agri. Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
and labeling of fertilizer prior to sale 14561 et seq. Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Seed testing, registration Cal Food & Agri. Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
and labeling Ch. 2 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Natl, treatment, art. HI; TBT 2.1.
Classification of milk Cal. Food & Agric. Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
Ch. 3 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Meat quality - types of Cal. Food & Agric. Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
adulteration prohibited 18758 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Cal. Health & Safety Code
26531
Domestic production - user Cal. Food & Agric. Code National treatment. Art. HI; TBT 2.1;
citrus processing facilities 63124 Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2;
Science, SPS art. 2.2;
Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Registration and licensing to Cal. Food & Agric. Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
deal in agricultural products 55481, 55521 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
Coloring - prohibited in the Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
manufacture or blending of olive oil. 28481 Risk assmt. SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Dairy quality - milk fat testers Cal. Food & Agric. Code Ch. 12, Science, SPS art. 2.2;
regulations 35161 et seq. Risk assmt. SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2
Reduced fat cheese - standards Cal. Food & Agric. Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
and requirements 37982 et seq. Risk assmt. SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.1
Equivalence SPS art. 4.1.
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State law provisions Cite Potential conflict
with GATT
Adulterants of commercial feed Cal. Food & Agric. Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
15041 Risk assmt. SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
2. Food Labeling
Safe drinking water and toxic enforcement - Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
warning of risk of birth defects 25249.5 (Proposition 65) Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Unnecess. obstacle, TBT 2.2.
Food labeling - canned Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
citrus products 26559 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Unnecess. obstacle, TBT 2.2.
Labeling & standards -  frozen dairy products Cal. Food & Agric. Code Part III, Science, SPS art. 2.2;
Ch. 503 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Labeling - concealment of inferiority Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
26528 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Organic marketing standards - Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
certification of organic foods 26569.3 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
3. Inspection and Food Safety
Sanitation standards - definition Cal. Food & Agric. Code Science, SPS art 2.2;
of adulteration of food 41361 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Cal. Penal Code 383.
Shellfish-processing Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS Art. 2.2;
and transportation 28503 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
4. Pesticides and Food Safety
Pesticide control -  prohibited acts Cal. Food & Agric. Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
12115.3, 12561, 12671, 12812 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Birth defect prevention -  pesticide Cal. Food & Agric. Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
active ingredients identification 13127 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Economic poisons - Cal. Food & Agric. Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
classification and labeling Division VII, Ch.2 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
requirements for sale and
registration
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State law provisions Cite Potential conflict
with GATT
B. Consumer Protection
Short weighing - true quantity Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 12024 Equivalence, TBT art. 2.7.
represented for commodities
C. Environmental Health
1. Pollution Abatement
Clean air - auto emission Cal. Vehicle Code 27153 et seq. Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2;
standards Science, SPS art. 2.2;
Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Reimbursement for pollution abatement Cal. Health & Safety Code Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
40919,41082,44080 TBT art. 2.1.
Standards for contaminants Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art.2.2;
39655 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Standards for motor fuels Cal. Health & Safety Code Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
13440,41954,43830
Standards for sources of pollution Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
41706 et seq. Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Restrictions on detergents that Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
are found to harm health or environment 41712,27606 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Waste treatment standards Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
25179.4-25179.6 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Noise - emission standards Cal. Vehicle Code 38370 Science, SPS art. 2.2;
Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Tires - importation requirements Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
for used tires (mosquito inspection) 23010 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
Drinking water - safety standards Ch. 6.6 Science, SPS art. 2.2;
(i.e. Safe Drinking Water and Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986) Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.1;
Equivalence, SPS art. 4.1.
2. Occupational Safety & Health
Worker protection - standards for Cal. Labor Code 6717 Science, SPS art. 2.2;
lead related construction work Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.1.
Occupational safety and health Cal. Lab. Code Div. 5, Part 1; Science, SPS art. 2.2;
standards - worker right to know Cal. Lab. Code 6361 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
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3. Toxic Materials
Lead acid batteries -  fees for dealers Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
25215.3 et seq. Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Asbestos protection -  licensing of workers Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 7065 Science, SPS art. 2.2;
Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Buffer zones - waste disposal facilities Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
25200 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Community right to know Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
25531.1 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Hazardous material - emergency Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
planning and insurance requirement Ch. 6.95 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Table wares standards - release Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
of lead and cadmium 25886 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
Wine - lead content standards Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
26530.1 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
Medical waste - containment, Cal. Health & Safety Science, SPS art. 2.2;
storage and treatment. Division XX, Ch.6.1., art. 8, 9 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
D. Labor and Economic Development
1. Business Development
Small business assistance - infrastructure Cal. Govt. Code Ch. 6.7 Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
Cal. Govt. Code 4535.2,14839 TBT art. 2.1.
Subsidy for tourism - Ca. Govt. Code 6107 Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
Commerce Marketing Fund TBT art. 2.1.
Natl, treatment, art. HI;
Customized job training Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code 10209, TBT art. 2.1.
10527,15020
Cal. Corp. Code 14202
2. California Business Preference
National business preference - Cal. Govt. Code 4300. Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
exemption for pre-1969 "Buy America" TBT art. 2.1.
and "Buy California” programs
Wage standards -  prevailing wage for Cal. Lab. Code 1771 Natl, treatment, art. HI;
workers employed on public works TBT art. 2.1.
Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
Preference to California Cal. Govt. Code 6107 Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
businesses Cal. Govt. Code 4533 TBT art. 2.1;
Govt, procurement.
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Public procurement -  preference for Cal. Govt. Code 4533 Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
companies that use California-based workers TBT art. 2.1;
Govt, procurement.
Public construction contracts - Cal. Pub. Con. Code 6107 Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
reciprocal preference requirement TBT art. 2.1;
Govt, procurement.
Public procurement - preference Cal. Govt. Code 14838 (f) Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
for California-based small TBT art. 2.1;
businesses Govt, procurement.
3. Other
Wage standards - prevailing Cal. Lab. Code 1771 Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
wage for workers employed on TBT art. 2.1;
public works Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
E. Natural Resource Conservation
1. Energy Conservation
Energy conservation markets procurement No provision found Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
TBT art. 2.1.
Motor vehicle fuel - limits on Cal. Health & Safety Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
future use 25372 et seq. Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2
Alternative fuels incentive grants Cal. Health & Safety Code Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
41082,41241 TBT art. 2.1.
• Cal. Pub. Util. Code 745
Cal. Pub. Res. Code 25648
Oil and gas conservation Cal. Pub. Res. Code Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
Division III, Ch. 1
2. product Packaging
Packaging, labeling, and advertising - content Cal. Health & Safety Code Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
Division 21, Ch. 4
Recyclable bottles/packaging Cal. Pub. Res. Code 42301 Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
Beverage containers - classification and Cal. Health & Safety Code Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
biodegradable requirement 24384.5 Science, SPS art. 2.2.
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3. Recycled Content
Recycling markets -  state and municipal Cal. Pub. Cont. Code Ch. 4 Natl, treatment, art. III;TBT art. 2.1.
Recycled content Cal. Pub. Res. Code 42211 Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
Newsprint quality - Cal. Pub. Res. Code 42775 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
recycled content Equivalence, SPS art. 4.1.
Glass - Clean Glass Recycling Act Cal. Pub. Res. Code 70000 Science, SPS art. 2.2;
(ceramic glass use prohibited) et seq. Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
Paving - use of recycled materials required Cal. Pub. Res. Code 42700 Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.1;
Equivalence, SPS art. 4.1.
Public procurement - recycled Cal. Pub. Con. Code Govt, procurement, art. Ill (Natl.
paper requirement Division II, Part 2, Ch.2., Treatment); Unnecess. obstacle,
art.l. TBT art. 2.2.
Fiberglass - Fiberglass Recycled Cal. Pub. Res. Code Science, SPS art. 2.2;
Content Act Division 12.9, art. 2-4 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
4. Wildlife Conservation
Importation of wild animals Cal. Fish & G Code 2120 Science, SPS art. 2.2;
et seq. Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Importation, sale and release of wildlife Cal. Fish & G Code 2120 Science, SPS art. 2.2;
et seq. Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Migratory bird protection hunting regulations Cal. Fish & G Code 356, Science, SPS art. 2.2;
and incorporation of federal laws 3130 et seq. Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8.
Endangered species - Cal. Fish & G Division III, art. Science, SPS art. 2.2;
classification, importation and 1.5-4 Risk assmt., SPS art. 5.1-5.8;
transportation Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
F. Taxation
Corporate tax based on income - Cal. Rev. & Tax Code 25128 Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
unitary taxation TBT art. 2.1.
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Uniform division of income for tax purposes Cal. Rev. & Tax Code 25128 Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
TBT art. 2.1.
Tax credit for purchase of low emission Cal. Rev. & Tax Code 17052.11 Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
vehicles or conversion devices TBT art 2.1. Tax subsidy,
SCM art. 1.1.
Tax credit for industrial Cal. Rev. & Tax Code 23649 Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
development (in-state property) TBT art. 2.1. Tax subsidy,
SCM art. 1.1.
Tax rebate for economic Cal. Rev & Tax Code 5108 Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
revitalization (high tech. industry) TBT art. 2.1. Tax subsidy,
SCM art. 1.1.
Tax exemption on fuel used by Cal. Rev & Tax Code 8655 Natl, treatment, art. Ill;
private entity under contract with TBT art. 2.1.
public entity Tax subsidy, SCM art. 1.1.
G. Transportation
Vehicle equipment and Cal. Vehicle Code Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
inspection - medium and heavy trucks & buses Division XII. Ch. 3.5;
Division XXVI, Ch. 3
General requirements for braking systems Cal. Vehicle Code 26311 Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
Hazardous materials transportation - Cal. Health & Safety Code Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
prohibited without a manifest 25169.1
Commercial drivers license requirements Cal. Vehicle Code Division VI, Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
Ch. 7.
Insurance requirements-proof Cal. Vehicle Code 6854 Unnecess. obstacle, TBT art. 2.2.
required for commercial vehicles
Source: Stumberg, 1994, p. 27.
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Appendix 4: Current U.S. State and Municipal Foreign Economic Sanctions
State/Municipality Target
Country
Status
Alameda County, CA Burma Selective purchasing 
and investment
Enacted December 1996.
Alameda County, CA Nigeria Selective purchasing 
and investment
Enacted October 1997.
Amherst, MA Nigeria Selective purchasing 
and investment
Enacted September 1997.
Ann Arbor, M A Burma Selective purchasing Enacted April 1996.
Berkeley, CA Burma Selective purchasing Enacted March 1995.
Berkeley, CA Nigeria Selective purchasing Enacted July 1997.
Berkeley, CA Tibet Selective purchasing Enacted June 1997.
Boulder, CO Burma Selective purchasing Enacted December 1996.
Brookline, MA Burma Selective purchasing Enacted November 1997.
Cambridge, MA Nigeria Selective purchasing Enacted May 1997.
Cambridge, MA Burma Selective purchasing Enacted June 1998.
Cambridge, MA Indonesia Selective purchasing Enacted August 1998.
Carrboro, NC Burma Selective purchasing Enacted October 1996.
Chapel Hill, NC Burma Selective purchasing Enacted January 1997.
Dade County, FL C u ba(l) Selective purchasing 
and investment
Enacted July 1992; 
updated June 1993
Los Angeles Burma Selective purchasing Enacted December 1998.
Madison, WI Buraia Selective purchasing Enacted August 1996.
Massachusetts Burma Selective purchasing Enacted July 1996.
373
State/Municipality Target
Country
Status
New York, NY Burma Selective purchasing Enacted May 1997.
Newton, MA Burma Selective purchasing Enacted November 1997.
Oakland, CA Nigeria Selective purchasing 
and investment
Enacted May 1997.
Oakland, CA Burma Selective purchasing Enacted May 1996.
Palo Alto, CA Burma Selective purchasing Enacted October 1997.
Philadelphia, PA N. Ireland Selective purchasing Enacted 1989; amended 
1991, 1994,1995.
Portland, OR Burma Selective purchasing Enacted July 1998.
Quincy, MA Burma Selective purchasing Enacted November 1997.
San Francisco, CA Burma Selective purchasing Enacted April 1995.
Santa Cruz, CA Burma Selective purchasing Enacted July 1997.
Somerville, MA Burma Selective purchasing Enacted February 1998.
Takoma Park, MD Burma Selective purchasing Enacted October 1996.
Vermont Burma Selective purchasing Enacted May 1999.
West Hollywood, CA Burma Enacted October 1997
West Hollywood, CA Arab League 
boycott 
of Israel
Selective purchasing Enacted October 1997.
Notes:
Bold denotes a law which was confirmed by the municipality 
as currently not being enforced.
Italic denotes a law which was suspended or repealed.
1. Broadened to include companies violating the Cuban Liberty and Democracy Act. 
Source: Organization for International Investment website.
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Appendix 5: U.S. Gross State Products vs. National Gross Products
(millions of U.S. dollars)
1995 1996 1997 1998
Australia 376,650 417,597 419,986 372,723
Belgium 275,744 268,208 243,540 250,391
Brazil 704,168 774,869 803,585 774,967
California 924,582 971,777 1,043,669 1,118,945
Canada 579,232 601,589 624,144 598,249
China 700,219 816,490 898,244 946,312
Florida 344,381 365,837 391,073 418,851
France 1,553,130 1,554,360 1,460,120 1,446,950
Georgia 202,750 218,381 233,773 253,769
Germany 2,458,250 2,383,080 2,114,460 2,150,520
Greece 117,564 124,361 120,933 121,533
Illinois 359,843 376,489 402,282 425,679
India 353,222 383,640 407,890 419,070
Michigan 253,940 264,848 280,178 294,505
New Jersey 271,297 285,528 303,580 319,201
New York 597,823 634,150 669,446 706,886
Ohio 295,207 305,559 325,239 341,070
Pennsylvania 318,066 328,704 347,169 364,039
Spain 584,188 608,814 558,568 582,137
Texas 515,433 555,609 606,901 645,596
United Kingdom 1,126,740 1,179,580 1,318,520 1,410,430
United States 7,338,400 7,751,100 8,329,000 8,699,200
Source: Gross State Products are from U.S. Bureau o f Economic Analysis, Department o f Commerce. Gross 
National Products are from The World Bank website.
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Appendix 6: Research approach (unabridged)
Research to determine the actors, their agendas, their assets, and the various 
channels of negotiation in the debate over California’s unitary tax method consisted of 
surveying a wide variety of participants in the debate to allow a general assessment of the 
relative importance of different actors and policy channels in the “judgments of well- 
placed observers”.1
In addition, a search was conducted of all relevant news articles from major U.S. and 
European newspapers to gain a fundamental understanding of the different arguments put 
forth and how the issue developed. The news articles examined started in 1986, the year 
California first passed legislation on the issue, and finished in 1996. All of the documents 
surveyed were then analyzed to identify relevant companies, state and federal government 
offices, industry associations, and law and consulting firms which were active in the debate; 
persons regularly mentioned within these organisations were catalogued.
Interviews were obtained by writing letters to the persons identified by the news 
search, with follow-up phone calls. Each participant was asked to identify other key players 
in the debate. This approach helped to ensure that the case study did not miss important 
players who had not been quoted in the press, or who had changed jobs since the time of the 
legislation. Many of those interviewed were employed by lobby organisations or the 
government. Few corporate people were mentioned directly by name in the press, and the 
lobbying groups which had represented MNEs in the unitary debate were reluctant to 
divulge client names. Also, due to the detailed and technical nature of the issue, many 
corporate representatives were not involved in the debate on a day-to-day basis.
However, it proved surprisingly easy to identify and meet with key legislative 
officials and lobbyists who had worked on the unitary tax issue at the state level from the
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early 1980s. A small and tightly-woven group of California state tax policy experts was 
quickly discovered. Due to their relatively specialised knowledge base, if key players at the 
state level had changed employment since the time of the unitary legislation, it was most 
often to take another position within the same group of experts.
Interviews were conducted in Washington DC and New York City (June 1997); in 
Sacramento and Los Angeles, California (January/February 1998), and in London (May 
1998). Li total, 52 interviews were conducted.
After the initial sessions, follow-up questions were conducted by phone, fax, and 
email. The original sessions were audiotaped, then transcribed, along with any clarifications 
from the follow-up correspondence. All of the research material gathered was used to 
examine the multilevel layers of bargaining which took place over California’s unitary 
tax, and to identify levers of influence on all sides. Due to the sensitive nature of both the 
lobbying process and taxation issues, interviewees are not quoted directly.
1 Robert Dahl, 1963, p. 52.
Appendix 7: Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, Capital Inflows
(millions o f U.S. dollars; outflows -)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
All countries 16,918 24,401 13,842 11,441 25,359 17,856 34,091 41,977
Canada 3,278 1,998 -1,439 111 3,294 572 2,547 959
Europe 9,805 14,732 10,610 9,058 14,686 13,127 21,730 34,974
European Communities 8,661 14,005 9,588 8,097 13,292 9,601 19,095 31,352
Belgium 263 323 27 290 302 -267 597 88
France 675 1,959 -199 79 774 -252 1,017 2,551
Germany 219 1,638 427 796 1,291 1,962 1,982 2,403
Italy 99 374 337 152 197 -58 114 -364
Luxembourg -2 35 52 -31 129 -180 -45 128
Netherlands 4,432 5,190 3,510 2,613 3,520 2,684 4,374 7,871
United Kingdom 2,938 4,406 5,383 4,055 6,882 5,303 10,827 18,562
Denmark, Greece, and Ireland 37 80 52 143 196 410 228 369
Other Europe 1,144 727 1,021 961 1,395 3,525 2,635 3,622
Sweden 265 7 43 337 216 190 1,395 744
Switzerland 719 483 914 615 1,035 3,028 1,414 2,582
Other 161 236 64 9 144 308 -174 296
Japan 948 2,960 1,987 1,440 4,374 3,081 7,268 6,181
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa 77 272 142 170 1,148 558 2,719 996
Latin America 2,301 1,700 1,621 455 615 684 -332 -1,453
South and Central America 327 138 437 60 90 478 826 -29
Panama 210 75 314 -12 -167 166 56 -34
Other 117 63 123 72 258 313 769 5
Other Western Hempishere 1,974 1,562 1,184 395 525 205 -1,157 -1,423
Bermuda 249 -48 304 -119 -84 546 19 49
Netherlands Antilles 1,406 1,417 995 330 848 -495 -750 -482
U.K. Islands, Caribbean 188 254 -43 225 -257 132 -554 -880
Other 132 -62 -72 -41 18 22 127 -102
Middle East 234 2,660 806 28 791 -357 -68 193
Israel 32 -12 94 22 76 -2 49 -57
Other 202 2,672 711 6 715 -354 -117 250
Other Africa, Asia, and Pacific 275 80 116 179 449 192 228 128
Memorandum-OPEC 240 2,685 719 10 754 -332 294 212
Source: Survey o f Current Business, U.S. Department o f Commerce.
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Appendix 8: GATT “Beer II” decision
In a suit brought by the Canadian government, a GATT panel concluded in June of 
1992 that U.S. federal and state laws which discriminated in favour of U.S. state beer 
companies by granting tax breaks to microbreweries were illegal, and ordered the U.S. to 
end the discrimination.1 Although the U.S. and Canadian governments reached a bilateral 
trade accord which removed the dispute from the GATT arbitration process, the matter 
was quietly dropped by both the U.S. and Canadian government; the U.S. government has 
not followed up on promises to ask Congress to change the federal laws in dispute or to 
pressure the states to change their laws.2
Nevertheless, states’ rights advocates were alarmed by the GATT panel’s ruling, 
viewing it as an extreme application of the GATT rule that jurisdictions should employ 
least-restrictive trade measures. They feared it set a precedent for GATT to hold any U.S. 
state to the standard of “the one state with the laws most favorable to imported 
products”.3 The Beer II ruling is therefore seen by many state advocates as directly 
conflicting with the federalist principle of allowing diverse state regulations. Further, the 
prohibition against “unnecessary barriers to trade” under GATT Article XX “means that 
the mere fact of differences in the laws of the states may be sufficient to find their laws in 
violation of GATT non-discrimination rules”.4 The European Commission has described 
U.S. state regulation as a “multiplicity of standards” which creates “impediments and 
even barriers to trade”,5 resulting in the “fragment of the U.S. market”.6 Beer II helped 
drive the states to demand exemptions for state regulations when the U.S. joined the 
World Trade Organisation and the North American Free Trade Agreement, requiring the 
U.S. federal government to consult with the states when state regulations were brought 
into question by multilateral organisations.
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1 Morton, 1997, p. 8.
2 Ibid., p. 16.
3 Weiler, 1996, p. 8.
4 Ibid., p. 9.
5 Stumberg, 1994, p. 1.
6 Ibid., p. 4.
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Appendix 9: Taxation of U.S. MNEs’ Foreign-Sourced Dividends
Several large U.S. companies with extensive international interests complained 
that if they were taxed on foreign dividends when they elected a water’s edge assessment, 
California would not give them credit for the foreign taxes they had already paid on the 
overseas factors of production used to generate those dividends or for the generally high 
foreign government withholding taxes imposed on the dividends themselves. However, if 
either a U.S. or foreign-domiciled company filed on a worldwide combined basis, any 
dividends entering the U.S. from overseas businesses were considered to be interfirm 
payments, and were weighted against the foreign property, payroll, and sales used to 
generate the dividends. U.S. MNEs argued that including their foreign dividends in a 
water’s edge assessment made the water’s edge system too expensive for them to use in 
many cases.
Therefore, U.S. MNEs with extensive international investments stated they would 
be forced to continue to file on a worldwide combined (WWC) basis and would not 
receive the benefit of lowered taxes possible from filing under a water's edge assessment. 
This would place U.S.-incorporated companies doing most of their business overseas at a 
disadvantage to their overseas competitors, since it offered an exemption from the WWC 
method as a viable possibility to foreign MNEs but not domestic MNEs. These U.S. 
MNEs further pointed out that both the Worldwide Unitary Working Group and proposed 
federal legislation had insisted on equity for foreign and domestic companies. They stated 
that taxing foreign dividends effectively penalised U.S. MNEs which were successful 
overseas, and subsidised poorly-performing firms by allowing them to deduct foreign 
losses from their U.S. profits under the WWC method. U.S. MNEs which were 
particularly active in lobbying against SB85 included Colgate-Palmolive, Johnson & 
Johnson, Singer, Allegheny International, Reynolds Metals, and Goodyear.
381
However, legislators argued that an exclusion for foreign dividends would 
encourage U.S. companies to invest overseas instead of domestically, and that state taxes 
play a relatively minor role in MNE investment location decisions in any case. They 
stated U.S. MNEs would not necessarily be at a disadvantage to foreign MNEs, since 
foreign MNEs often faced taxes in their home countries on dividends they received from 
their U.S. subsidiaries. They further argued that dividend payments are often used as 
surrogates for interest, royalty payments, and reductions in the cost of goods sold, 
particularly from overseas. Thus, to measure income accurately and prevent accounting 
manipulations to avoid taxation, foreign dividends must be taxed as income. In any case, 
the federal definition of water’s edge income included foreign dividends, and any double 
taxation of foreign subsidiaries would be partially alleviated by the federal foreign tax 
credit, which allowed an 85% deduction; therefore, exempting foreign dividends from 
state taxation would duplicate federal efforts. At the time, roughly two-thirds of U.S. 
states included at least some foreign-source dividends in the tax base of U.S. parent 
corporations, making this type of taxation the state norm.
Domestic MNEs were seen as unwilling to compromise in their continued 
insistence on a 100% exclusion of their foreign-sourced dividends from the water’s edge 
method, and some of the original allies of U.S. MNEs on this issue, such as Assemblyman 
Dennis Brown (R-Long Beach), Tom Hannigan (D-Fairfield), and Senate Republican 
leader Jim Nielsen, grew frustrated with their intransigence. The California Business 
Council therefore concentrated on killing the unitary reform bill because they knew it 
would be extremely difficult to get a 100% dividend exclusion when Governor 
Deukmejian and Senate President Pro Tern David Roberti (D-LA) opposed it as both 
expensive and an encouragement to U.S. firms to export jobs overseas.1
1 Interview #25.
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Appendix 10: 80/20 Companies
80/20 companies are those with extensive overseas operations which only conduct 
the minimum 20% of their business in the U.S. necessary to maintain their U.S. 
incorporation: this affords them U.S. legal protection, particularly for royalty payments on 
intellectual property rights. Many felt California should not include 80/20 companies in 
its definition of water’s edge income because, under U.S. federal law, any U.S. company 
with more than 80% of its business overseas had its income treated as if it were all 
foreign-sourced, and was therefore subject to foreign tax credits. However, U.S. 80/20 
corporations argued their substantial overseas subsidiaries should be excluded from 
California’s water’s edge definition so that they would be on an equal playing field with 
their main competitors, foreign-incorporated firms, whose subsidiaries were not being 
included in California’s water’s edge definition.
The California Franchise Tax Board, however, argued that excluding the 
subsidiaries of 80/20 companies from the water’s edge definition would make it 
problematic to audit their activities, as the federal government did not conduct full 
corporate audits of 80/20 subsidiaries. The U.S. Internal Revenue Service was only 
moderately concerned with auditing the inner-group transactions of 80/20 companies, 
because any shifting of tax burdens within such a group would have no effect on the 
overall tax liability of the group. The states argued that if they did not police these inner- 
company transactions, no one would, and the 20% of activities these companies 
conducted within the U.S. would not be properly audited. Corporations argued the IRS 
would audit these transactions for the purpose of limiting foreign tax credits. However, 
this type of audit does not typically result in any adjustment of income between the 
entities of the consolidated group. 80/20 companies argued that excluding them from 
using the water’s edge method was a heavy price to pay for what was essentially an 
administrative problem.
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This conflict arose because California used a company's ‘place of incorporation’ 
as the criterion for determining which firms were to be combined for apportionment, 
irrespective of whether they operated in the U.S., instead of the 'place of business’ 
criterion, which is based on where a corporation's business operations are primarily 
conducted geographically.
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Appendix 11: Mandatory vs. Optional Worldwide Combination
Although most U.S. companies wanted to use the water’s edge method, during the 
debate leading up to California’s 1986 unitary reform legislation, several large U.S. 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) were in favour of legislation offering companies the 
choice of filing under the WWC or water’s edge methods, since they paid lower taxes in 
California by using the worldwide combined (WWC) method. Standard Oil, IBM, and 
Procter & Gamble were all in favour of an election, and the California Chamber of 
Commerce supported the election in an attempt to find common ground for the business 
community. Although few in number, these companies were economically powerful, and 
they had the support of key legislators.1 The election option was therefore included in 
most of the legislative efforts to reform the WWC method, even though it raised the cost 
of the bill considerably.2
The California Business Council (CBC) and the Committee on State Taxation 
(COST), however, were both in favour of an outright prohibition on the WWC method, 
not an election. These groups thought that pressing for an election was too risky, since it 
would raise the price of the reform bill. In addition, they felt that asking the legislature to 
allow companies to use the WWC method would make it that much more difficult for 
them to argue that worldwide combination was an unfair method. The California 
Franchise Tax Board (FTB) remained adamantly opposed to giving companies a choice, 
since they felt this violated correct tax principles and would promote tax evasion. The 
FTB attached very large revenue loss estimates to an election: in June 25, 1986, the FTB 
estimated that allowing taxpayers to choose between the two assessment methods would 
raise the cost of SB85 by $280 million.
1 Interview #42.
2 Ibid.
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Appendix 12: U.S. Internal Revenue Service Revisions to the 
Arm’s Length Standard
In 1988, the Treasury and IRS issued a draft “White Paper” outlining transfer 
pricing regulations that let multinational enterprises choose one of the following methods 
(ranked in order of preference) to allocate income from intangible goods: 1) exact 
comparables; 2) inexact comparables; 3) the Basic Arm’s Length Rate of Return 
(BALRM, or “ballroom”) method; 4) BALRM plus profit split. BALRM divides a firm’s 
overall profit between the company’s tangible and intangible goods by estimating the 
‘correct’ market rate of return for the firm’s factors of production. Any remaining income 
would then be allocated to the owner of the intangible good. If both company units 
involved in a transaction owned intangible goods, the profit split method would then be 
used to split the income from intangible goods according to the “relative value of the 
intangibles of each party”.1
1 Muchlinski, 1995, p. 292.
Appendix 13: Threatened U.S. Subfederal Sanctions Over 
Holocaust Survivor Claims on Swiss Banks
In 1998, a coalition of U.S. local and state finance officers threatened sanctions 
against Swiss banks over the issue of asset claims against these banks by Holocaust 
survivors and their heirs. New York City’s comptroller organised a network of nearly 900 
city and state treasurers and pension-fund controllers, who announced that, pending a 
satisfactory settlement of claims by Jewish groups, their members would implement a 
phased-in schedule of economic sanctions, first against Swiss banks, and eventually 
against other Swiss enterprises. Such sanctions included plans to “stop placing overnight 
deposits in Swiss banks in September 1998; prohibit new pension fund money- 
management contracts with, and trading through, Swiss banks in mid-November; cancel 
existing fund-management contracts with Swiss banks and seek legislation to exclude 
Swiss companies from state procurement bids in January 1999; and sell all Swiss 
company stocks held in public pension funds by mid-1999”.1
Further pressure came when the New York state banking department threatened to 
delay an operating license for the proposed merger of the Union Bank of Switzerland and 
the Swiss Bank Corporation. However, “New York’s regulators relented and allowed the 
merger to proceed after receiving assurances through a U.S. government official that the 
banks were willing to increase their settlement offer”.2 Mediation by the U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of State and a federal district court judge led to an out-of-court agreement for a 
substantial settlement with Holocaust survivors. In early 1999, similar pressures were 
directed against Germany to compensate workers enslaved by the Nazi regime during 
World War n. The push to create a German reparations fund reportedly came after 
Deutsche Bank’s proposed merger with Banker’s Trust in the U.S. “appeared threatened 
with state and local regulatory objections similar to those posed in the Swiss bank case”.3
1 Kline, 1999, p. 123.
2 Ibid., p. 124.
3 Ibid., p. 131.
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Chart 1: California General Fund Revenues, 1983-1994
1983 % of 
total
1984 %of
total
1985 % of 
total
1986 %of
total
Personal Income Tax 7,912.7 37.3% 10,016.2 40.5% 12,021.5 40.8% 12,021.5 41.4%
Bank and Corporation Tax 2,876.8 13.5% 3,414.1 13.8% 4,219.9 13.9% 4,219.9 14.5%
Subtotal collected by FTB 10,789.5 50.8% 13,430.3 54.3% 16,241.4 54.7% 16,241.4 56.0%
Retail Sales and Use Tax 7,959.5 37.5% 9,165.2 37.0% 10,057.5 36.3% 10,057.5 34.7%
Estate, Gift and Inheritance Tax 337.8 1.6% 283.2 1.1% 273.2 0.9% 273.2 0.9%
Insurance Company Tax 715.3 3.4% 480.0 1.9% 828.4 2.9% 828.4 2.9%
Cigarette Tax 177.3 0.8% 184.4 0.7% 183.3 0.7% 183.3 0.6%
Alcoholic Beverage Excise Tax 136.9 0.6% 137.4 0.6% 133.4 0.5% 133.4 0.5%
Horse Racing Fees 112.3 0.5% 113.9 0.5% 121.4 0.4% 121.4 0.4%
Other Revenues Plus Interest 1,012.1 4.8% 952.4 3.9% 1,181.2 3.9% 1,181.2 4.1%
on Investments
Subtotal 10,451.2 49.2% 11,316.5 45.7% 12,778.5 45.3% 12,778.5 44.1%
GRAND TOTAL 21,240.7 100.0% 24,746.8 100.0% 29,020.0 100.0% 29,020.0 100.0%
Chart 1 (continued):
1987 % of 
total
1988 % of
total
1989 %of
total
1990 % of
total
Personal Income Tax 14,596.9 43.5% 14,379.9 41.8% 16,326.9 43.3% 17,219.3 43.9%
Bank and Corporation Tax 4,999.5 14.9% 5,073.9 14.7% 5,147.3 13.7% 4,768.9 12.2%
Subtotal collected by FTB 19,596.4 58.4% 19,453.8 56.5% 21,474.2 57.0% 21,988.2 56.1%
Retail Sales and Use Tax 11,114.7 33.1% 11,907.7 34.6% 12,984.6 34.5% 13,851.7 35.4%
Estate, Gift and Inheritance Tax 253.5 0.8% 406.0 1.2% 350.9 0.9% 427.1 1.1%
Insurance Company Tax 1,087.8 3.2% 1,208.2 3.5% 1,268.8 3.4% 1,219.3 3.1%
Cigarette Tax 176.6 0.5% 174.1 0.5% 153.1 0.4% 149.9 0.4%
Alcoholic Beverage Excise Tax 130.2 0.4% 131.5 0.4% 127.6 0.3% 131.6 0.3%
Horse Racing Fees 105.1 0.3% 109.8 0.3% 111.7 0.3% 112.4 0.3%
Other Revenues Plus Interest 1,100.5 3.3% 1,018.6 3.0% 1,220.0 3.2% 1,301.9 3.3%
on Investments
Subtotal 13,968.4 41.6% 14,955.9 43.5% 16,216.7 43.0% 17,193.8 43.9%
GRAND TOTAL 33,564.8 100.0% 34,409.7 100.0% 37,690.9 100.0% 39,182.0 100.0%
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Chart 1 (continued):
1991 %of
total
1992 % of
total
1993 % of
total
1994 %of
total
Personal Income Tax 17,024.7 43.4% 17,427.7 43.4% 17,497.6 43.4% 17,468.6 43.9%
Bank and Corporation Tax 4,215.9 10.7% 4,482.6 11.1% 4,967.1 12.3% 4,962.7 12.5%
Subtotal collected by FTB 21,240.6 54.2% 21,910.3 54.5% 22,464.7 55.7% 22,431.3 56.3%
Retail Sales and Use Tax 14,196.7 36.2% 15,143.7 37.7% 14,509.8 35.9% 14,068.6 35.3%
Estate, Gift and Inheritance Tax 497.0 1.3% 469.4 1.2% 244.0 1.2% 520.4 1.3%
Insurance Company Tax 1,312.3 3.3% 1,144.1 2.8% 118.2 2.9% 1,135.2 2.9%
Cigarette Tax 156.7 0.4% 159.7 0.4% 188.8 0.5% 173.6 0.4%
Alcoholic Beverage Excise Tax 212.8 0.5% 297.5 0.7% 283.8 0.7% 280.7 0.7%
Horse Racing Fees 96.6 0.2% 84.9 0.2% 76.4 0.2% 76.0 0.2%
Other Revenues Plus Interest 1,508.9 3.8% 972.9 2.4% 1,414.1 2.8% 1,140.2 2.9%
on Investments
Subtotal 17,981.0 45.8% 18,272.2 45.5% 17,862.4 44.3% 17,394.6 43.7
GRAND TOTAL 39,221.5 100.0% 40,182.5 100.0% 40,330.1 100.0% 39,825.9 100.0%
Source: Franchise Tax Board, annual reports, 1983-1994.
Chart 2: California Bank and Corporation Tax Apportionment Formula
1982
Amount (000)
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Total Property Values 
Within and without the state 3,084,553,192 2,991,501,533 7,813,058,607 7,148,229,659 9,525,832,946 8,893,399,307
Within the state 506,472,399 513,741,050 748,576,585 909,204,245 1,039,593,686 1,191,456,763
Statewide average 16.4% 17.2% 9.6% 12.7% 10.9% 13.4%
Total Wages and Salaries 
Within and without the state 613,486,790 662,732,825 674,182,136 740,964,248 1,045,106,351 1,190,062,717
Within the state 79,265,899 83,040,165 95,239,091 104,742,462 123,244,122 151,768,187
Statewide average 12.9% 12.5% 14.1% 14.1% 11.8% 12.8%
Total Sales 
Within and without the state 2,787,581,607 3,411,509,773 3,867,944,177 7,968,907,447 18,407,411,184 22,423,227,741
Within the state 333,687,658 408,097,089 509,214,639 687,077,086 1,031,758,144 1,295,410,939
Statewide average 12.0% 12.0% 13.2% 8.6% 5.6% 5.8%
Source: Franchise Tax Board, annual reports, 1982-1992.
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Chart 3: California Gross State Product, selected years
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
1980 1985 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Total Gross State Product $327,907 $528,950 $798,237 $830,950 $878,124 $971,777 $1,118,945
Private industries 283,675 461,749 702,293 725,995 768,693 857,510 994,268
Agriculture, forestry, fish 9,442 11,014 16,354 16,511 18,341 19,567 20,900
Farms 7,243 7,657 10,344 10,037 11,246 11,787 11,645
Agricultural services 2,199 3,357 6,010 6,474 7,095 7,781 9,255
Mining 6,676 8,742 6,384 4,320 3,903 5,168 4,337
Metal mining 103 190 287 282 251 216 126
Coal mining a/ a/ 1 1 1 1 1
Oil & gas 6,134 8,067 5,396 3,383 2,863 4,058 3,106
Nonmetallic minerals 440 484 700 654 788 894 1,104
Construction 16,263 24,707 35,820 28,392 29,767 32,927 41,390
Manufacturing 58,847 85,922 118,016 116,068 119,740 134,669 154,608
Durable goods 38,477 58,633 77,483 71,666 74,344 86,785 103,277
Lumber & wood 2,122 2,192 3,266 2,680 2,953 2,727 3,105
Furniture and fixtures 1,073 1,529 1,697 1,693 1,634 2,010 2,762
Stone, clay, glass 1,747 2,125 2,699 2,352 2,551 2,561 3,382
Primary metals 2,070 1,581 1,951 1,493 1,751 2,161 2,307
Fabricated metals 4,355 5,765 6,209 5,648 6,297 7,222 8,300
Industrial machinery 6,909 8,941 16,110 16,303 15,656 19,527 24,980
Electronic equipment 9,882 18,917 17,923 17,037 19,364 25,248 29,506
Motor vehicles 1,034 1,542 1,214 1,328 3,109 2,573 2,926
Other transport, equip. 6,097 10,967 13,510 10,030 8,663 7,672 8,293
Instruments and related 2,126 3,685 10,762 11,211 9,853 12,169 14,093
Misc. manufacturing 1,062 1,386 2,142 1,890 2,515 2,915 3,623
Nondurable goods 20,371 27,290 40,533 44,401 45,395 47,884 51,331
Food & kindred products 6,331 8,179 12,447 13,437 12,604 13,275 13,763
Tobacco products 6 1 2 2 2 2 7
Textile mill products 318 423 606 629 712 736 1,003
Apparel & textile 1,659 2,364 3,564 4,043 4,316 4,599 4,592
Paper products 1,295 1,880 2,341 2,566 2,484 2,666 2,667
Printing & publishing 3,339 5,251 8,235 8,923 8,806 9,592 10,486
Chemicals 2,333 3,426 5,662 6,844 8,505 7,942 8,567
Petroleum products 3,476 3,681 4,690 5,079 4,661 5,446 6,194
Rubber & plastics 1,402 1,922 2,775 2,679 3,110 3,436 3,817
Leather products 212 163 211 200 196 189 235
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Chart 3 (continued):
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
1980 1985 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Transportation & utilities 24,659 40,629 56,715 57,898 65,132 70,419 81,756
Transportation 10,455 15,096 20,398 21,775 24,589 26,530 30,938
Railroad transportation 1,109 1,276 1,149 1,011 1,029 948 1,064
Local & interurban 511 763 992 1,240 1,296 1,464 1,828
Trucking & warehousing 3,964 5,857 7,161 7,390 8,551 9,123 10,741
Water transportation 723 1,182 1,591 1,562 1,701 1,945 2,187
Transportation by air 3,009 3,501 6,175 6,929 8,124 8,865 10,457
Pipelines, excl. nat. gas 67 153 188 204 230 267 283
Transportation services 1,073 2,364 3,142 3,439 3,657 3,918 4,379
Communications 8,403 14,326 18,326 19,574 22,650 25,473 31,214
Electric, gas & sanitary 5,800 11,206 17,991 16,549 17,893 18,416 19,603
Wholesale trade 23,699 37,366 52,158 56,102 61,644 67,927 77,932
Retail trade 33,005 53,062 72,153 76,425 80,984 89,058 102,726
F.I.R.E. 56,563 103,222 179,310 187,715 194,523 213,898 249,999
Depository institutions 6,867 11,772 24,819 23,924 21,901 23,496 28,825
Nondepository institution 1,022 3,179 3,620 4,159 4,137 4,875 10,601
Security brokers 1,189 2,755 4,038 5,069 6,832 9,525 11,811
Insurance carriers 3,957 3,731 7,662 9,780 11,522 12,294 14,458
Insurance agents 1,692 2,918 5,354 5,373 5,975 6,186 6,826
Real estate 41,427 76,711 133,141 138,618 143,245 156,719 174,832
Holding and investment 409 2,155 678 792 912 803 2,645
Services 54,522 97,085 165,382 182,564 194,658 223,877 260,620
Hotels & lodging 2,271 3,673 5,920 6,166 6,296 7,011 8,227
Personal services 2,213 3,557 5,404 5,836 6,343 6,601 7,284
Business services 11,802 24,149 34,682 37,098 43,172 57,018 73,256
Auto repair & parking 2,978 5,524 8,078 8,308 8,939 10,068 11,203
Misc. repair services 1,529 2,330 3,006 3,125 3,258 3,549 3,929
Motion pictures 3,249 5,836 9,517 9,322 10,248 13,072 14,757
Amusement and recreation 2,337 4,166 7,455 9,369 8,531 9,944 11,632
Health services 14,189 23,847 39,201 46,203 47,337 49,537 53,209
Legal services 3,161 6,621 13,210 14,765 13,970 14,236 16,553
Educational services 1,754 2,730 4,026 4,917 5,593 6,192 7,103
Social services 1,029 1,745 3,363 4,213 4,826 5,375 6,221
Membership organisations 1,973 2,718 4,249 4,582 4,948 5,107 5,510
Other services 5,227 8,939 25,430 26,649 29,001 33,800 38,952
Private households 811 1,249 1,839 2,012 2,196 2,366 2,784
Government 44,232 67,201 95,944 104,955 109,431 114,267 124,677
Federal civilian 8,345 12,384 16,201 18,382 19,096 19,058 19,954
Federal military 6,289 11,160 12,842 13,496 11,803 10,894 10,418
State and local 29,598 43,657 66,901 73,077 78,532 84,315 94,305
Electronic equip. + Instr. 12,009 22,603 28,686 28,248 29,217 37,418 43,599
Depository + Nondepository 7,888 14,951 28,438 28,083 26,038 28,371 39,426
Business serv. + Other serv. 17,028 33,088 60,112 63,747 72,173 90,818 112,208
a/Less than $500,000.
Source: Bureau o f Economic Analysis, U.S. Department o f Commerce.
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Chart 4: U.S. State Export Totals to the World
(thousands o f U.S. dollars)
% change
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1993-99
Alabama 2,504,344 3,115,364 3,587,068 3,702,427 4,537,234 4,560,189 4,898,862 95.6%
Alaska 817,873 887,672 891,543 850,416 969,016 758,508 949,966 16.2%
Arizona 5,785,148 6,970,648 8,402,790 9,937,766 13,556,747 10,752,998 10,123,011 75.0%
Arkansas 1,109,771 1,470,852 1,794,446 1,997,220 2,211,589 1,934,109 1,828,873 64.8%
California 68,066,344 78,190,359 92,038,424 98,633,998 103,802,450 98,809,033 102,863,848 51.1%
Colorado 6,214,809 7,802,107 9,688,769 10,064,946 11,329,185 10,733,342 11,171,162 79.8%
Connecticut 10,200,971 10,272,016 12,942,121 13,052,470 12,897,120 12,139,749 11,335,139 11.1%
Delaware 3,454,507 3,758,073 4,396,791 4,584,498 5,103,884 4,968,559 4,856,835 40.6%
D.C. 4,702,087 5,150,744 5,323,519 5,084,786 4,880,984 4,392,398 4,344,494 -7.6%
Florida 14,695,824 16,559,218 18,564,439 19,618,195 22,888,599 23,172,624 22,544,211 53.4%
Georgia 6,050,133 7,108,082 8,626,786 8,617,989 9,810,037 11,212,056 11,060,577 82.8%
Hawaii 216,771 237,398 255,686 295,176 303,166 211,372 243,506 12.3%
Idaho 1,235,896 1,530,506 1,892,550 1,610,103 1,716,069 1,459,982 2,116,580 71.3%
Illinois 20,347,213 24,534,201 30,478,211 32,224,851 34,225,044 33,838,066 30,856,534 51.6%
Indiana 8,445,190 9,533,979 11,051,969 12,119,025 13,097,315 13,949,086 14,583,916 72.7%
Iowa 1,955,741 2,331,362 2,577,824 2,695,060 3,116,724 3,411,725 2,985,168 52.6%
Kansas 3,109,413 3,498,265 4,461,452 4,971,283 5,133,178 4,402,843 4,856,336 56.2%
Kentucky 3,325,866 4,188,243 5,030,113 5,824,244 6,904,058 7,439,971 8,016,157 141.0%
Louisiana 3,220,327 3,576,895 4,580,707 4,730,822 4,373,491 4,391,867 3,947,304 22.6%
Maine 1,065,258 1,138,928 1,318,192 1,248,775 1,590,154 1,664,342 1,785,203 67.6%
Maryland 2,713,706 2,848,462 3,438,959 3,509,925 3,860,975 4,013,739 4,068,263 49.9%
Mass. 11,593,997 12,585,960 14,396,358 15,368,409 17,368,057 16,467,254 1,710,584 47.5%
Michigan 25,322,490 36,812,120 37,102,347 38,128,161 37,920,065 39,268,759 41,489,947 63.8%
Minnesota 9,974,369 10,011,066 12,404,328 13,884,051 13,793,273 13,499,436 14,400,804 44.4%
Mississippi 803,332 1,099,868 1,368,686 1,221,668 1,421,336 1,414,043 1,454,289 81.0%
Missouri 4,733,284 5,234,843 5,689,949 6,590,489 7,043,043 6,832,445 7,431,059 57.0%
Montana 243,265 259,954 279,190 340,869 429,822 390,025 403,999 66.1%
Nebraska 1,740,700 1,957,906 2,255,255 2,452,813 2,493,682 2,471,576 1,991,417 14.4%
Nevada 503,892 458,481 711,116 691,564 807,116 764,851 1,083,386 115.0%
New Hamp. 1,134,867 1,247,913 1,478,627 1,744,875 1,930,984 1,986,545 2,159,090 90.3%
New Jersey 14,540,560 16,760,765 18,368,587 18,458,394 20,815,367 20,032,935 21,007,591 44.5%
New Mexico 400,036 488,455 426,578 917,395 1,779,860 1,896,156 2,964,882 641.2%
New York 40,702,259 37,259,709 44,080,108 44,964,741 48,885,277 45,564,469 43,296,774 6.4%
N. Carolina 7,976,373 8,968,847 10,567,424 11,586,603 13,102,101 12,919,909 13,571,377 70.1%
N. Dakota 343,707 388,870 488,594 576,232 623,085 657,417 634,608 84.6%
Ohio 17,651,364 19,478,217 20,926,490 22,555,189 25,106,457 24,814,804 26,561,694 50.5%
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Chart 4 (continued):
(thousands o f U.S. dollars)
%
change
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1993-99
Oklahoma 2,334,587 2,171,959 2,467,324 2,537,565 2,721,629 2,623,241 2,405,277 3.0%
Oregon 6,204,733 6,987,407 9,902,084 8,481,327 8,358,568 8,143,544 11,164,311 79.9%
Penn. 13,189,649 14,698,634 17,680,205 17,445,572 19,298,414 19,138,811 19,527,654 48.1%
Rhode Island 938,387 1,011,548 956,796 954,826 1,126,500 1,113,086 1,104,714 17.7%
S. Carolina 3,219,519 3,510,116 4,497,870 4,924,922 5,673,836 5,856,943 6,476,471 101.2%
S. Dakota 213,811 263,888 348,556 397,332 435,264 373,541 1,143,374 434.8%
Tennessee 6,151,139 7,506,236 9,460,530 9,328,342 9,916,912 9,872,507 9,342,655 51.9%
Texas 35,622,483 40,488,977 45,192,646 48,252,054 56,292,938 59,029,288 61,705,632 73.2%
Utah 2,045,015 2,233,076 2,313,412 2,768,491 3,293,330 3,099,397 2,789,300 -10.0%
Vermont 2,276,004 2,304,297 2,683,579 2,610,829 2,592,089 2,757,708 2,826,650 24.2%
Virginia 8,118,380 9,947,272 10,425,230 10,925,992 11,512,427 11,459,928 10,722,377 32.1%
Washington 27,397,726 25,062,327 22,032,006 25,498,048 31,745,600 37,960,354 36,825,865 34.4%
W. Virginia 754,077 940,642 1,097,937 1,217,925 1,298,817 1,178,228 897,100 19.0%
Wisconsin 5,810,366 6,927,927 8,004,453 8,409,713 9,791,517 9,221,445 9,546,275 64.3%
Wyoming 88,509 95,377 101,206 123,684 175,916 158,404 155,760 76.0%
Puerto Rico 4,365,071 4,618,897 4,704,505 5,188,399 5,528,117 6,126,535 7,893,586 80.8%
Virgin Islands 162,125 158,046 228,591 192,405 242,722 114,478 180,857 11.6%
Unallocated 39,065,166 35,772,636 39,047,625 48,714,210 57,766,857 55,048,520 53,120,060 36.0%
Source: Prepared by Office o f Trade and Economic Analysis, International Trade Administration,
Department o f Commerce. From the Exporter Location Series, U.S. Census Bureau.
Chart 5: International Container Port Rankings
Port TEUs
1 Hong Kong 11,265,984
2 Singapore 10,600,000
3 Long Beach/LA 5,091,845
4 Rotterdam 4,899,879
5 Kaohsiung 4,500,000
6 Busan 3,754,000
7 Kobe 2,787,000
8 Hamburg 2,725,715
9 Yokohama 2,390,629
10 Antwerp 2,250,000
11 New York/NJ 2,169,961
TEUs: Twenty-foot equivalent units
Source: Containerized International and Port Development International
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Chart 6: Top-Rated Graduate Schools in Sciences
Top-Rated Graduate Schools in Science
Biochemistry & Molecular Biology Neurosciences
1 UC-San Francisco 1 UC-San Diego
2 MIT 2 Yale
3 Stanford 3 Harvard
4 UC-Berkeley 4 UC-San Francisco
5 Harvard 5 Stanford
6 Yale 6 Columbia
7 Cal Tech 7 John Hopkins
8 Wisconsin 8 Washington
9 UC-San Diego 9 UC-Berkeley
10 Johns Hopkins/Columbia 10 Cal Tech/Rockefeller U.
Bold denotes school in California
Source: National Research Council, New York Times, 9/13/95.
C hart 7: Percentage of State Population with Some College Education
California 31%
New York 30%
Texas 26%
Florida 25%
North Carolina 24%
Michigan 24%
Source: U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Social and Economic Characteristics, 
1990 Census o f Population and Housing.
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Chart 8: Foreign Trade Through California Ports, 1983 to 1999
(in millions o f  U.S. dollars)
Year Exports Imports Total
1983 29,380 37,944 67,324
1984 32,204 49,270 81,474
1985 32,396 61,606 94,002
1986 32,838 69,875 102,713
1987 39,663 78,478 118,141
1988 53,568 86,605 140,173
1989 63,049 94,080 157,129
1990 68,552 97,122 165,673
1991 73,860 100,744 174,604
1992 81,139 111,548 192,687
1993 82,174 125,348 207,522
1994 95,615 144,002 239,617
1995 116,825 165,045 281,870
1996 124,120 169,981 294,101
1997 131,143 184,684 315,826
1998 116,282 189,943 306,226
1999 122,093 209,025 331,118
Note: D ata reflect value o f  trade through California customs districts and not value o f  exported goods 
originating in California or imported goods destined fo r  California.
Source: U.S. Department o f  Commerce, Department o f  the Census.
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Chart 9: Affiliate Employment and Gross Book Value from Foreign Investment,
California and the U.S.
Employment Gobs) Gross Book Value
U.S. California % U.S. U.S. $ (millions) California % U.S.
1982 2,448,062 249,049 10.2 225,235 25,240 11.2
1983 2,546,514 255,551 10.0 244,012 27,601 11.3
1984 2,714,295 274,424 10.1 269,462 31,517 11.7
1985 2,862,153 298,796 10.4 295,181 35,323 12.0
1986 2,937,900 289,171 9.8 320,215 38,321 12.0
1987 3,224,300 334,900 10.4 353,278 44,275 12.5
1988 3,844,200 407,100 10.5 418,069 52,411 12.5
1989 4,511,500 514,900 11.4 489,461 63,706 13.0
1990 4,735,000 555,900 11.7 578,355 75,768 13.1
1991 4,872,200 561,100 11.5 634,688 81,842 12.9
1992 4,706,000 521,500 11.1 660,817 81,067 12.7
Source: State o f  California, “Foreign D irect Investment In California”. Novem ber 1994, p.7.
Chart 10: Affiliate Employment and Gross Book Value from Foreign Investment,
Top Ten States in 1992
Employment (jobs) Gross Book Value
($ millions)
Rank State Rank State
1 California 521,800 1 California 84,067
2 New York 340,000 2 Texas 61,341
3 Texas 324,400 3 New York 43,184
4 Illinois 246,400 4 Illinois 27,680
5 New Jersey 216,300 5 Ohio 24,536
6 Ohio 212,600 6 New Jersey 21,888
7 Pennsylvania 215,300 7 Florida 21,758
8 Florida 1,984,900 8 Alaska 20,946
9 North Carolina 191,300 9 Louisiana 20,757
10 Georgia 154,300 10 Georgia 19,116
All other states 2,088,200 All other states 315,544
Total 4,705,500 Total 660,817
Source: State o f  California, “Foreign D irect Investment In California”. Novem ber 1994, p.6.
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Figure 1
Affiiliate Book Value of Foreign Investment, 
California as a Percent of the U.S. in 1992
All Industries 
Manufacturing 
Retail Trade 
Wholesale Trade 
Services 
Real Estate
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Source: State of California, "Foreign Direct Investment in California", 
November 1994, p. 7.
' I ' " I ' ' f ' r' "r'f~ ^ T
Figure 2
Defense Share of Manufacturing Jobs 
in California
1960 1972 1990 1995
Source: California Employment Development Department
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Figure 3
Fastest Growing High Tech Manufacturers
CA MA MN NY TX PA AZ CT NH NJ WA 
Source: World Trade Magazine, 1995
Figure 4
California Total Nonfarm Employment, 1990-Aug. 96
(jobs in thousands)
12,800 -i
12,600 -
12,400
12,200
12,000
Jan-90 Jan-91 Jan-92 Jan-93 Jan-94 Jan-95
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Jan-96
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Chart 11: Median Income of Households by State
State 1994-1996
United States $34,911
Alaska $50,060
California $38,106
Colorado $40,971
Connecticut $43,353
Hawaii $43,541
Illinois $38,630
Maryland $42,582
Massachusetts $40,695
Michigan $38,027
Minnesota $38,554
New Hampshire $39,016
New Jersey $45,817
Virginia $38,787
Wisconsin $39,877
Source: U.S. Bureau o f  the Census, March 1997 Current Population Survey.
Chart 12: Total Personal Income in California
Year California
Personal
Income
Percent
Change
(millions o f$ )
1980 281,589 13.7%
1981 315,375 12.0%
1982 336,098 6.6%
1983 361,589 7.6%
1984 402,979 11.4%
1985 436,898 8.4%
1988 548,302 8.6%
1989 590,962 7.8%
1990 639,298 8.2%
1991 653,172 2.2%
1992 684,674 4.8%
1993 698,130 2.0%
1994 718,321 2.9%
1995 754,787 5.1%
1996 798,580 5.8%
1997 846,839 6.0%
Source: Bureau o f  Economic Analysis, U.S. Department o f  Commerce.
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Chart 13: Gross State Products (GSP)
(millions o f current U.S. dollars)
STATE 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
U.S. Total 3,446,583 3,866,334 4,151,449 4,355,877 4,683,245 5,092,174
A labam a 4 5 , 1 1 6 4 9 , 7 4 1 5 3 , 5 8 5 5 6 , 0 3 0 6 0 , 7 2 2 6 5 , 7 4 8
A la s k a 2 2 , 2 5 3 2 3 , 5 5 8 2 5 , 8 7 0 1 8 , 6 3 6 2 2 , 0 2 4 2 1 , 3 5 3
A r iz o n a 3 8 , 2 5 2 4 4 , 4 7 1 4 9 , 2 6 1 5 4 , 6 1 5 5 8 , 9 9 6 6 3 , 3 2 8
A r k a n sa s 2 4 , 9 7 6 2 8 , 2 6 8 2 9 , 1 3 4 3 0 , 4 3 0 3 2 , 3 3 8 3 4 , 6 0 2
California 425,811 484,068 528,950 567,025 624,022 684,452
C o lo r a d o 5 0 , 4 8 4 5 6 , 0 1 3 5 9 , 0 3 4 5 9 , 9 1 4 6 3 , 3 4 6 6 6 , 7 2 0
C o n n e c t ic u t 5 3 , 9 2 5 6 1 , 1 4 3 6 6 , 5 4 0 7 2 , 8 3 2 8 1 , 4 1 1 8 9 , 7 0 7
D e la w a r e 1 0 , 4 0 9 1 1 , 6 6 2 1 3 , 0 2 1 1 4 , 0 9 9 1 5 , 7 5 6 1 7 , 1 2 0
D i s t r i c t  o f  C o l 2 4 , 3 1 8 2 6 , 4 2 0 2 8 , 3 8 4 3 0 , 0 3 7 3 2 , 3 9 8 3 5 , 6 2 2
F l o r i d a 1 3 9 , 6 1 7 1 5 8 , 5 4 7 1 7 3 , 2 8 1 1 8 7 , 8 7 0 2 0 6 , 9 7 4 2 2 6 , 9 0 5
G e o r g ia 7 7 , 3 2 9 8 9 , 3 7 3 9 9 , 1 9 9 1 0 8 , 7 7 7 1 1 7 , 8 0 3 1 2 7 , 5 4 7
H a w a ii 1 6 , 9 0 4 1 8 , 5 4 1 1 9 , 9 8 3 2 1 , 5 2 5 2 3 , 4 0 4 2 6 , 0 0 7
Id a h o 1 1 , 5 8 0 1 2 , 4 8 3 1 2 , 9 7 9 1 3 , 0 8 3 1 3 , 8 1 4 1 5 , 0 3 6
I l l i n o i s 1 7 2 , 2 5 0 1 9 3 , 1 7 8 2 0 6 , 2 9 9 2 1 8 , 3 8 1 2 3 2 , 3 1 2 2 5 0 , 7 7 7
I n d ia n a 6 7 , 9 9 1 7 7 , 6 0 0 8 1 , 2 7 4 8 5 , 7 9 9 9 2 , 1 7 4 9 9 , 4 7 5
Iow a 3 6 , 9 3 9 4 1 , 4 6 4 4 2 , 8 5 1 4 3 , 5 5 0 4 5 , 6 4 6 4 9 , 2 1 0
K a n sa s 3 4 , 8 4 4 3 8 , 1 5 8 4 0 , 6 0 7 4 1 , 4 1 8 4 4 , 1 3 4 4 6 , 3 9 6
K e n tu c k y 4 3 , 1 9 6 4 8 , 9 0 5 5 1 , 5 9 2 5 3 , 4 5 2 5 6 , 7 2 7 6 1 , 1 2 4
L o u is ia n a 7 7 , 7 8 8 8 3 , 8 2 9 8 5 , 1 0 4 7 6 , 1 9 7 7 7 , 0 4 6 8 3 , 7 3 1
M aine 1 3 , 1 2 8 1 4 , 8 4 0 1 6 , 0 7 1 1 7 , 4 5 4 1 9 , 3 5 1 2 1 , 6 6 6
M a ry la n d 6 1 , 8 3 6 6 9 , 7 2 2 7 6 , 9 8 9 8 4 , 1 1 1 9 2 , 4 8 0 1 0 2 , 6 8 6
M a s s a c h u s e t t s 9 0 , 9 0 0 1 0 3 , 9 4 8 1 1 5 , 1 1 0 1 2 6 , 0 3 1 1 3 9 , 5 3 3 1 5 2 , 3 0 4
M ic h ig a n 1 2 4 , 9 0 2 1 4 0 , 8 8 6 1 5 1 , 2 0 2 1 6 1 , 0 0 5 1 6 7 , 5 1 8 1 7 8 , 0 6 8
M in n e s o ta 6 0 , 5 8 6 6 9 , 8 7 0 7 4 , 3 9 1 7 7 , 8 5 3 8 3 , 9 2 0 9 0 , 0 7 0
M i s s i s s i p p i 2 6 , 2 0 5 2 9 , 2 3 1 3 0 , 6 5 1 3 1 , 4 3 3 3 3 , 8 3 9 3 6 , 0 1 0
M is s o u r i 6 6 , 4 8 7 7 6 , 0 3 9 7 9 , 5 7 5 8 5 , 0 3 4 9 0 , 4 2 2 9 7 , 1 9 3
M ontana 1 0 , 6 7 7 1 1 , 2 5 6 1 1 , 2 1 1 1 1 , 2 5 7 1 1 , 6 2 9 1 1 , 8 8 7
N e b r a sk a 2 1 , 2 8 8 2 4 , 2 6 1 2 5 , 5 8 9 2 5 , 9 7 1 2 6 , 9 4 4 2 9 , 1 4 7
N evad a 1 5 , 3 1 6 1 6 , 9 0 8 1 8 , 4 1 7 2 0 , 0 3 0 2 2 , 1 5 6 2 5 , 3 8 9
New H a m p sh ire 1 2 , 6 9 2 1 4 , 8 9 7 1 6 , 8 2 7 1 8 , 7 0 1 2 1 , 5 2 2 2 3 , 2 8 6
New J e r s e y 1 1 9 , 0 8 7 1 3 4 , 5 4 4 1 4 6 , 9 2 0 1 5 9 , 6 2 2 1 7 6 , 1 4 0 1 9 7 , 5 3 4
New M ex ico 2 0 , 5 6 4 2 2 , 2 6 3 2 3 , 4 8 1 2 2 , 5 3 9 2 3 , 1 5 4 2 4 , 0 3 2
New Y ork 3 0 3 , 3 5 3 3 3 9 , 0 8 4 3 6 6 , 5 5 3 3 9 3 , 5 2 3 4 2 5 , 5 0 1 4 6 2 , 4 0 2
N o r th  C a r o l in a 7 8 , 3 8 5 8 9 , 7 0 0 9 8 , 1 7 6 1 0 6 , 2 6 3 1 1 4 , 9 1 7 1 2 6 , 3 4 5
N o r th  D a k o ta 1 0 , 1 8 7 1 0 , 9 6 0 1 0 , 9 1 9 9 , 9 7 5 1 0 , 3 7 2 9 , 9 2 9
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Chart 13 (continued):
(millions o f current U.S. dollars)
STATE 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
O h io 1 4 5 , 9 6 4 1 6 5 , 0 2 5 1 7 5 , 9 5 8 1 8 4 , 0 7 1 1 9 3 , 7 9 0 2 0 7 , 4 6 0
O klahom a 4 7 , 9 6 2 5 1 , 9 1 4 5 3 , 3 9 2 4 8 , 9 9 0 4 8 , 8 2 0 5 2 , 7 3 4
O regon 3 3 , 8 9 0 3 7 , 8 2 1 3 9 , 9 2 3 4 2 , 0 0 4 4 5 , 0 4 6 4 9 , 7 1 5
P e n n s y lv a n ia 1 5 5 , 2 1 2 1 7 0 , 7 9 6 1 8 0 , 6 7 8 1 9 0 , 7 6 5 2 0 6 , 5 1 9 2 2 4 , 5 0 8
R hode I s l a n d 1 2 , 3 1 6 1 3 , 7 9 5 1 5 , 1 8 2 1 6 , 5 1 7 1 7 , 8 6 1 1 9 , 7 2 2
S o u th  C a r o l in a 3 6 , 3 5 7 4 1 , 9 7 8 4 4 , 6 7 2 4 8 , 4 1 8 5 3 , 2 7 3 5 8 , 1 2 4
S o u th  D a k o ta 8 , 1 4 4 9 , 3 7 2 9 , 8 3 1 1 0 , 3 0 6 1 0 , 8 8 1 1 1 , 3 7 5
T e n n e s s e e 5 7 , 3 1 2 6 4 , 6 6 6 6 9 , 2 6 0 7 4 , 1 2 3 8 1 , 4 8 2 8 7 , 8 7 2
T e x a s 2 7 1 , 0 8 5 2 9 6 , 9 3 8 3 1 5 , 9 4 7 2 9 9 , 6 9 5 3 0 4 , 8 2 6 3 3 4 , 9 5 0
U ta h 1 9 , 8 7 8 2 2 , 2 5 7 2 4 , 0 9 4 2 4 , 4 5 3 2 5 , 1 7 7 2 7 , 2 1 5
V erm ont 6 , 3 0 4 6 , 9 7 0 7 ,  655 8 , 3 0 4 9 , 2 8 4 1 0 , 4 3 5
V i r g i n i a 8 1 , 2 7 6 9 2 , 1 9 6 1 0 0 , 6 9 2 1 1 0 , 2 6 6 1 2 1 , 0 3 1 1 3 1 , 7 5 5
W a sh in g to n 6 5 , 3 8 0 7 1 , 0 8 6 7 4 , 4 9 4 8 0 , 4 6 2 8 6 , 8 9 8 9 5 , 6 5 1
W est V i r g i n i a 2 0 , 8 2 2 2 2 , 7 5 8 2 3 , 5 0 6 2 3 , 8 4 2 2 4 , 5 3 4 2 6 , 3 4 2
W is c o n s in 6 2 , 8 9 5 6 9 , 9 9 9 7 4 , 1 1 0 7 7 , 9 6 7 8 2 , 2 9 1 8 9 , 8 3 8
Wyoming 1 2 , 2 1 2 1 2 , 9 3 2 1 3 , 0 2 2 1 1 , 2 2 4 1 1 , 0 8 4 1 1 , 6 6 8
NEW ENGLAND 1 8 9 , 2 6 4 2 1 5 , 5 9 4 2 3 7 , 3 8 6 2 5 9 , 8 3 8 2 8 8 , 9 6 1 3 1 7 , 1 2 0
MID EAST 6 7 4 , 2 1 5 7 5 2 , 2 2 8 8 1 2 , 5 4 5 8 7 2 , 1 5 7 9 4 8 , 7 9 4 1 , 0 3 9 , 8 7 3
GREAT LAKES 5 7 4 , 0 0 2 6 4 6 , 6 8 8 6 8 8 , 8 4 3 7 2 7 , 2 2 2 7 6 8 , 0 8 6 8 2 5 , 6 1 8
PLAINS 2 3 8 , 4 7 6 2 7 0 , 1 2 4 2 8 3 , 7 6 3 2 9 4 , 1 0 7 3 1 2 , 3 2 0 3 3 3 , 3 2 0
SOUTH EAST 7 0 8 , 3 8 0 7 9 9 , 1 9 1 8 5 8 , 8 5 1 9 0 7 , 1 0 1 9 8 0 , 6 8 7 1 , 0 6 6 , 1 0 5
SOUTH WEST 3 7 7 , 8 6 3 4 1 5 , 5 8 6 4 4 2 , 0 8 2 4 2 5 , 8 3 9 4 3 5 , 7 9 6 4 7 5 , 0 4 3
ROCKY MTNS 1 0 4 , 8 3 2 1 1 4 , 9 4 0 1 2 0 , 3 4 1 1 1 9 , 9 3 0 1 2 5 , 0 5 0 1 3 2 , 5 2 5
FAR WEST 5 7 9 , 5 5 3 6 5 1 , 9 8 2 7 0 7 , 6 3 8 7 4 9 , 6 8 3 8 2 3 , 5 5 0 9 0 2 , 5 6 8
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Chart 13 (continued):
(millions o f current U.S. dollars)
STATE 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
U.S. Total 5/411,353 5,706,658 5,895,430 6,209,096 6,513,026
A labam a 6 8 , 2 6 1 7 1 , 5 3 5 7 5 , 9 3 0 8 1 , 0 8 7 8 4 , 4 1 1
A la s k a 2 2 , 9 3 3 2 4 , 7 7 3 2 2 , 0 2 0 2 2 , 3 7 1 2 2 , 8 4 2
A r iz o n a 6 5 , 9 3 8 6 8 , 7 8 0 7 1 , 7 9 8 7 8 , 9 3 0 8 5 , 4 4 2
A r k a n sa s 3 6 , 8 4 8 3 8 , 4 1 5 4 1 , 3 2 9 4 4 , 6 4 5 4 7 , 1 7 7
California 742,866 798,237 814,216 830,950 846,994
C o lo r a d o 7 0 , 0 0 4 7 4 , 6 4 9 7 9 , 3 9 6 8 5 , 7 8 6 9 3 , 5 5 3
C o n n e c t ic u t 9 5 , 0 1 6 9 8 , 9 1 4 1 0 0 , 3 7 3 1 0 3 , 7 6 6 1 0 7 , 9 9 3
D e la w a r e 1 9 , 1 6 6 2 0 , 2 8 2 2 2 , 1 6 0 2 3 , 0 6 1 2 3 , 7 5 5
D i s t r i c t  o f  C o l 3 8 , 1 8 3 4 0 , 4 2 7 4 2 , 2 4 0 4 4 , 4 5 8 4 6 , 5 9 6
F lo r id a 2 4 4 , 3 0 3 2 5 8 , 0 4 0 2 6 9 , 5 1 4 2 8 5 , 1 7 7 3 0 4 , 6 5 1
G e o r g ia 1 3 4 , 8 3 4 1 4 1 , 3 3 8 1 4 8 , 6 2 7 1 6 0 , 7 2 7 1 7 1 , 9 9 3
H a w a ii 2 8 , 8 0 1 3 2 , 2 5 5 3 3 , 9 8 9 3 5 , 5 3 2 3 6 , 3 0 4
Id a h o 1 6 , 6 8 9 1 7 , 7 1 4 1 8 , 6 2 7 2 0 , 3 2 6 2 2 , 6 6 2
I l l i n o i s 2 6 4 , 1 1 5 2 7 6 , 4 5 1 2 8 6 , 2 8 8 3 0 3 , 9 1 4 3 1 7 , 8 9 6
I n d ia n a 1 0 6 , 8 9 8 1 1 0 , 9 9 1 1 1 4 , 3 7 8 1 2 3 , 8 3 3 1 3 1 , 7 3 1
Iow a 5 3 , 0 7 2 5 6 , 1 8 5 5 8 , 1 4 0 6 1 , 5 6 1 6 3 , 1 6 0
K a n sa s 4 8 , 4 2 4 5 1 , 5 5 5 5 3 , 6 5 0 5 6 , 3 8 1 5 8 , 4 1 6
K en tu ck y 6 4 , 9 7 7 6 7 , 8 5 5 7 0 , 7 8 5 7 6 , 6 9 7 8 0 , 8 3 9
L o u is ia n a 8 6 , 6 7 0 9 4 , 9 9 5 9 5 , 9 8 8 9 1 , 3 1 5 9 6 , 1 4 6
M aine 2 3 , 0 6 0 2 3 , 4 7 5 2 3 , 6 1 7 2 4 , 3 7 4 2 5 , 3 7 3
M a ry la n d 1 0 9 , 5 4 8 1 1 4 , 9 7 1 1 1 7 , 6 0 0 1 2 0 , 7 0 0 1 2 6 , 4 8 5
M a s s a c h u s e t t s 1 5 9 , 1 3 1 1 5 9 , 9 3 2 1 6 1 , 4 8 8 1 6 7 , 3 0 4 1 7 5 , 6 1 0
M ic h ig a n 1 8 6 , 7 1 2 1 9 0 , 7 0 0 1 9 4 , 0 8 6 2 0 6 , 5 2 6 2 2 2 , 7 3 4
M in n e s o ta 9 6 , 1 5 0 1 0 0 , 3 5 4 1 0 3 , 8 5 8 1 1 1 , 8 6 8 1 1 5 , 5 1 7
M i s s i s s i p p i 3 7 , 6 6 9 3 9 , 1 7 7 4 1 , 3 0 7 4 4 , 2 1 7 4 7 , 3 5 6
M is s o u r i 1 0 2 , 7 0 9 1 0 4 , 8 4 2 1 1 0 , 4 4 6 1 1 6 , 0 5 7 1 1 9 , 7 7 2
M ontana 1 2 , 8 2 6 1 3 , 4 4 9 1 4 , 0 8 8 1 5 , 0 9 7 1 6 , 1 4 8
N e b r a sk a 3 1 , 2 3 7 3 3 , 5 7 8 3 5 , 5 4 2 3 7 , 5 9 8 3 8 , 7 6 5
N evad a 2 8 , 4 7 3 3 1 , 6 3 0 3 3 , 6 5 2 3 6 , 4 6 8 3 9 , 8 4 4
New H am p sh ire 2 4 , 0 9 6 2 3 , 8 7 5 2 4 , 9 4 1 2 6 , 3 8 6 2 7 , 4 9 5
New J e r s e y 2 0 8 , 3 4 5 2 1 6 , 9 4 1 2 2 4 , 2 7 6 2 3 5 , 4 2 3 2 4 6 , 6 0 7
New M ex ico 2 5 , 4 7 9 2 7 , 1 5 1 3 0 , 8 3 5 3 2 , 8 2 4 3 7 , 0 2 1
New Y ork 4 7 9 , 4 5 2 5 0 2 , 1 0 2 5 0 4 , 5 3 3 5 3 5 , 2 0 1 5 5 1 , 1 8 1
N o r th  C a r o l in a 1 3 5 , 9 8 3 1 4 1 , 1 9 9 1 4 7 , 5 7 4 1 6 0 , 1 1 6 1 6 8 , 8 5 9
N o r th  D a k o ta 1 0 , 8 2 6 1 1 , 6 7 5 1 1 , 8 5 5 1 2 , 9 3 9 1 3 , 1 0 3
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Chart 13 (continued):
(millions o f current U.S. dollars)
STATE 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Ohi o 2 1 9 , 3 3 2 2 3 0 , 1 2 1 2 3 5 , 9 8 7 2 5 0 , 4 7 1 2 6 0 , 8 5 3
O klahom a 5 4 , 6 0 8 5 7 , 7 1 6 5 9 , 6 4 5 6 1 , 9 2 4 6 4 , 7 4 9
O regon 5 3 , 5 2 2 5 7 , 8 5 3 6 0 , 6 6 6 6 4 , 2 9 7 7 0 , 0 5 0
P e n n s y lv a n ia 2 3 7 , 9 8 9 2 4 9 , 7 0 4 2 6 0 , 4 2 5 2 7 5 , 1 4 4 2 8 7 , 7 9 7
R hode I s l a n d 2 1 , 0 4 5 2 1 , 6 2 7 2 1 , 7 5 3 2 2 , 6 5 0 2 3 , 5 8 1
S o u th  C a r o l in a 6 2 , 2 4 5 6 6 , 0 5 7 6 8 , 7 5 0 7 1 , 9 1 1 7 5 , 8 2 9
S o u th  D a k o ta 1 2 , 1 4 6 1 3 , 0 6 8 1 4 , 1 4 3 1 5 , 1 7 7 1 6 , 3 4 7
T e n n e s s e e 9 2 , 4 2 9 9 5 , 0 1 4 1 0 2 , 0 2 8 1 1 1 , 8 3 1 1 1 9 , 6 8 5
T e x a s 3 5 7 , 1 5 5 3 8 8 , 0 9 9 4 0 3 , 2 6 1 4 2 4 , 6 8 0 4 5 2 , 9 6 8
U ta h 2 8 , 6 8 3 3 1 , 3 2 5 3 3 , 6 2 6 3 5 , 6 3 2 3 8 , 4 0 7
V erm ont 1 1 , 3 2 0 1 1 , 7 5 0 1 1 , 7 5 1 1 2 , 5 4 4 1 3 , 1 4 0
V i r g i n i a 1 4 1 , 7 4 8 1 4 8 , 1 0 2 1 5 3 , 8 8 5 1 6 1 , 7 0 4 1 7 0 , 7 2 3
W a sh in g to n 1 0 4 , 7 5 8 1 1 5 , 6 4 2 1 2 2 , 5 9 7 1 3 0 , 7 7 2 1 3 8 , 3 7 9
W est V i r g i n i a 2 7 , 2 3 9 2 8 , 2 9 0 2 9 , 3 1 7 3 0 , 8 8 5 3 2 , 2 1 7
W is c o n s in 9 5 , 4 2 9 1 0 0 , 4 3 4 1 0 4 , 9 1 7 1 1 2 , 3 2 4 1 1 9 , 5 1 0
Wyoming 1 2 , 0 1 1 1 3 , 4 1 6 1 3 , 5 3 2 1 3 , 5 3 5 1 4 , 3 6 0
NEW ENGLAND 3 3 3 , 6 7 0 3 3 9 , 5 7 3 3 4 3 , 9 2 3 3 5 7 , 0 2 4 3 7 3 , 1 9 2
MID EAST 1 0 9 2 , 6 8 3 1 1 4 4 , 4 2 7 1 , 1 7 1 , 2 3 4 1 , 2 3 3 , 9 8 7 1 , 2 8 2 , 4 2 1
GREAT LAKES 8 7 2 , 4 8 6 9 0 8 , 6 9 8 9 3 5 , 6 5 6 9 9 7 , 0 6 8 1 , 0 5 2 , 7 2 4
PLAINS 3 5 4 , 5 6 3 3 7 1 , 2 5 6 3 8 7 , 6 3 5 4 1 1 , 5 8 2 4 2 5 , 0 8 0
SOUTH EAST 1 1 3 3 , 2 0 5 1 1 9 0 , 0 1 6 1 , 2 4 5 , 0 3 4 1 , 3 2 0 , 3 1 2 1 , 3 9 9 , 8 8 7
SOUTH WEST 5 0 3 , 1 8 1 5 4 1 , 7 4 5 5 6 5 , 5 3 8 5 9 8 , 3 5 8 6 4 0 , 1 8 0
ROCKY MTNS 1 4 0 , 2 1 3 1 5 0 , 5 5 3 1 5 9 , 2 7 0 1 7 0 , 3 7 6 1 8 5 , 1 3 0
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Chart 13 (continued):
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
STATE 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
U.S. Total 6,930,791 7,309,516 7/715,901 8,240,312 8/745/219
A labam a 8 9 , 6 1 1 9 5 , 3 4 1 9 8 , 9 9 4 1 0 4 , 6 8 1 1 0 9 , 8 3 3
A la s k a 2 2 , 7 6 9 2 4 , 2 0 3 2 4 , 8 4 1 2 5 , 5 1 2 2 4 , 2 3 6
A r iz o n a 9 5 , 7 8 0 1 0 4 , 6 3 8 1 1 3 , 0 9 9 1 2 3 , 1 3 2 1 3 3 , 8 0 1
A r k a n sa s 5 0 , 8 1 7 5 3 , 6 1 9 5 6 , 5 1 7 5 9 , 1 1 6 6 1 , 6 2 8
California 878,124 924,582 971,777 1,043,669 1,118,945
C o lo r a d o 1 0 1 , 6 3 6 1 0 9 , 1 9 8 1 1 7 , 4 7 0 1 2 9 , 6 5 3 1 4 1 , 7 9 1
C o n n e c t ic u t 1 1 2 , 5 8 8 1 1 8 , 9 7 3 1 2 4 , 6 9 3 1 3 4 , 7 9 2 1 4 2 , 0 9 9
D e la w a r e 2 4 , 9 9 4 2 7 , 3 8 8 2 8 , 7 0 4 3 1 , 1 9 8 3 3 , 7 3 5
D i s t r i c t  o f  C o l 4 7 , 4 8 4 4 8 , 3 9 9 4 8 , 4 9 9 5 0 , 5 9 9 5 4 , 1 0 0
F l o r i d a 3 2 5 , 1 3 5 3 4 4 , 3 8 1 3 6 5 , 8 3 7 3 9 1 , 0 7 3 4 1 8 , 8 5 1
G e o r g ia 1 8 7 , 1 5 3 2 0 2 , 7 5 0 2 1 8 , 3 8 1 2 3 3 , 7 7 3 2 5 3 , 7 6 9
H a w a ii 3 6 , 7 6 3 3 7 , 2 5 9 3 7 , 5 1 7 3 8 , 8 0 7 3 9 , 7 1 2
Id a h o 2 4 , 7 7 3 2 7 , 0 2 0 2 7 , 9 4 8 2 9 , 0 8 6 3 0 , 9 3 6
I l l i n o i s 3 4 2 , 8 8 8 3 5 9 , 8 4 3 3 7 6 , 4 8 9 4 0 2 , 2 8 2 4 2 5 , 6 7 9
I n d ia n a 1 4 1 , 8 9 5 1 4 8 , 6 4 2 1 5 5 , 3 0 4 1 6 3 , 7 7 5 1 7 4 , 4 3 3
Iow a 6 9 , 6 1 1 7 2 , 1 5 2 7 7 , 5 2 2 8 1 , 5 7 4 8 4 , 6 2 8
K a n sa s 6 2 , 1 5 4 6 3 , 9 8 3 6 7 , 9 7 2 7 3 , 0 5 9 7 6 , 9 9 1
K en tu ck y 8 6 , 8 5 0 9 1 , 4 3 7 9 5 , 5 0 0 1 0 1 , 4 4 5 1 0 7 , 1 5 2
L o u is ia n a 1 0 5 , 2 9 2 1 1 4 , 1 0 5 1 2 0 , 1 2 7 1 2 7 , 1 7 7 1 2 9 , 2 5 1
M aine 2 6 , 5 5 0 2 8 , 0 8 7 2 9 , 0 6 4 3 0 , 6 4 5 3 2 , 3 1 8
M a ry la n d 1 3 4 , 0 6 6 1 3 9 , 7 3 2 1 4 5 , 3 9 0 1 5 5 , 0 0 8 1 6 4 , 7 9 8
M a s s a c h u s e t t s 1 8 7 , 7 5 5 1 9 7 , 1 0 5 2 0 9 , 6 2 3 2 2 3 , 4 8 3 2 3 9 , 3 7 9
M ic h ig a n 2 4 6 , 6 2 9 2 5 3 , 9 4 0 2 6 4 , 8 4 8 2 8 0 , 1 7 8 2 9 4 , 5 0 5
M in n e s o ta 1 2 4 , 9 8 6 1 3 1 , 8 4 8 1 4 1 , 4 7 9 1 5 2 , 3 4 0 1 6 1 , 3 9 2
M i s s i s s i p p i 5 1 , 2 6 1 5 4 , 3 9 8 5 6 , 3 1 0 5 9 , 2 9 2 6 2 , 2 1 6
M is s o u r i 1 3 0 , 0 9 9 1 3 9 , 7 3 8 1 4 6 , 8 0 4 1 5 5 , 2 4 3 1 6 2 , 7 7 2
M ontana 1 7 , 0 2 3 1 7 , 6 6 4 1 8 , 2 1 4 1 9 , 0 6 0 1 9 , 8 6 1
N e b r a sk a 4 2 , 1 7 7 4 4 , 3 0 2 4 8 , 0 4 3 4 9 , 7 7 1 5 1 , 7 3 7
N evad a 4 4 , 8 4 2 4 9 , 0 9 4 5 4 , 0 3 3 5 8 , 4 8 8 6 3 , 0 4 4
New H am p sh ire 2 9 , 3 9 3 3 2 , 3 7 3 3 5 , 0 4 7 3 8 , 1 3 7 4 1 , 3 1 3
New J e r s e y 2 5 7 , 9 7 0 2 7 1 , 2 9 7 2 8 5 , 5 2 8 3 0 3 , 5 8 0 3 1 9 , 2 0 1
New M ex ico 4 1 , 6 5 1 4 2 , 0 1 6 4 3 , 8 2 5 4 6 , 4 8 4 4 7 , 7 3 6
New Y ork 5 7 5 , 6 7 1 5 9 7 , 8 2 3 6 3 4 , 1 5 0 6 6 9 , 4 4 6 7 0 6 , 8 8 6
N o r th  C a r o l in a 1 8 2 , 1 6 4 1 9 4 , 5 1 4 2 0 3 , 9 7 1 2 2 0 , 9 0 0 2 3 5 , 7 5 2
N o r th  D a k o ta 1 4 , 1 4 0 1 4 , 7 4 7 1 6 , 0 8 9 1 6 , 1 9 3 1 7 , 2 1 4
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Chart 13 (continued):
(millions o f current U.S. dollars)
STATE 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
O hio 2 8 0 , 5 7 2 2 9 5 , 2 0 7 3 0 5 , 5 5 9 3 2 5 , 2 3 9 3 4 1 , 0 7 0
O klahom a 6 6 , 5 2 6 6 9 , 3 5 5 7 3 , 8 9 3 7 8 , 3 2 1 8 1 , 6 5 5
O regon 7 5 , 3 2 8 8 1 , 3 0 1 9 1 , 9 0 2 9 8 , 8 3 7 1 0 4 , 7 7 1
P e n n s y lv a n ia 3 0 0 , 5 4 0 3 1 8 , 0 6 6 3 2 8 , 7 0 4 3 4 7 , 1 6 9 3 6 4 , 0 3 9
Rhode I s l a n d 2 4 , 2 5 4 2 5 , 5 5 6 2 6 , 4 4 4 2 9 , 1 7 5 3 0 , 4 4 3
S o u th  C a r o l in a 8 1 , 2 5 3 8 6 , 4 8 4 8 9 , 2 4 2 9 4 , 5 3 9 1 0 0 , 3 5 0
S o u th  D a k o ta 1 7 , 3 5 6 1 8 , 3 6 6 1 9 , 5 3 4 2 0 , 0 3 0 2 1 , 2 2 4
T e n n e s s e e 1 2 9 , 5 4 1 1 3 6 , 6 2 8 1 4 1 , 8 1 2 1 5 0 , 7 2 8 1 5 9 , 5 7 5
T e x a s 4 8 3 , 5 9 1 5 1 5 , 4 3 3 5 5 5 , 6 0 9 6 0 6 , 9 0 1 6 4 5 , 5 9 6
U tah 4 2 , 2 9 5 4 6 , 4 2 4 5 1 , 6 3 1 5 6 , 0 6 2 5 9 , 6 2 4
V erm ont 1 3 , 7 4 1 1 3 , 9 8 1 1 4 , 6 7 9 1 5 , 4 7 9 1 6 , 2 5 7
V i r g i n i a 1 7 9 , 7 0 9 1 8 9 , 0 0 3 1 9 9 , 9 9 3 2 1 3 , 3 5 8 2 3 0 , 8 2 5
W a sh in g to n 1 4 6 , 5 4 3 1 5 1 , 4 6 9 1 6 1 , 9 5 4 1 7 6 , 2 2 6 1 9 2 , 8 6 4
W est V i r g i n i a 3 4 , 7 5 7 3 6 , 3 0 2 3 7 , 2 3 7 3 8 , 5 4 5 3 9 , 9 3 8
W is c o n s in 1 2 7 , 2 2 0 1 3 3 , 6 5 3 1 4 1 , 0 3 7 1 4 9 , 2 8 3 1 5 7 , 7 6 1
Wyoming 1 4 , 8 7 1 1 5 , 6 9 7 1 7 , 0 5 9 1 7 , 7 7 0 1 7 , 5 3 0
NEW ENGLAND 3 9 4 , 2 8 1 4 1 6 , 0 7 3 4 3 9 , 5 5 0 4 7 1 , 7 1 2 5 0 1 , 8 0 9
MID EAST 1 , 3 4 0 , 7 2 5 1 , 4 0 2 , 7 0 6 1 , 4 7 0 , 9 7 5 1 , 5 5 7 , 0 0 0 1 , 6 4 2 , 7 6 0
GREAT LAKES 1 , 1 3 9 , 2 0 4 1 , 1 9 1 , 2 8 5 1 , 2 4 3 , 2 3 7 1 , 3 2 0 , 7 5 8 1 , 3 9 3 , 4 4 9
PLAINS 4 6 0 , 5 2 4 4 8 5 , 1 3 7 5 1 7 , 4 4 4 5 4 8 , 2 0 9 5 7 5 , 9 5 8
SOUTH EAST 1 , 5 0 3 , 5 4 3 1 , 5 9 8 , 9 6 2 1 , 6 8 3 , 9 2 1 1 , 7 9 4 , 6 2 6 1 , 9 0 9 , 1 4 2
SOUTH WEST 6 8 7 , 5 4 7 7 3 1 , 4 4 2 7 8 6 , 4 2 7 8 5 4 , 8 3 8 9 0 8 , 7 8 7
ROCKY MTNS 2 0 0 , 5 9 9 2 1 6 , 0 0 2 2 3 2 , 3 2 2 2 5 1 , 6 3 0 2 6 9 , 7 4 2
FAR WEST 1 , 2 0 4 , 3 6 9 1 , 2 6 7 , 9 0 9 1 , 3 4 2 , 0 2 5 1 , 4 4 1 , 5 3 9 1 , 5 4 3 , 5 7 2
Source: Bureau o f  Economic Analysis, U.S. Department o f  Commerce, prepared by New Jersey Department o f  
Labor, Division o f  Labor M arket and Demographic Research. September 5, 2000.
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Chart 14: Affiliate Employment in California, All Countries, by Industry of Affiliate,
1984-1992
Industry 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
All Industries 274,424 298,796 289,171 334,900 407,100 514,900 555,900 561,100 521,800
Mining 1,175 1,048 1,163 1,500 1,800 5,500 2,700 2,400 2,300
Petroleum 10,705 9,496 8,693 9,700 9,600 10,900 12,400 11,400 8,200
Manufacturing 133,237 150,464 132,689 141,600 173,300 213,900 216,800 210,100 202,000
Food and kindred products 13,861 15,217 16,880 17,500 18,400 27,300 29,000 30,400 30,300
Chemicals and allied products 43,827 53,936 24,883 26,600 28,000 32,700 37,300 34,500 38,600
Industrial chemicals & synthetics 10,277 10,728 11,400 9,800 11,100 11,000 12,500 11,400 14,500
Drugs 5,936 6,676 7,270 8,700 10,000 13,400 14,300 14,300 14,300
Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods (D) (D) 5,912 4,900 5,400 7,400 7,400 6,000 6,000
Agricultural chemicals (D) CD) 16 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other 378 446 285 1,900 1,600 900 3,100 2,800 3,800
Primary and fabricated metals 8,979 9,032 10,564 8,200 13,400 20,400 16,500 14,400 12,800
Primary metal industries 4,877 4,691 2,762 4,900 6,700 10,100 8,500 7,700 7,100
Fabricated metal products 4,101 4,341 5,802 3,300 6,700 10,300 8,000 6,700 5,600
Machinery 40,040 40,062 44,563 39,500 52,900 60,900 69,700 66,600 60,200
Machinery, except electrical 11,929 11,210 10,407 11,000 19,000 25,900 29,300 30,400 24,700
Electric and electronic equipment 28,111 28,852 34,056 28,500 33,900 34,900 40,500 36,200 35,500
Other manufacturing 27,031 32,215 35,799 49,900 60,500 72,600 64,300 64,200 12,000
Textile products and apparel 925 935 942 1,200 1,700 3,500 3,900 4,100 3,900
Lumber, wood, furniture, fixtures 1,865 6,400 2,678 1,300 1,900 1,500 2,200 1,500 1,000
Paper and allied products 831 3,460 2,235 2,500 2,600 2,400 3,200 3,700 4,100
Printing and publishing 5,255 6,111 9,253 6,400 7,400 7,500 8,000 8,500 8,400
Rubber and plastics products 3,219 3,162 3,344 2,900 5,000 5,600 5,100 4,500 4,600
Stone, clay, and glass products 5,517 7,356 7,802 13,000 13,500 17,100 16,300 13,500 11,500
Transportation equipment 2,574 4,502 4,340 6,400 7,700 12,000 11,600 12,000 10,900
Instruments and related products 2,260 2,875 3,445 10,800 8,700 10,000 11,000 13,300 12,500
Other 4,585 1,957 1,760 5,500 1,210 1,300 3,000 3,100 3,200
Wholesale Trade 45,850 48,953 49,280 57,500 65,400 74,800 75,400 80,000 81,400
Motor vehicles and equipment 10,443 11,728 10,999 11,400 11,800 11,800 12,100 13,400 13,600
Metals, minerals excl. petroleum 1,477 2,588 2,688 3,599 3,400 3,900 3,700 3,100 2,100
Other durable goods 25,564 26,382 26,646 2,900 5,500 7,100 7,200 8,200 7,800
Farm product raw materials 2,926 1,657 1,308 600 700 1,000 1,000 1,200 1,400
Other nondurable goods 5,440 6,598 7,639 8,900 6,200 6,700 5,600 6,400 8,500
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Chart 14 (continued):
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Retail Trade 24,816 26,176 32,206 32,200 48,200 68,000 74,600 77,200 57,100
Food stores, restaurants & bars 4,322 4,588 3,935 3,900 1,900 (D) (D) 16,100 15,800
Other retail trade 20,494 21,588 28,271 15,700 (D) 35,100 (D) 26,000 26,200
Finance, except banking 5,596 5,688 7,434 8,500 10,100 9,800 4,800 4,900 4,200
Insurance 4,555 5,295 5,237 7,000 12,200 12,700 18,100 19,100 18,900
Real Estate 4,032 4,708 4,488 6,200 6,400 7,500 8,400 6,200 6,900
Services 31,575 35,971 33,363 49,400 53,500 75,800 99,300 105,200 105,100
Other Industries 44,458 46,970 47,981 22,700 28,200 41,600 46,100 47,000 38,000
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1,583 1,569 1,674 1,600 1,700 2,700 2,100 1,800 2,000
Construction 3,737 3,269 3,385 6,300 5,700 10,000 11,800 10,500 7,100
Transportation 6,900 5,404 5,769 (D) 14,600 17,600 21,700 25,400 19,400
Communication & public utilities 663 757 3,790 (D) 4,600 5,700 7,800 7,000 7,200
D: Supressed to avoid  disclosure o f  data o f  individual companies. n.a.: not available
Source: Bureau o f  Economic Analysis, U.S. Department o f  Commerce. Office o f  Foreign Investment, California 
Trade and Commerce Agency. “Foreign D irect Investment in California". February 1997.
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Chart 15: Affiliate Gross Book Value of Property, Plants, and Equipment in California, 
All Countries, by Industry of Affiliate, 1984-92
_____________________________________(millions o f  U.S. dollars)_____________________________________
Industry 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
All Industries 31,517 35,323 38,321 44,275 52,411 63,706 75,768 82,334 84,067
Mining 154 253 286 351 477 1,349 851 805 891
Petroleum (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) 10,918 11,795 11,758 (D)
Manufacturing 7,545 8,751 9,285 11,245 12,931 15,613 17,697 18,138 20,097
Food and kindred products 740 1,112 1,279 1,473 1,426 1,970 2,333 2,481 2,686
Chemicals and allied products 2,050 2,321 2,022 2,449 2,545 2,716 4,037 4,124 5,145
Industrial chemicals and synthetics 1,135 1,200 1,262 1,503 1,400 1,412 1,574 1,587 2,219
Drugs 328 361 419 509 614 691 1,274 1,485 1,691
Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods (D> (D) (D) 376 426 555 650 691 773
Agricultural chemicals (D) (D) (*) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other 26 35 (D) 61 104 58 539 361 461
Primary and fabricated metals 619 698 763 983 1,348 1,738 1,887 1,611 1,757
Primary metal industries 416 479 535 829 1,030 1,346 1,282 1,201 1,163
Fabricated metal products 203 219 229 154 318 392 605 510 594
Machinery 1,825 2,145 2,465 2,530 3,343 3,958 4,784 4,622 5,170
Machinery, except electrical 579 568 554 791 1,106 1,555 1,817 2,262 2,453
Electric and electronic equipment 1,246 1,576 1,911 1,738 2,237 2,403 2,967 2,359 2,717
Other manufacturing 2,312 2,476 2,757 3,811 4,270 5,230 4,655 5,291 5,340
Textile products and apparel 10 14 14 81 141 186 107 199 128
Lumber, wood, furniture, fixtures (D) (D) 289 (D) 42 36 57 63 65
Paper and allied products (D) (D) (D) (D) 160 237 279 318 402
Printing and publishing 153 156 351 239 194 296 338 372 512
Rubber and plastics products 116 188 128 122 238 260 302 348 385
Stone, clay, and glass products 1,016 1,070 1,098 1,606 2,013 2,366 1,972 2,161 1,992
Transportation equipment (D) (D) (D) 630 728 993 963 994 1,668
Instruments and related products 44 66 60 494 328 371 489 617 537
Other 220 63 62 216 426 486 148 209 150
Wholesale Trade 1,664 2,112 2,475 2,929 3,744 4,912 6,719 8,242 9,798
Motor vehicles and equipment 593 835 946 1,127 1,466 1,721 2,956 3,851 4,727
Metals, minerals, except petroleum 74 91 105 154 159 219 219 236 231
Other durable goods 739 854 1,002 95 156 382 473 459 428
Farm product raw materials 71 67 56 38 44 55 63 78 121
Other nondurable goods 187 266 366 335 246 359 322 374 487
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Chart 15 (continued):
Industry 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Retail Trade 618 695 1,326 1,315 1,939 1,799 2,684 3,405 2,521
Food stores, eating & drinking 123 129 82 22 19 (D) (D) 850 (D)
Other retail trade 495 566 1,244 (D) (D) 631 729 863 (D)
Finance, except banking 342 493 946 403 245 470 642 883 785
Insurance 188 249 298 281 442 492 776 1,259 (D)
Real Estate 9,123 10,292 10,484 13,045 14,230 17,213 20,853 22,383 23,252
Services 1,228 1,366 1,346 2,915 5,000 6,515 9,036 10,418 10,891
Other Industries (D) (D) (D) (D) (D> 5,774 5,566 5,849 4,749
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 429 384 394 393 417 551 695 630 547
Construction 72 78 101 382 275 576 1,646 1,735 1,079
Transportation 175 192 239 517 2,384 2,639 1,426 1,577 881
Communication and public utilities (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) 669 949 1,102 1,350
D: Suppressed to avoid  disclosure o f  data o f  individual companies, rua.: not available  
* Less than $500,000
Source: Bureau o f  Economic Analysis, U.S. Department o f  Commerce. Office o f  Foreign Investment, California 
Trade and Commerce Agency. “Foreign D irect Investment In California". February 1997.
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Chart 16: Affiliate Gross Book Value of Property, Plant and Equipment in California,
by Country of UBO, 1984-92
(millions o f  U.S. dollars)
Country 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
All countries 31,517 35,323 38,321 44,275 52,411 63,706 75,768 82,334 84,067
Canada 5,304 5,775 6,100 6,108 7,922 9,463 8,954 8,972 7,092
Europe 17,036 19,130 2,050 21,536 24,591 28,483 34,123 35,443 35,829
Austria 5 (D) 7 (D) (D) (D) 167 176 76
Belgium 45 50 98 146 168 100 74 259 257
Denmark 23 28 37 56 59 188 217 269 311
Finland (D) 8 (D) 8 14 8 37 46 46
France 948 742 848 1,307 1,785 1,858 2,924 3,446 3,800
Germany 1,209 1,650 1,704 2,106 2,497 2,931 4,020 4,085 5,154
Ireland (D) (D) (D) 183 159 262 520 609 646
Italy (D) (D) (D) 109 217 287 332 297 268
Liechtenstein 36 38 51 43 62 176 169 110 178
Luxembourg (D) (D) 31 (D) (D) 120 215 210 225
Netherlands (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) 10,767 11,083 10,842 10,866
Norway (D) (D) (D) (D) 102 117 (D) (D) (D)
Spain 25 25 24 51 52 54 55 79 104
Sweden 96 139 136 123 413 558 830 1,080 1,054
Switzerland 611 1,105 1,252 1,065 1,152 1,283 1,835 2,011 2,346
UK 3,914 4,540 4,807 5,681 7,636 9,476 11,437 11,590 10,320
Other 1 1 1 145 (D) (D) (D) (D) (D)
Latin America/West Hemisph. 1,317 1,373 1,237 1,351 1,452 1,865 2,214 2,168 2,575
South and Central America 514 485 547 589 695 1,071 1,247 1,306 1,441
Brazil (*) 3 6 (D) (D) 17 (D) (D) (D)
Mexico 95 120 146 152 118 236 303 353 466
Panama 373 303 332 367 497 757 658 653 (D)
Venezuela 9 10 10 27 28 28 31 33 13
Other 37 49 53 (D) (D) 34 (D) (D) 55
Other Western Hemisphere 803 888 690 762 757 794 968 862 1,133
Bahamas 39 47 18 129 136 351 111 112 (D)
Bermuda (D) (D) (D) 225 282 305 351 328 458
Netherlands Antilles 639 694 524 377 290 311 306 319 245
U.K. Islands, Caribbean 27 29 31 32 41 61 182 85 336
Other (D) (D) (D) 8 9 9 17 18 (D>
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Chart 16 (continued):
Country 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Middle East 2,096 2,204 1,969 1,930 2,037 1,909 1,997 2,172 2,163
Israel 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 8
Kuwait 1,306 1,315 1,143 1,224 1,240 1,252 1,271 1,373 1,419
Lebanon 50 54 54 17 18 19 21 21 22
Saudi Arabia 363 371 475 384 419 275 306 359 347
United Arab Emirates 186 220 234 (D) (D) 302 332 350 (D)
Other 189 243 62 (D) (D) 60 64 65 (D)
Japan 3,907 4,598 57,983 8,464 11,702 17,054 23,060 27,688 30,240
Australia, New Zealand, S. Africa 242 448 681 2,534 1,999 1,262 1,395 1,387 1,341
Other Africa, Asia, Pacific
Africa, except South Africa 6 20 26 184 167 231 236 273 141
China n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 93
Hong Kong 1,115 1,183 1,175 958 942 1,111 1,412 1,649 1,878
South Korea 64 83 230 494 694 1,005 1,020 1,073 1,106
Malaysia n.a. n.a. n.a. 26 60 29 30 48 90
Philippines 165 181 182 156 160 192 190 207 155
Singapore n.a. n.a. n.a. 197 214 222 229 282 384
Taiwan n.a. n.a. n.a. 39 46 208 466 487 554
United States 42 35 121 147 255 314 161 136 181
D: Suppressed to avoid disclosure o f  data o f  individual companies. n.a.: not available
* Less than $500,000
Source: Bureau o f  Economic Analysis, U.S. Department o f  Commerce. Office o f  Foreign Investment, California 
Trade and Commerce Agency. “Foreign Direct Investment In California”. February 1997.
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Chart 17: Affiliate Employment in California, by Country, 1984-92
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Country 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
All countries 274,424 298,796 289,171 334,900 407,100 514,900 555,900 561,100 521,800
Canada 27,102 30,115 34,846 34,000 60,200 63,800 63,600 63,200 35,900
Europe 155,787 170,152 153,798 174,200 211,000 264,600 290,200 280,200 268,300
Austria 352 357 369 300 2,200 2,200 1,300 1,200 700
Belgium 500 439 1,914 3,500 2,400 1,100 400 1,100 (D)
Denmark 424 457 1,187 1,800 4,100 6,500 (D) 4,500 4,100
Finland 419 433 606 499 600 700 1,600 1,300 1,500
France 17,968 13,452 14,956 17,300 20,100 2,300 28,700 29,000 31,200
Germany 43,514 52,616 24,122 26,900 72,700 30,000 46,100 47,000 48,100
Greece 14 37 20 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ireland 740 767 198 2,500 2,400 2,400 3,800 3,600 3,900
Italy 376 403 (D) 1,100 (D) (D) 7,100 4,100 3,200
Liechtenstein 212 230 268 300 600 900 300 300 300
Luxembourg 284 689 722 3,800 4,400 4,400 4,400 4,400 5,400
Netherlands 22,304 20,513 24,873 26,100 27,300 29,800 30,500 25,700 27,300
Norway (D) (D) 284 200 200 400 300 200 200
Spain (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) (D)
Sweden 3,879 3,735 4,777 (D) 7,800 8,400 14,400 15,200 12,900
Switzerland 15,946 21,874 22,708 22,200 16,700 31,100 26,400 27,200 28,900
UK 47,329 52,391 53,493 62,200 87,700 116,600 112,500 112,900 97,500
Other 55 57 59 (*) (*) (D) (*) (D) 100
Latin America/West Hemisph. 15,249 11,398 12,393 1,300 13,700 32,700 17,700 17,500 18,100
South and Central America 5,309 5,156 6,313 6,600 6,900 26,500 10,600 11,500 12,900
Argentina 4 4 5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Brazil 0 0 (D) 300 300 200 (D) (D) (D)
Mexico (D) (D) 518 1,100 700 (D) 3,700 4,700 5,900
Panama 4,318 4,089 4,377 (D) 4,700 (D) 4,700 (D) (D)
Venezuela 2 2 5 300 300 300 300 200 300
Other (D) (D) (D) n.a. n.a. 700 (D) 800 800
Other Western Hemisphere 9,940 6,242 6,080 6,300 6,800 6,300 7,100 6,100 5,200
Bahamas (D) (D) (D) 200 200 200 100 100 100
Bermuda 232 427 772 3,500 4,300 3,400 4,200 3,300 3,700
Netherlands Antilles (D) (D) (D) 2,500 2,300 2,100 2,000 1,900 1,000
U.K. Islands, Caribbean 393 473 483 (*) 100 600 900 800 300
Other (D) (D) (D) (*) (*) 0 0 0 (*)
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Chart 17 (continued):
Country 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Middle East 6,765 6,091 4,337 1,900 2,700 2,600 1,100 1,100 1,500
Israel 159 218 144 200 200 200 200 200 300
Kuwait (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) 700 500 700
Lebanon (D) (D) 300 (*) 0 0 (*) 0 (*)
Saudi Arabia 1,651 971 (D) 400 400 2,200 100 200 300
United Arab Emirates 2 2 2 0 (*) (*) (*> 100 (*)
Other 35 130 141 (D) (D) (D) (*) (*) 100
Japan 54,264 61,216 60,977 71,300 86,600 109,400 134,300 52,400 147,900
Australia, New Zealand, S. Africa 7,797 11,734 13,381 26,800 18,900 24,300 26,100 21,700 19,800
Other Africa, Asia, Pacific
Africa, except South Africa 46 56 53 (*) 100 300 300 100 (*)
China n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 400
Hong Kong 4,015 4,657 4,670 6,200 5,400 4,900 7,700 9,500 10,200
South Korea 707 832 2,482 2,900 3,200 3,000 3,300 3,400 3,800
Malaysia n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 100 100 100 200 200
Philippines 165 176 186 600 700 (D) (D) 1,900 (D)
Singapore n.a. n.a. n.a. 200 600 700 1,100 1,100 1,400
Taiwan n.a. n.a. n.a. 600 700 1,000 3,900 3,600 3,200
United States 2,177 2,018 1,684 2,500 2,600 4,000 3,700 3,300 7,000
D: Suppressed to avoid disclosure o f  data o f  individual companies. n.a.: not available
* Fewer than 50  employees
Source: Bureau o f  Economic Analysis, U.S. Department o f  Commerce. Office o f  Foreign Investment, California 
Trade and Commerce Agency. "Foreign Direct Investment In C alifom ia,’. February 1997.
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Appendix 15: Application of Unitary Methods in Other Countries
Section 1.
Chapter IE, Part 4a of the Italian Transfer Pricing Provisions gives the possibility 
of allocating the overall profits from sales between several associated companies. These 
profits “are allocated pro rata according to the costs borne by each of the companies 
involved”.1 The Italian law states that since such a profit split does not take into account 
either market conditions or the economic holdings of an enterprise, it would only be 
acceptable under international agreement with a treaty partner.
Para. 13 of the German International Tax Law allows for estimates of income 
attributable to a domestic entity. “This provision permits the income allocation to be 
based on a ‘normal return on the capital invested in the company’ or on the profit on 
turnover, which can be expected and is customary under the circumstances present. The 
possibility of profit splits is not specifically addressed in this provision”.2 Paras. 2.4.5 and 
2.5.6 of the German Administrative Transfer Pricing Regulations allows the comparisons 
of profit levels on transactions within the enterprise to profit levels on external 
transactions in order to verify transfer prices.
Section 2.
Australian subfederal states are not allowed to collect corporate taxes; in 
Germany, Canada, and Japan, the federal government collects corporate revenue and 
distributes it to the subfederal levels by a formula; in the U.S., states determine a firm’s 
taxable income themselves using a formulary apportionment method.3
The German Trade Tax is also based on a unitary approach, but “the German 
Trade Tax Law provides for the exclusion from the taxable base of major foreign-source 
items, such as income attributable to a foreign private enterprise, or dividends received 
from foreign corporations engaged in active trade or business, provided the domestic 
enterprise holds a minimum of the shares of the foreign entity.. .As the trade tax is based
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on federal law, the apportionment formula is uniform for the whole country. As opposed 
to the rather mixed tax environment in the United States, created by the individual state 
income tax laws which differ in spite of the model recommended in the Uniform Division 
of the Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), the aggregate of apportioned tax base 
cannot exceed 100% of the apportionable tax base for one enterprise, or one group of 
enterprises joined by fiscal unity, under the Trade Tax Law. The municipalities then apply 
their individual percentage rate (Hebesatz) to the apportioned tax base. The municipality 
is free to legislate on this rate within certain limits set by state law, and the constraints of 
finding an adequate balance between revenue needs and attracting business”.4
1 Friedhelm, 1984, p. 107.
2 Ibid., p. 106.
3 Hufbauer, 1992.
4 Friedhelm, 1984, p. 103.
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Appendix 16: Interviews
1: Charles S. Nelson
Investment Director
California Trade & Commerce Agency
State of California
27 Dover Street
London W1X 3PA
England
(0171)629-8211
April 28, 1997
2: Timothy J. McCormally 
General Counsel and Director of Tax Affairs 
Tax Executives Institute 
1001 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Suite 320
Washington, DC 20004-2505 
Interview by letter 
May 14, 1997
3: J.D. Foster
Executive Director and Chief Economist
The Tax Foundation
1250 H St., NW Suite 750
Washington, DC 20005-3908
202-783-2760
June 4, 1997
4: Willard M. Berry 
President
European-American Business Council 
1333 H St., NW Suite 630 
Washington, DC 20005 
202-347-9292 
June 4, 1997
5: Christopher J. Mustain 
Manager of Government Relations 
European-American Business Council 
1333 H St., NW Suite 630 
Washington, DC £0005 
202-347-9292 
June 4,1997
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6: Professor Susan Tolchin
School of Business and Public Management
George Washington University
710 21st St., N.W.
Suite 206
Washington, DC 20052 
Phone interview
Co-author of Buying Into America, on foreign lobbying in the U.S., 
which contains a chapter on changes in California’s unitary laws. 
June 5,1997
7: Dick Geltman 
4125 Leland St.
Chevy Chase, MD 20815-5033 
301-656-2470
Worked on the unitary issue at National Governor’s 
Association from 1981-1988.
June 6,1997
8: Richard M. Hammer
International Tax Counsel
United States Council for International Business
1212 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-1689
212-354-4480
Chairman of USCIB Tax Group since 1988; previously, 
an international tax counsel with Price Waterhouse for 20 years. 
June 11, 1997
9: Joseph C. Feuer
Manager, European Affairs/Taxation
United States Council for International Business
1212 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-1689
212-354-4856
June 11, 1997
10: Tim Masanz
Director, Economic Development and Commerce Group 
National Governors’ Association 
Hall of States
444 North Capitol St. Suite 267 
Washington, DC 20001-1512 
202-624-5311
In charge of the lobbying for the National Conference of 
State Legislatures in 1984/1985; with NGA since 1989.
June 17, 1997
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11: James Carter
Organization for International Investment 
1901 Pennsylvania Ave., NW 
Suite 807
Washington, DC 20006-3405 
202-659-1903
Tax Counsel, ICI Americas; UNICE representative. 
June 17, 1997
12: Kimberly Pinter, Esq.
Director, Corporate Finance & Tax 
National Association of Manufacturers 
1331 Pennsylvania Ave., NW 
Suite 1500-North Tower 
Washington, DC 20004-1790 
202-637-3075 
June 18, 1997
13: Monica Maguire 
Senior Policy Director, Taxation 
National Association of Manufacturers 
1331 Pennsylvania Ave., NW 
Suite 1500-North Tower 
Washington, DC 20004-1790 
202-637-3076 
June 18, 1997
14: Harley T. Duncan
Executive Director
Federation of Tax Administrators
Hall of States
444 North Capitol St., NW
Suite 348
Washington, DC 20001 
202-624-5891
With FTA since 1988; previously, a state tax 
administrator in Kansas from 1983-1988.
June 19, 1997
15: Jim Rosapepe 
Rosapepe & Powers 
1828 L St., NW 
Suite 1010
Washington, DC 20036 
202-296-8060
Lobbyist for Multistate Tax Commission.
June 19,1997
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16: Matthew C. Porterfield 
Attorney Fellow
Georgetown University Law Center 
Harrison Institute for Public Law 
111 F Street, NW Room 102 
Washington, DC 20001-2095 
202-662-9608
Specialist in U.S. state/international legal conflicts.
June 19, 1997
17: Robert K. Stumberg 
Professor of Law
Georgetown University Law Center 
Harrison Institute for Public Law 
111 F Street, NW Room 102 
Washington, DC 20001-2095 
202-662-9608
Specialist in U.S. state/international legal conflicts.
June 19, 1997
18: Mr. Dan R. Bucks 
Executive Director 
Multistate Tax Commission 
444 North Capitol St.
Suite 425
Washington, DC 20001-1512
Started working for MTC in March 1988; previously,
Deputy Director of Taxes for the state of Montana.
June 20, 1997
19: Mr. John P.Z. Kent 
Vice President, Taxes 
GTE Corporation 
1 Stamford Forum 
Ninth Floor 
Stamford, CT 06904 
Phone interview
Chairman, Taxation Committee, The Business Roundtable. 
June 20, 1997
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20: Mr. Paul Aurbuck 
Attorney
Western Governors’ Association
600 17th Street
Suite 1705 South Tower
Denver, Colorado 80202-5452
303-623-9378
Phone interview
June 20, 1997
21: Kendall Houghton 
General Counsel 
Committee on State Taxation 
122 C St., NW
Washington, DC 20001 -2109 
kendallh @ ix .netcom.com 
Email interview 
July 8, 1997
22: Mr. Sheridan M. Cranmer 
Senior Manager 
State and Local Tax 
KPMG Peat Marwick 
725 South Figueroa St.
Los Angeles, CA 90017
213-995-8366
Worked as a state and local and federal tax attorney in 
the audit area at Litton Industries from 1988-1997; former 
Executive Secretary, California Unitary Tax Council (CUTC). 
February 5, 1998
23: Steve Larson 
Staff Director
Senate Budget and Fiscal Review Committee 
State Capitol 
Room 5013
Sacramento, CA 95814 
916-445-5202
Previously, Staff Director for California Senator Alfred Alquist. 
January 28, 1998
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24: Martin Helmke 
Tax Consultant
Assembly Committee on Revenue and Taxation 
State Capitol 
Room 3060
Sacramento, CA 95814 
916-445-3808
Previously with Senate Committee on Revenue and Taxation. 
January 28, 1998
25: Mr. Richard E. Ratcliff 
Applied Strategies 
1100 N Street, Suite 5B 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
916-441-3934
Lobbyist for the Organization for the Fair 
Treatment of International Investment (OPTll).
January 29, 1998
26: Lenny M. Goldberg 
Lenny Goldberg & Associates 
926 J Street, Suite 710 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
916-446-4300
Lobbyist in favour of the WWC tax method.
January 29, 1998
27: Kathleen Krause 
Principal Consultant
Assembly Committee on International Trade and Development
State Capitol
P.O. Box 942849
Sacramento, CA 94249-0001
916-323-8241
January 29, 1998
28: Dan Walters 
The Sacramento Bee 
2100 Q Street 
Sacramento, CA 95816 
916-321-1000
Columnist who followed the California unitary tax debate. 
January 30, 1998
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29: Erick Miethke
Nielsen, Merksamer, Parrinello, Mueller & Naylor 
770 L Street, Suite 800 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
916-446-6752
Attorney for California Unitary Tax Council (CUTC). 
January 30, 1998
30: Ralph F. Simoni 
California Advocates, Inc.
925 L Street, Suite 350 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
916-441-5050
Lobbyist for Coca-Cola during the unitary tax debate. 
February 9, 1998
31: Fred L. Main
Vice President and General Counsel 
California Chamber of Commerce 
1201 K St., Suite 1200 
P.O. Box 1736
Sacramento, CA 95812-1736
916-444-6670
February 9, 1998
32: David Doerr 
Chief Tax Consultant 
California Taxpayer’s Association 
921 Eleventh Street, Suite 800 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
916-441-0490
Before 1987, Chief Consultant to 
Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee. 
February 10, 1998
33: Sandy George 
George R. Steffes, Inc.
1201 K Street 
Suite 850
Sacramento, CA 95814 
916-444-6034
Lobbyist for both corporate and domestic 
multinational companies against unitary tax.
February 10, 1998
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34: Judi L. Smith 
Chief Consultant
Assembly Committee on Revenue and Taxation 
California State Capitol 
Room 6017
Sacramento, CA 95814 
916-322-3730
Deputy to Tim Gage, assistant to Assemblyman John Vasconcellos. 
February 11, 1998
35: Dennis Revell 
President/CEO 
Revell Communications 
1121 L St. Suite 806 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
916-443-3816
Represented Japanese firms in 1983;
lobbyist for California Business Council from 1984.
February 11,1998
36: Barbara O. Cavalier
Regional Director, State Government Affairs
Abbott Laboratories
1121 L Street, Suite 800
Sacramento, CA 95814
916-443-7464
Lobbyist for California Manufacturers’ Association.
February 11,1998
37: Barry Weissman 
Tax Counsel 
ARCO
213-486-1440 
Phone interview
Member of California Unitary Tax Council (CUTC).
February 16, 1998
38: Kathryn Sommers 
Director
Multistate Audit Bureau 
Franchise Tax Board 
9645 Butterfield Way 
P.O. Box 1779
Rancho Cordova, CA 95741-1779
916-845-4169
February 23, 1998
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39: Benjamin F. Miller 
Counsel, Multistate Tax Affairs 
Franchise Tax Board 
Legal Branch, MS-B17 
9645 Butterfield Way 
P.O. Box 1720
Rancho Cordova, CA 95741-1720
916-845-3320
February 10, 1998
40: Brian Bugsch 
Policy Analyst
California Trade and Commerce Agency
International Trade and Investment
State of California
801 K Street, Suite 1926
Sacramento, CA 95814-3520
916-445-0171
February 11, 1998
41: Matthew Flynn 
Director
Office of Foreign Investment 
California Trade and Commerce Agency 
801 K Street, Suite 1936 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
916-323-8021 
February 11, 1998
42: James D. Joyce
State and Local Tax Services
Arthur Andersen
Suite 1500
RiverPark Tower
333 West San Carlos Street
San Jose, CA 95110-2710
Director of state & local taxes for Castle & Cook;
chairman of the state legislation committee of COST for 10 years,
member of the tax steering committee for the California
Chamber of Commerce, member of the California Business Council.
408-977-3241
February 25, 1998
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43: Terry Ryan 
Apple Computer 
Coopertino 
408-996-1010 
February 25,1998
44: Ray Rossi 
Director
External Tax Affairs 
Intel Corporation 
SC4-206
2200 Mission College Blvd.
Santa Clara, CA 95052-8119
408-765-1193
February 25, 1998
45: Jerry Zanelli 
Governmental Advocates, Inc.
1127 11th St. Room 400 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
916-448-8240
Lead lobbyist for Japanese companies. 
February 26, 1998
46: David Nagler
Director of Govt. Affairs for Genentech 
980 Ninth St.
Suite 1500 
Sacramento, CA 
916-443-573
Lobbyist for California Business Council. 
February 26, 1998
47: Lester D. Ezrati 
General Tax Counsel 
Corporate Tax Department 
Hewlett-Packard Company 
3000 Hanover Street, MS 20BF 
Pal Alto, CA 94304 
650-857-3962 
lester-ezrati @ hp .com 
Email interview 
June 1, 1998
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48: Nancy Ordway
Deputy Director, Department of Finance 
State of California 
Sacramento, California 
1983-1987
Federal Budget and Tax Liaison,
Office of the California Governor 
Washington, DC.
1987-1991
7041,220@ compuserve.com 
Email interview 
July 30, 1998
49: Denny Valentine
Westinghouse lobbyist and California
Business Council representative, 1985-1987.
Dvalen@aol.com
Email interview
May 11, 1998
50: Ian R. Spence 
Director
International Department 
UK Inland Revenue 
Strand Bridge House 
The Strand 
London WC2A 1LLB 
(0171) 438-6622 
May 1,1998
51: K. Koojman 
Head of Group Taxation 
Shell Center 
York Road 
London SE1 7NA 
(0171) 934-1234 
May 18, 1998
52: Timothy J. McCormally
General Counsel and Director of Tax Affairs
Tax Executives Institute
1200 G Street, NW Suite 300
Washington, DC 20005-3802
(202) 638-5601
Interview by letter
May 14, 1997
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